E-10-(i)Book of Authorities
54 passages
M08888 IN THE MATTER OF The Public Utilities Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380, as amended. - and - IN THE MATTER OF an Application by EfficiencyOne for Approval of the Use of Measure Level Non-Energy Benefits Within Cost Effectiveness Testing
AI summary The document pertains to a regulatory proceeding under the Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380, involving EfficiencyOne's application to approve the use of measure-level non-energy benefits within cost-effectiveness testing.
LEGISLATION - 6. Interpretation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 235 - 7. Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380 - 8. Utility and Review Board Act, S.N.S. 1992, c. 11
AI summary The document references three Nova Scotia legislative acts: the Interpretation Act, Public Utilities Act, and Utility and Review Board Act. These laws provide the legal framework for utility regulation, interpretation of statutes, and the operational authority of the Utility and Review Board in the province.
rporation all information necessary to enable the Board to fulfil its duties. - 38 The Public Utilities Act applies mutatis mutandis to the supervision of the Corporation under Section 37, except that - (a) the Corporation is not entitled...
AI summary The ENSC Act governs the transition of demand-side management (DSM) administration from NSPI to ENSC, requiring Board approval with conditions. The Public Utilities Act applies mutatis mutandis, with the ENSC Act taking precedence in conflicts. Utilities may recover DSM charges via rate base, as approved by the Review Board.
[128] The Dunsky report noted that: The move to a performance-based model would provide ENSC with increased flexibility to adjust and adapt its plans as needed, as situations arise and as feedback comes in. Furthermore, an oversight model...
AI summary The Dunsky report supports ENSC's shift to a performance-based model (PBM) for DSM programs, citing flexibility and reduced regulatory burden. The Province and EAC endorse PBM discussions, while Board Counsel questions the need for Board approval for stakeholder consultation. ENSC seeks Board approval to explore PBM implementation, emphasizing cost recovery and program flexibility.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT - and - IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION for Approval of a Supply Agreement for electricity efficiency and conservation activities between EfficiencyOne and Nova Scotia Power Incorporated, the estab...
AI summary The document outlines an application by EfficiencyOne and Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) for approval of a supply agreement for electricity efficiency and conservation activities, and the establishment of a 2016-2018 Demand Side Management (DSM) Resource Plan, before the Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (NSUARB).
2.0 BACKGROUND - [6] The Board considers it useful to set out some of the background of DSM in Nova Scotia to provide some context for this Decision. - [7] For a number of years prior to 2010, NSPI included requests for approval of spendin...
AI summary The document outlines the transition of DSM programming in Nova Scotia from NSPI to ENSC under the ENSC Act, requiring Board oversight. ENSC administered DSM programs post-2010, with regular Board approvals for spending and cost allocations. The 2014 EECR Act amended DSM frameworks by repealing the ENSC Act and modifying the PUA, redefining efficiency and conservation activities.
3.3 Status of 2013 and 2014 Verification and Evaluation Recommendations [49] In Appendix C, attached to its application, E1 included Table 1 - Update on Implementation of 2013 Verification Recommendations, and Table 2 - Update on Implement...
AI summary E1 provided updates on the implementation status of 2013 and 2014 verification and evaluation recommendations, with most completed. No intervenors raised concerns, though evaluation reports noted issues with Home Energy Report savings. E1 will update the Board on 2014 recommendations in its Q2 report.
3.5.2 Incentives [66] The Board, in its questioning of E1's witnesses, and NSPI and the Industrial Group in their submissions, expressed significant concerns over the manner in which incentives are determined by E1. It would appear from th...
AI summary The Board expressed concerns about E1's incentive structure, noting over 60% of the DSM budget is allocated to incentives. Expert testimony highlighted issues with incentive justification, with NSPI and the Industrial Group arguing that some incentives lack quantitative criteria and may be influenced by vested interests. Mr. Dunsky's testimony was preferred, but concerns about incentive reasonableness remained.
3.5.2.1 Findings [71] The CA summarized his view of the purpose of a DSM program: The basic purpose is to reduce the level of energy required by Nova Scotia in the future, both short and long term. DSM programs are an integral component in...
AI summary The CA emphasizes the importance of DSM programs in reducing future energy needs and controlling costs. The Board criticizes the NSPI Plan for underfunding residential programs and not aligning with the IRP, while favoring the E1 Plan for better alignment with the PUA and historical spending levels, despite concerns about past under-spending and overachievement of targets.
3.5.3 Affordability [76] Having determined the parameters of a preferred plan, the Board is specifically directed by the 2014 amendments to the PUA to address the issue of affordability. The most relevant sections are Section 79L(8) and (9...
AI summary The NSUARB must address affordability under the 2014 PUA amendments, specifically Sections 79L(8) and (9), which require evaluating electricity efficiency programs' affordability for NSPI customers. Traditionally, the Board used the lowest long-term cost principle, but affordability is now a critical factor. The Board must assess whether the amendments alter DSM expenditure evaluations and if the proposed plan meets affordability criteria.
3.10 Agreed form of Supply Agreement [120] E1 included an Agreed Form of Supply Agreement as Appendix J of its application, effective January 2016. The Supply Agreement generally outlines the terms and conditions which each party is expect...
AI summary E1 included an Agreed Form of Supply Agreement as Appendix J of its application, effective January 2016, outlining terms under the PUA. Attached schedules were left blank pending the Board's decision and Compliance Filing.
3.11 Compliance with Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring (2014) Act [122] Section 79J of the PUA contemplates that E1 and NSPI will enter into an agreement for electricity efficiency and conservation. That implies to the...
AI summary The Board emphasizes the obligation under the PUA for E1 and NSPI to negotiate an electricity efficiency agreement in good faith. The proceeding became unnecessarily litigious, particularly over the DSM budget, leading to high costs and extensive evidence. Despite eventual agreement via the Consensus Agreement, the Board criticizes the lack of early resolution and the burden on ratepayers.
4.0 LETTERS OF COMMENT AND PUBLIC SPEAKERS [129] The Board received 37 letters of comment from various persons, who wrote individually or on behalf of organizations. With only two exceptions, all were supportive of E1 and maintaining the a...
AI summary The Board received 37 letters, mostly supporting E1's DSM plan, citing environmental, economic, and low-income benefits. Public speakers emphasized maintaining DSM programs and energy efficiency culture. One letter critiqued Dr. Peach's evidence, while concerns about industry capacity if spending decreases were raised.
aving considered the history of underspending on DSM programming, the history of overachieving savings and demand targets, and as an inducement to bring greater rigor to the calculation of incentives. [142] The Board considers that the tar...
AI summary The Board approves the E1 DSM Plan, noting its alignment with the PUA's best interests for NSPI customers. It emphasizes balancing short-term affordability with long-term costs, approves aspects of the Consensus Agreement, and retains TRC for cost-effectiveness screening while rejecting the Quantum Agreement.
5) EVALUATION AND REPORTING - a) The Parties support EfficiencyOne's proposal for annual program impact evaluations and process evaluations at the organizational level with program process evaluations if required. EfficiencyOne will provid...
AI summary Parties support EfficiencyOne's proposal for annual program evaluations, including impact and process assessments. EfficiencyOne will report on 2016-2018 performance, explain substantial changes (≥25% variance), and provide advance notice for mid-course adjustments. Reporting timelines and content are subject to Board revisions via Schedule 1.
II BACKGROUND - [8] On June 12, 2017, E1 filed the Application seeking a Board Order compelling NSPI to provide the Customer Usage Data and the Names and Emails. - [9] The Board determined the Application should proceed by a paper hearing,...
AI summary E1 filed an application in 2017 seeking customer data from NSPI, leading to a paper hearing. The Board set a timeline, with interventions from CA, SBA, IG, and NSDOE. NSPI submitted evidence, and E1 rebutted. The text outlines legislative changes transferring DSM responsibilities from NSPI to ENSC and later to E1 under the PUA and ENSCA.
IV LEGISLATION [17] E1's authority to request information from NSPI, NSPI's obligation to respond to E1's request, and the Board's jurisdiction to determine the Application, are all set out in s. 79K of the PUA , which states:
AI summary The text outlines E1's authority to request information from NSPI, NSPI's obligation to comply, and the Board's jurisdiction under section 79K of the Public Utilities Act (PUA). This provision establishes the legal framework for information disclosure and regulatory oversight in the proceeding.
Information for franchise holder - 79K (1) Nova Scotia Power Incorporated shall provide a franchise holder with such information in its possession or control, including records and personal information, respecting customer electricity usag...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) must provide franchise holders with customer electricity usage data for energy efficiency initiatives. Franchise holders may apply to the Board if NSPI fails to comply. Confidentiality clauses apply, except for publicly available or legally mandated disclosures. References to PUA and PIPEDA define 'personal information' and compliance obligations.
Disclosure without knowledge or consent - 7(3) For the purpose of clause 4.3 of Schedule 1, and despite the note that accompanies that clause, an organization may disclose personal information without the knowledge or consent of the indivi...
AI summary The text outlines conditions for disclosing personal information without consent under section 7(3)(c), including compliance with court orders or laws. The Board considered submissions on PIPEDA's impact on interpreting PUA's s. 79K(1) and CASL's implications for E1's marketing practices using Names and Emails.
i) Statutory Interpretation - [42] Based on the legislative history of the enactment of s. 79K of the PUA , the purpose of the legislation, and the language used in this provision, E1 submits that the legislation is "broadly worded and sho...
AI summary E1 argues that s. 79K of the PUA should be interpreted expansively, allowing disclosure of personal information from NSPI under the 2016-2018 Supply Agreement, which was approved by the Board. The legislative intent and language support this broad interpretation.
Information to be provided by public utilities and confidentiality - 21 (1) Upon written notice from the Corporation, a public utility shall, within such reasonable time as is specified in the notice, provide to the Corporation, for the pu...
AI summary The text outlines legal requirements for public utilities to disclose customer electricity data to the Corporation, with confidentiality exceptions. It references 2014 legislative amendments under the PUA and EECRA, which transferred DSM functions from Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation to E1 (EfficiencyOne) as the initial franchise holder.
Transfer of business information - 4 (1) The Corporation shall, on or before the Implementation Date, transfer to the first franchise holder all of its business information, including any business information that is personal information....
AI summary The Corporation must transfer all business information, including personal data, to the first franchise holder by the Implementation Date, adhering to existing conditions and preserving privileges. The PUA allows similar transfers to subsequent franchise holders or NSPI on an interim basis.
- (c) is required by law to be disclosed, but only to the extent so required. - (5) Information provided pursuant to this Section is subject to the same conditions on the transfer or disclosure to which it was subject when held by the fran...
AI summary The text outlines information disclosure requirements for franchise holders, emphasizing legal obligations, confidentiality conditions, and privilege preservation. It defines 'electricity efficiency and conservation activities' under Section 79A(b) and links these provisions to the 2014 PUA amendments, aiming to establish a cost-effective DSM service delivery model with measurable performance.
ii) Are the Names and Emails information respecting customer electricity and load? [70] Mindful of the more general principles of statutory interpretation discussed above, the Board will now address the specific interpretation issues relat...
AI summary The Board determines that Names and Emails are 'information respecting electricity usage and load' under the PUA, as they are necessary for E1 to deliver cost-effective DSM services. NSPI and SBA argue the data is unrelated to usage/load, but the Board emphasizes contextual interpretation tied to DSM's goal of altering end-user consumption patterns.
iii) Are the Names and Email necessary to enable E1 to provide NSPI with reasonably available cost-effective energy efficiency and conservation activities? [75] NSPI's position on the necessity of the Names and Emails is summarized at p. 1...
AI summary NSPI argues E1 has not proven the necessity of customer Names and Emails for cost-effective DSM activities, emphasizing existing data availability and privacy concerns. The CA found E1's evidence insufficient and requested further comments. Privacy balancing is emphasized over E1's cost pressures.
nt in transmitting electronic messages, or in NSPI having caused or permitted the electronic message to be sent, NSPI would also be seen as having an existing business relationship with its customers. It is therefore difficult to see how N...
AI summary The document examines whether NSPI has implied consent to send CEMs on behalf of E1 under CASL, noting existing business relationships. It highlights uncertainty around DSM service models and customer relationships, with the Board expecting E1 to comply with laws and ordering indemnification for CASL breaches.
VI CUSTOMER USAGE DATA
AI summary The section 'VI CUSTOMER USAGE DATA' outlines the context of a regulatory proceeding, including relevant acronyms and entities, but the provided text does not contain specific arguments or data.
b) Analysis and Findings - [116] E1 submits the Customer Usage Data falls squarely within the ambit of s. 79K(1) of the PUA , in that it will provide it with customer electricity usage and load information for specific locations, on an ong...
AI summary E1 argues Customer Usage Data falls under PUA s. 79K(1) for DSM activities. NSPI agrees some data may fall under this section. The CA supports E1 but questions data necessity. SBA opposes releasing phone numbers due to privacy. The Board concludes most data is acceptable except phone numbers, which raise PIPEDA concerns.
IX SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION [136] E1 applied to the Board for an Order requiring NSPI to disclose Names and Emails, and Customer Usage Data, pursuant to s. 79K(1) of the PUA . [137] The Board has determined that the Names and Emails, and the...
AI summary E1 requested the Board to order NSPI to disclose customer data (names, emails, usage) under the PUA. The Board ruled this information is necessary for E1 to develop cost-effective DSM programs, citing its relevance to customer electricity usage and load analysis.
- [32] The Board's Decision reviewed the evidence and made the critical findings of fact that Central had expansion plans and, but for the prospect of expropriation, Central would have implemented them: - [723] Consequently, the Board is s...
AI summary The Board found that Central planned expansion projects (a retail store and distribution centre) delayed by expropriation threats. It accepted expert evidence on losses but reduced the loss period and rejected future claims. A 10% interest rate was applied to compensation due to the Province's delay, citing s. 53(4) of the Public Utilities Act.
- 55. At the hearing, Central provided no evidence that it had any active business plan to expand its operations, other than what its principal said he planned to do. … - 58. The Province submits that the Board's decision was unreasonable...
AI summary Central failed to provide evidence of active business plans beyond its principal's statements. The Province challenges the Board's award of disturbance damages for pre-expropriation delays, arguing insufficient evidence. The Board applied legal tests from Dell and Shun Fung , finding expropriation impeded Central's retail and distribution plans. The Province asserts factual findings are binding, limiting appeals to jurisdiction or law.
t it just – you just deal with an event and then the event stops and then you get on with business as normal. There's a period of catch-up before the business gets back to where it would have been. … I don't think it's appropriate to stop...
AI summary The Province challenges the Board's acceptance of PwC's methodology for calculating loss periods, arguing that the loss period should extend beyond the Market Street store's opening. The Board acknowledged PwC's analysis of vendor discounts and distribution centre impacts, while the Province seeks to replace PwC's findings with Mr. Wintrip's opinion.
of reasonableness is grounded in the legislature's choice to give a specialized tribunal responsibility for administering the statutory provisions and its consequent expertise (para. 33). However, this rationale is only part of the legisla...
AI summary The text argues that deference to specialized tribunals cannot override the legislature's provision for Court of Appeal jurisdiction on legal questions. It emphasizes statutory interpretation principles from Re Rizzo and Bell ExpressVu , stressing alignment with legislative intent and context over rigid deference.
ced initially with Graydon Bushell when he wrongfully misled Steve Smith by convincing him that he could not proceed with business expansion because of the imminent highway expansion. (p. 7925) … The Respondent inquires why nothing was don...
AI summary The text discusses a dispute over a 1998 directive from the Province of Nova Scotia preventing business expansion, with claims that no such directive existed. It highlights flawed legal advice from Graydon Bushell, the absence of legal consultation by Steve Smith, and challenges to disturbance damages claims under s. 27(3)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Board's role and the Respondent's arguments are central.
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
AI summary The document outlines rules of construction, including definitions and interpretations of terms used in regulatory proceedings involving Nova Scotia utility and energy efficiency programs, with extensive acronym listings for organizations, legislation, and programs.
REPEAL AND AMENDMENT
AI summary The document outlines a regulatory proceeding related to the repeal and amendment of certain regulations, though no specific details or arguments are presented in the provided text.
Public Utilities Act
AI summary The document pertains to the Public Utilities Act, a legislative framework governing utility regulation in Nova Scotia. Key entities include Nova Scotia Power Inc. and the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board, though specific arguments or cross-references are not detailed in the provided text.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD
AI summary The section outlines the powers and duties of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB), including oversight of utility companies, regulation of rates, and enforcement of compliance with relevant legislation such as the Utility and Review Board Act and the Public Utilities Act.
Powers imposed by contract or other Act preserved 24 Subject to this Act, the powers, rights, privileges and obligations secured to or imposed upon any public utility by any statute, or by any contract or agreement made under the authority...
AI summary The Act preserves the rights, powers, and obligations of public utilities under existing statutes or contracts, except for rate-related agreements. The Board may investigate these matters for public interest and recommend changes to the legislature.
Annual capital expenditure program of public utility - 35A (1) Notwithstanding Section 35, a public utility may submit to the Board for approval an annual capital expenditure program. - (2) Where the plan referred to in subsection (1) is a...
AI summary The text outlines provisions for public utilities to submit annual capital expenditure programs to the Board for approval. Approved programs allow expenditures without further approval, while expenditures under $250,000 not in the program require no Board approval. Statutory amendments in 1992 and 2010 are referenced.
Annual depreciation - 38 (1) Every public utility shall make provision for proper and adequate annual depreciation of its property and assets used and useful in furnishing, rendering or supplying each type or kind of service, and shall in...
AI summary The Public Utilities Act mandates that public utilities in Nova Scotia account for annual depreciation using the straight-line method or as prescribed by the Board. Utilities must report depreciation rates to the Board, which can determine or revise these rates as necessary.
Separate rate base for each service supplied - 42 (1) The Board shall fix and determine a separate rate base for each type or kind of service furnished, rendered or supplied to the public by a public utility. - (2) In establishing a rate b...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) is mandated to establish separate rate bases for each service type provided by public utilities, considering factors like working capital, organization expenses, and construction overheads. The Board may revise rate bases and direct amortization of allowed sums as operating expenses.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
AI summary The document outlines the powers and duties of public utilities in Nova Scotia, referencing regulatory bodies like the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) and legislation such as the Public Utilities Act (PUA). It highlights the role of entities like Efficiency Nova Scotia (ENS) and Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) in energy management and compliance.
Resources to be used - 48 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any enactment, the Nova Scotia Power Incorporated may in the operation of its generation and transmission plant or like facilities take steps to maximize the u...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) is permitted to prioritize indigenous resources in operations, prohibited from nuclear energy generation, and required to consider private power producers when seeking capacity increases. The Board must factor indigenous resource costs into revenue requirements. Legal references include R.S., c. 380, s. 48 and 1992, c. 8, s. 35.
Duty to furnish information, return forms and deliver documents - 51 (1) Every public utility shall furnish to the Board all information required by it to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, and shall make specific answers to all...
AI summary Public utilities must provide the Board with required information, complete forms accurately, and deliver documents upon request. Non-compliance requires sworn explanations and timely submissions. The Board may demand maps, contracts, and records in specified formats, with inventory details.
- (3) An application to the Board by a public utility for approval of any issue of its shares, stocks, bonds, debentures or other evidence of indebtedness, shall comply with and conform to the rules of procedure of the Board. - (4) After h...
AI summary The text outlines procedures for a public utility seeking Board approval to issue securities. The Board must ensure compliance with legal requirements, approve issuance amounts, set terms (e.g., prices, interest rates), and mandate shareholder resolutions for capital increases. The Board retains authority to amend orders post-approval.
Distribution of surplus profit 75 (1) Nothing in this Act shall be taken to prohibit a public utility from entering into any reasonable arrangement with its employees for the division or distribution of its surplus profits. - (2) No such a...
AI summary The Act permits public utilities to distribute surplus profits to employees via arrangements, but only after the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) determines them reasonable and just. The UARB oversees these arrangements to ensure compliance with the Act's objectives.
Penalty on public utility - 112 (1) If any public utility - (a) violates any provision of this Act; - (b) does any act by this Act prohibited; - (c) fails or refuses to perform any duty enjoined upon it for which a penalty has not been pro...
AI summary The section outlines penalties for public utilities violating the Public Utilities Act, imposing a $200 fine per offense, and holds utilities liable for employee actions within their employment scope.
Conflict with and application of 117 (1) Any Act whether enacted before or after the fourteenth day of April, 1943, relating to a public utility as defined by this Act shall be read and construed as subject in all respects to the provision...
AI summary The Public Utilities Act (Nova Scotia) establishes precedence over other legislation relating to public utilities, applying specifically to Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI). The Act defines NSPI as a public utility and was amended in 1992 with the repeal of section 35. Legal references include Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, chapter 380, section 117.
Interpretation - 2 In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) "Board" means the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board; - (b) "Chair" means the Chair of the Board; - (c) "Clerk" means the Clerk of the Board; - (d) "member" mea...
AI summary Defines terms in the Utility and Review Board Act, including the Board's composition and references to the Public Utilities Act. Establishes definitions for 'Board,' 'Chair,' 'Clerk,' 'member,' 'municipality,' and 'predecessor board,' with a focus on regulatory structure and statutory context.
Functions, powers and duties - 4 (1) The Board has those functions, powers and duties that are, from time to time, conferred or imposed on it by - (a) this Act, the Assessment Act , the Expropriation Act , the Gasoline and Diesel Oil Tax A...
AI summary The Board's functions, powers, and duties are conferred by various acts including the Assessment Act and Public Utilities Act, and may be assigned by the Governor in Council. Assignments discontinue existing boards/commissions, with Sections 49 and 50 applying mutatis mutandis. Statutory references include 1992, c. 11, s. 4 and others.
Public Utilities Act amended 43 amendments
AI summary The Public Utilities Act (PUA) has been amended, though specific details of the 43 amendments are not provided in the text. The amendment likely relates to regulatory changes impacting utility services in Nova Scotia.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT - and - IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION by EFFICIENCYONE for Approval of a Supply Agreement for Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Activities between EfficiencyOne and Nova Scotia Power Inc. a...
AI summary EfficiencyOne (E1) seeks approval for a supply agreement with Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) and its 2019 Demand Side Management (DSM) Resource Plan. The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) conducted a paper hearing, with intervenors including the Consumer Advocate, SBA, and Ecology Action Centre. Submissions and evidence were filed in June 2018.
EFFICIENCYONE 2019 DSM FILING 2019 Snpply Agreement 1 27. SURVIVAL 18 31 32 (a) "Act" the as amended from shall mean Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S, 1989, c.380, time to time. 33 34 (b) "Agreement" means this agreement NSPI and EfficiencyOn...
AI summary The text defines key terms in the EfficiencyOne 2019 DSM Filing, including 'Act' referring to the Public Utilities Act, 'Agreement' as the contract between NSPI and EfficiencyOne, and 'Business Day' as Monday to Friday excluding holidays in Nova Scotia.
E-13-(i)Book of Authorities
22 passages
Cases Cited By Bastarache J. Referred to: Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Decision 2001-65, July 31, 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Alta. E.U.B., Deci...
AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving ATCO's argument that allocating profits to customers is confiscatory. The court rejects this, noting that regulated utilities have rates set by regulators, not the market. The decision is prospective, not retroactive, and the Commission's authority to manage rates and monitor services is affirmed. The distinction between amortized and non-amortized assets is deemed less critical than ATCO claims.
Jurisprudence Citée par le juge Bastarache Arrêts mentionnés : Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Décision 2001-65, 31 juillet 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. c. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Cor...
AI summary The jurisprudence section cites multiple legal cases referenced by Judge Bastarache, including decisions from Alberta’s Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) and Public Utilities Board (PUBA), as well as Supreme Court of Canada rulings. Key cases involve utility regulation, energy disputes, and administrative law, highlighting precedents related to regulatory authority and utility company obligations.
Citée par le juge Binnie (dissident) Atco Ltd. c. Calgary Power Ltd., [1982] 2 R.C.S. 557; S.C.F.P. c. Ontario (Ministre du Travail), [2003] 1 R.C.S. 539, 2003 CSC 29; TransAlta Utilities Corp. c. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68...
AI summary The text lists legal cases and regulatory decisions cited by Judge Binnie (dissident) in a Nova Scotia proceeding, including references to Canadian and international court rulings, utility regulatory decisions, and legislation related to energy and public utilities.
Lois et règlements cités Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act, R.S.A. 2000, ch. A-17, art. 13, 15, 26(1), (2), 27. - Gas Utilities Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. G‑5, ss. 16, 17, 22, 24, 26, 27(1), 36 to 45, 59. - Interpretation Act , R.S.A. 2000...
AI summary The document lists Alberta legislation cited in a regulatory proceeding, including the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act, Gas Utilities Act, and Public Utilities Board Act, along with specific sections related to energy and utility regulation.
Authors Cited - Anisman, Philip, and Robert F. Reid. Administrative Law Issues and Practice . Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1995. - Black, Alexander J. "Responsible Regulation: Incentive Rates for Natural Gas Pipelines" (1992), 28 Tulsa L.J...
AI summary The document lists legal references and legislation relevant to energy regulation, including works by authors on administrative law, utility rate control, and regulatory frameworks. Key legislation cited includes the Gas Utilities Act, Public Utilities Act, and Public Utilities Board Act.
of Calgary ("City") which argues that the Board can determine how to allocate the proceeds pursuant to its power to approve the sale and protect the public interest. I find this position unconvincing. this case, to allocate a portion of th...
AI summary The document analyzes whether the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) can allocate proceeds from a utility sale to rate-paying customers. It argues that AEUB's authority is limited by statutes like AEUBA, PUBA, and GUA, which prioritize rate-setting and consumer protection over broad distribution powers. The City of Calgary contends the Board can allocate proceeds, but the analysis concludes this position lacks legal foundation.
1.2.1.2 Decision 2002-037, [2002] A.E.U.B.D. No. 52 (QL) In a second decision, the Board determined the allocation of net sale proceeds. It reviewed the regulatory policy and general principles which affected the decision, although no spec...
AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) allocated net sale proceeds using a 'no-harm' test, referencing its 2001-65 decision and the TransAlta Formula. It emphasized protecting consumers by allocating proceeds to mitigate harm, citing the Alberta Court of Appeal's 1986 ruling. The Board concluded a sale would not harm customers due to a favorable lease agreement, though future operational costs were not addressed.
torisation, elle avait conclu au respect de ce critère, mais n'avait alors tiré aucune conclusion concernant l'incidence sur les frais d'exploitation, notamment l'entente de location obtenue par ATCO. Puis, après avoir examiné les observat...
AI summary The Commission addressed the allocation of net gains from land and buildings, applying the TransAlta formula to distribute profits between customers and shareholders. It rejected arguments that non-use of buildings by the new owner negated the gain's value, emphasizing the need to balance customer affordability with investor returns while avoiding speculative behavior by utilities.
1.2.2 Court of Appeal of Alberta ((2004), 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 205, 2004 ABCA 3) ATCO appealed the Board's decision. It argued that the Board did not have any jurisdiction to allocate the proceeds of sale and that the proceeds should have b...
AI summary ATCO appealed a decision allocating proceeds from asset sales, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled in ATCO's favor, but the Commission later used the TransAlta formula to distribute proceeds between shareholders, clients, and expenses. The allocation included $4.07 million to clients, $2.01 million to shareholders, and $465,000 to ATCO for expenses.
u'appelle cette considération. Comme je l'explique plus loin, l'expertise de la Commission n'est pas mise à contribution lorsqu'elle se prononce sur l'étendue de ses pouvoirs. 2006 SCC 4 (CanLII) 28 Third, the present case is governed by t...
AI summary The case discusses the regulatory framework governed by PUBA, GUA, and AEUBA, emphasizing the Board's mandate to protect public interest through utility regulation. Section 26(2)(d)(i) of the GUA requires regulator approval for asset sales to ensure customer protection. Legal precedents like Atco Ltd. v. Calgary Power Ltd. and Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Public Utilities Board (Alberta) are cited to support the regulatory approach.
2.3.2 Pouvoir explicite : sens grammatical et ordinaire La Ville soutient à titre préliminaire qu'en lui demandant d'autoriser la vente des biens et l'attribution du produit de l'opération, ATCO a reconnu le pouvoir de la Commission d'impo...
AI summary The City argues that ATCO's request for authorization implies the Commission's power to impose conditions on the sale of assets. However, the analysis rejects this, noting that past Commission decisions demonstrate its authority to regulate asset sales regardless of ATCO's claims. Key cases include Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. and Re ATCO Gas-North , which affirm the Commission's historical exercise of this power.
prestation du service ni à sa qualité. Par conséquent, la simple lecture du par. 26(2) de la GUA permet de conclure que la Commission n'a pas le pouvoir d'attribuer le produit de la vente d'un bien. La Ville ne fonde pas son argumentation...
AI summary The document analyzes whether the Commission has the authority to assign proceeds from asset sales under the GUA and AEUBA. The City argues that sections 26(2) of the GUA, 15(3) of the AEUBA, and article 37 of the PUBA grant this power. However, the analysis emphasizes that these provisions are ambiguous and should not confer absolute discretion on the Commission, citing legal precedents and statutory interpretation principles.
2.3.3.1 Historical Background and Broader Con‑ text The history of public utilities regulation in Alberta originated with the creation in 1915 of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners by The Public Utilities Act , S.A. 1915, c. 6. This...
AI summary Historical regulation of public utilities in Alberta began with the 1915 Public Utilities Act, influenced by American models. The text discusses legal cases and the City's claims regarding utility ownership and profit distribution, which are rebutted as conflicting with applicable law.
2.3.3.1 Historique et contexte général Les services publics sont réglementés en Alberta depuis la création en 1915 de l'organisme appelé Board of Public Utility Commissioners en vertu de la loi intitulée The Public Utilities Act , S.A. 191...
AI summary Public utilities in Alberta have been regulated since 1915 under the Public Utilities Act. The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) was formed in 1995 by merging the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERC) and the Public Utilities Board (PUB), inheriting powers from both the 1915 legislation and the Public Utilities Board Act (PUBA).
2.3.3.3 The Power to Attach Conditions As its second argument, the City submits that the power to allocate the proceeds from the sale of the utility's assets is necessarily incidental to the express powers conferred on the Board by the AEU...
AI summary The City argues that the Board's power to allocate asset sale proceeds is incidental to its authority under AEUBA, GUA, and PUBA. The Commission rejects this, citing case law that prohibits retroactive rate adjustments and emphasizes shared risk between clients and shareholders in rate-setting. Legal precedents from Alberta and other provinces support the Commission's position.
2.4 Other Considerations Under the regulatory compact, customers are protected through the rate-setting process, under which the Board is required to make a wellbalanced determination. The record shows that the City did not submit to the B...
AI summary The regulatory compact ensures customer protection via the Board's rate-setting authority. Although the City did not submit a general rate review application in response to ATCO's sale request, the Board could independently convene hearings to adjust rates based on new economic data from the sale, citing PUBA and GUA provisions.
2.4 Autres considérations Dans le cadre du pacte réglementaire, les clients sont protégés par la procédure d'établissement des tarifs à l'issue de laquelle la Commission doit rendre une décision pondérée. Il appert du dossier que la Ville...
AI summary The regulatory process ensures client protection through a balanced rate-setting procedure. The City did not request approval for a general rate in response to ATCO's application to sell goods. However, the Commission could have initiated a hearing to establish fair rates under PUBA and GUA, considering the financial implications of the sale.
nnée de 1922 à 1965. Dans un secteur réglementé, le rendement juste et équitable est déterminé par l'organisme de réglementation compétent et non par le marché spéculatif et aléatoire de l'immobilier. Je ne crois pas que l'allégation d'eff...
AI summary The text discusses the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board's (AEUB) authority to impose conditions on ATCO's property, emphasizing that regulatory discretion is determined by legislation, not market speculation. ATCO argues that the Commission's conditions, particularly profit distribution, were irregular, while the AEUBA and PUBA frameworks are cited as legal foundations for the Board's powers. The 'confiscatory' effect claim is dismissed as irrelevant to the legal debate.
4. L'absence de réciprocité ATCO soutient que les clients ne devraient pas tirer avantage d'un marché haussier, car c'est elle, et non eux, qui subirait la perte si la valeur du terrain diminuait. Toutefois, la documentation présentée à no...
AI summary ATCO argues that clients should not benefit from rising land values, as it bears the risk of depreciation. However, the Commission asserts that both profits and losses from asset sales must be attributed to ratepayers, not the utility. Cited decisions (e.g., Re TransAlta Utilities Corp.) reinforce this principle, emphasizing fairness. SoCalGas is referenced to highlight symmetry of risk and reward in rate base land valuation.
Powers of Board 36 The Board, on its own initiative or on the application of a person having an interest, may by order in writing, which is to be made after giving notice to and hearing the parties interested, - (a) fix just and reasonable...
AI summary The Board may set gas utility rates, depreciation methods, and service standards, requiring compliance. A French clause restricts share transfers exceeding 50% ownership without Commission approval, aiming to prevent monopolistic control.
f the Board to obtain material, evidence and information necessary for it to reach reasoned decisions. These powers are obviously necessary and proper for the due exercise of the Board's jurisdiction. (Accordingly, in his view, the "matter...
AI summary The text discusses the Board's authority under sections 10(3) to gather evidence and inspect property, with a legal debate over whether cost-award powers fall under the same category. Counsel for F.R.A.P. argues cost awards are ejusdem generis with control powers, while I.P.L.'s counsel emphasizes evidence-gathering as the primary focus.
respect of the actual costs reasonably incurred by any person who made representations to the Board under this section and may direct by whom and to whom the amount so fixed shall be paid. • • • • • - 75.21(1) Where the amount of compensat...
AI summary Sections 29.6 and 75.21 govern cost allocation in regulatory proceedings. Section 29.6 allows the Board to fix costs after public hearings on pipeline projects, while 75.21 mandates cost reimbursement by companies if arbitration awards exceed 85% of offered compensation. The text argues that specific cost-allocating powers in legislation limit the Board's general jurisdiction.