

NOVA SCOTIA ENERGY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT

- and -

**IN THE MATTER OF: NOVA SCOTIA POWER INC. (NS Power) Outage Report for
January 23-26, 2026, Cold Weather Event**

NON-CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION REQUESTS

To: **Nova Scotia Power Inc.**
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
From: **Nova Scotia Energy Board**
Board Staff

Responses Due: **Friday, May 8, 2026**

Copies: 1 electronic copy (PDF searchable)

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Crystal Henwood, Clerk of the Board

Request IR-1:

Reference page 6 of the report.

Please explain what “system adjustments” were implemented after the February 4, 2023, extreme cold weather event.

Request IR-2:

Reference page 7 of the report.

The report states that data from the February 4, 2023, event was used to “identify heavily loaded feeders which are subject to protective devices that could be at risk of tripping during extreme cold/load conditions.”

a) How did the identified feeders perform in the January 2026 cold weather event?

b) Please provide each feeder’s rated capacity identified as heavily loaded, as well as the peak load before and during the January 2026 cold weather event.

c) To the extent that feeders tripped or were considered to be at risk of tripping in the January 2026 cold weather event and were not identified from the February 4, 2023 data, what factor(s) does NS Power attribute to other feeders that were not identified (if any) which tripped or were at risk of tripping in the most recent event?

Request IR-3:

Reference page 7 of the report.

With respect to the “substation transformers” and “bulk power substations or assets” that were anticipated to be at risk for overload, how did the identified infrastructure perform in the January 2026 cold weather event?

Request IR-4:

Reference page 7 of the report.

“Select areas were identified across the Province where restoration is known to be subject to cold load pickup (very high loading following an outage) and plans were prepared by the Energy Delivery Services Regional Engineering team to streamline the restoration process, where possible.”

a) How are these areas identified?

b) Why would they be subject to cold load pickup?

Request IR-5:

Reference page 8 of the report.

“NS Power maintains and implements its Cold Weather Preparedness plan as outlined in the NERC Standard, EOP-012-2 “Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations”. Planning and preparations for the severe weather and load events were carried out in the week prior to the event with the focus on hardening the generation fleet for the upcoming cold snap, topping up site fuel inventories, optimizing generation output where possible, and staffing various sites for improved response times.”

- a) The Board recently approved an updated version of the Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations (EOP) standard. EOP-12-3 was approved on February 28, 2026, with an effective date of July 1, 2026. Please provide a status update confirming that implementation remains on track for July 1, 2026.

Request IR-6:

Reference page 9 of the report.

With respect to the Grid Status Index displayed on the web page:

- a) Please explain the procedure that was used to review the status reported on the Index.
- b) Was the Index reviewed at regular fixed time intervals for a potential change? If not, please explain how it was determined that the “status” of the grid status index should be confirmed or changed.

Request IR-7:

Reference page 9 of the report.

“...Large Industrial Interruptible Rider (LIIR) customers were contacted by the Key Accounts team on January 23, 2026...”

Reference page 14 of the report.

“To ensure operating reserves were maintained, the LIIR customers without data telemetry and control were interrupted, providing an estimated 20 MW of load relief. The LIIR customers with data telemetry and operator control were not interrupted during the event...”

- a) Please explain the substance of the January 23, 2026, LIIR customer contacts by the Key Accounts team.
- b) Were all LIIR customers contacted or was it only those not equipped with telemetry and control?

1 c) Please provide the time that interruption notifications were issued, the time the
2 interruptions occurred, and the durations. If notifications were not issued, please explain
3 why not.
4

5 **Request IR-8:**

6 Reference page 13, Figure 5, of the report.

7 The table shows peak Maritime Link imports of just over 250 megawatts in the early evening hours
8 of January 25, 2026. Given the recent positive test on the Labrador Island Link operating at 900
9 megawatts, please provide an estimate of the Maritime Link imports that could be expected in the
10 future events, assuming similar conditions to that which existed on January 25, 2026. Would the
11 increased capacity of the Labrador Island Link of 900 megawatts increase the reserve capacity
12 on NS Power's system in similar conditions?
13

14 **Request IR-9:**

15 Reference page 17 of the report.

16 "Pre-event, NS Power's operational power system engineers, with support from the planning team
17 at the Independent Energy System Operator – Nova Scotia (IESO-NS), re-studied stability limits
18 with the addition of new transmission-connected Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and
19 increased the Onslow South Corridor limit by 45 MW."

20 a) How was this new limit established? Is it based on the storage capacity of the two
21 operational BESS projects (combined output of 100 MW for 4 hrs)?

22 b) Please explain how the battery charging is planned, and how and when their energy is
23 dispatched?
24

25 **Request IR-10:**

26 Reference page 18 of the report.

27 70W High Street "Rotating feeder outages were initiated at 70W High Street to avoid overload
28 conditions reaching the protection limit for transmission line L-5545:" ... "At 10:41, it was
29 confirmed that the protection limit was increased on L-5545 and rotating outages were cancelled."
30

31 Reference page 22 of the report.

32 "The long-term resolution to the L-5545 overloading issue is a proposed new substation which
33 will offload the transmission line." Also, protection settings were reviewed and adjusted after the
34 2023 event.

- 1 a) Please provide the present rated loading capacity of Transmission Line L-5545, as well
2 as the loading expressed as a percentage of the rated capacity during the January
3 weather event, along with the actual values reached during the January cold-weather
4 event.
- 5 b) What temporary solutions are available to avoid rotating feeder outages in the event of
6 another transmission-line overload?
- 7 c) When did the utility first identify the transmission-line loading issue, and since that date,
8 what action was taken to avoid rotating feeder outages?
- 9 d) What protection settings were changed? Please provide the values that were modified in
10 2023, the new settings, and the maximum allowable values.

11

12 **Request IR-11:**

13 Reference page 18 of the report.

14 79V Three-Mile Plain “Loading above design limit was observed on transformer 79V-T1 Rotating
15 feeder outages were initiated to protect the asset until the winding temperature could be verified
16 in the field.” ... “A technician arrived on site at the substation and confirmed that the winding
17 temperature was within acceptable limits and the rotating outages were cancelled.”

- 18 a) Is there any remote monitoring (SCADA) available at 79V, or must a technician be on site
19 to confirm the winding temperature?
- 20 b) Please provide the transformer’s rated capacity, its allowable winter loading capacity, and
21 the actual loading observed during the January cold-weather event.
- 22 c) Please explain the relationship between loading above design limits and transformer
23 winding temperatures. Additionally, clarify why the field technician’s confirmation that the
24 winding temperature was within acceptable limits indicates that the transformer was not
25 overloaded.

26

27 **Request IR-12:**

28 Reference page 19 of the report.

29 “There was one reported case of repeated outages on downline recloser 512N-311, located in
30 the community of Hedgeville, Pictou County. The recloser tripped and reclosed 18 times during
31 the morning of January 25, affecting approximately 324 customers. The Engineering team
32 analyzed the device performance, and a technician was deployed to apply changes to the device
33 settings in the field, resolving the issue.”

- a) What protection settings were changed? Please provide the values that were modified, the new settings, and the reasons for the changes.
- b) How was the effectiveness of the new settings measured?
- c) Why were these settings not changed earlier?
- d) How does the utility determine which settings will be applied to each recloser?
- e) Is this a permanent solution to this problem on this line?

Request IR-13:

Reference page 19 of the report.

“On January 24th and 25th Tufts Cove 6 was derated for periods of time due to freezing instrumentation tubing for a transmitter. An exterior wall mounted heater was repositioned which resolved the issue. On January 25th Burnside 2 failed to start due to a fuel control light off setting that required adjustment. The unit was operational the following morning.”

- a) Did either of these events impact the need to interrupt the LIIR customers between 16:47 and 22:04 on January 25?

Request IR-14:

Reference page 20 of the report.

“Wind generation tracked the forecast trend well. The January 24 day-ahead forecast predicted a steeper generation decline than the two-day-ahead planning forecast on January 23 as shown on the graph below, with the actual wind generation dropping by 367 MW between the first and last hour of the day due to declining wind speeds.”

- a) Please confirm whether there were any operational issues with the wind turbines, and whether the low wind production on January 25 during the cold-weather event was due to low wind conditions.

Request IR-15:

Reference page 21, Figure 13, Grid Battery Usage, of the report.

- a) Please provide similar separate tables for each of the two respective battery storage sites.
- b) Please explain the reason for the difference (if any) in the performance of the respective battery storage sites.

Request IR-16:

Page 20 of 23, Figures 11 and 12 provide hourly average wind generation and forecasts.

1 a) Please confirm whether the generation forecast was adjusted for cold weather.

2 i. If not, please provide Figure 11 and Figure 12 with unadjusted and cold
3 adjusted forecast.

4 **Request IR-17:**

5 a) Please provide the hourly load forecasts the utility prepared in advance of the January
6 weather forecast that were used for generation dispatch planning.

7 b) Referencing the hourly net load in Figure 5 of the report, please provide a list of the
8 generation resources that supplied that net load during each hour and their rated capacity.

9 c) Please provide a list of power generation resources that did not come online despite being
10 required.

11 d) Please provide a graph, along with the underlying data in an Excel spreadsheet, showing
12 the hourly net load for January 24 and 25, 2026, the MW supply by resource for each hour,
13 and the remaining generation (supply) available to the utility.