N-1Application
4 passages
1 Q11. WHAT ARE YOUR OVERALL CONCLUSIONS? 2 A11. Good utility practice is critical to ensure that the bulk power system is able to generate and 3 deliver energy to customers and should be encouraged. NSPML should not be penalized 4 for pla...
AI summary NSPML qualifies for relief from the holdback mechanism as conditions for termination are met, with Nova Scotians receiving 140% of contractual energy volumes. The Maritime Link delivered $495MM in renewable energy, exceeding NSPML's costs. The Board's traditional oversight mechanisms are deemed sufficient for asset management and energy procurement.
25 Q12. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE HOLDBACK MECHANISM. 26 A12. The holdback mechanism was implemented by the Board in a September 11, 2017, decision 27 regarding the application of NSPML for approval of an interim cost assessment and 1 approval t...
AI summary The holdback mechanism, established in 2017 by the Board, ensures ratepayer protection by withholding funds from NSPML/NS Power until 90% of energy delivery targets are met. Adjusted in 2022 to $2 million monthly, it funds replacement energy costs if targets are unmet, with a review planned for 2023. This mechanism addresses uncertainty in energy deliveries from the Labrador-Island Link.
13 Q13. DID THE BOARD PROVIDE A STATED PURPOSE FOR THE HOLDBACK 14 MECHANISM? 15 A13. Yes. In 2019, the Board noted that the holdback was put in place "to provide an incentive 16 to ensure that NSPML and NS Power achieved the promised bene...
AI summary The Board established the holdback mechanism in 2019 to incentivize NSPML and NS Power to deliver promised benefits of the Maritime Link before the NS Block. Subsequent 2022-2023 proceedings emphasized addressing imbalances between NSPML and ratepayers, who faced replacement energy costs due to poor deliveries, while addressing intergenerational equity concerns.
itment to 17 maintaining its assets in a proactive and preventative manner in accordance with good 18 utility practice. In fact, the Maritime Link has exceeded 99% monopole availability since 19 2020. 20 Without an allowance for planned ou...
AI summary The Maritime Link has achieved over 99% monopole availability since 2020. NSPML argues that without accounting for planned outages, it cannot meet termination criteria for the Holdback Mechanism, leading to ongoing under-recovery of prudently incurred costs, while customers receive energy on time under the ECA terms.
N-4NSPML (IG) RIRs 1-26 - Redacted
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PARTIALLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 Importantly, the Board's past decisions have been very consistent in terms of disallowances 2 matching harm to customers. At the start of the Holdback process, there was little question 3 that the extent of delays...
AI summary The Board's past decisions consistently disallowed customer harm from delays, with Make-up Energy deliveries post-LIL commissioning showing negligible or slightly positive impacts. NSPML asserts that Make-up Energy has provided customer benefits, supported by a Similar Value Analysis and replacement cost reviews, with no negative impact from contractual remedies.
PARTIALLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 While NSPML does not consider Holdback issues while planning outages, the design of 26 Application, NSPML has requested termination of the holdback mechanism and, in the 27 alternative if the Board determines that...
AI summary NSPML has requested the termination of the holdback mechanism and, if it continues, a separate mitigation process. The application seeks approximately $16.5 million, including deferred interest and WACC calculations. The Board is asking for explanations regarding the interest claim and verification of the figures in Appendix B.
NSPML Responses to Industrial Group Information Requests 1 exists for specific reasons, and those reasons no longer existed. NSPML submits that 24 a) The ~$15 million in holdback has been recorded as a revenue by NSPML in the applicable 25...
AI summary NSPML explains that the release of a holdback would not affect its income statement, revenue requirement, return on equity, or WACC calculation. The holdback is treated as a return of equity, reducing average equity thickness slightly. It also notes that the release would not impact debt service coverage ratios, loan covenants, or FAM reporting.
stions from Interconnection Customer about the conduct of the contest, and shall reasonably permit Interconnection Customer or an Interconnection Customer representative to attend contest proceedings. Interconnection Customer shall pay to...
AI summary The text outlines obligations between an Interconnection Customer and Transmission Provider regarding cost recovery for legal contests. The Interconnection Customer must reimburse documented costs incurred by the Transmission Provider during appeals or protests. Settlements require either customer consent or approval from tax counsel, with liability relief if settlements occur without consent.
5.19 Modification. 5.19.1 General. Either Party may undertake modifications to its facilities. If a Party plans to undertake a modification that reasonably may be expected to affect the other Party's facilities, that Party shall provide to...
AI summary Section 5.19 outlines procedures for facility modifications under a JOA, requiring advance notice, confidentiality, and cost allocation rules. Modifications must comply with LGIA and Good Utility Practice. Interconnection Customer is not liable for Transmission Provider's modification costs but must cover their own necessary upgrades.
ion Customer to reschedule its maintenance as necessary to maintain the reliability of the Transmission System; provided, however, adequacy of generation supply shall not be a criterion in determining Transmission System reliability. Trans...
AI summary The Transmission Provider may require an Interconnection Customer to reschedule maintenance to ensure Transmission System reliability, excluding generation supply adequacy as a reliability criterion. Compensation is mandated for additional costs incurred by the customer, excluding cases where the customer modified maintenance schedules within the prior 12 months.
11.4 Transmission Credits. 11.4.1 Repayment of Amounts Advanced for Network Upgrades. Interconnection Customer shall be entitled to a cash repayment, equal to the total amount paid to Transmission Provider and Affected System Operator, if...
AI summary The section outlines a repayment mechanism for Interconnection Customers who paid for Network Upgrades. Repayment equals payments made to Transmission Providers and Affected System Operators, excluding refunds under Article 5.17.8. Interest is calculated per FERC regulations (18 C.F.R. § 35.19a(a)(2)(iii)) from payment dates until repayment. Rights may be assigned to third parties.
Article 12. Invoice 12.1 General. Each Party shall submit to the other Party, on a monthly basis, invoices of amounts due for the preceding month. Each invoice shall state the month to which the invoice applies and fully describe the servi...
AI summary Article 12 outlines invoicing procedures between parties under the LGIA, including monthly billing, netting of mutual debts, final invoices post-construction, payment timelines, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Transmission Provider must issue detailed final invoices and refund overpayments, while disputes require escrow arrangements and interest calculations per FERC regulations.
N-8Evidence - CA
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IV. Ratepayer Responsibility for Paying Accrued WACC - Q: Please summarize NSPML's request to recover accrued WACC. - A: NSPML requests "updated WACC consideration to the date of the Board's Decision."[29](#page-8-1) The - total amount dep...
AI summary NSPML requests recovery of accrued WACC up to the Board's decision date, citing $1.1M by 2025. It argues WACC is a standard financing mechanism and that customers would not pay it twice. The delay in filing was due to staffing constraints and reliance on third-party data from NLH and NS Power.
Q: Why might the Board wish to consider a different approach? - A: The Board may wish to consider whether NSPML recovering full WACC on deferred balances reflects risk-appropriate compensation. Where a utility's regulatory receivable is es...
AI summary The Board may consider using a debt-only carrying charge instead of WACC for NSPML's deferred balances, as the regulatory receivable is a risk-free asset. This approach is common in North American jurisdictions and aligns with recent financing arrangements involving Nova Scotia Power. The 21-month delay in recovery is seen as unusual, and the Board has discretion to apply this alternative method.
Q: What is your recommendation? - A: I recommend that the Board direct release of the Holdback as discussed in Section III plus a carrying charge calculated at NSPML's approved cost of debt through the date of the Board Decision on this ma...
AI summary The respondent recommends releasing the Holdback with a carrying charge calculated at NSPML's approved cost of debt, reduced by $270,000 due to a 21-month delay. This adjustment aims to reflect the deferred costs associated with the delayed application.
SUMMARY OF PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - 2023– Present Vice President, Grid Strategies, LLC . Provides research, technical assistance, and expert testimony on electric- and gas-utility planning, economics, and regulation. Reviews electric util...
AI summary The individual has extensive experience in utility regulation, energy efficiency, and renewable energy, including roles at Grid Strategies, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, and Resource Insight. They have provided expert testimony, designed programs, and evaluated resource planning and procurement strategies for regulated and competitive markets.
EXPERT TESTIMONY - 2008 South Carolina PSC Docket No. 2007-358-E, surrebuttal testimony on behalf of Environmental Defense, the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy and the Southern Environmental L...
AI summary Expert testimony from 2008–2010 details advocacy for energy efficiency cost recovery mechanisms (shareholder incentives, lost revenue adjustments) and evaluation of integrated resource plans by SACE, Environmental Defense, and allied organizations in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia regulatory proceedings.
102699Submission - IG
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LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK The Maritime Link Act , SNS 2012, c 9 (the " ML Act "), and the Maritime Link Cost Recovery Process Regulations , NS Reg 189/2012 (the " ML Regulations "), establish an approval mechanism by which NSPML recovers its c...
AI summary The legislative framework outlines the Maritime Link Act and ML Regulations , establishing how NSPML recovers costs from NSPI and ratepayers. The Board has broad jurisdiction and imposed conditions on cost recovery to ensure fairness and consistency, including the Holdback as a customer-protection measure.
d to pay for replacement cost energy would be paid over to NSPML. This holdback mechanism will continue in each and every month during 2022 and then will be reviewed by the Board in January of 2023. [32] The fact that today's customers are...
AI summary The document discusses the holdback mechanism implemented by Nova Scotia Power Maritime Link (NSPML) to address intergenerational equity concerns related to the Maritime Link project. The holdback is intended to ensure that current customers contribute to the replacement cost of energy, with the mechanism being reviewed by the Board in 2023. The Board believes this approach will not jeopardize NSPML's ability to service its federal loan-guaranteed debt.
[Emphasis added] The $2 million holdback continued following the 2023 cost assessment proceeding.[5](#page-3-0) Separately, the Board initiated a proceeding, Matter M11009, to consider the disposition of the Holdback in all months during 2...
AI summary The document discusses the $2 million holdback following the 2023 cost assessment proceeding and the Board's initiation of Matter M11009 to address the disposition of the holdback. The Board directed the crediting of $12 million to ratepayers, increased the monthly holdback, and established conditions for termination, including consistent performance and relief provisions under exceptional circumstances.
CONSISTENT PERFORMANCE HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED OVER THE COMPLIANCE PERIOD The Industrial Group notes the importance of examining the full picture of the 12-month Compliance Period in determining whether the multiple failures in delivery, inc...
AI summary The Industrial Group argues that NSPML has not consistently met delivery performance thresholds over the 12-month Compliance Period, with significant underdeliveries, and that terminating the Holdback would be unreasonable given ongoing performance issues and the financial burden on ratepayers. They emphasize the need for continued compliance before removing protections.
NO INTEREST ON POST-COMPLIANCE PERIOD HOLDBACK AMOUNTS In the alternative, should the Board find that the evidence supports termination of the Holdback effective May 1, 2024, the Industrial Group submits that NSPML should not be entitled t...
AI summary The Industrial Group argues that NSPML should not recover interest on post-compliance holdback funds due to its delayed application. NSPML delayed filing its application for over 20 months, leading to over $15.3 million in withheld funds and over $1 million in accumulated interest. The Industrial Group claims this delay is unreasonable and should not be compensated by ratepayers.
CONCLUSION The Industrial Group respectfully requests that the Board: - 1. Reject NSPML's request to terminate the Holdback retroactively to May 2024 on the basis that: - (a) NSPML has not demonstrated full compliance with the Board's hold...
AI summary The Industrial Group requests the Board to reject NSPML's retroactive termination of the Holdback due to non-compliance with conditions and lack of justification for relief. Alternatively, if termination is granted, they argue that NSPML should not receive WACC on post-Compliance Period holdback amounts due to delays in the application.