Topic:"Gas Utilities Act Gua" in M08888

Cases Cited By Bastarache J. Referred to: Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Decision 2001-65, July 31, 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Alta. E.U.B., Deci...

AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving ATCO's argument that allocating profits to customers is confiscatory. The court rejects this, noting that regulated utilities have rates set by regulators, not the market. The decision is prospective, not retroactive, and the Commission's authority to manage rates and monitor services is affirmed. The distinction between amortized and non-amortized assets is deemed less critical than ATCO claims.

Jurisprudence Citée par le juge Bastarache Arrêts mentionnés : Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Décision 2001-65, 31 juillet 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. c. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Cor...

AI summary The jurisprudence section cites multiple legal cases referenced by Judge Bastarache, including decisions from Alberta’s Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) and Public Utilities Board (PUBA), as well as Supreme Court of Canada rulings. Key cases involve utility regulation, energy disputes, and administrative law, highlighting precedents related to regulatory authority and utility company obligations.

of Calgary ("City") which argues that the Board can determine how to allocate the proceeds pursuant to its power to approve the sale and protect the public interest. I find this position unconvincing. this case, to allocate a portion of th...

AI summary The document analyzes whether the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) can allocate proceeds from a utility sale to rate-paying customers. It argues that AEUB's authority is limited by statutes like AEUBA, PUBA, and GUA, which prioritize rate-setting and consumer protection over broad distribution powers. The City of Calgary contends the Board can allocate proceeds, but the analysis concludes this position lacks legal foundation.

1.1 Overview of the Facts ATCO Gas - South ("AGS"), which is a division of ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. ("ATCO"), filed an application by letter with the Board pursuant to s. 25.1(2) (now s. 26(2)) of the GUA, for approval of the sale of it...

AI summary ATCO Gas - South applied to sell non-utility land in Calgary, arguing the sale would reduce rates by retiring the asset from the rate base. The Board considered the application without a hearing, while opposing parties contested the disposition of sale proceeds to shareholders.

torisation, elle avait conclu au respect de ce critère, mais n'avait alors tiré aucune conclusion concernant l'incidence sur les frais d'exploitation, notamment l'entente de location obtenue par ATCO. Puis, après avoir examiné les observat...

AI summary The Commission addressed the allocation of net gains from land and buildings, applying the TransAlta formula to distribute profits between customers and shareholders. It rejected arguments that non-use of buildings by the new owner negated the gain's value, emphasizing the need to balance customer affordability with investor returns while avoiding speculative behavior by utilities.

1.2.2 Court of Appeal of Alberta ((2004), 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 205, 2004 ABCA 3) ATCO appealed the Board's decision. It argued that the Board did not have any jurisdiction to allocate the proceeds of sale and that the proceeds should have b...

AI summary ATCO appealed a decision allocating proceeds from asset sales, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled in ATCO's favor, but the Commission later used the TransAlta formula to distribute proceeds between shareholders, clients, and expenses. The allocation included $4.07 million to clients, $2.01 million to shareholders, and $465,000 to ATCO for expenses.

u'appelle cette considération. Comme je l'explique plus loin, l'expertise de la Commission n'est pas mise à contribution lorsqu'elle se prononce sur l'étendue de ses pouvoirs. 2006 SCC 4 (CanLII) 28 Third, the present case is governed by t...

AI summary The case discusses the regulatory framework governed by PUBA, GUA, and AEUBA, emphasizing the Board's mandate to protect public interest through utility regulation. Section 26(2)(d)(i) of the GUA requires regulator approval for asset sales to ensure customer protection. Legal precedents like Atco Ltd. v. Calgary Power Ltd. and Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Public Utilities Board (Alberta) are cited to support the regulatory approach.

2.3.2 Explicit Powers: Grammatical and Ordinary Meaning As a preliminary submission, the City argues that given that ATCO applied to the Board for approval of both the sale transaction and the disposition of the proceeds of sale, this sugg...

AI summary The City argues that ATCO's application for sale approval implies Board jurisdiction over proceeds allocation, but this is rejected as the application alone does not confirm jurisdiction. Past cases show utility companies challenged the Board's authority to allocate sale proceeds, with references to multiple Board decisions (e.g., Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Re ATCO Gas-North ). The analysis focuses on statutory interpretation of GUA and AEUBA provisions.

2.3.2 Pouvoir explicite : sens grammatical et ordinaire La Ville soutient à titre préliminaire qu'en lui demandant d'autoriser la vente des biens et l'attribution du produit de l'opération, ATCO a reconnu le pouvoir de la Commission d'impo...

AI summary The City argues that ATCO's request for authorization implies the Commission's power to impose conditions on the sale of assets. However, the analysis rejects this, noting that past Commission decisions demonstrate its authority to regulate asset sales regardless of ATCO's claims. Key cases include Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. and Re ATCO Gas-North , which affirm the Commission's historical exercise of this power.

prestation du service ni à sa qualité. Par conséquent, la simple lecture du par. 26(2) de la GUA permet de conclure que la Commission n'a pas le pouvoir d'attribuer le produit de la vente d'un bien. La Ville ne fonde pas son argumentation...

AI summary The document analyzes whether the Commission has the authority to assign proceeds from asset sales under the GUA and AEUBA. The City argues that sections 26(2) of the GUA, 15(3) of the AEUBA, and article 37 of the PUBA grant this power. However, the analysis emphasizes that these provisions are ambiguous and should not confer absolute discretion on the Commission, citing legal precedents and statutory interpretation principles.

2.4 Autres considérations Dans le cadre du pacte réglementaire, les clients sont protégés par la procédure d'établissement des tarifs à l'issue de laquelle la Commission doit rendre une décision pondérée. Il appert du dossier que la Ville...

AI summary The regulatory process ensures client protection through a balanced rate-setting procedure. The City did not request approval for a general rate in response to ATCO's application to sell goods. However, the Commission could have initiated a hearing to establish fair rates under PUBA and GUA, considering the financial implications of the sale.

respect of the actual costs reasonably incurred by any person who made representations to the Board under this section and may direct by whom and to whom the amount so fixed shall be paid. • • • • • - 75.21(1) Where the amount of compensat...

AI summary Sections 29.6 and 75.21 govern cost allocation in regulatory proceedings. Section 29.6 allows the Board to fix costs after public hearings on pipeline projects, while 75.21 mandates cost reimbursement by companies if arbitration awards exceed 85% of offered compensation. The text argues that specific cost-allocating powers in legislation limit the Board's general jurisdiction.