E-10-(i)Book of Authorities
21 passages
- [1] What initiatives should be taken to encourage electricity consumers in Nova Scotia to conserve and efficiently use electrical energy? How should such initiatives be paid for? Who should pay for them? How should the savings be measure...
AI summary The text discusses the importance of demand-side management (DSM) in Nova Scotia, emphasizing its role in reducing electricity consumption, delaying infrastructure costs, and supporting environmental goals. It highlights the need for careful planning and analysis to ensure DSM initiatives are effective and affordable for consumers.
emand-side management programs with a view to restraining electricity demand and use; and - (b) may engage in energy efficiency and conservation programs other than electricity demand-side management. - 31 (1) Subject to the approval of th...
AI summary The ENSC Act outlines Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation's (ENSC) authority to manage demand-side programs and energy efficiency initiatives. It mandates the Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (NSUARB) to approve annual assessments, oversee cost allocation between programs, and supervise ENSC's compliance. Key provisions include program submission requirements, just-and-reasonable cost allocation, and the NSUARB's supervisory role.
4.3 Cost Allocation [76] Avon recommended the Board reduce the costs directly assigned to the large industrial class from $1.473 Million to $1.01 Million. In its Closing Submission Avon stated: The 2012 program costs that have been assigne...
AI summary Avon recommended reducing costs assigned to large industrial customers, citing a lack of evidence supporting their participation in efficiency programs. The Consumer Advocate argued that cost allocation for enabling strategies was inequitable, as residential ratepayers bore a disproportionate share of the costs despite limited access to DSM spending.
5.5 Integrated Multi-Fuels Mandate [117] ENSC noted that the Province is in the process of changing its mandate and future responsibilities: With the expectation that ENSC will obtain a multi-fuels mandate in time for integration with 2012...
AI summary ENSC is transitioning to an integrated multi-fuels mandate to streamline programs, avoid cross-subsidization, and align with 2012 DSM initiatives. Concerns include overlapping DSM administrators, cost allocation for shared services, and preventing electricity ratepayer subsidization of non-electricity users. ENSC plans to submit its reorganization plan for Board approval in 2011.
5.5.1 Findings [125] The Board understands that ENSC's mandate is being expanded to manage non-electricity efficiency programs. Some transition is already underway and formal negotiations are to be concluded in the near future. ENSC, at th...
AI summary ENSC is expanding its mandate to manage non-electricity efficiency programs but lacks a formal policy to track time and costs. The Board shares intervenors' concerns about delays and potential cross-subsidization, ordering ENSC to submit its policy by September 30, 2011.
- [15] The Board is to determine the activities to be undertaken, and NSPI is to undertake the activities by virtue of an agreement for a three year term with the franchise holder, approved by the Board ( PUA ss. 79(H), 79(I), and 79(J))....
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (Board) directs Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) to undertake demand-side management (DSM) activities under a three-year agreement with E1 (formerly the first franchise holder). Spending limits are set by the Public Utilities Act (PUA) and the Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring (2014) Act (EECR Act), with recovery deferred over eight years. The Board's approval of funding and charges is governed by PUA sections 79R and 79Q.
3.11 Compliance with Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring (2014) Act [122] Section 79J of the PUA contemplates that E1 and NSPI will enter into an agreement for electricity efficiency and conservation. That implies to the...
AI summary The Board emphasizes the obligation under the PUA for E1 and NSPI to negotiate an electricity efficiency agreement in good faith. The proceeding became unnecessarily litigious, particularly over the DSM budget, leading to high costs and extensive evidence. Despite eventual agreement via the Consensus Agreement, the Board criticizes the lack of early resolution and the burden on ratepayers.
2) ESTABLISHMENT OF A RESERVE FUND - a) In lieu of development of a DSM reserve fund, the Parties agree they will not challenge EfficiencyOne's ability to apply on an expedited basis to the Board for recovery of funds to address extraordin...
AI summary Parties agree not to challenge EfficiencyOne's expedited fund recovery for extraordinary circumstances if mitigation efforts are made. Surplus from the three-year contract will be returned to NS Power for ratepayers. The clause does not waive participation rights in such applications.
4) COST ALLOCATION - a) The Parties agree to collaboratively work to develop new DSM cost allocation and DSM cost recovery models to be submitted by October 31, 2015 for approval or Decision by the Board, or within a reasonable period of t...
AI summary Parties agree to collaboratively develop DSM cost allocation and recovery models by October 31, 2015, for Board approval. Key items include 2015/2016-2018 DSM cost allocation, a 2014 rate-smoothing adjustment, and mid-course adjustments. Nova Scotia Power retains discretion to apply to the UARB regarding DSM cost accounting treatment.
on. These assertions were supported by Central's evidence that the Board accepted as factual. Consequently, the foregone vendor discounts and incremental costs should be added to the disturbance loss.
AI summary The Province argues that foregone vendor discounts and incremental costs should be included in disturbance loss calculations, citing Central's evidence accepted as factual by the Board.
Mr. MacINTOSH: Thank you. So when you're writing this email to Mr. Smith and you're talking about, "We believe it's a benefit for both parties to advance expropriation" and so on, that was a successful delay tactic on the part of the depar...
AI summary The Board ruled that interest under the Expropriation Act should commence when the owner ceased productive use of land due to expropriation steps, not the expropriation date. The Province appeals, citing Partition Holdings Ltd. v. Ontario, but the Board's interpretation aligns with Cory J.A.'s reasoning on fairness and statutory wording.
- [818] For vendor discounts, PwC stated that Central estimated an additional two years before they would have an additional facility at Lower South River to allow them to do the necessary bulk buys. Using the average lost vendor discounts...
AI summary Central's cross-appeal regarding future losses involves PwC's estimates of vendor discounts, operating, and capital costs tied to a second facility. The Board rejected these claims as too speculative, citing insufficient evidence and excessive reliance on estimates. PwC argued costs were necessary due to expropriation, while the Province's expert disputed their reasonableness.
- 7 The discretion of the Court with respect to costs is not disturbed by the provisions of the statute referred to, although the principle above stated must be kept foremost in mind. In a case such as this one the Court should give effect...
AI summary The Court allocates costs in a regulatory proceeding, awarding Central 80% of its reasonable costs for the Province's exhaustive appeal, while Central bears its own costs for the dismissed cross-appeal. The decision references statutory principles, prior cases ( A.M. Souter , Johnson ), and the Board's role in cost calculation.
r the deposit of the expropriation document in the registry of deeds; - (c) any increase or decrease in the value of the land resulting from the anticipation of expropriation by the expropriating authority or from any knowledge or expectat...
AI summary The text discusses statutory requirements for expropriation compensation, emphasizing the need to claim compensation as of the expropriation date. Provincial employees acted promptly to acquire adjacent properties to manage costs, while Mr. Smith acknowledged potential compensation opportunities, including a 2002 mobile park development involving Mr. Arsenault.
Offer to registered owner if no agreement - 13 (1) In this Section, "registered owner" means a known registered owner. - (2) Where no agreement as to compensation has been made with the owner, the expropriating authority shall, within nine...
AI summary The section outlines procedures for expropriating authorities to serve registered owners with compensation offers if no agreement is reached. Key requirements include serving a copy of expropriation documents, a compensation offer based on market value appraisals, and timelines for service. Failure to serve within 90 days triggers interest charges on unpaid compensation.
- (2) Subject to subsection (4) of Section 13, the date for possession shall be at least three months after the date of the serving of the offer required by Section 13 - [406] The interplay between these provisions is explained by the Supr...
AI summary The text discusses the legal interpretation of land possession timelines post-expropriation offers, citing the Supreme Court of Canada's Judson decision and contrasting Nova Scotia's expropriation laws with Ontario's. It emphasizes mandatory interest from the expropriation document's deposit date and highlights differences in legislative schemes between provinces.
Liability for costs and expenses of valuation - 31 (1) Where a valuation is ordered by the Board under this Act, the Board may order that all costs and expenses of counsel, engineers, valuators, clerks, stenographers and other assistants r...
AI summary The Board may order public utilities to pay valuation-related costs, including legal and professional fees, and may charge these expenses to the utility's capital account. This is outlined in R.S., c. 380, s. 31.
Spending and cost-recovery for activities of franchise holder - 79R (1) In making an order approving electricity efficiency and conservation activities pursuant to Section 79Q, the Board shall approve the amount that the franchise holder m...
AI summary The Board approves spending and cost recovery for electricity efficiency activities, capping at $35M adjusted by Efficiency Nova Scotia's 2013 over-recovery. Recovery is deferred over eight years, with performance requirements and payment terms outlined. The EECR Act (2014, c.5, s.15) is referenced.
Allocation of costs recoverable 79S The Board may, when approving an application made pursuant to Section 79L or 79Q, determine the manner in which any costs recoverable by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated from its customers must be allocate...
AI summary The Board has authority to allocate costs recoverable by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) from customers under Sections 79L and 79Q, considering the Rate Smoothing Adjustment from its 2014 order (c. 5, s. 15). This determines how costs are distributed among customers.
Electricity Demand-side Management Fund addressed 79T Notwithstanding Sections 28 to 30 of the Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation Act , any surplus or deficit relating to the Electricity Demand-side Management Fund established pursuant to...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Board) has authority under the Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation Act (ENSC Act) to manage surpluses or deficits in the Electricity Demand-side Management Fund, overriding sections 28-30 of the Act. This provision was enacted in 2014, c. 5, s. 15.
Public Service Superannuation Act - 10 (1) For all purposes of the Public Service Superannuation Act , each full-time member and each full-time employee of the Board is and is deemed to be a person employed in the public service of the Pro...
AI summary The Public Service Superannuation Act designates full-time members and employees of the Board as public service employees. Salary deductions are directed by the Governor in Council, paid to the Minister of Finance, and allocated to the Superannuation Fund. The Board covers payments from the Consolidated Fund for superannuation allowances.
E-13-(i)Book of Authorities
7 passages
ompany might be moved to speculate in nondepreciable property or result in the company being motivated to identify and sell existing properties where appreciation has already occurred. [paras. 112-13] The Board went on to conclude that the...
AI summary The Board concluded that sharing the net gain from the sale of land and buildings using the TransAlta Formula was equitable. From the gross proceeds of $6,550,000, ATCO received $465,000 for costs, shareholders received $2,014,690, and customers received $4,070,310, with specific allocations to different customer groups.
2.3.3.2 Rate Setting 63 Rate regulation serves several aims — sustainability, equity and efficiency — which underlie the reasoning as to how rates are fixed: 62 . . . the regulated company must be able to finance its operations, and any re...
AI summary Rate regulation aims to balance sustainability, equity, and efficiency, ensuring utilities can operate while limiting excessive shareholder returns. The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) regulates energy resources and utility tariffs, emphasizing fair pricing for consumers. The text references a 1999 manual on utility price controls and highlights the AEUB's role in overseeing Alberta's energy and utility sectors.
and buildings collectively in accordance with the TransAlta Formula is equitable in the circumstances of this application and is consistent with past Board decisions. [Emphasis added; paras. 112-14.] The Court was advised that the two-thir...
AI summary The Commission's decision to apply the TransAlta Formula, allocating two-thirds of costs to ratepayers, is deemed equitable and consistent with prior rulings. The Court noted this allocation would be factored into ATCO's rate calculations to offset amortized costs over time.
re any interest, legal or equitable, in the property used to provide the service or in the funds of the owner of the utility" (para. 2). In SoCalGas , the regulator disposed of this point as follows: No one seriously argues that ratepayers...
AI summary The text discusses the confiscatory effect in utility regulation, arguing that ratepayers do not own utility assets but should benefit from gains on asset sales. It emphasizes that tariffs must cover operating costs and provide reasonable returns without adjusting for past profits or losses. The New York Telephone case is noted as irrelevant to this specific issue.
Base tarifaire 90(1) Pour fixer des tarifs, des taux ou des charges justes et raisonnables, ou leurs barèmes, opposables au propriétaire d'une entreprise de services public et applicables par lui, la Commission établit une base tarifaire p...
AI summary The text outlines the process for establishing a fair rate base for public utilities in Alberta, considering factors like initial costs, depreciation, working capital, and ensuring a just return for owners. The Commission evaluates these elements to determine equitable rates and charges applicable to public utility owners.
ngs before this Board are not the kind of costs which are customarily awarded by "a superior court of record". In the normal course of events, the court, after hearing a lis inter partes adjudicates
AI summary The Board clarifies that certain costs are not typically awarded by superior courts of record, emphasizing the distinction between its jurisdiction and that of courts in lis inter partes proceedings. The analysis focuses on procedural and jurisdictional boundaries in regulatory cost allocations.
7, as amended, ss. 45(3) and 73; Tax Court of Canada Act, 1980-81-82-83 (Can.), c. 158, as amended, ss. 13, 18, and 20(1); Dominion Controverted Elections Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-28, ss. 40 and 72. or any other work effecting a public inter...
AI summary Section 29.6 outlines the Board's authority to direct pipeline diversion or relocation for public interest or drainage system interference, requiring compliance with sections 29.1-29.5. Section 75.21 addresses cost allocation for such actions, including reimbursement for representations made to the Board. Procedures and cost recovery mechanisms are emphasized.