
Nova Scotia Energy Board

IN THE MATTER OF *The Public Utilities Act*, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380, as amended

M12694

NS Power Report on the January 23-26, Cold Weather Event

March 6, 2026

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the Nova Scotia Energy Board's letter dated February 4, 2026, the following is a report on Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's (NS Power, Company) response to the cold weather event experienced in Nova Scotia from Friday January 23 to Monday January 26, 2026.

While the outage threshold was not reached during the event, the Board is requesting that NS Power include the following information in the report:

- Number of outages during the event;
- Hourly and daily system information that normally would have been posted on the OASIS site to reflect net load and other system information;
- Duration of the customer advisory to conserve energy;
- Details of the actions taken in relation to interruptible load and the response of the interruptible customers;
- Reserve assistance from neighbouring utilities, including the performance of the Maritime Link;
- NS Power system operator's assistance to Newfoundland and Labrador during its emergency event;
- Description of the system's stability during the cold weather event;
- Performance of the utility's generation assets during the event, including the performance of wind and battery storage;
- Status (and explanation) of the utility's generation assets during the event;
- Advise what, if any, actions taken, or lessons learned, after the February 3-5, 2023, cold weather event, impacted NS Power's response to, or the grid's ability to withstand, the January 23-26, 2026, cold weather event.

Details on the Board's questions including planning activities undertaken by the Company, performance of the generation fleet, and load-related impacts on the electrical system are discussed in the following sections.

2.0 PREPARATION FOR JANUARY 23-26 COLD WEATHER EVENT

NS Power conducted preparations across all operations teams in advance of the onset of the extreme cold weather front by undertaking various activities, as outlined in the following Sections.

2.1.1 Weather Forecast

The first weather briefing for emergency management officials for this extreme cold event was issued by Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) on January 20, 2026. Weather forecasts received by NS Power from ECCC, as well as third-party forecast providers, prior to the event indicated the likelihood of an extended period of extreme cold across Nova Scotia. Forecasted temperatures were expected between -15°C and -25°C for several days, with wind chill values as low as -30°C.

The forecast conditions did not indicate significant potential for unplanned outages due to high winds or precipitation, and ultimately system risks were considered limited to the potential impacts from extreme cold temperatures.

NS Power continued to regularly review available forecasts in advance of the arrival of the cold weather as part of the Company's pre-event preparations. Subsequent forecasts were largely consistent in terms of the timing, cold temperatures, and duration of the event.

2.1.2 Operations Coordination Team

Following receipt of the weather alert from ECCC, NS Power's Event Monitoring Team launched a coordinated planning effort, forming the Operations Coordination Team with representatives from the following work groups:

- Control Centre Operations
- Power Production
- Energy Delivery Services
- Distribution System Planning
- Regional Operations
- Enterprise Asset Management

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- Customer Care
- Energy Marketing & Planning
- Corporate Communications
- Customer Care

The Operations Coordination Team met regularly starting on January 20, 2026 to prepare for the cold weather event.

The Operations Coordination Team monitored the following items when planning for the cold weather event:

1. Weather forecast updates
2. Load and wind generation forecasts
3. Power production resource availability
4. Readiness of Transmission, Substation and Distribution resources
5. Staffing of engineering and field resources
6. Review of action items and lessons learned from the February 4, 2023 extreme cold weather event

2.1.3 Operational Readiness

Building on the lessons learned from the February 4, 2023 extreme cold weather event, a set of preventative measures was implemented in both Power Production and Energy Delivery. These measures included targeted upgrades, enhanced inspection routines, and system adjustments designed to strengthen infrastructure reliability and ensure the grid can support increased demand during periods of extreme cold.

In the week leading up to the cold weather event, operational work groups completed proactive field work and analysis to ensure system readiness. As a result, the system was well equipped to manage higher loads under challenging conditions

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1 **Distribution**

2 The team reviewed the work completed in response to the February 4, 2023 extreme cold weather
3 event and confirmed completion. Additionally, the Distribution Planning team used 2025 peak
4 load data as well as data from the February 4, 2023 event to identify heavily loaded feeders which
5 are subject to protective devices that could be at risk of tripping during extreme cold/load
6 conditions. The Energy Delivery Services Regional Engineering team then validated or updated
7 protective device settings, where appropriate.

8 Select areas were identified across the Province where restoration is known to be subject to cold
9 load pickup (very high loading following an outage) and plans were prepared by the Energy
10 Delivery Services Regional Engineering team to streamline the restoration process, where
11 possible.

12 **Substation Asset Management**

13 The team reviewed peak historical System Loading data to identify substation transformers across
14 the system that were at risk of overloading during the event. These transformers were flagged for
15 monitoring, or manual inspection if required, during the event. A review of transformer main and
16 sub-component capacity ratings was also conducted to verify acceptable emergency overload
17 limits.

18 In addition, thermal scans were completed on any bulk power substations or assets that were
19 anticipated to be at risk for overload. Following relevant maintenance practices, anything flagged
20 as an issue was addressed, and breaker gas and transformer oil conservators were topped up prior
21 to the extreme loading event.

22 **Transmission Line**

23 All transmission elements that were out of service due to planned maintenance were returned to
24 service in advance of the event.

1 **Control Centre Operations**

2 Before the cold weather event, NS Power met with neighbouring utilities to discuss readiness and
3 align resource availability across the Atlantic area. All Atlantic provinces were forecast to
4 experience the cold weather event. At the time of the coordination calls, Newfoundland and
5 Labrador was experiencing a frazil ice issue that was limiting its Bay D’Espoir hydro generator
6 and therefore their ability to provide support to other Atlantic provinces. See: [Frazil Ice and our](#)
7 [Power System: The trouble with frazil – Newfoundland & Labrador Hydro](#). It was noted that this
8 issue could potentially limit the amount of energy imported from Newfoundland & Labrador on the
9 Maritime Link during the cold weather event and the team prepared for this scenario.

10 The team evaluated staffing level for the cold load event and requested additional engineering
11 resources to be on site at the Control Centre during the event to provide analysis and contingency
12 support.

13 **Power Production**

14 NS Power maintains and implements its Cold Weather Preparedness plan as outlined in the NERC
15 Standard, EOP-012-2 “Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations”. Planning and
16 preparations for the severe weather and load events were carried out in the week prior to the event
17 with the focus on hardening the generation fleet for the upcoming cold snap, topping up site fuel
18 inventories, optimizing generation output where possible, and staffing various sites for improved
19 response times.

20 Execution of the Extreme Cold Weather Plan includes enhanced protection measures for all
21 identified vulnerable locations, such as verifying heat tracing systems, deploying supplemental
22 heating, and preparing contingency torches. In addition, the fuel handling systems were prepared
23 to maintain reliable operation through specialized coal pile management practices, continuous
24 operation of conveyors and oil circulation, and the use of contingency air lances to clear plugs and
25 blockages.

2.1.4 Customer Outreach

Before and during the event, NS Power employed a communication strategy which included a phased roll out to customers, several customer-facing initiatives and outreach to stakeholders.

Social media posts were issued indicating:

We have been monitoring weather forecasts and preparing for the extremely cold temperatures expected across the province this weekend, as we do with all extreme weather that comes our way. We are working to ensure our system is ready to handle the increased demand for energy – and our teams are ready to respond so customers continue to receive safe, reliable service. We encourage customers to be prepared too by visiting: nspower.ca/extremecold

As noted in the messaging, a web page was launched that displays the Grid Status Index, which indicates how close the NS Power system is to capacity in a severe cold weather event. Status levels change when the amount of electricity being used (or forecast to be used) by customers could be higher than the amount of generation that is currently available on the system. Status Levels are Normal, Watch, Warning and Load Shedding. The website was modelled after similar sites deployed by other utilities. As the Status Levels changed over the course of the event, the webpage was updated and additional messaging was shared on social media, with media outlets, with all employees and with stakeholders.

Additionally, Large Industrial Interruptible Rider (LIIR) customers were contacted by the Key Accounts team on January 23, 2026 and provided with the following information:

- Our teams are preparing for an extremely cold weekend across the province.
- Nova Scotia Power is treating this similar to other extreme weather events, with representatives from across the organization preparing the Power System for the upcoming weather.
- From Saturday evening through to Monday, temperatures could get as low as -21 degrees. This type of cold means significantly more demand for energy on the system from all customers.


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- That's why our teams in power plants and in the field across the province have been planning ahead so they're prepared and ready to respond to this high demand for energy. We want to ensure the safety of our customers and the electricity grid.
- We will maximize our generation capacity, including our two new grid-scale battery sites, and electricity imports from our neighbouring utilities.
- The system will be tight all weekend.
- We do know that the potential to interrupt our customers is high for both LIIR non-telemetry and LIIR telemetry, with the largest risk occurring Sunday evening after 5PM.
- As always, this is subject to change, and we will communicate via our normal channels. We wanted to share this information ahead of time to help with your weekend planning.

3.0 JANUARY 24-25, 2026 EXTREME COLD EVENT

NS Power served a new all-time hourly integrated average system peak load of 2459 MW at 18:00 on January 25, 2026 (2481 MW instantaneous peak), exceeding the previous hourly integrated average system peak load of 2455 MW set at 12:00 on February 4, 2023. The NS Power grid and assets performed well during this peak.

Figure 1 - Forecast and Actual Load January 24-25



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The following sections provide specific responses to the information requested by the Board in their letter dated February 4, 2026.

3.1 Number of outages during the event

Over the four-day period from January 23, 2026 to January 26, 2026 there were a total of 172 unplanned outage events. The table below shows the number of outages per day by operational region.

Figure 2 - Unplanned Outages from January 23-26, 2026

Date	Western Region	Metro Region	Northeast Region	Cape Breton Region	Total
January 23	12	8	1	5	26
January 24	14	18	13	4	49
January 25	19	24	16	8	67
January 26	9	9	8	4	30
Total	54	59	38	21	172

The outages occurring on January 23 and 26 were unrelated to the effects of the cold weather, and only a small portion of the outages on January 24 and 25 were directly related to the cold weather event (see Figure 2). In comparison to the February 3 and 4, 2023 cold weather event, fewer customers were impacted by outages caused by loading and/or system protection settings in January 2026. In terms of both manual operations for load management and automatic protection operations (discussed in Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2), the impacts on customers resulting from the 2026 cold weather event were significantly reduced as shown in the Figure below.

Figure 3 - Comparison of Cold Weather-Related Events

Event	Event Count	Customer Interruptions	Customer Hours of Interruption
February 2023	213	92,393	230,913
January 2026	9*	7,275	6,952

* Off-on-off outages discussed in Section 3.7.2 registered as momentary outages and are therefore not included in the sustained outage event count.

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3.2 Hourly and daily system information posted on OASIS

Below are the hourly average MW flows for January 24 and 25, 2026 for System Conditions normally posted on the OASIS Daily Report.

Figure 4 -Hourly Megawatt Flows January 24 and 25

24 January 2026 Hour-Ending:	1:00	2:00	3:00	4:00	5:00	6:00	7:00	8:00	9:00	10:00	11:00	12:00
Net Load	1768	1834	1848	1844	1869	1935	1988	2066	2155	2197	2198	2165
Highlands Export	-3	-3	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-4	-5	-5	38	-3
East End Export at Sydney	263	266	270	260	297	324	340	361	376	376	423	359
East End Export at East Bay	435	416	459	468	466	472	486	493	516	521	604	526
Cape Breton Export	501	455	465	467	462	477	548	574	593	592	700	626
Onslow Import	662	639	655	655	636	649	725	756	782	787	889	813
NS Export	-167	-190	-168	-146	-176	-200	-196	-171	-150	-147	-5	-117
Onslow South	735	751	746	727	722	754	819	819	816	825	787	825
Flow Into Metro	510	525	524	522	511	533	579	564	547	551	517	559
Western Import	134	135	130	115	121	126	138	150	160	165	163	158
Valley Import	148	146	148	158	155	161	175	194	205	208	202	200
Maritime Link Import	36	13	35	53	23	13	11	-3	8	10	26	4
Wind Generation	395	433	448	463	456	472	457	457	457	467	480	472
24 January 2026 Hour-Ending:	13:00	14:00	15:00	16:00	17:00	18:00	19:00	20:00	21:00	22:00	23:00	24:00
Net Load	2126	2087	2073	2099	2213	2350	2362	2329	2297	2247	2181	2135
Highlands Export	-5	-5	-5	-6	26	70	44	27	69	77	73	1
East End Export at Sydney	373	381	382	373	403	433	429	398	435	451	450	386
East End Export at East Bay	388	389	388	428	561	592	529	500	508	472	471	474
Cape Breton Export	479	468	465	505	647	694	630	601	612	578	580	584
Onslow Import	670	655	642	670	794	825	779	764	788	755	764	766
NS Export	-211	-214	-213	-198	-155	-108	-151	-141	-143	-156	-155	-162
Onslow South	775	757	751	765	835	807	805	781	808	792	798	809
Flow Into Metro	521	513	508	515	562	542	539	523	533	513	529	544
Western Import	151	145	144	149	163	150	151	146	164	171	161	157
Valley Import	196	190	185	184	197	213	209	202	207	201	193	202
Maritime Link Import	-145	-153	-151	-103	-1	-2	-61	-59	-85	-139	-137	-69
Wind Generation	467	457	455	446	427	429	452	468	464	461	447	427

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Figure 5 - Hourly Megawatt Flows January 25 and 26

25 January 2026 Hour-Ending:	1:00	2:00	3:00	4:00	5:00	6:00	7:00	8:00	9:00	10:00	11:00	12:00
Net Load	2172	2140	2099	2066	2076	2114	2164	2241	2311	2336	2320	2294
Highlands Export	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	19	72	67	33	32	70
East End Export at Sydney	377	371	370	349	351	367	406	465	469	434	425	461
East End Export at East Bay	514	508	515	497	485	522	577	672	692	691	674	686
Cape Breton Export	624	620	619	587	578	619	673	772	790	787	792	803
Onslow Import	801	795	788	761	763	799	815	880	912	925	921	916
NS Export	-174	-172	-176	-175	-174	-172	-150	-132	-117	-119	-135	-178
Onslow South	864	852	847	819	818	848	840	887	898	919	924	949
Flow Into Metro	571	578	561	553	560	582	565	587	583	592	597	626
Western Import	183	164	174	156	150	153	160	175	191	205	207	204
Valley Import	197	193	201	202	199	209	222	233	246	247	242	235
Maritime Link Import	-17	-14	-17	-17	-16	-4	16	50	65	103	86	56
Wind Generation	421	408	396	389	403	384	355	355	346	357	338	297

25 January 2026 Hour-Ending:	13:00	14:00	15:00	16:00	17:00	18:00	19:00	20:00	21:00	22:00	23:00	24:00
Net Load	2263	2226	2241	2300	2387	2459	2431	2384	2324	2237	2129	2064
Highlands Export	72	53	71	91	92	86	55	64	42	44	79	59
East End Export at Sydney	472	452	468	484	471	463	443	446	417	430	457	436
East End Export at East Bay	687	667	699	727	774	873	865	867	836	815	782	802
Cape Breton Export	792	773	808	838	902	999	980	966	937	917	881	905
Onslow Import	901	890	943	967	1018	1092	1061	1048	1039	1017	968	982
NS Export	-186	-189	-173	-166	-120	-90	-100	-86	-89	-60	-65	-65
Onslow South	935	928	963	963	950	984	969	945	951	901	853	872
Flow Into Metro	618	613	638	645	620	655	657	646	649	619	597	589
Western Import	201	200	204	192	200	191	176	167	170	158	138	166
Valley Import	233	240	258	258	271	276	276	270	264	251	229	232
Maritime Link Import	46	47	63	74	136	241	252	251	251	215	159	200
Wind Generation	271	244	202	159	120	92	84	71	74	69	58	54

Figure 6 - Five-Day Historic Peak Demand and Load Forecast

Five-Day Historic Peak Demand		Five-Day Load Forecast	
24-Jan-26 19:00	2362	26-Jan-26 18:00	2321
23-Jan-26 18:00	1895	27-Jan-26 18:00	2206
22-Jan-26 18:00	1832	28-Jan-26 19:00	2177
21-Jan-26 09:00	2091	29-Jan-26 08:00	2181
20-Jan-26 19:00	1975	30-Jan-26 19:00	2166

3.3 Duration of the customer advisory to conserve energy

As discussed in Section 2.1.4, advance notice was provided to customers on Friday, January 23rd through the company website, with media outlets and on social media channels (Facebook and Instagram) that NS Power was preparing for extreme cold temperatures, and preparation tips were provided for customers for how they could also be prepared. These messages were also shared with elected officials on January 23rd and throughout the weekend. Similar messaging was shared by neighboring utilities to their customers before and during the event.

The request for energy conservation was posted on Saturday, January 24 at 09:40 to Facebook and at 09:43 to Instagram. NS Power's grid status webpage ([Outages - Prepare and Stay Safe| Nova Scotia Power](#)) was also updated at approximately 09:30 to Warning status. A media advisory with the request for customers to conserve energy was sent at approximately 13:00 on Saturday, January 24. The notice that grid status had returned to Normal was shared on Monday, January 26 at 08:20 on the NS Power webpage and then posted at 10:24 on Facebook and Instagram.

While impossible to say how much energy customers may have otherwise consumed, we know that many different factors contributed to NS Power being able to serve the record peak on January 25. It is likely that customer reduced energy consumption was one of those factors..


3.4 Details of the Actions Taken in Relation to Interruptible Load

3.4.1 Interruptible Customers

Load management procedures were implemented on January 25, 2026 utilizing interruptible customer capacity. NS Power maintains operating reserves of generation as a North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)-regulated component of power system security. To ensure operating reserves were maintained, the LIIR customers without data telemetry and control were interrupted, providing an estimated 20 MW of load relief. The LIIR customers with data telemetry and operator control were not interrupted during the event, but provided an additional 50 MW of interruptible load that was carried as 10-Minute Reserve which would have been activated for any loss of a unit or transmission limit violation, and before any firm load shedding.

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Figure 7 - Interruptible Customers and System Load



The timeline of notifications for the alert, advisory and interruption notices to LIIR customers is provided in the table below.

Figure 8 - Interruptible Industrial Customer Notifications

Interruptible Industrial Notifications	Call Time
Advisory LIIR	1/25/2026 16:15
Alert LIIR	1/25/2026 16:17
Advisory LIIR Telemetry and Control	1/25/2026 16:18
Interruption LIIR Non-Telemetry and Control	1/25/2026 16:47
Alert LIIR Telemetry and Control	1/25/2026 16:49
RESTORE LIIR Non-Telemetry and Control	1/25/2026 22:04
Alert Cancellation LIIR Telemetry and Control	1/25/2026 22:19
Alert Cancellation LIIR	1/25/2026 22:19
Advisory Cancellation LIIR Telemetry and Control	1/25/2026 22:21
Advisory Cancellation LIIR	1/25/2026 22:21

3.4.2 Manual Load Shedding

As per NERC requirements to operate within studied limits and prevent cascading outages, NS Power prepares and maintains a manual load shedding list of up to 50 percent of system load that can be shed within 10 minutes to address capacity constraints. While the weather did cause localized outages on January 25 (discussed in Section 3.7.1), NS Power's careful management of available capacity allowed the Company to avoid system-wide manual load shedding during this event.

3.5 Assistance from Neighbouring Utilities

When all available generation resources are in use and load management procedures are in effect, utilities may request emergency energy assistance from neighbouring areas through established interconnection operating agreements for mutual assistance when a supply emergency exists and market-based real-time transactions are not adequate or not available.

Between January 21 and 25, emergency energy assistance was utilized by both the Newfoundland System Operator (NLSO) and NS Power, to the benefit of each party. When NLSO lost a large hydroelectric facility due to a frazil ice event as noted in Section 2.1.3, NS Power was able to provide emergency energy assistance to NL on January 21, 24 and 25. Fortunately, the NLSO resolved its frazil ice issue in the early afternoon of January 25 and was then able to support NS Power over the evening peak with emergency energy assistance. The table below indicates operator-to-operator emergency energy assistance (MWh) delivered to NS Power from neighbouring utilities. Emergency energy assistance from NLSO began at 16:30 and continued until 22:00. At the Nova Scotia evening peak, with the transmission flow corridor from NB fully subscribed, emergency energy assistance on the NB Tie was only possible from Maritime Electric (MECL) in PEI. Emergency energy assistance from MECL via the New Brunswick System Operator (NBSO) began at 17:00 and continued until 21:00.

Figure 9 - Emergency Energy Assistance from Neighbouring Utilities

Hour-Ending:	13:00	14:00	15:00	16:00	17:00	18:00	19:00	20:00	21:00	22:00	23:00	24:00
MECL via NBSO	0	0	0	0	0	28	30	30	30	0	0	0
NLSO	0	0	0	0	25	100	100	100	100	62	0	0

There were no issues reported for the Maritime Link and it performed as designed for flowing energy in both directions in support of both the NLSO and the NSPSO. The Maritime Link is also an excellent voltage control resource for maintaining healthy system voltages and dynamic reactive support. During the peak load period, Maritime Link injected more than 100 MVAR to the NS Power system.

3.6 NSPSO Assistance to Newfoundland and Labrador

As noted above, NS Power provided emergency energy assistance to NLSO on January 21, 24 and 25. NS Power provided 343 MWh emergency energy assistance to NLSO on January 21 and 113 MWh on January 24 in addition to the energy shown in the hourly table below for the morning of January 25. Other utilities continued to provide energy to NLSO via the NS Power transmission system until 17:00 on January 25 when the NB-NS transmission interface reached capacity.

Figure 10 - NSPSO Emergency Energy Assistance to NLSO on January 25, 2026

Hour-Ending:	01:00	02:00	03:00	04:00	05:00	06:00	07:00	08:00	09:00	10:00	11:00	12:00
NSP to NLSO	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	0	0	0	0	0

3.7 Description of System Stability During the Cold Weather Event

During this cold weather event, all System Operating Limits (SOLs) and Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs) were respected and the Nova Scotia power system remained stable at all times. Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) were armed as necessary to avoid any SOLs, IROLs or stability issues.

As the Metro area is the Nova Scotia load centre, the Onslow South corridor flow was anticipated to be congested as wind generation declined and loads increased, even with all dispatchable Metro, West and Valley (south of Onslow) generation online and at full output. Pre-event, NS Power's operational power system engineers, with support from the planning team at the Independent Energy System Operator – Nova Scotia (IESO-NS), re-studied stability limits with the addition of new transmission-connected Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and increased the Onslow South Corridor limit by 45 MW. Dynamic stability and transient studies were also conducted to verify this new limit, and the Reliability Coordinator (NBSO) was informed. Corridor flows were

1 near or over the previously established limit for seven (7) hours, so the increased capability
2 prevented the need for non-firm load shedding to alleviate corridor flow restrictions.

3 The primary backbone corridor limits (CBX, Onslow Import) remained within design and studied
4 limits.

5 **3.7.1 Transmission / Substation**

6 NS Power's careful management of the available capacity allowed the Company to avoid province-
7 wide manual load shedding during this event. However, localized rotating feeder outages were
8 initiated to prevent the overload of individual transmission and substation assets.

9 **70W High Street**

10 Rotating feeder outages were initiated at 70W High Street to avoid overload conditions reaching
11 the protection limit for transmission line L-5545:

- 12 • Feeder 70W-321 was manually tripped at 10:19 on January 25.
- 13 • Feeder 70W-314 was manually tripped at 10:34.
- 14 • Feeder 70W-321 was closed at 10:35.
- 15 • At 10:41, it was confirmed that the protection limit was increased on L-5545 and
16 rotating outages were cancelled.

17 **79V Three-Mile Plain**

18 Loading above design limit was observed on transformer 79V-T1 Rotating feeder outages were
19 initiated to protect the asset until the winding temperature could be verified in the field.

- 20 • Feeder 79V-403 was manually tripped at 16:47 January 25.
- 21 • Feeder 79V-401 was manually tripped at 17:05.
- 22 • Feeder 79V-403 was closed at 17:09.
- 23 • A technician arrived on site at the substation and confirmed that the winding
24 temperature was within acceptable limits and the rotating outages were cancelled.
- 25 • Feeder 79V-401 was restored at 17:19.

3.7.2 Distribution

The distribution system displayed significantly better performance during this event as compared to the February 4, 2023 event with respect to repeated outages on downline reclosers. This was achieved through the action items following the 2023 event and the proactive work since 2023 and ahead of this event. There was one reported case of repeated outages on downline recloser 512N-311, located in the community of Hedgeville, Pictou County. The recloser tripped and reclosed 18 times during the morning of January 25, affecting approximately 324 customers. The Engineering team analyzed the device performance, and a technician was deployed to apply changes to the device settings in the field, resolving the issue.

3.8 Performance of NS Power's Generation Assets During the Event

The company's generation assets performed well throughout this event, as detailed in the following sections.

3.8.1 Generation

The decision was made on January 20th to bring Lingan 2 online on January 24th to support the fleet and reduce the risk of firm customer load shedding throughout the event. The remainder of the fleet was available and generating throughout the event with the following exceptions:

- Leading up to and during the event, Wreck Cove 2 remained offline for a planned life extension project.
- Victoria Junction 2 remained offline for a planned generator and controls upgrade.
- On January 24th and 25th Tufts Cove 6 was derated for periods of time due to freezing instrumentation tubing for a transmitter. An exterior wall mounted heater was repositioned which resolved the issue.
- On January 25th Burnside 2 failed to start due to a fuel control light off setting that required adjustment. The unit was operational the following morning.

3.8.2 Wind

Wind generation resources performed well during the event. Hourly average wind generation and forecasts are shown in the following table.

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
Figure 11 - Hourly Average Wind Generation and Forecasts

January 25 Hour-ending:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
2 Day-Ahead Forecast	443	433	423	412	406	396	389	376	364	373	362	357
Day-Ahead Forecast	401	399	398	393	386	375	357	342	331	321	312	298
Actual Generation MW	421	408	396	389	403	384	355	355	346	357	338	297

January 25 Hour-ending:	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
2 Day-Ahead Forecast	346	333	323	309	281	248	219	194	173	155	131	109
Day-Ahead Forecast	287	270	241	206	174	140	113	91	74	66	66	67
Actual Generation MW	271	244	202	159	120	92	84	71	74	69	58	54

Wind generation tracked the forecast trend well. The January 24 day-ahead forecast predicted a steeper generation decline than the two-day-ahead planning forecast on January 23 as shown on the graph below, with the actual wind generation dropping by 367 MW between the first and last hour of the day due to declining wind speeds. On the system peak hour, wind was providing 92 MW (14 percent) of the 645 MW of installed wind capacity.

Figure 12 - Forecast and Actual Wind Generation MW January 25, 2026




For comparison, wind generation was at approximately 300 MW during the peak hour in the February 2023 cold weather event. This highlights the variability of wind generation and illustrates the need for supporting dispatchable generation to back-up wind when it is not available on the system, in particular to meet peak energy demands.

3.8.3 Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)

The NS Power BESS currently consists of two sites (99W Bridgewater, 132H Spider Lake) with a combined output capability of 100 MW for up to four (4) hours. With the reduction of forecast wind generation and in anticipation of the tight supply situation over the evening system peak, the batteries were maintained at a state of full charge until approximately 16:20 on January 25 when they began discharging energy back onto the grid. Battery output was adjusted in response to fluctuations in generation, the Onslow South Corridor flow and system voltage in the Metro and West regions, and to augment the Metro dynamic reactive reserves. Over the course of the evening peak, the BESS provided 230 MWh to the grid and substantial VAR support to maintain system voltages during the period of high system loading. The available state of charge of the batteries also contributed to operating reserves and assisted in reserve recovery.

Figure 13 - Grid Battery Usage



3.9 Lessons Learned from the February 3-5, 2023 Cold Weather Event

NS Power completed post-event analysis and reporting after the February 2023 Cold Weather event. As a result of this analysis, actions were identified for follow up and were completed. Consequently, the NS Power system was better positioned to withstand extreme cold temperatures. Specifically, during the 2023 event rotating feeder outages were performed to alleviate overload conditions at seven (7) substations and on-off-on outages were experienced by 25 downline reclosers. During the 2026 event, under similar or higher loading conditions, overloading occurred at only one (1) substation and on-off-on outages were experienced by only one (1) downline recloser.

The two issues that were identified in the 2023 event and also noted in the 2026 event were:

- L-5545 transmission line protection limit was reached, which resulted in rotating feeder outages at 70W High Street (discussed in Section 3.7.1)
- Downline recloser 512N-311 experienced multiple outages (discussed in Section 3.7.2)

In both instances protection settings were reviewed and adjusted after the 2023 event. During the 2026 event, engineering resources reviewed the protection settings for these assets and were able to revise them during the event to resolve the issue. The long-term resolution to the L-5545 overloading issue is a proposed new substation which will offload the transmission line

4.0 CONCLUSION

NS Power's Event Monitoring Team identified the potential impact of the forecasted extreme cold weather and engaged the Operation Coordination Team in advance of the event to ensure the power system was optimized to respond. System load reached a new record peak during the January 23-26 cold weather event. During the event, the power system was operated in a safe, stable manner with no system-wide firm load shedding due to system generation capacity shortages. Engineering teams worked with operations to implement learnings from the February 2023 cold load event to minimize customer impact due to localized extreme feeder loading. The Company's key preliminary findings are summarized as follows:

- NS Power served a new all-time system peak load of 2459 MW at 18:00 on January 25, 2026.

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- 1 • The performance of NS Power's generation fleet provided maximum output from
2 all available units.
- 3 • The addition of BESS was beneficial during the event, providing capacity and
4 reactive power peak support over peak load periods.
- 5 • There were no firm customer interruptions during the event due to generation and
6 import resource availability.
- 7 • The NS Power bulk power transmission system performed well under high load
8 conditions.
- 9 • The Labrador Island Link and Maritime Link performed well, both operating in bi-
10 pole mode throughout the event. The Maritime Link was used to provide
11 emergency energy from Nova Scotia to Newfoundland & Labrador on January 21,
12 23 and 24 and from Newfoundland & Labrador to Nova Scotia on January 25.
- 13 • Localized Customer impacts were experienced due to localized rotating feeder
14 outages at 70W Bridgewater, 79V Three Mile Plaines and repeated outages in
15 Seafoam due to equipment overload (downline recloser 512N-311). These issues
16 were resolved by the engineering team during the event.
- 17 • NS Power coordinated with neighbouring utilities to provide support to each other,
18 as required, throughout the event.

19 The preparation work completed by the operational teams across NS Power in advance of this
20 extreme cold weather event positioned the system well to respond.