Topic:"Cybersecurity" in M12623

Version History Version Date Action Change Tracking (New, Errata or Revisions) 1.6.1 Functional Entities (Responsible Entities)4 1.6.2 Applicability of NPCC Criteria4 2Defined Terms 5 3 NERC ERO Reliability Standard Requirements 5 4NPCC Re...

AI summary The document outlines version history and various sections related to reliability standards and compliance requirements under the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NPCC). It includes appendices and attachments detailing monitoring procedures, reserve calculations, and contingency measures.

5.4 Criteria for Dependability and Security - 5.4.1 The thermal capability of all RAS components shall be rated to withstand the maximum short time, long time and continuous loading of the associated protected elements . - 5.4.2 Position o...

AI summary This section outlines criteria for dependability and security in the RAS , emphasizing the thermal capability of components, monitoring of control devices that can disable the RAS , and continuous monitoring of network elements used in the RAS to ensure system reliability.

nts, signal noise or high resistance contact bridging. - 2.4.4 RAS , including intelligent electronic devices ( IED s) and communication systems used for protection , should comply with applicable industry standards for utility grade prote...

AI summary The text discusses the need for RAS (Remedial Action Scheme) and IED s (Intelligent Electronic Devices) to comply with industry standards for utility-grade protection systems, ensuring reliable operation in harsh substation environments.

2.6 Operating Time of a RAS Adequate time margin should be provided taking into account study inaccuracies, differences in equipment, and protection operating times. - Network configurations that impact the delivery or latency of GOOSE mes...

AI summary The operating time of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) must account for study inaccuracies and equipment differences. Network configurations affecting GOOSE message delivery in one RAS Group should not impact the redundant RAS Group unless studies confirm acceptable clearing times. GOOSE message configuration is critical for protection during events.

2.11 Battery and Direct Current (DC) Supply - 2.11.1 The circuitry between each battery and its first protective device cannot be protected and therefore should be designed so as to minimize the possibility of electrical short circuit. - 2...

AI summary The text outlines technical requirements for battery and DC supply systems, emphasizing circuit design to prevent short circuits and voltage regulation to ensure stable power delivery. It also highlights the importance of testing firmware and automation software in an off-line environment and ensuring interoperability of IEDs in substations.

5.3 Criteria for Security A RAS [Type I or Type II] shall be designed to avoid cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations. , due to unintended operati...

AI summary This section outlines the criteria for the design and operation of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), focusing on security, dependability, and reliability. It specifies requirements to prevent cascading failures, ensures proper monitoring of control devices, and sets standards for power supply and tripping capabilities.

2.6 Operating Time of a RAS Adequate time margin should be provided taking into account study inaccuracies, differences in equipment, and protection operating times. - Network configurations that impact the delivery or latency of GOOSE mes...

AI summary The operating time of a RAS must account for study inaccuracies and equipment differences. Network configurations affecting GOOSE message delivery in one RAS Group should not disrupt the redundant RAS Group, unless studies confirm acceptable clearing times. GOOSE message configuration for protection must meet specified maximum clearing times.