HomeDcrrM12780Evidence
Topic/Matter Intersection

Topic:"Dcrr" in M12780

Matter: EfficiencyOne - 2027-2031 Demand Side Management (DSM) Plan Application
21 passages 11 documents

Dcrr across all matters →

E-7E1 (CA) RIRs 1-19 1 passage
Section 25 p. p. 20
ticipation impacts. This lack of standardization limits the ability to make reliable, like-for-like comparisons of outcomes or strategic priorities. DATE FILED: May 28, 2026 E1 (CA) IR-14 Page 2 of 2 Request IR-15: Reference: Evidence, pag...

AI summary E1 proposes adjusting spending thresholds for program changes, prompting questions about budget management, historical spending, BNI sector volatility, and the absence of a sector-level spending collar.

E-9E1 (IG) RIRs 1-29 1 passage
Response IR-09: p. p. 19
Response IR-09: (a) EfficiencyOne (E1) was referring to the certainty that E1's spending for the proposed 2027– 2031 DSM Preferred Plan is limited to the investment approved by the Nova Scotia Energy Board (NSEB). To provide more certainty...

AI summary EfficiencyOne (E1) outlines its approach to the 2027–2031 DSM Preferred Plan, emphasizing spending certainty through the Mid-Course Adjustment (MCA) process with a 15% variance threshold and enhanced rate class reporting. E1 integrates rate class assessments into forecasting and budgeting but does not propose hard caps on spending. Surplus from the 2023–2026 DSM Plan will inform the Balance Adjustment (BA) in NS Power's Cost Recovery Rider.

E-12E1 (NSEB) RIRs 1-66 - Redacted 2 passages
E1 Responses to Nova Scotia Energy Board (NSEB) Information Requests NON-CONFIDENTIAL p. p. 3
E1 Responses to Nova Scotia Energy Board (NSEB) Information Requests NON-CONFIDENTIAL 1 affordability is the appropriate course at this time. E1 wishes to be clear that this 2 constrained investment level is a response to specific and extr...

AI summary E1 acknowledges constrained DSM investment due to economic conditions but reaffirms long-term commitment to Base-level DSM (1.2% load savings) aligned with the IRP. They provide an estimated PCR for the 2027–2031 DSM Plan, noting it is subject to change upon NS Power's DCRR filing.

19 Table 1: Metrics in 2023-2025 DSM Plan Application p. p. 3
19 Table 1: Metrics in 2023-2025 DSM Plan Application Column in 2023-2025 DSM Plan Application Attachment 4 Explanation 22 DCRR process. The DCRR includes a Balance Adjustment, which will be informed by E1's 23 surplus for 2027–2031 based...

AI summary The text discusses the DCRR process, which includes a Balance Adjustment informed by E1's surplus for 2027–2031, reported to NS Power and included in the 2028 DCRR. Adjustments are made by both NS Power and E1.

E-15E1 (SNS) RIRs 1-15 1 passage
Response IR-12: p. p. 5
portfolio that remains cost-effective in aggregate. Second, measures that fail the cost-effectiveness test require explicit justification , reinforcing scrutiny of marginal or high-cost offerings. (f) The 2027–2031 DSM Plan establishes a s...

AI summary The 2027–2031 DSM Plan mandates cost-effectiveness for E1, linking spending to savings outcomes through fixed performance targets, customer incentives, and mid-course adjustments (MCA). It emphasizes budget reallocation, regulatory oversight, and accountability to ensure savings obligations are met efficiently while pursuing lower-cost opportunities.

E-22Evidence - NSPI 5 passages
High Level Assessment of E1's Preferred Plan p. p. 7
years, producing 29.3 MW of available capacity, representing less than one percent for a system with 2,460 MW peak, with a levelized unit cost of $240.1/kW-year and a PAC result of 1.7.[5](#page-8-0) The Plan's DR proposal also demonstrate...

AI summary The document assesses E1's Preferred Plan, highlighting concerns about the low PAC result for residential demand response and the exclusion of strategic electrification due to failure to meet the Board's modified PAC test. It argues for greater accountability, performance obligations, and improved program design for DR and SE to ensure they contribute effectively to system reliability and cost reduction.

Affordability of E1's Preferred Plan p. p. 10
4. 13 Mike Specian and Alex Aquino, Faster and Cheaper: Demand-Side Solutions for Rapid Load Growth , ACEEE, February 2026, p. 33. shifts toward deeper and more complex measures such as building envelope upgrades, heat pumps, and custom co...

AI summary E1 highlights increased costs for its DSM plan due to higher first-year costs for complex measures, reduced savings from residential heat pumps, and inflationary pressures. E1 argues that while some factors are unique to Nova Scotia, the higher cost of delivering energy savings compared to other jurisdictions remains unexplained. The Board is urged to evaluate the plan's affordability at two levels: total portfolio revenue requirement and resource allocation within the budget.

B. Recommended Path Forward in Demand Response p. p. 19
xtreme weather, and hedge against uncertainty in load growth and generation buildout. Those attributes make DR directly relevant to affordability and reliability, not just to DSM portfolio accounting. The distinction between DR and traditi...

AI summary The text emphasizes the importance of developing a mature demand response (DR) market, highlighting that DR is crucial for affordability and reliability, unlike traditional energy efficiency (EE). It criticizes E1's limited and passive approach to residential DR and suggests adopting strategies like those used by the Ontario IESO to improve performance and cost-effectiveness.

1. Strategic electrification can be a beneficial DSM resource when it is targeted, controlled, and coordinated with system planning. p. p. 23
nstance, it is very important to model the impact of SE measures on an hourly basis, as the "strategic" or beneficial aspect of SE programs are about not adding incremental load during the peak hours. Successful cost-effectiveness outcomes...

AI summary Strategic electrification (SE) can be a beneficial demand-side management (DSM) resource when designed with flexibility to avoid peak load impacts. Programs like EV managed charging and electric water heating can shift loads to off-peak hours, improving grid utilization and deferring costly infrastructure investments. E1 must redesign SE programs to align with proven system benefits as the electricity system evolves.

2. Treatment of Demand Response p. p. 37
2. Treatment of Demand Response - Treat DR as a valuable dispatchable system capacity resource, not merely as another customer-facing DSM program. - Require E1 to expand and improve residential DR rather than pause new enrollment and wait...

AI summary The text emphasizes the importance of treating Demand Response (DR) as a key system capacity resource, not just a DSM program. It calls for expanding residential DR, improving performance reporting, and learning from successful programs like Ontario's Peak Perks. It also highlights the need for E1 to update its DR studies and avoid substituting BNI DR for a robust residential DR strategy.

E-23Evidence - Synapse 3 passages
Q. Do you have any concerns about E1's demand response program proposal? p. p. 32
Q. Do you have any concerns about E1's demand response program proposal? - A. Yes. I identify major concerns regarding the following aspects of E1's demand response proposal: - E1's proposed residential demand response program offerings ha...

AI summary The respondent raises several concerns about E1's demand response program proposal, including low program cost-benefit ratios, high delivery costs, lack of process evaluation for phasing out certain programs, inconsistent performance weighting, and unequal incentives for different backup generator types.

PAC benefit-cost ratios and avoided costs p. pp. 32-33
PAC benefit-cost ratios and avoided costs - Q. Please explain your concerns about the cost-effectiveness of the residential demand response programs based on the PAC test. - A. In the 2026 Extension of E1's DSM program, my colleague Jennif...

AI summary The respondent is concerned about the cost-effectiveness of E1's residential demand response program based on the Program Administrator Cost (PAC) test. E1's projections are inconsistent, with conflicting claims about when the program will achieve cost-effectiveness. The projected PAC benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for the 2027 program is expected to improve slightly compared to the 2026 extension.

Q. Do you recommend a specific alternative EV program design? p. pp. 40-41
Q. Do you recommend a specific alternative EV program design? A. Not at this time. A 2025 Rivian study using 2023 home-charging data from more than 5,000 vehicles found that EV owners actively scheduled charging to align with time-of-use t...

AI summary The response indicates that no specific alternative EV program design is recommended at this time, citing low customer participation in current EV demand-response designs. However, it highlights the potential of managed charging programs to achieve greater peak load reductions, referencing studies and data from National Grid Massachusetts.

E-24Evidence - SNS 2 passages
4.2 Smart Thermostats Illustrate the Missed Opportunity p. p. 6
4.2 Smart Thermostats Illustrate the Missed Opportunity This issue is especially clear with smart thermostats. EfficiencyOne plans to incentivize 121,039 smart thermostats over the Plan period, including 68,539 provided at no cost through...

AI summary EfficiencyOne plans to deploy a large number of smart thermostats but will not require them to participate in demand response, despite their potential. Solar Nova Scotia argues that making these devices demand-response capable would provide significant benefits and should be integrated into DR programming where feasible.

4.5 Recommended Direction for Demand Response p. p. 6
4.5 Recommended Direction for Demand Response Solar Nova Scotia recommends that the Board: - direct IESO Nova Scotia, as the Independent Energy System Operator responsible for resource procurement, to procure longer-term demand response an...

AI summary Solar Nova Scotia recommends that the Board direct IESO Nova Scotia to procure long-term demand response capacity, ensure DSM-funded devices are demand-response capable, and require EfficiencyOne to expand and optimize demand response programs, including reporting on performance metrics.

E-29CA (IG) RIR 1 to 5 3 passages
11 "… However, customers are already paying a DCRR, and even the IRP level of DSM 12 spending barely impacts the DCRR that customers are already paying." p. p. 5
11 "… However, customers are already paying a DCRR, and even the IRP level of DSM 12 spending barely impacts the DCRR that customers are already paying." 13 14 (a) Please quantify the assertion that the increase in investment "barely impac...

AI summary The text discusses concerns about the impact of the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP)-aligned scenario on the DCRR, asking for quantification of the claim that increased investment barely affects DCRR. It requests detailed breakdowns by customer class and explanations of assumptions and calculations.

6 Request IR-07: p. p. 5
6 Request IR-07: 7 Preamble: At pages 24–25 of Mr. Love's evidence (Tables 2 and 3), he presents the change in non-participant bills for the IRP-aligned scenario compared to E1's Preferred Plan. For the plan years 2027–2031, he shows incre...

AI summary The document requests clarification on the incremental DCRR cost for Large and Medium Industrial classes under the IRP-aligned scenario compared to the Preferred Plan, and whether the bill-impact analysis uses the Preferred Plan or a no-DSM counterfactual as the baseline.

26 Response IR-07: p. p. 5
26 Response IR-07: 27 28 (a) GEEG has not calculated the DCRR value. The percentages in Tables 2 and 3 are bill-29 impact percentages, not absolute-dollar DCRR charges. 30 31 (b) The percentage increases in Tables 2 and 3 represent the inc...

AI summary GEEG has not calculated the DCRR value, noting that the percentages in the tables represent bill impact percentages rather than absolute DCRR charges. The percentage increases reflect the incremental cost of the IRP scenario over the Preferred Plan.

102331Board letter re: Board only confidential/response 1 passage
Definitions for Act and regulations p. p. 2
Definitions for Act and regulations - 2 (1) In the Act, "general rate increase" does not include increases arising from the fuel adjustment mechanism, demand side management cost recovery riders or the special annually adjusted rates. - (2...

AI summary The Act defines 'general rate increase' to exclude increases from the fuel adjustment mechanism, demand side management cost recovery riders, and special annually adjusted rates. It also defines 'pay plan' as the Senior Officials Pay Plan approved under the Civil Service Act and Public Service Act.

102409Letter E1 re: Response to Board letter re confidentiality 1 passage
(b) Absence of Legislative Concern p. p. 0
(b) Absence of Legislative Concern Second, significant legislation weighing in favour of disclosing executive compensation information in the M10431 Decision does not apply in the present case. In the M10431 Decision, the Board's finding t...

AI summary The text argues that statutory obligations requiring NS Power to disclose executive compensation under the Public Utilities Act do not apply to E1, the DSM franchise holder. Key differences include E1's partial regulation and the exclusion of DSM cost recovery riders from 'general rate increases,' which triggers disclosure requirements. E1's compensation is only partially recoverable from ratepayers, unlike NS Power's fully regulated monopoly.

102579Letter NSPI re: requests that its third-party experts, Sanem Sergici and/or Sai Shetty of The Brattle Group, participate virtually 1 passage
SELECTED WHITEPAPERS AND REPORTS p. pp. 19-21
Success, with Nicole Irwin, prepared for Uplight (November 2019) - Incorporating Distributed Energy Resources into Resource Planning: Energy Efficiency , with Ryan Hledik, D.L. Oates, Tony Lee, and Jill Moraski, prepared for EPRI (May 2019...

AI summary The document lists several whitepapers and reports prepared by Success and Nicole Irwin for various organizations, including EPRI, Baltimore Gas & Electric, and the Maryland Public Utilities Commission. These reports cover topics such as distributed energy resources, DSM cost recovery, and alternative regulatory mechanisms for setting base rates.

Disclaimer: These summaries were generated by AI from the filings they describe. We take care to make them accurate, but errors are possible - and they aren't advice. Only the filings themselves are the record: if you're relying on something here, confirm it against the source documents or the Nova Scotia Energy Board's own record. Full disclaimer →