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Topic:"Bca" in M07544

Matter: E-ENS-R-16 - EfficiencyOne - Incentive Setting Methodology Review and RecommendationsGroup with M06733
18 passages 6 documents

Bca across all matters →

E-1Incentive Setting Methodology: CLEAResult Report & EfficiencyOne Implementation Plan 3 passages
Preamble p. p. 15
ontinuing the current activities, but improving specific areas. In an effort to further refine and develop the incentive setting methodology, CLEAResult identified the following areas for improvement: - 1. Lack of a formal and documented i...

AI summary CLEAResult identifies four areas for improving Nova Scotia's incentive-setting methodology, including lack of formal processes, outdated market penetration analysis, absence of TRM documents, and limited cost-effectiveness tools. Recommendations include establishing a documented framework. EfficiencyOne is noted for lacking a documented incentive process.

Cost Effectiveness Requirements p. p. 112
Cost Effectiveness Requirements The gas utilities' overall DSM goals are to achieve all the cost-effective DSM available in its market. The OEB determined that cost effectiveness should be based on the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) t...

AI summary Gas utilities must achieve all cost-effective Demand Side Management (DSM) in their markets. The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) mandates the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) test for screening programs, with low-income programs requiring a minimum TRC-plus ratio of 0.7 and Resource Acquisition programs requiring 1.0. Market transformation programs are exempt from cost-effectiveness testing.

COST EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS p. p. 121
COST EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS Total Resource Cost (TRC) is used by BC Hydro and the BCUC at the program level to evaluate performance. Programs must have a TRC of 1.0 or greater. There is an expectation of low-income programs. Internally...

AI summary BC Hydro and BCUC use Total Resource Cost (TRC) to evaluate programs, requiring a TRC of 1.0 or higher. Low-income programs are expected, and internal cost effectiveness tests like utility cost and ratepayer impact measure are also applied.

E-3REVISED Incentive Setting Methodology: CLEAResult Report & EfficiencyOne Implementation Plan - Clean Version 2 passages
Preamble p. p. 15
ontinuing the current activities, but improving specific areas. In an effort to further refine and develop the incentive setting methodology, CLEAResult identified the following areas for improvement: - 1. Lack of a formal and documented i...

AI summary CLEAResult identifies four areas for improving incentive-setting methodology: lack of formal processes, outdated market penetration analysis, absence of TRM documents, and insufficient tools for short-term cost-effectiveness calculations. Recommendations aim to address these gaps.

Cost Effectiveness Requirements p. p. 125
Cost Effectiveness Requirements The gas utilities' overall DSM goals are to achieve all the cost-effective DSM available in its market. The OEB determined that cost effectiveness should be based on the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) t...

AI summary Gas utilities in Nova Scotia must achieve all cost-effective Demand Side Management (DSM) programs. The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) mandates the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) test for screening, with low-income programs requiring a minimum TRC-plus ratio of 0.7 and Resource Acquisition programs needing 1.0. Market transformation programs are exempt from cost-effectiveness testing due to their behavioral focus.

E-3-(i)REVISED Incentive Setting Methodology: CLEAResult Report & Efficinecy One Implementation Report - Redline Version 6 passages
Preamble p. p. 15
ontinuing the current activities, but improving specific areas. In an effort to further refine and develop the incentive setting methodology, CLEAResult identified the following areas for improvement: - 1. Lack of a formal and documented i...

AI summary CLEAResult identifies four areas for improving Nova Scotia's incentive-setting methodology: lack of formal processes, outdated market penetration analysis, absence of TRM documents, and lack of cost-effectiveness tools. Recommendations aim to address these gaps.

Participant Cost Test p. p. 37
Participant Cost Test In evaluating a participant's purchase decision from a financial perspective, the PC test is a useful analysis to deploy. It assesses all of the direct financial considerations that a participant faces in making a pur...

AI summary The Participant Cost (PC) test evaluates whether financial benefits of a technology or service exceed costs from the participant's perspective. Benefits include incentives, tax credits, and utility savings, while costs cover purchase, installation, and maintenance. The test uses NPV with a discount rate and is reported as a benefits/costs ratio. A ratio above 1.0 indicates benefits outweigh costs, while below 1.0 suggests no payback, influencing incentive adjustments.

Application of Thresholds p. pp. 45-47
Application of Thresholds Incentives can exceed all three of these limits thresholds (and often do), but the limitsthey provide a reference point that can be used during the design process. The limitsthresholds are independent of one anoth...

AI summary The document discusses the application of incentive thresholds in program design, noting they serve as reference points but are independent. It highlights differences between PAC (capturing incentive costs) and TRC, and mentions considerations for customer cost limits based on retail price, incremental cost, or payback. Figures illustrate theoretical limits for incentives.

Cost Effectiveness Requirements p. pp. 130-177
Cost Effectiveness Requirements The gas utilities' overall DSM goals are to achieve all the cost-effective DSM available in its market. The OEB determined that cost effectiveness should be based on the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) t...

AI summary Nova Scotia gas utilities must achieve all cost-effective Demand Side Management (DSM) programs. The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) mandates the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) test for screening, with a 0.7 threshold for low-income programs and 1.0 for Resource Acquisition programs. Market transformation programs are exempt from cost-effectiveness testing.

COST EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS p. p. 139
COST EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS Total Resource Cost (TRC) is used by BC Hydro and the BCUC at the program level to evaluate performance. Programs must have a TRC of 1.0 or greater. There is an expectation of low-income programs. Internally...

AI summary BC Hydro and BCUC use Total Resource Cost (TRC) at the program level, requiring a TRC of 1.0 or greater. Low-income programs are expected, and other internal cost-effectiveness tests like utility cost and ratepayer impact measures are applied.

Cost Effectiveness Testing p. p. 148
Cost Effectiveness Testing As detailed in D.14-10-046 8 , the CPUC has interpreted its mandate to deliver cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation programs as meaning that all energy efficiency portfolios of delivery agents should...

AI summary The CPUC mandates cost-effective energy efficiency programs using Total Resource Cost (TRC) and Program Administration Cost (PAC) tests. California's Standard Practice Manual guides evaluation, with TRC measuring societal net benefits and PAC focusing on program administrator costs. The DEER database and E3's model are used for testing.

67135Reply comments - Synapse (BCC) 1 passage
INCENTIVES FOR EARLY REPLACEMENT p. p. 0
INCENTIVES FOR EARLY REPLACEMENT In its response letter, EfficiencyOne (E1) indicates that it "respectfully disagrees that incremental costs are applicable for most program and project types, using Synapse's definition of incremental costs...

AI summary EfficiencyOne (E1) disputes Synapse's use of incremental costs for early replacement programs, advocating instead for total project costs. Synapse supports incremental costs, citing a 2014 NEEP study that defines incremental costs as the premium of efficient equipment over standard systems. NEEP's method assumes eventual equipment replacement without program intervention, contrasting with E1's total cost approach. CLEAResult agrees to clarify cost scenarios, while Synapse criticizes E1's DSM Resource Plan for lacking clarity on early retirement programs.

69772Incentive Setting Methodology and CLEAResult Report and EfficiencyOne Implementation Plan - Second Revision - Clean Version 4 passages
Preamble p. p. 15
ontinuing the current activities, but improving specific areas. In an effort to further refine and develop the incentive setting methodology, CLEAResult identified the following areas for improvement: - 1. Lack of a formal and documented i...

AI summary CLEAResult identifies four areas for improving Nova Scotia's incentive-setting methodology: lack of formal processes, outdated market penetration analysis, absence of consolidated measure assumptions (TRM), and insufficient short-term cost-effectiveness tools. Recommendations focus on refining these aspects for better program effectiveness.

Cost Effectiveness Requirements p. p. 125
Cost Effectiveness Requirements The gas utilities' overall DSM goals are to achieve all the cost-effective DSM available in its market. The OEB determined that cost effectiveness should be based on the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) t...

AI summary Gas utilities in Nova Scotia must achieve all cost-effective Demand Side Management (DSM) programs. The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) mandates the Total Resource Cost-plus (TRC-plus) test for cost-effectiveness, with low-income programs requiring a minimum TRC-plus ratio of 0.7 and Resource Acquisition programs requiring 1.0. Market transformation programs are exempt from cost-effectiveness testing as they aim to drive behavioral change.

4. Incremental Cost Design p. p. 125
4. Incremental Cost Design Based on the market research and technology, Union will attempt to incentivize a portion of the incremental cost determined to motivate customers to implement. Typically, this has fallen between 25-35 percent of...

AI summary Union aims to incentivize 25-35% of incremental costs to encourage customer implementation. Incremental costs are calculated as the difference between measure cost and standard measure cost for measures with base cases, and as full measure cost for those without.

COST EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS p. p. 134
COST EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS Total Resource Cost (TRC) is used by BC Hydro and the BCUC at the program level to evaluate performance. Programs must have a TRC of 1.0 or greater. There is an expectation of low-income programs. Internally...

AI summary BC Hydro and BCUC require programs to meet a Total Resource Cost (TRC) threshold of 1.0 or higher. Low-income programs are expected, and internal cost-effectiveness tests include utility cost and ratepayer impact measures.

69773Incentive Setting Methodology and CLEAResult Report and EfficiencyOne Implementation Plan - Second Revision - Redline Version 2 passages
Preamble p. p. 0
ontinuing the current activities, but improving specific areas. In an effort to further refine and develop the incentive setting methodology, CLEAResult identified the following areas for improvement: - 1. Lack of a formal and documented i...

AI summary CLEAResult identifies four areas for improvement in incentive-setting methodology: lack of formal process, outdated market penetration analysis, absence of TRM documents, and lack of short-term cost-effectiveness tools. Recommendations are provided to address these gaps.

Cost Effectiveness Testing p. p. 146
Cost Effectiveness Testing As detailed in D.14-10-046 8 , the CPUC has interpreted its mandate to deliver cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation programs as meaning that all energy efficiency portfolios of delivery agents should...

AI summary The CPUC mandates cost-effective energy efficiency programs, using TRC and PAC tests. California's Standard Practice Manual and Energy Efficiency Policy Manual guide evaluations, comparing avoided generation costs against program costs. DEER database and E3's model support measure-level and portfolio testing.

Disclaimer: These summaries were generated by AI from the filings they describe. We take care to make them accurate, but errors are possible - and they aren't advice. Only the filings themselves are the record: if you're relying on something here, confirm it against the source documents or the Nova Scotia Energy Board's own record. Full disclaimer →