E-10-(i)Book of Authorities
35 passages
[Exhibit E-1, p. 12] [47] For 2012, ENSC forecasts annual energy and demand savings of 233.6 GWh and 44 MW respectively. On a cumulative basis, forecast energy savings are 543 GWh compared to an IRP target of 500 GWh and the cumulative for...
AI summary ENSC forecasts significant energy and demand savings for 2012, supported by NPB, Avon, and the CA. EAC suggests improvements to the DSM Plan, particularly in lighting and residential programs. Concerns are raised about the high cost of fuel substitution measures and the accuracy of savings estimates.
ergy savings from actual DSM programs in future years. [ENSC Closing Submission, pp. 3-5] [66] ENSC acknowledged some of the concerns raised, and submitted that the proper question for the Board is: ... what evidence is on the record to su...
AI summary ENSC argues that the NSUARB should assess whether proposed DSM spending increases are justified given over-achievement of IRP targets and stakeholder opposition. The CA raises concerns about a 100% budget increase from 2010 and ENSC's operational inexperience as a new entity. ENSC emphasizes analyzing rate impacts of DSM spending.
4.2.1 Findings - [71] The Board understands that the targets for energy and demand savings are considered to be aggressive when compared to other jurisdictions; however, these targets and associated investments were established early in th...
AI summary The Board acknowledges the aggressive DSM targets set in the IRP and notes that NSPI exceeded them. ENSC, as the new administrator, finds the targets challenging but achievable. The Board supports including savings from non-program funded initiatives and approves the 2012 DSM investment of $43.7 million.
4.4 Bill Impacts [79] In his direct evidence on behalf of Board Counsel, Mr. Woolf discussed the need to establish key principles regarding how to quantify bill and rate impacts due to increasing DSM budgets in order that these rate and bi...
AI summary The document outlines principles for quantifying bill and rate impacts from increased DSM budgets, emphasizing analysis of program participant and non-participant effects, long-term impacts, and cost-benefit considerations. The Province recommends ENSC collaborate with NSPI and PWDG to refine DSM plan filings, which ENSC agrees to.
4.4.1 Findings [81] The Board is persuaded that there is a need to have better information on rate and bill impacts in future proceedings and directs ENSC to undertake the necessary consultation with a view to providing enhanced informatio...
AI summary The Board mandates ENSC to improve transparency on rate and bill impacts through consultation, aligning with Mr. Woolf's recommendations for the 2013 DSM Plan. This emphasizes the need for enhanced data in future regulatory proceedings.
5.1.2 Adoption of Energy-Efficiency Codes and Standards In this filing, ENSC has reported energy savings attributed to the adoption of codes and standards from two sources: a new residential energy code and a new federal standard for gener...
AI summary ENSC reports energy savings from new residential codes and federal lamp standards in 2012, excluding NSPI initiatives in the 2012 DSM Plan but planning to include them in 2013. ENSC proposes adopting T-8 lighting standards and a national commercial energy code, citing incremental load forecast impacts from the 2009 IRP Update.
9.0 SUMMARY OF BOARD FINDINGS [153] The Board accepts the 2010 DSM Plan evaluation and verification, with the qualification made in the SVS for a 10% reduction for the Efficient Products-Direct Install program. [154] The Board understands...
AI summary The Board accepts the 2010 DSM Plan evaluation, approves the 2012 DSM investment, and sets conditions for ENSC, including data system improvements, quarterly progress reviews, and policy development. It also approves changes to the TRC test and requires studies on free ridership and spillover effects.
- [15] The Board is to determine the activities to be undertaken, and NSPI is to undertake the activities by virtue of an agreement for a three year term with the franchise holder, approved by the Board ( PUA ss. 79(H), 79(I), and 79(J))....
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (Board) directs Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) to undertake demand-side management (DSM) activities under a three-year agreement with E1 (formerly the first franchise holder). Spending limits are set by the Public Utilities Act (PUA) and the Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring (2014) Act (EECR Act), with recovery deferred over eight years. The Board's approval of funding and charges is governed by PUA sections 79R and 79Q.
han $53 million, is not the driving factor for an increase in rates while not causing negative impacts on EfficiencyOne's ability to achieve Mid-DSM levels, as per the IRP, in the future as required. - In an effort to ensure that more cust...
AI summary The Plan proposes a higher investment level and a balanced approach to DSM program participation across residential and BNI sectors, aiming for greater participation than NS Power's alternative scenario. It ensures affordability and avoids new capacity additions until 2032.
3.5.2.1 Findings [71] The CA summarized his view of the purpose of a DSM program: The basic purpose is to reduce the level of energy required by Nova Scotia in the future, both short and long term. DSM programs are an integral component in...
AI summary The CA emphasizes the importance of DSM programs in reducing future energy needs and controlling costs. The Board criticizes the NSPI Plan for underfunding residential programs and not aligning with the IRP, while favoring the E1 Plan for better alignment with the PUA and historical spending levels, despite concerns about past under-spending and overachievement of targets.
3.5.3 Affordability [76] Having determined the parameters of a preferred plan, the Board is specifically directed by the 2014 amendments to the PUA to address the issue of affordability. The most relevant sections are Section 79L(8) and (9...
AI summary The NSUARB must address affordability under the 2014 PUA amendments, specifically Sections 79L(8) and (9), which require evaluating electricity efficiency programs' affordability for NSPI customers. Traditionally, the Board used the lowest long-term cost principle, but affordability is now a critical factor. The Board must assess whether the amendments alter DSM expenditure evaluations and if the proposed plan meets affordability criteria.
3.5.6 Avoided Cost Analysis [101] Synapse, in its evidence, indicated that rate impact analysis should account for all factors that impact rates either positively or negatively, which would include avoided costs that might exert downward p...
AI summary Synapse argues rate impact analysis must include avoided costs, such as environmental compliance. E1 and NSPI discuss locational DSM's potential to reduce transmission costs. The Board supports collaboration on locational avoided cost considerations.
3.5.7 Rate and Bill Impact Analysis [105] In approving the Consensus Agreement the Board approves the Section 6 provisions related to rate and bill impact analysis.
AI summary The Board approves the Consensus Agreement's Section 6 provisions related to rate and bill impact analysis as part of the regulatory proceeding.
5.0 SUMMARY OF BOARD FINDINGS [138] E1 applied to the Board for approval of its 2016-2018 DSM Plan, pursuant to s. 79J(3) of the PUA , as it was unable to reach agreement with NSPI on the terms of the Supply Agreement. E1 sought approval f...
AI summary E1 applied for approval of its 2016-2018 DSM Plan with a budget of $121.5 million, but the Board approved a reduced amount of $102.15 million after considering past underspending and overachievement of savings targets. The Quantum Agreement was not approved, and instead, the Board set a lower spending cap with no inflation increases.
1) ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDARDIZED FILING FOR FUTURE APPLICATIONS TO APPROVE A DSM SUPPLY AGREEMENT - a) The Parties agree to the establishment of a standardized filing for future applications, the substance of which will be vetted through...
AI summary Parties agree to establish a standardized filing for future DSM supply agreements, including program descriptions, energy savings, cost-effectiveness analysis, and rate impact details. EfficiencyOne may add relevant information, with technical data provided in its Plan filing. The DSM Advisory Group will vet the template for Board approval.
3) PERFORMANCE TARGETS, INDICATORS AND THRESHOLDS - a) The parties agree to the following Performance Targets and Performance Indicators: - i) Performance Targets are set over the three-year contract period, rather than annually. - ii) Eff...
AI summary Parties agree to three-year performance targets for EfficiencyOne, requiring 90% achievement on two key metrics (cumulative energy and peak demand savings). Non-compliance triggers regulatory review. Indicators include energy savings, customer satisfaction, and rate impact analysis. Reporting by program and rate class is mandated.
6) RATE AND BILL IMPACT ANALYSIS - a) As with prior filings of its rate and bill impact analysis, EfficiencyOne agrees to develop, in consultation with the DSM Advisory Group, assumptions to its rate and bill impact analysis. This will inc...
AI summary EfficiencyOne agrees to collaborate with the DSM Advisory Group to develop rate and bill impact analyses, including fixed cost contributions, and will file historical analyses annually by October 31.
7) RESOLUTION PROCESS Year Report/ Process Filing Timeframe Inclusions Historical- looking rate and bill impact analysis End of October Results by rate class in graphical form Overview and description of analysis Commentary around results...
AI summary The document outlines the resolution process, including historical rate and bill impact analysis, quarterly and annual reports, meetings with the DSMAG, and evaluation reports. These processes involve regular filings and discussions to assess performance, program impacts, and financial statements.
Source of funds for municipal charge 31 Where it is declared that any matter is to form a municipal charge, it shall be rated, levied and collected with and by the same means as are by law directed with respect to other moneys for municipa...
AI summary The text states that any matter declared as a municipal charge must be collected using the same legal procedures as other municipal funds, as outlined in R.S., c. 235, s. 31.
(The table of contents is not part of the statute) Section Short title . 1 Interpretation - Powers and Duties of the Board Expenses of Board . 15 Payment and recovery of amount assessed . 16 Expenses of annual report . 17 Supervision of ut...
AI summary This section outlines the structure and content of the legislation, covering the Board's powers and duties, financial and operational requirements for utilities, valuation processes, depreciation regulations, and rate-setting procedures. It includes specific provisions for annual reports, capital expenditures, and regulatory oversight.
Rates of utility to include allowance for depreciation 41 In fixing rates, tolls and charges to be paid to a public utility for any service, the Board shall include proper allowances for depreciation. R.S., c. 380, s. 41.
AI summary The Board must include proper allowances for depreciation when setting utility rates, as mandated by R.S., c. 380, s. 41. This ensures fair compensation for utility assets over time.
Separate rate base for each service supplied - 42 (1) The Board shall fix and determine a separate rate base for each type or kind of service furnished, rendered or supplied to the public by a public utility. - (2) In establishing a rate b...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) is mandated to establish separate rate bases for each service type provided by public utilities, considering factors like working capital, organization expenses, and construction overheads. The Board may revise rate bases and direct amortization of allowed sums as operating expenses.
Orders by Board respecting rates and charges of utility 44 The Board may make from time to time such orders as it deems just in respect to the tolls, rates and charges to be paid to any public utility for services rendered or facilities pr...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) has authority to set, amend, or rescind utility rates and charges under R.S., c. 380, s. 44, which empowers the Board to regulate tolls, rates, and charges for public utilities.
Equal rates and charges for similar services - 67 (1) All tolls, rates and charges shall always, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions in respect of service of the same description, be charged equally to all persons and...
AI summary The regulation mandates equal tolls, rates, and charges for similar services under comparable conditions. The Board may define 'similar circumstances' via regulation, and non-compliance is prohibited. This provision is codified in R.S., c. 380, s. 67.
Domestic rate or charge in certain cases - 73 (1) In this Section, "municipality" means a municipality as defined by the Municipal Affairs Act. - (2) This Section does not apply to a customer that is the Government of Canada, the Province...
AI summary This section establishes that certain non-profit organizations, including senior citizens' clubs and volunteer fire departments, are eligible for a domestic rate not exceeding standard rates. The provision applies to energy supplied after May 5, 1978, upon application, and the Governor in Council may extend eligibility to similar organizations. Exemptions apply to government entities.
N.S. Power Inc. to undertake activities - 79I (1) On and after the Implementation Date, Nova Scotia Power Incorporated shall undertake cost-effective electricity efficiency and conservation activities that are reasonably available in an ef...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) is required to implement cost-effective electricity efficiency and conservation activities post-Implementation Date. NSPI may fulfill this obligation via agreements with franchise holders (approved by the Board) or alternative methods approved by the Board. Exceptions include rate structure development, financing arrangements, charitable activities, and other Board-approved initiatives, as outlined in the Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring (2014) Act.
Notice of hearing of application for rate changes 86 Notice of the hearing of any application, for the approval of or providing for an increase or decrease in the rates, tolls and charges of any public utility, shall be given by advertisem...
AI summary The notice requires public utility rate change applications to be advertised in newspapers for three consecutive weeks prior to hearings, as mandated by R.S., c. 380, s. 86. This ensures public awareness of proposed rate adjustments.
Consumer advocate - 91 (1) Where the Governor in Council directs or the Board on its own motion decides, the Board shall appoint a person to act as a consumer advocate in a hearing before the Board. - (2) A consumer advocate appointed purs...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) may appoint a consumer advocate to represent residential consumers in hearings. The advocate acts as a full intervenor, with authority to negotiate settlements and access legal/technical expertise. Fees and expenses are paid by applicants, and the Governor in Council may regulate qualifications.
Small business advocate - 92 (1) In this Section, - (a) "prescribed" means prescribed by the regulations made pursuant to subsection (7); - (b) "small business" means a business - (i) of a prescribed type, - (ii) to which prescribed rate c...
AI summary The section defines 'small business' and outlines the appointment of a small business advocate by the Board. The advocate acts as a full intervenor, with the Board's authority to set fees and expenses, including expert costs. Regulations by the Governor in Council define eligibility criteria and advocate qualifications.
- Let's not forget in all this that as much as this was a recommendation, as much as this makes sense to - go, that consumers will be paying for this on their electrical bill, starting January 1st . So electric bills - will rise on January...
AI summary The speaker highlights that electricity rates will increase starting January 1st due to the DSM charge, emphasizing that consumers, industrials, and businesses will bear the cost. They express concern about the government not adequately addressing the rate hikes and question the integration of Conserve Nova Scotia into Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: - 1. The Board approves a DSM Plan for 2019 in the amount of $34,050,000 with performance targets of 127.2 GWh in incremental annual net energy savings and 20.2 MW in incremental net annual peak demand savings. -...
AI summary The Board approves a 2019 DSM Plan with specific energy and demand savings targets, accepts a progress report, and directs updates to avoided costs and the RBIA. E1 is required to conduct a new DSM Potential Study and improve methodologies for GHG estimates and transparency in its processes. The Board also requests alternate DSM budget scenarios and compliance with filing frameworks.
the lifecycle cost per kWh for the energy efficiency programs is $0.026 per kWh – significantly lower than the current cost of Standard Offer Service, which ranges from $0.062 to $0.093 per kWh.86 Until such time that energy efficiency is...
AI summary The document discusses the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency programs, noting that the lifecycle cost per kWh is significantly lower than the current Standard Offer Service cost. It outlines the establishment of energy efficiency goals for utilities and mentions that goals for natural gas and residential limited-income sectors are not yet fully developed.
Comments at 1; SMECO Comments at 1; PE Comments at 9-10. & lt;sup>90 See, e.g. Staff Comments at 12-14. & lt;sup>91 OPC Comments at 4-8; Coalition Comments at 18-22. EmPOWER programs have not come close to saturating markets with energy ef...
AI summary The document discusses the establishment of post-2015 electric energy efficiency goals, rejecting per capita methods in favor of a retail sales baseline and a three-year program cycle. It also notes that EmPOWER programs have not saturated markets and that a potential study is not a barrier to setting targets.
4. Multifamily Energy Efficiency Goals We continue to acknowledge the importance of extending EmPOWER programs to all market segments, although we note that no party recommended the establishment of a separate post-2015 energy efficiency g...
AI summary The document discusses the continuation of EmPOWER programs for all market segments, noting that no party recommended a separate post-2015 energy efficiency goal for the multifamily sector. It acknowledges that multifamily initiatives are currently funded from both residential and C&I surcharges and that tracking progress is important for equitable resource distribution.
l be reflected in 120 Id. 121 See Order No. 86785 (Dec. 23, 2014). the cost-effectiveness screening tools, subject to the modified assumption of a four-year Capacity DRIPE; - (4) That the Utilities' individual weighted average cost of capi...
AI summary The document outlines post-2015 demand reduction goals and specifies adjustments to cost-effectiveness screening tools, including the use of a four-year Capacity DRIPE assumption. It also sets discount rates for various tests, includes specific benefit valuations from Itron, and requires utilities to report forecasted electric savings for the 2015–2017 program cycle.
E-13-(i)Book of Authorities
36 passages
le droit de ses actionnaires au profit net. La ville de Calgary a défendu les intérêts des clients, s'opposant à ce que le produit de la vente soit attribué aux actionnaires comme le préconisait ATCO. Convaincue que la vente ne serait pas...
AI summary The city of Calgary opposed ATCO's plan to allocate sale proceeds to shareholders, arguing for customer benefit. The Commission allowed the sale and split the proceeds, but the Alberta Court of Appeal overturned this, ordering full allocation to ATCO. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal but accepted the incidental one. AEUBA was cited in the Commission's decision.
Cases Cited By Bastarache J. Referred to: Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Decision 2001-65, July 31, 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Alta. E.U.B., Deci...
AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving ATCO's argument that allocating profits to customers is confiscatory. The court rejects this, noting that regulated utilities have rates set by regulators, not the market. The decision is prospective, not retroactive, and the Commission's authority to manage rates and monitor services is affirmed. The distinction between amortized and non-amortized assets is deemed less critical than ATCO claims.
il nous faut décider si la Commission a raisonnablement exercé son pouvoir et respecté les limites de sa compétence : était-elle autorisée, en l'espèce, à attribuer une partie du gain net aux clients? La ville de Calgary (« Ville ») défend...
AI summary The text examines whether the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) had the authority to distribute net gains from a public utility sale to customers. The City of Calgary argues the Commission can decide on such distribution under its public interest mandate. However, analysis of AEUBA, PUBA, and GUA concludes the Commission's power is limited to rate-setting and network reliability, not gain redistribution.
1.2.1.1 Décision 2001-78 Dans une première décision relative à la demande d'autorisation de la vente des biens, la Commission a appliqué le critère de l'« absence de préjudice » et soupesé les répercussions possibles sur les tarifs et la q...
AI summary The Commission evaluated the sale of assets, concluding no harm to customers due to a prudent lease arrangement. It found no negative rate impact for five years, potential cost savings, and deferred assessment of future lease costs to be reviewed in future rate applications.
1.2.1.2 Décision 2002-037, [2002] A.E.U.B.D. No. 52 (QL) Dans une deuxième décision, la Commission a décidé de l'attribution du produit net de la vente. Elle a fait état de la politique réglementaire et des principes généraux présidant à l...
AI summary The Commission allocated net proceeds from a sale, referencing the 'absence of prejudice' principle and the TransAlta formula. It emphasized its authority to protect customers, citing Alberta Court of Appeal decisions. The TransAlta formula dictates that when sale prices exceed historical costs, gains are shared between shareholders and customers based on specific ratios.
u'appelle cette considération. Comme je l'explique plus loin, l'expertise de la Commission n'est pas mise à contribution lorsqu'elle se prononce sur l'étendue de ses pouvoirs. 2006 SCC 4 (CanLII) 28 Third, the present case is governed by t...
AI summary The case discusses the regulatory framework governed by PUBA, GUA, and AEUBA, emphasizing the Board's mandate to protect public interest through utility regulation. Section 26(2)(d)(i) of the GUA requires regulator approval for asset sales to ensure customer protection. Legal precedents like Atco Ltd. v. Calgary Power Ltd. and Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Public Utilities Board (Alberta) are cited to support the regulatory approach.
v. National Energy Board , [1978] 1 F.C. 601 (C.A.); Canadian Broadcasting League v. Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission , [1983] 1 F.C. 182 (C.A.), aff'd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 174). I understand the City's arguments to be...
AI summary The City argues that customers have a right to utility property proceeds and that the Board can allocate sale proceeds by necessity. The author rejects these claims, stating they contradict existing law, and emphasizes the Board's main functions and incidental powers derived from context.
2.3.3.1 Historical Background and Broader Con‑ text The history of public utilities regulation in Alberta originated with the creation in 1915 of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners by The Public Utilities Act , S.A. 1915, c. 6. This...
AI summary Historical regulation of public utilities in Alberta began with the 1915 Public Utilities Act, influenced by American models. The text discusses legal cases and the City's claims regarding utility ownership and profit distribution, which are rebutted as conflicting with applicable law.
qu'il s'agisse de la common law ou du droit d'origine législative (voir Sullivan, p. 154- 155). Il est également censé être au fait de toutes les circonstances entourant l'adoption de la nouvelle loi. Bien que la Commission puisse sembler...
AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) and Public Utilities Board (PUB) have a primary mandate to set rates for public utilities, with secondary oversight roles. Legal frameworks like AEUBA, PUBA, and GUA support this, emphasizing rate-setting as central to regulatory authority. Judicial references, including Atco Ltd. , highlight the connection between regulatory control and rate-fixing functions.
2.3.3.2 Rate Setting 63 Rate regulation serves several aims — sustainability, equity and efficiency — which underlie the reasoning as to how rates are fixed: 62 . . . the regulated company must be able to finance its operations, and any re...
AI summary Rate regulation aims to balance sustainability, equity, and efficiency, ensuring utilities can operate while limiting excessive shareholder returns. The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) regulates energy resources and utility tariffs, emphasizing fair pricing for consumers. The text references a 1999 manual on utility price controls and highlights the AEUB's role in overseeing Alberta's energy and utility sectors.
operations regulated (see Black, at pp. 356-57; Milner, at p. 101; Atco Ltd. , at p. 576; Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton , [1929] S.C.R. 186 (" Northwestern 1929 "), at pp. 192-93). Therefore, when interpreting the broad p...
AI summary The Board's authority to set 'just and reasonable' rates under the GUA and PUBA is central to balancing consumer and investor interests. Legal precedents like Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton (1929 and 1979) emphasize the need for fair returns on the rate base while protecting customers. The statutes mandate a regulatory framework ensuring economic benefits for both stakeholders.
ce provided in the relevant period of time, ratepayers do not gain equitable or legal rights to non-depreciable assets when they have paid only for the use of those assets. [Emphasis added; para. 64.] I fully adopt this conclusion. The Boa...
AI summary The text argues that ratepayers do not gain equitable or legal rights to non-depreciable utility assets, emphasizing that customers are not residual claimants. It criticizes the Board for conflating customer interests with asset ownership, noting shareholders bear risks from asset sales. Cites U.S. cases Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch and Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission to support the principle that utility assets remain the utility’s responsibility.
2.3.3.3 The Power to Attach Conditions As its second argument, the City submits that the power to allocate the proceeds from the sale of the utility's assets is necessarily incidental to the express powers conferred on the Board by the AEU...
AI summary The City argues that the Board's power to allocate asset sale proceeds is incidental to its authority under AEUBA, GUA, and PUBA. The Commission rejects this, citing case law that prohibits retroactive rate adjustments and emphasizes shared risk between clients and shareholders in rate-setting. Legal precedents from Alberta and other provinces support the Commission's position.
uld also require as a condition that the utility reinvest part of the sale proceeds back into the company in order to maintain a modern operating system that achieves the optimal growth of the system. In my view, allowing the Board to conf...
AI summary The text argues against the Board's authority to confiscate a utility's net gains from a sale, emphasizing that utilities are private ventures with profit motives. It criticizes the Board's attempt to reallocate proceeds as economically unsound and beyond its statutory powers, citing MacAvoy and Sidak's analysis on capital costs.
2.4 Other Considerations Under the regulatory compact, customers are protected through the rate-setting process, under which the Board is required to make a wellbalanced determination. The record shows that the City did not submit to the B...
AI summary The regulatory compact ensures customer protection via the Board's rate-setting authority. Although the City did not submit a general rate review application in response to ATCO's sale request, the Board could independently convene hearings to adjust rates based on new economic data from the sale, citing PUBA and GUA provisions.
3. Conclusion Le rôle de notre Cour dans le présent pourvoi a été d'interpréter les lois habilitantes en tenant compte comme il se doit du contexte, de l'intention du législateur et de l'objectif législatif. Aller plus loin et conclure à l...
AI summary The court interprets enabling legislation, finding the Commission lacked power to assign sale proceeds from public utility assets. The decision annuls the Commission's ruling, directing it to permit ATCO's sale and allocate profits. Justice Binnie dissents, arguing the Board's authority under AEUBA to impose public interest conditions was properly exercised.
est conféré : S.C.F.P. c. Ontario (Ministre du Travail) , [2003] 1 R.C.S. 539, 2003 CSC 29. ATCO prétend que la Commission a même outrepassé un aussi large pouvoir. Voici un extrait de son mémoire : [TRADUCTION] Nul droit issu de la loi ou...
AI summary ATCO challenges the Commission's authority, citing a Supreme Court case, arguing that the Commission's decision has a confiscatory effect. The Commission contends it must determine ATCO's allowable profit. Alberta's 'original cost' jurisdiction supports the Board's rate-making approach, with the order's prospective nature aligning with statutory mandates.
B. The Board's Decision 94 ATCO argues that the Board's decision should be seen as a stand-alone decision divorced from its rate-making responsibilities. However, I do not agree that the hearing under s. 26 of the GUA can be isolated in th...
AI summary ATCO argues the Board's decision under s. 26 of the GUA is separate from rate-making, but the Board disagrees, citing the TransAlta (1986) case as precedent. The case addresses asset disposal gains and the 'TransAlta Formula,' emphasizing the Board's regulatory authority over future rates and utility oversight.
nt que je comprends maintenant que toutes les parties ont intérêt à ce que issues of this sort, if possible, before a general rate hearing so as to lessen the burden on that already complex procedure. Given this encouragement from the Albe...
AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) approved ATCO Gas - South's (AGS) sale of a Calgary property under a 'no-harm test,' linking approval to future financial considerations. The Board's decision (2001-78) allowed the sale but required subsequent analysis of profit allocation, which ATCO contested, arguing the Board was functus officio after the first phase. The Board emphasized ongoing oversight of financial impacts.
vorisés au détriment des clients touchés par l'opération. (P. W. MacAvoy et J. G. Sidak, « The Efficient Allocation of Proceeds from a Utility's Sale of Assets » (2001), 22 Energy L.J. 233, p. 234) Ce n'est pas d'hier que les organismes de...
AI summary The text discusses regulatory considerations regarding the allocation of profits from utility asset sales, referencing past cases like Re Consumers' Gas Co. (Ontario Energy Board, 1976) and Re Boston Gas Co. (Massachusetts D.P.U., 1982). It argues that profits from such sales should be shared between shareholders and customers to prevent speculative behavior by utilities.
F. L'argumentation d'ATCO Les principaux arguments d'ATCO ont pour la plupart été abordés, mais, par souci de clarté, je les rappellerai. ATCO ne conteste pas vraiment le pouvoir de la Commission d'assortir de conditions la vente d'un terr...
AI summary ATCO argues that the Commission violated its property rights by allocating land sale profits to customers, claiming ownership of the land and disputing retroactive rate adjustments. It also contends amortization rules exclude land from rate structures and criticizes the Board's asymmetrical burden on ratepayers. The Commission's decision is deemed reasonable within regulatory precedents.
1. La question de l'effet confiscatoire Dans son mémoire, ATCO affirme que [TRADUCTION] « [l]es biens appartenaient au propriétaire du service public et que la répartition projetée par la Commission ne peut avoir qu'un effet confiscatoire...
AI summary ATCO Gas - South argues that a proposed rate allocation by the Commission would have a confiscatory effect. The Commission counters that regulated utilities have a set rate of return determined by regulators, not the market, citing the Re Southern California Gas Co. case (C.P.U.C. 1990). The argument highlights differences between private and regulated investments, emphasizing that regulated utilities recover costs through tariffs, not market risks.
2. The Regulatory Compact The Board referred in its decision to the "regulatory compact" which is a loose expression suggesting that in exchange for a statutory monopoly Cette considération liée aux « risques » vaut également en Alberta. P...
AI summary The regulatory compact in Alberta ensures that customers guarantee ATCO a fair return on land and buildings, even as risks and gains are shared. This approach, similar to the SoCalGas case, rejects ATCO's claim of 'confiscatory' profit allocation. The Board emphasizes that profit distribution is context-dependent and that the Commission's decision should not be overturned.
ns of The Gas Utilities Act that the Board must act prospectively and may not award rates which will recover expenses incurred in the past and not recovered under rates established for past periods. As stated earlier, the Board in this cas...
AI summary The text discusses the requirement under the Gas Utilities Act for regulatory boards to act prospectively, not retroactively, in rate-setting. It references a New York case where gains from real estate sales were used to reduce rates over 17 years and a U.S. case emphasizing balancing investor and consumer interests in rate design.
3. Le terrain en tant que bien non amortissable La Cour d'appel de l'Alberta a établi une distinction entre le profit tiré de la vente d'un terrain, dont le coût historique n'est pas amorti (et qui n'est donc pas graduellement remboursé pa...
AI summary The Alberta Court of Appeal distinguished profits from land sales (non-depreciable assets) versus depreciable assets like buildings in rate-making. It supported the Commission's inclusion of building amortization in rates but not land. ATCO's land was valued at $83,720 (historical cost), while buildings had a net book value of $141,525 after amortization. Regulatory precedents like Re Boston Gas Co. and SoCalGas show regulators often treat land sales similarly to depreciable assets.
4. Lack of Reciprocity ATCO argues that the customers should not profit from a rising market because if the land loses value it is ATCO, and not the ratepayers, that will absorb the loss. However, the material put before the Court suggests...
AI summary ATCO argues customers shouldn't profit from rising markets, but the Board asserts profits/losses from asset sales should accrue to customers, citing past decisions like Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. and Re Alberta Government Telephones . The Board emphasizes case-specific fairness over rigid formulas, rejecting ATCO's claims of limited regulatory discretion.
III. Disposition 149 I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, and restore the decision of the Board, with costs to the City of Calgary both in this Court and in the court below. ATCO's cross-appeal s...
AI summary The appeal is allowed, restoring the Board's decision and dismissing ATCO's cross-appeal. The argument is that ATCO's claim about bearing land value risk is incorrect, referencing SoCalGas. The decision emphasizes that utilities benefit from historical cost-based returns even if market values decline.
Pouvoirs de la Commission 36 La Commission peut, d'office ou à la demande d'un intéressé, par ordonnance écrite, après avoir donné un avis aux personnes intéressées et les avoir entendues, - a) fixer des tarifs individuels ou conjoints, de...
AI summary The Commission has authority to set gas utility rates, establish depreciation methods, enforce infrastructure maintenance, and mandate service standards. It may also require gas suppliers to deliver gas under specified terms, ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements and fair practices.
Excess revenues or losses - 40 In fixing just and reasonable rates, tolls or charges, or schedules of them, to be imposed, observed and followed afterwards by an owner of a gas utility, - (a) the Board may consider all revenues and costs o...
AI summary The regulatory board considers revenues and costs of gas utility owners when setting just and reasonable rates. The board may require gas service providers to extend infrastructure if financially justified and may mandate gas supply under specific terms. The process aligns with applicable legislation.
Recettes excédentaires ou insuffisantes - 40 Pour fixer des tarifs, des taux ou des charges justes et raisonnables, ou leurs barèmes, opposables au propriétaire d'un service de gaz et applicables par lui, la Commission - a) peut tenir comp...
AI summary The Board may consider revenues and costs from specific periods when setting rates, tolls, or charges. It can apply excess or insufficient revenues to the relevant fiscal year, address delays in proceedings, and approve methods for managing such revenues. The Board must also approve the period for using these funds.
Jurisdiction and powers 36(1) The Board has all the necessary jurisdiction and power fixation des tarifs, des taux ou des charges, ou de leurs barèmes, - (ii) un exercice ultérieur, - (iii) deux exercices ou plus visés aux sousalinéas (i)...
AI summary The Board asserts jurisdiction and power to fix tariffs, consider surpluses/deficits, and address procedural delays. It may approve actions for excesses/deficits and determine periods for implementation.
Établissement des tarifs 89 La Commission peut, d'office ou à la demande d'un intéressé, par ordonnance écrite, après avoir donné un avis aux personnes intéressées et les avoir entendues, - a) fixer des tarifs individuels ou conjoints, des...
AI summary The Commission has authority to set just and reasonable rates, depreciation methods, and service standards for public utilities. It may also require infrastructure expansion if deemed reasonable and financially justified by the utility owner.
Base tarifaire 90(1) Pour fixer des tarifs, des taux ou des charges justes et raisonnables, ou leurs barèmes, opposables au propriétaire d'une entreprise de services public et applicables par lui, la Commission établit une base tarifaire p...
AI summary The text outlines the process for establishing a fair rate base for public utilities in Alberta, considering factors like initial costs, depreciation, working capital, and ensuring a just return for owners. The Commission evaluates these elements to determine equitable rates and charges applicable to public utility owners.
Revenue and costs considered - 91(1) In fixing just and reasonable rates, tolls or charges, or schedules of them, to be imposed, observed and followed by an owner of a public utility, - (a) the Board may consider all revenues and costs of...
AI summary The Board considers revenues and costs for setting just and reasonable rates, including the impact of the Small Power Research and Development Act on electric energy generation, transmission, and distribution. It may adjust for excess revenues or deficiencies tied to the fiscal year of the proceeding, excluding allocations to specific periods. The French text references capital, depreciation, and amortization in determining just returns.
Prise en compte des recettes et des dépenses - 91(1) Pour fixer des tarifs, des taux ou des charges justes et raisonnables, ou leurs barèmes, opposables au propriétaire d'une entreprise de services publics et applicables par lui, la Commis...
AI summary The regulation outlines how a commission sets just and reasonable rates by considering a utility owner's revenues and expenses from specific periods, including the impact of the Small Power Research and Development Act, and handling excess or deficit revenues. It allows consideration of multiple fiscal periods and addresses delays in proceedings.
ue instance, le CRTC s'est vu reconnaître la compétence nécessaire en vertu de son pouvoir général de prendre des règlements, de son pouvoir général d'assortir les licences de conditions, ou des deux. [107] La conclusion selon laquelle le...
AI summary The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the CRTC's authority under the Telecommunications Act to set rates and manage deferral accounts, citing its statutory mandate and specialized expertise. This decision reinforced the CRTC's role in implementing telecommunications policy objectives.