Topic:"Prudence Reviews" in M12663

5 Figure 25 – Summary of intervenor submissions Party Position Summary of reasoning for position CA Opposes the request for temporary financial relief96 • The request is not supported by sufficient evidence (minimal financial detail and re...

AI summary The intervenors (CA, SBA, and IG) oppose the request for temporary financial relief. They argue that the proposed use of the Fuel Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) is inappropriate, lacks sufficient evidence, and shifts financial risks to customers. They also highlight inconsistencies with legislation, the lack of clarity in the proposal, and the existence of alternative financing options.

27 1 (iii) quantitative testing of underlying assumptions. 2 (c) Please clarify whether "satisfied" should be interpreted as acceptance of 3 arithmetic reasonableness only; or an opinion that costs are prudent, 4 necessary, optimal and eff...

AI summary The text includes requests for clarification regarding the interpretation of 'satisfied' in the context of cost evaluations, the impact of using unaudited actuals on assessments, and the scope of DGT's reasonableness review. It also references DGT's statements about audited financial statements and the focus of their procedures on accuracy and reasonableness.

Legal Framework The Board has consistently held that confidential treatment is the exception, not the rule, and that the burden rests solely on the party claiming it. Rule 12(1) of the Board Regulatory Rules 4131-3135-7547 Crystal Henwood...

AI summary The Board emphasizes that confidentiality is an exception, not the rule, and that the burden of proving it lies with the party requesting it. In past proceedings, such as M10431 and M12691, the Board ruled that executive compensation information should be publicly accessible to ensure transparency and alignment with public interest. This principle applies to U-8, as its disclosure would not pose significant harm.

ion, para. 8. [ 39 ](#page-26-7) Hearing Transcript, June 17, 2026, p.. 202-205; 258. [ 40 ](#page-26-9) Hearing Transcript, June 17, 2026, pp. 281-283. 1 discretion to then reallocate based on operational needs. This "robbing Peter to pay...

AI summary The CA is concerned that the IESO NS may engage in imprudent spending by reallocating underspent funds to other categories, potentially leading to over-spending. The CA also highlights the problematic approval of NB Power's RIGS facility before proper analysis and governance processes were in place, leading to significant risks for NB Power and its customers.

fuel procurement process. This is particularly the case since the FAM proposed by NSPI would transfer 100% of the risk to ratepayers. Accordingly, the Board rejects the proposed FAM...[7](#page-2-2) The Board did not foreclose the possibil...

AI summary The Board rejected the proposed Fuel Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) due to the risk it posed to ratepayers, emphasizing the need for a robust fuel procurement policy, transparency, and independent audits before considering such a mechanism in the future.

2. The Ontario precedent does not support IESO-NS's position. IESO-NS relies on the Ontario OEB's decision in EB-2015-0275 as authority for its narrow reading of s. 29(4). IESO-NS submits that the OEB did not exercise a power to disallow c...

AI summary IESO-NS cites an Ontario decision to argue that the Board cannot disallow costs or fix revenue requirements. However, the Industrial Group (IG) contends that the Ontario precedent is not applicable here, as the context was different and the OEB did exercise authority by modifying the fee structure. The IG argues that the Ontario OEB's actions contradict IESO-NS's claim that the Board has no front-end authority.

IESO NOVA SCOTIA PANEL 43 Cr-ex, (Murphy) lead items needed to be procured in advance. This is not uncommon for large generation facilities that are under development. [9:40:09] Q. Okay. But what risk if the NB Board didn't approve that pr...

AI summary The discussion revolves around the IESO's participation in a power project before NB Board approval, with concerns about potential financial exposure to ratepayers. The IESO's 20% involvement could have resulted in a potential $15 million loss if the project was not approved, but the IESO argues that the project's approval by the Energy and Utility Board mitigates this risk.

IESO NOVA SCOTIA PANEL 175 Cr-ex, (MacAdam) 1 undertake to investigate the difference between the 5.05 12 could make sure that we did have track of what we were 13 spending and that were trying to be prudent within our 14 regulatory allowa...

AI summary The discussion focuses on budget alignment between 2025/2026 and 2026/2027, noting that while the 2026/2027 budget is aligned with the previous one, there are concerns about unanticipated costs, such as IT expenses, that were not identified in the earlier budget. The speaker acknowledges the need for prudence in managing costs within regulatory allowances.