

June 10, 2026

james.gogan@mcinnescooper.com

James Gogan
McInnes Cooper
1300-1969 Upper Water Street
PO Box 730
Halifax, NS B3J 3R7

Dear Mr. Gogan:

M12780 – EfficiencyOne – Demand Side Management (DSM) Resource Plan and Purchase Agreement – Board Only Confidential Filings

In preparation for the upcoming oral hearing, the Board Panel assigned to this matter, consisting of Stephen McGrath, KC, Chair, Steven M. Murphy, MBA, P.Eng., Member; and Darlene Willcott, LL.B., Member, has raised a concern about certain Responses to Information Requests (RIRs) which EfficiencyOne (E1) filed as Board Only - Confidential. The RIRs in question and the reasons for seeking Board Only Confidential treatment are:

- 1) NSEB IR 17, Attachment 2, contains the Mercer Compensation Review, which includes sensitive compensation information that, if disclosed, would reveal the confidential salary information of identifiable individuals. It is E1's position that this material constitutes sensitive commercial and financial information, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause harm to E1.

Treatment of filings as Board Only - Confidential is rare. The Board had occasion to canvass the issue of a Board Only - Confidential filing in the context of NS Power executive compensation in that utility's 2022 General Rate Application (Matter M10431). In a June 14, 2022, decision letter, (copy attached), at p. 9, the Board held that:

...the public interest outweighs NS Power's arguments for keeping the information "Board Confidential", including the executive team's reasonable expectation of privacy. In this instance, the Board has weighed those privacy concerns and finds that they are satisfactorily addressed by retaining the "General Confidential" nature of the Mercer Reports and only allowing access by the Intervenor who have signed a Confidentiality Undertaking.

The Board would ask EfficiencyOne to explain why it should not follow the same rationales discussed in that decision and order that the filings outlined in Item 1 be treated as General Confidential and made immediately available to the Intervenor representatives who have signed the approved Confidentiality Undertaking.

Your response is requested by noon on **Tuesday, June 16, 2026.**

Yours truly,



Crystal Henwood
Clerk of the Board

c. William Mahody, K.C., Board Counsel
Parties M12780





Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board

Mailing address

PO Box 1692, Unit "M"
Halifax, Nova Scotia
B3J 3S3
board@novascotia.ca
<http://nsuarb.novascotia.ca>

Office

3rd Floor, 1601 Lower Water Street
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3P6
1 855 442-4448 (toll-free)
902 424-4448 t
902 424-3919 f

June 14, 2022

By Email

Dear Parties:

M10431 – Nova Scotia Power Inc. – 2022 General Rate Application – Confidentiality Objections

Background

This decision letter contains the Board's findings about a motion by various Intervenor challenging the confidentiality claimed by Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NS Power, Company, Utility) over certain portions of its general rate application (GRA). The request was considered by the Board panel of Stephen T. McGrath, LL.B., Chair; Roland A. Deveau, Q.C., Vice Chair; and Steven M. Murphy, MBA, P.Eng., Member.

NS Power filed its GRA on January 27, 2022. The Board issued a Hearing Order on February 2, 2022, establishing an evidentiary disclosure timeline leading to the scheduled public hearing in September 2022. NS Power filed its responses to the Intervenor's Information Requests (IRs) on May 3, 2022. The timeline included a deadline for the filing of objections to NS Power's confidentiality redactions of May 17, 2022, later extended to May 27, 2022.

The Consumer Advocate (CA), the Nova Scotia Department of Natural Resources and Renewables (NRR, Province), and the Industrial Group/Dalhousie University (Industrial Group) filed objections to some of the confidentiality claimed by NS Power in its GRA, and its IR responses. The confidentiality is claimed by NS Power in accordance with *Rule 12* of the *Board Regulatory Rules*, which also sets out the procedure for dealing with objections to confidentiality. Under s. 12(3) of the *Board Regulatory Rules*, the burden is on an applicant for confidentiality (in this case NS Power) to show that confidential treatment of the evidence is warranted. The Board observes that much of the material in the GRA that was redacted as commercially sensitive information was not challenged by the Intervenor.

Following extensions granted by the Board, NS Power was to provide comments on the confidentiality objections by Friday, June 3, 2022, with reply submissions from the CA, the Industrial Group and the Province by Tuesday, June 7, 2022. The CA and the Province objected to the confidentiality claimed by NS Power over documentation prepared by Mercer Consulting and filed as "Board Confidential" (it can only be viewed by the Board, not the Intervenor) in response to Grant Thornton IR-17 (Mercer Reports). This objection is supported by the Industrial Group. Grant Thornton asked for any supporting documentation for the base executive

compensation for the 2022 to 2024 test years. NS Power continues to claim full confidentiality as “Board Confidential” over the Mercer Reports. When it initially filed the evidence, NS Power said that “good human resource practices and privacy legislation” required it to protect confidential personnel information. In its later submissions, the Utility added that it does not have to disclose the Mercer Reports because the recovery in customers’ power rates of its executive compensation is capped by the *Public Utilities Act* at the compensation paid to a provincial deputy minister under the Nova Scotia Government’s Senior Officials Pay Plan. Accordingly, NS Power submitted that any figures discussed in the Mercer Reports for anything over that amount is not recovered in electricity rates and, therefore, is not relevant to the GRA.

Ms. Rubin, counsel for the Industrial Group, also objected to 13 other claims for confidentiality by NS Power. Following Ms. Rubin’s submissions, NS Power conceded that 10 of these 13 confidentiality claims should be abandoned and agreed to make public those parts of the evidence. On two other items, NS Power maintained its view that the redacted evidence should remain confidential. On the final item, NS Power agreed to unredact a part of the evidence over which it claimed confidentiality. In her reply submission, Ms. Rubin appeared to accept all of NS Power’s submissions on these items, except for one item relating to the confidentiality claimed over cyber security measures taken by NS Power.

Legal Framework for the request

a) Confidentiality

NS Power’s request for confidentiality is made under s.12(4) of the *Board Regulatory Rules*. Section 12, in its entirety, provides:

Confidential documents

- 12** (1) Subject to Rule 12(2), all documents filed in respect of an application shall be placed on the public record.
- (2) A party may request that all or any part of the document be held in confidence by the Board, which request shall be placed on the public record.
- (3) The burden of satisfying the Board that a document should be held in confidence is on the party claiming confidentiality.
- (4) Any request for confidentiality shall
- (a) include a summary of the nature of the information in the document;
 - (b) state
 - (i) the reasons for the request, including the details of the nature and extent of the specific harm that would result if the document were publicly disclosed, and
 - (ii) any objection to placing an abridged version of the document on the public record, and the reasons for such an objection; and
 - (c) be filed with the Board and served on the parties.
- (5) Where a party has made a request under Rule 12(2), the document shall be held in confidence unless the Board orders otherwise.

(6) A party may object to a request for confidentiality by filing an objection and serving the objection on the parties.

(7) An objection shall state the reasons

(a) why the party requires disclosure of the document; and

(b) why disclosure would be in the public interest.

(8) The party claiming confidentiality will have an opportunity to reply to any objection.

(9) The Board may decide the issue with or without a hearing. Where the Board holds a hearing, the Board may direct that the hearing be held in the absence of the public.

(10) In ruling on a request for confidentiality the Board shall consider

(a) whether the document may disclose matters involving public security;

(b) whether the document may disclose sensitive financial, commercial or personal matters in relation to which the desirability of avoiding disclosure in the interest of any person affected outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that documents be available to the public; or

(c) such other matters as the Board deems appropriate.

(11) The Board may

(a) order that the document be held in confidence by the Board;

(b) order that the document be placed on the public record;

(c) order that an abridged version of the document be placed on the public record;

(d) order that the document be made available to a party to the proceeding, who has a good faith interest in accessing the confidential information and who would not otherwise be in conflict of interest, on such terms as the Board considers appropriate, including the signing of a confidentiality undertaking in a form approved by the Board;

(e) order that the document be withdrawn; and

(f) make any other order the Board may deem to be in the public interest.

(12) Where the Board rejects a claim for confidentiality, the party claiming confidentiality may, within seven (7) days of receiving the Board's decision, or such other time as the Board may allow, notify the Board in writing that

(a) if the party is an applicant, the application is withdrawn; or

(b) if the party is an intervenor, the intervention is withdrawn.

(13) Where a party provides written notice to the Board pursuant to Rule 12(12), if the document is on file with the Board, the Board shall immediately return the documents for which confidentiality was claimed. [Emphasis added]

As noted in s.12(3), the burden of satisfying the Board that a document (or excerpts of a document) should be held in confidence is on the party claiming confidentiality.

b) Executive Compensation

An important aspect of the discussion in this matter relates to the provisions capping NS Power's recovery of its executive compensation in customers' electricity rates. Section 64B of the *Public Utilities Act* provides:

Recovery of executive remuneration

64B (1) In this Section, "report" means the report required by subsection (2).

(2) Nova Scotia Power Incorporated shall submit to the Board

(a) on or before January 1, 2013; and

(b) with each application for a general rate increase made after January 1, 2013,

a report identifying who the executive employees of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated are, the position held by each executive employee and the remuneration to which each executive employee is entitled.

(3) The Board shall review the report and determine whether it accurately reflects who the executive employees of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated are, the position held by each executive employee and the remuneration to which each executive employee is entitled.

(4) The Board may prescribe the content and form of the report.

(5) The Board shall review the report either

(a) *ex parte*; or

(b) after such notice and public hearing as the Board in its discretion determines.

(6) The Board shall either

(a) approve the report; or

(b) reject the report and require Nova Scotia Power Incorporated to amend the report on such terms and conditions as the Board considers necessary or advisable.

(7) Where Nova Scotia Power Incorporated fails to amend the report within thirty days of being required to do so, the Board shall determine who is an executive employee of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated for the purpose of this Section.

(8) Nova Scotia Power Incorporated shall not recover from any rate, charge or fee approved by the Board

(a) any bonus or incentive compensation; or

(b) any other remuneration, except remuneration that is prescribed by the regulations, paid to an executive employee of

Nova Scotia Power Incorporated as identified in an approved report or determined by the Board.

Moreover, ss. 2 and 3 of the *Nova Scotia Power Incorporated Regulations*, N.S. Reg. 231/2012, provide:

Definitions for Act and regulations

2 (1) In the Act, “general rate increase” does not include increases arising from the fuel adjustment mechanism, demand side management cost recovery riders or the special annually adjusted rates.

(2) In the Act and these regulations, “pay plan” means the Senior Officials Pay Plan approved by the Governor in Council by Order in Council 2007-85 under the *Civil Service Act* and the *Public Service Act*, and as amended from time to time.

Salary and compensation recoverable from rates, charges or fees

3 For the purpose of subsection 64B(8) of the Act, Nova Scotia Power Incorporated may recover the following remuneration from its rates, charges or fees approved by the Board:

- (a) for the Chief Executive Officer, no more than a salary equaling a 110% compa-ratio as provided for in the pay plan and no more than an additional 13% of the amount of that salary representing other benefits and compensation;
- (b) for each executive other than the Chief Executive Officer, no more than a salary equaling a 100% compa-ratio as provided for in the pay plan and no more than an additional 13% of the amount of that salary representing other benefits and compensation.

Analysis and Findings

a) Mercer Reports – Executive Compensation

The primary outstanding issue relates to the Intervenor’s request that the confidential treatment of the Mercer Reports about executive compensation be relaxed from “Board Confidential” to “General Confidential” so that Intervenor’s who have signed a Confidentiality Undertaking (CU) be permitted to access and review that evidence, subject to confidentiality protections outlined in the CU. The Province initially requested full public disclosure, but in reply submissions only asked that the Mercer Reports be disclosed under Confidentiality Undertaking. The Industrial Group’s reply submissions also supported the disclosure of the information under a CU. The Consumer Advocate did not specify whether he wanted the disclosure to be beyond that granted under a CU.

As noted earlier in this decision letter, NS Power’s recovery in customers’ power rates of its executive compensation is capped by the *Public Utilities Act* at the compensation paid to a provincial deputy minister as per the Nova Scotia Government’s Senior Officials Pay Plan, with an additional 13 percent of that amount permitted for other benefits and compensation (Government Pay Plan Cap). This is explained in the response provided to GT IR-17 and set out in Appendix 6E of the GRA. Also publicly disclosed in Appendix 6E is that the aggregate executive compensation for 2021 under the Government Pay Plan Cap is \$2,025,915.43 for nine executives. The response to GT IR-17 states that these executive compensation costs within the GRA are forecast to escalate at a rate of two percent per year for the 2022-2024 test period. This is the extent to which NS Power wants to disclose details of its executive compensation.

However, in its submissions, NS Power did offer a compromise providing the following disclosure:

NS Power acknowledges these compensation costs under the Government Pay Plan Cap are relevant and is prepared to disclose, on a non-confidential basis, the market comparable aggregate amount of total direct compensation that is included in the Mercer Reports to demonstrate that the compensation included in the GRA is below market. Given the existence of the Government Pay Plan Cap, NS Power believes this to be unnecessary to demonstrate the prudence of the executive compensation costs included in the GRA; it nonetheless views this as an appropriate compromise to resolve the concerns raised by the parties. [Emphasis added]

[NS Power Submission, June 3, 2022, p. 2]

This offer was not accepted by the Intervenor.

The Board considers it helpful to highlight the nature of the "Board Confidential" treatment that NS Power claims for the Mercer Reports. Evidence that is filed as "Board Confidential" can be viewed by the Board only, not by any of the Intervenor. In their reply submissions, the Intervenor acknowledges that some confidentiality should continue over parts of the Mercer Reports, impliedly, the Board infers, because some of the information contains sensitive personnel information. They submit that information should be redacted and only be accessed by those Intervenor who have signed a CU. It is typical in other proceedings (including this proceeding) for confidential evidence to be accessed by parties who have agreed to sign a CU. The Board understands that the form of CU is not at issue in this matter. Rather, NS Power rejects the proposition that the Intervenor should have any access to any part of the Mercer Reports. The Board observes that executive compensation is included in the Final Issues List for this GRA.

The Province noted that NS Power is a regulated monopoly which derives its revenues from the delivery of an essential service to Nova Scotians. Citing the Board's decision in *Nova Scotia Power Inc. (Re)*, 2002 NSUARB 59, the Province highlighted the importance of ensuring NS Power's independence from other affiliates in its corporate family, notably from its parent Emera. In its submissions, the Province submitted:

Were the Board to deny intervenors access to information NS Power has deemed to be "Board Confidential", no intervenors would be in a position to make submissions on behalf of their stakeholders relating to these materials, even though they relate directly to the issue of Executive Compensation which is duly before the Board. More egregiously, if the Board decides not to discuss confidential information in its ultimate decision, neither the ratepaying public nor the intervenors speaking on their behalf will have any sense of justification for overall Executive Compensation. Such opacity on this issue would undoubtedly lead to concerns among ratepayers and questions as to the fairness of the GRA process.

While NRR appreciates the desire of NS Power to shield this information, there is no reason for the executives of a business engaged in a regulated monopoly to receive top-ups to unidentified, secret ceilings. It is contrary to the public interest for the particulars of Executive Compensation within a regulated monopoly to remain opaque and free from independent scrutiny. At the very least, the Board should have the benefit of intervenor comments about Executive Compensation and will be deprived of such benefit if the Board accepts this information remaining "Board Confidential" as defined by NS Power.

[NRR Submissions, May 27, 2022, p. 5]

The Industrial Group submitted:

...NSPI's ratepayers have an interest in whether NSPI's executives and management team are appropriately compensated (not excessively or inadequately compensated) to attract and retain talent, and they are properly incented to act in the best interests of ratepayers. This is of particular interest where NSPI is one of many affiliated companies within the Emera Group and where there is regular movement of personnel.

Secondly, it may be of interest and relevant to hold up Mercer's compensation comparators with those comparators selected for purposes of cost of capital/ROE.

[Industrial Group Reply Submissions, June 7, 2022, p. 1]

In his submissions, the CA suggested that the level of executive compensation may indeed be related to NS Power's application to increase its return on equity band and its equity thickness:

It is to be noted that NS Power's application seeks an increased ROE range and an earnings sharing mechanism above that range. NS Power also seeks an increase to its equity thickness to allow for much greater overall earnings for its shareholder. NS Power takes the position that these ROE changes are required to attract necessary capital. In fact, that was the justification offered by Emera's CEO in recently reported comments to the media (see CBC.ca news article).

Absent evidence regarding the reasonableness of executive compensation, ratepayers are simply unable to fully challenge NS Power's assertions regarding the need for the proposed ROE increases. In such circumstances, ratepayers are left to wonder what portion of NS Power's proposed ROE increases are required to fund legitimate capital improvements to the electricity system and what portion of the proposed ROE increases will be used to fund unproven executive compensation.

[CA Reply Submission, June 7, 2022, pp. 1-2]

It does not escape the Board's consideration that NS Power operates in a privileged context vis-à-vis its ratepayers. In its decision respecting a claim for confidentiality in a prior NS Power FAM Audit proceeding [2012 NSUARB 137] in M04972, the Board noted the significance of the "regulatory compact":

3. The Regulatory Compact

[46] Under the regulatory compact, NSPI is given a monopoly; that is, the exclusive right to supply power and energy to almost all of the consumers of electricity in Nova Scotia. In exchange for that right it has an obligation to serve those customers requiring service at rates approved by the Board.

[47] NSPI is given the opportunity under the *Public Utilities Act* to recover its prudently incurred costs through the rates set by the Board. Therefore, a focus of this Board and any other tribunal in the economic regulation of a public utility is to examine whether the utility's costs are prudently incurred. That goes to the heart of the regulatory compact and the FAM is an integral component of the costs NSPI seeks to recover.

[2012 NSUARB 137, paras. 46-47]

The Board is committed to the "open courts principle". As noted in the Province's submissions, *Rule 12* of the *Board Regulatory Rules* effectively codifies the open courts principle. The Board has previously confirmed this point:

[11] The Board has considered that Rule 12 is in essence a codification of the criteria set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, in that it takes into account both the principle of open courts, and the prevention of "serious risk to an important interest" and balances the interests of the parties with the public interest.

[*Re NSPI (South Canoe)*, 2014 NSUARB 5, para. 11]

Further, in *Friends of Harmony, Camden, Greenfield and Surrounding Areas (Re)*, 2015 NSUARB 140, the Board stated:

[11] With respect to the present proceeding, the Board has the benefit of a recent decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal respecting a claim for confidentiality in a matter involving Nova Scotia Power Incorporated: *Cape Breton Explorations Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*, 2013 NSCA 134. The Court set out the applicable law as follows:

[23] The open courts principle is well-established. Importantly, it is linked to the fundamental freedom of expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication, set out in s. 2(b) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 at 36, the Supreme Court of Canada quoted with approval this passage from *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 at ¶23:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

[24] Confidentiality orders are permitted as an exception to the open courts principle, but only when certain criteria set out in *Sierra Club* at ¶53 are met, these being that:

- (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
- (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[2013 NSCA 134, paras. 23-24]

The Board also remains mindful that there is a public interest in ensuring that all proceedings before it be conducted in a transparent manner, not the least of which is a general rate application by NS Power.

Having reviewed all the submissions, the Board concludes that the Mercer Reports are relevant and should be available to the Intervenor who have signed a confidentiality undertaking.

At the very least, as noted by Ms. Rubin, ratepayers have an interest in knowing whether the members of the Utility's executive team are appropriately compensated and are properly incented to act in the best interests of ratepayers. The Board accepts the Intervenor's submissions that there is a public interest in granting access to this information. Unless the total compensation is released, the ratepayers have no way of ascertaining for themselves that the overall executive compensation is justified. As noted by the Province, 'such opacity on this issue would undoubtedly lead to concerns among ratepayers and questions as to the fairness of the GRA process'.

In its submissions, NS Power essentially conceded that if the information is relevant the "full amount of executive compensation" should be made available to Intervenor's:

NRR concludes its submissions stating that it is contrary to the public interest for the executive compensation of a regulated public utility to be free from independent scrutiny. While NS Power agrees with this in principle, it only applies to the extent that such expenses are being recovered in rates. If NS Power were seeking to recover the full amount of executive compensation then it would disclose the full amount, just as it did prior to the introduction of the Government Pay Plan Cap. In that instance, the public interest would outweigh the individuals' reasonable expectation of privacy and NS Power's interest in keeping the information confidential given the specific and personal salary information contained in the Mercer Reports.

[NS Power Submission, June 3, 2022, pp. 5-6]

The Board concludes that the public interest outweighs NS Power's arguments for keeping the information "Board Confidential", including the executive team's reasonable expectation of privacy. In this instance, the Board has weighed those privacy concerns and finds that they are satisfactorily addressed by retaining the "General Confidential" nature of the Mercer Reports and only allowing access by the Intervenor's who have signed a Confidentiality Undertaking. In this respect, the Board observes that it considered making some of the Reports public, but given the integrated nature of many of the tables and charts in the Reports, it was not practical to remove the redactions for any meaningful parts of the documents. However, in order to provide as much information as reasonably possible to ratepayers in the public, the Board directs NS Power make public the aggregate total compensation for its executive team (combined) for each of the categories of compensation listed on page 18 of the Mercer Report in Attachment 1 of GT-17, specifically for each of the following categories:

- Base Salary
- Short-Term Incentives (STI)
- Total Cash Compensation (TCC)
- Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
- Total Direct Compensation including Perquisites (TDC)

Thus, the Mercer Reports are to be made immediately available to the Intervenor's who have signed a CU. Further, NS Power is to publicly file the aggregate total compensation for its combined executive team (as per the above bullets) by June 24, 2022.

b) Cyber Security Measures discussed in OM&G costs

In its Direct Evidence, Appendix 6A – OM&G Costs by Group, pages 19-20, NS Power claimed confidentiality over various cyber security measures it has undertaken. Ms. Rubin asserted that the description of these measures did not contain any technical detail and were only generic in nature. She stated that there was a public interest in knowing whether these measures warranted the costs claimed. In its reply submissions, NS Power maintained its view that this information was confidential.

The Board is aware of NS Power's obligation to protect its critical infrastructure from cyber security threats. It must adhere to NERC and NPCC cyber security standards for its part of the North American bulk energy transmission system. Disclosing the cyber security measures would allow those perpetrating cyber attacks to know which measures are being taken by NS Power (and which measures are not being taken). It would not be in the public interest for this information to be made public. The Board accepts NS Power's position on this point and finds that the description of these measures should remain confidential for reasons of public security.


c) Stantec decommissioning study – Pricing Information

In Grant Thornton IR-50, the Board Counsel consultant requested copies of the latest decommissioning studies. The Stantec Report in Attachment 1 to the IR response was filed as fully confidential, while the Hydro Asset Study in Attachment 2 was partially confidential. NS Power acknowledged in its submissions that both documents should be dealt with in similar fashion. It stated that only the pricing information in the Stantec Report should be confidential and the remainder of the report should be public. This was satisfactory to Ms. Rubin. Accordingly, the Board directs NS Power to re-file the partially confidential Stantec Report by June 24, 2022.

d) Process for re-filing of evidence over which confidentiality withdrawn

As noted earlier in this decision letter, NS Power has agreed to withdraw its claim of confidentiality over various issues raised by Ms. Rubin. NS Power is directed to re-file unredacted versions of this evidence by June 24, 2022.


Yours truly,



Stephen T. McGrath, LL.B.
Chair



Roland A. Deveau, Q.C.
Vice Chair



Steven M. Murphy, MBA, P.Eng.
Member

c. S. Bruce Outhouse, Q.C., Board Counsel