N-8NSPML (NSEB) RIR 1 to 44 - Redacted
9 passages
12.3 Own Property Damage For the avoidance of doubt, it is the Parties' intent that, subject to any right a Party may have to seek compensation from a third party who caused the Loss or from insurance, each Party shall be responsible for a...
AI summary The Parties agree that each is responsible for Losses to its own property, including facilities, equipment, and materials on the site of Defined Assets, regardless of the cause, including O&M Activities or the actions of the other Party or its affiliates. This applies unless compensation from a third party or insurance is available.
12.5 Indemnification Procedure - (a) Generally [12.1](#page-39-3) - Each Party (each, an " Indemnitor ") shall indemnify and hold harmless the other Parties and the other Persons as set forth in Sections , [12.2](#page-39-2) or [12.3](#pag...
AI summary This section outlines the indemnification procedure, requiring an Indemnitor to compensate an Indemnified Party for specified claims. The Indemnified Party must provide prompt notice of the claim, detailing it and estimating the loss, though failure to do so does not absolve the Indemnitor unless it causes material prejudice.
18.16 Successors and Assigns This Agreement shall be binding upon and enure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns.
AI summary This section outlines that the agreement is binding on the parties and their successors and permitted assigns, ensuring continuity of obligations and benefits.
ARTICLE FOUR: REMEDIES FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER/RECEIVE - 4.1 "Seller Failure." on line 2, insert ", by Section 3.3," immediately after the word "Product" and capitalize the first letter of the word "schedule" wherever it is used in the sect...
AI summary This section outlines modifications to the remedies for failure to deliver or receive, including changes to Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and the addition of a new Section 4.3 that mandates parties to mitigate damages using commercially reasonable efforts.
ARTICLE TWO: TRANSACTION TERMS AND CONDITIONS Section 2.2 ("Governing Terms") is amended by: (1) inserting the following as a new third sentence: "All references herein to the "Master Agreement" or to "this Agreement" shall be deemed to re...
AI summary Article Two of the document outlines amendments to Section 2.2, specifically modifying references to the Master Agreement and establishing a hierarchy for resolving inconsistencies between transaction terms, the Master Agreement, and the EAA.
reement to which Emera is not a party unless it also meets the definition of "Curtailment" or "event of Force Majeure" in the NS OATT, but the following shall not be considered a Force Majeure event: - (i) lack of finances or changes in ec...
AI summary The text defines key terms related to contractual obligations and operational standards, including Force Majeure exclusions, Forecast Notice, Forgivable Events, Formal Agreements, and GHG Credits. It outlines conditions under which certain events are not considered Force Majeure, such as financial difficulties or failure to meet regulatory standards.
2.7 Subsequent Term(s) - (a) No later than five years before the end of the Initial Term and eighteen months before the end of any Subsequent Term, the Parties shall complete a study to determine the remaining Service Life of the ML. - (b)...
AI summary This section outlines the process for determining the remaining service life of the Maritime Link (ML) and the procedure for negotiating the purchase and sale of energy during subsequent terms of the agreement. Emera must notify Nalcor of its intent to negotiate, and both parties must agree on terms and conditions for energy sales during subsequent terms.
1.2 Construction of Agreement (a) Interpretation Not Affected by Headings, etc - The division of this Agreement into articles, sections and other subdivisions, the provision of a table of contents and the insertion of headings are for conv...
AI summary This section outlines the interpretation and construction principles for the Agreement, emphasizing that headings and subdivisions are for convenience and do not affect the Agreement's meaning. It clarifies definitions, usage of terms, and references to statutes and regulations.
NSPML Responses to Nova Scotia Energy Board Information Requests 1 Request IR-41: 1 Request IR-42: 2 3 IR-32 to IR-44 Reference Exhibit N-1, Appendix A, Concentric Expert Evidence (refer to 4 Appendix page numbers at the bottom of each pag...
AI summary The document discusses NSPML's inability to achieve its approved return on equity (ROE) due to factors such as the NS Block holdback mechanism. It also references the potential impact of disallowing a portion of the 2024 holdback on NSPML's ROE.
N-17Alberta Utilities Commission
Decision 27084-D02-2023
4 passages
d the ATCO Utilities filed company-specific evidence. - 11. The Consumers' Coalition of Alberta (CCA), the Office of the Utilities Consumer Advocate (UCA), and the Industrial Power Consumers Association of Alberta (IPCAA) (collectively, th...
AI summary The document outlines the participation of various interveners in the proceeding, including the Consumers' Coalition of Alberta, the Office of the Utilities Consumer Advocate, and the Industrial Power Consumers Association of Alberta. It also describes the Commission's initiative to organize a technical conference to develop a comparator group for estimating the fair rate of return on equity for Alberta utilities.
oncentric evidence, PDF page 109. Exhibit 27084-X0743, Concentric reply evidence, PDF page 51. 199 Exhibit 27084_X0678, EDTI-AML-CCA-2023FEB21-003 Attachment (OEB Report), PDF page 3. 191. The Commission approves a 0.5 adjustment factor fo...
AI summary The Commission has approved a 0.5 adjustment factor for both changes in the 30-year GoC bond yield and changes in the utility bond yield spread in the formula.
hat the deemed equity ratio applicable to AltaLink and EPCOR should be 40 per cent, which he submitted reflects the substantial increase in market risk since the 2018 GCOC proceeding, and increased business risk faced by AltaLink and EPCOR...
AI summary The document discusses recommendations to increase the deemed equity ratio for Alberta utilities, including AltaLink and EPCOR, to 40 per cent, citing increased market and business risks. J. Coyne argues that this aligns with Canadian and U.S. standards and is conservative for non-taxable entities like ENMAX.
compelling evidence that these risks have increased or will increase, or that a 39 per cent equity thickness undermines Apex's ability respond to these contingencies. - 281. In the Etzikom decision 271 referred to by Apex as an example of...
AI summary The Commission determines that Apex's risks have not significantly changed since 2018, and thus maintains a 39% equity thickness, citing its financial integrity and ability to attract capital. The decision references the Etzikom case, where the Commission denied cost recovery under the PBR framework, emphasizing that distribution utilities can manage capital programs flexibly.
N-21UARB APPROVAL SHEET Replace L6513/Upgrade Line Terminals
11 passages
DESCRIPTION: This project consisted of building a new transmission line (L6613) which replaced the adjacent line (L6513) for a designed operating temperature of 100˚C with a summer rating of 320 MVA and a winter rating of 363 MVAutilizing...
AI summary This project involved replacing an existing transmission line with a new one to support the Maritime Link project. The original submission was not approved in 2015, and NS Power is now resubmitting it as part of a General Rate Application.
1 j. Conclusions on Business Risk 2 As discussed in this Section, NSPI's risk profile is characterized by the following factors: 1) 3 ownership of substantial regulated generation assets; 2) the need to retire a substantial amount 4 of the...
AI summary NSPI's business risk profile includes regulated generation assets, retirement of thermal generation, capital investments for renewable transition, FAM audits, volumetric risk, weaker economic trends, and storm exposure. The company requests continuation of the storm rider pilot. Credit agencies are closely monitoring NSPI's decarbonization risks.
b. Recovery of Fuel and Purchased Power Costs NSPI is the only Canadian investor-owned electric utility that owns significant regulated generation, and the Company has an annual FAM. While the FAM includes an incentive component whereby NS...
AI summary NSPI is the only Canadian investor-owned electric utility with significant regulated generation and an annual FAM. The FAM includes an incentive component that was suspended during the 2017-2019 period and again under the 2020-2022 fuel stability plan. The provincial government has purchased a $117 million receivable to reduce deferred fuel costs. Other Canadian utilities, such as FortisBC and Maritime Electric, have different mechanisms for recovering fuel and purchased power costs.
9 c. Volume/Demand Risk NSPI does not have a mechanism to mitigate volume/demand risk due to changes in volume attributable to weather, economic conditions, or energy efficiency and conservation programs. The significance of this risk has...
AI summary NSPI lacks mechanisms to mitigate volume/demand risk due to factors like weather, economic conditions, and energy efficiency programs. As more residential customers switch to electric heating, this risk has increased. Other Canadian utilities have mechanisms like revenue stabilization plans, weather-related variance accounts, and performance-based regulation to manage volumetric risk.
2 Findings included in the Board's Decision under M10431 The NSEB's 2023-2024 GRA Decision provided general direction for pursuing available options: In considering NS Power's requested opt-out fee, the Board questions whether all reasonab...
AI summary The Board questions whether all reasonable options have been explored to minimize or eliminate the proposed opt-out fee for the smart meter program, noting that customers who opt-out will still pay for the capital project through embedded rate costs. The Board is not persuaded that the fee has been fully justified and emphasizes the need for flexible meter reading schedules.
2.1.2 Economic Comparison of In-house versus Outsourced Meter Readings In its Order dated December 6, 2018, the Board directed NS Power to explore the option of providing opt-out meter reading services by external contractor resources, inc...
AI summary The NS Power evaluated the economic feasibility of outsourcing opt-out meter reading services versus in-house provision. The analysis, conducted as part of the 2023-2024 GRA, concluded that outsourcing would result in a 25% increase in costs compared to maintaining in-house services, thus finding no cost savings for customers.
2.1.3 Regulation 5.1 – Post Card and Estimated Meter Reading Customer-submitted meter reads, by post card or electronically, were raised in both the AMI Application and the 2023-2024 GRA as an option to reduce or eliminate an opt-out fee....
AI summary The document discusses Regulation 5.1, which allows customers to submit their own meter readings via post card or electronically, as an option to reduce or eliminate opt-out fees. This was addressed in the AMI Application and the 2023-2024 GRA. NS Power provides instructions on how to read analog meters and submit readings online, and similar instructions could be developed for digital meters.
Non-standard Meter Service (AMI) Opt-out Fee 2026-2027 GRA Direct Evidence Appendix 13A Page 8 of 14 Customer-submitted meter reads are used only on an exception basis when NS Power is unable to obtain an on-site reading. Regulation 5.1 re...
AI summary The document discusses the risks and inaccuracies associated with customer-submitted meter reads under the proposed opt-out fee for non-standard meter service (AMI) in 2026-2027. It highlights the potential for errors due to reduced meter read frequency and the limitations of customer-submitted readings compared to manual reads by NS Power.
Non-standard Meter Service (AMI) Opt-out Fee 2026-2027 GRA Direct Evidence Appendix 13A Page 10 of 14 NS Power has increasingly been asked by stakeholders to leverage its AMI data for various justifications and analyses. AMI data helps NS...
AI summary NS Power highlights additional benefits of AMI data, including improved outage management, reduced field work, and better integration of new electric loads, which support the approval of the ATO application. These benefits were not included in the original NPV analysis.
Non-standard Meter Service (AMI) Opt-out Fee 2026-2027 GRA Direct Evidence Appendix 13A Page 13 of 14 having then achieved "the successful installation of AMI meters for approximately 98%"[18](#page-126-1) of its customers, without any req...
AI summary The document notes that approximately 98% of customers have successfully had AMI meters installed, with no need for revisions to the opt-out fee model inputs or assumptions.
Re: M08349 – CI 47124 – Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Project – Costs Associated with Opt-Out Services The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB, Board) approved Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's (NS Power, Company) applicat...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) approved Nova Scotia Power's AMI project in 2018 and directed the company to explore cost-effective opt-out meter reading services and track associated costs. NS Power has installed over 531,000 smart meters and migrated most to OTA billing, with the Board approving the discontinuation of monthly updates due to compliance with the Electricity Act.
N-22Decision Ontario Energy Board EB-2024-0063
12 passages
Submissions There was general consensus that the key risk factors that need to be considered when determining the cost of capital parameters and capital structure include business risks and financial risks. With respect to energy transitio...
AI summary The document discusses the consensus on key risk factors for determining cost of capital parameters and capital structure, noting that energy transition risks do not significantly impact timing or recovery for regulated utilities in the 2025-2029 period. OEB staff recommend addressing energy transition uncertainties through regular rate cases or the Non-Wires Solutions (NWS) Guidelines.
e OEA stated that financial flexibility means that utilities are capital intensive businesses and must be able to access capital markets at all necessary times regardless of conditions or the economy. between the ratepayer groups and the u...
AI summary The OEA argues that utilities need financial flexibility to access capital markets effectively, and that adjusting the ROE to account for flotation costs is necessary to meet the FRS. The EDA claims removing the 50 basis points adder would confiscate past equity costs, but OEB staff and CCC counter that this adder has overcompensated utilities and that no unrecovered costs remain.
ing case. The OEA also disagreed with the recommendations regarding Enbridge Gas and Hydro One made by Dr. Cleary. Several ratepayer groups supported Dr. Cleary's recommendations regarding Hydro One. The OEA generally supported Concentric'...
AI summary The OEA supported Concentric's proposals but emphasized the need to adjust the deemed capital structure and base ROE to meet the FRS. The SEC suggested reducing the equity thickness for electricity distributors, but OEB staff and the OEA disagreed, citing insufficient evidence. Ratepayer groups supported Dr. Cleary's recommendations for Hydro One.
EPCOR Natural Gas EPCOR Natural Gas's current approved equity ratio is 36% for its South Bruce service territory and 40% for its Aylmer service territory. The deemed debt component includes a deemed 4% component for short-term debt for bot...
AI summary EPCOR Natural Gas has different approved equity ratios for its service territories. The OEB determines long-term debt costs based on actual debt costs and the DLTDR, applying this method when there are material variances affecting the revenue requirement, aligning with practices for electricity distributors and transmitters.
Use of the DLTDR No party took issue with the OEB's general policy to rely primarily on the embedded or actual cost for existing long-term debt instruments. As with the experts, the point of disagreement was whether the DLTDR should be use...
AI summary The document discusses the use of the Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate (DLTDR) as a cap for utilities. While no party opposed the OEB's general policy to rely on actual or embedded costs for existing long-term debt, there is disagreement over whether the DLTDR should be a universal cap. OEB staff and ratepayer groups support extending the cap to all utilities, while others argue that applying it to Enbridge Gas and OPG could lead to under-recovery of prudently incurred costs. The OEA opposes a universal cap, citing lack of evidence of issues with the current practice and differences in credit ratings.
Findings The DLTDR will continue to be applicable to all electricity distributors and transmitters, as well as EPCOR Natural Gas (both Aylmer and South Bruce), rebasing rates in 2025 and beyond, in prescribed circumstances, unless some oth...
AI summary The OEB concludes that the DLTDR will continue to be used for rate rebasing, with modifications to its calculation and clarity on applicability. Actual market-based debt will be prioritized, and the DLTDR will be set annually, with the 2025 rate at 4.51%. The OEB will assess prudence in debt management for OPG and Enbridge Gas.
Where: BVCAUA3M BVLI is the Bloomberg ticker BVCAUA3M BVLI Index (3-month) which tracks utility bond yields, with the data point as at September 30, taken from Bloomberg LP, for year t. If at any point, the BVCAUA3M BVLI Index (3-month) be...
AI summary The document discusses the application of the Deemed Short-Term Debt Rate (DSTDR) in rate applications for various utilities, including electricity and natural gas distributors, as well as OPG. LEI recommends using DSTDR as a cap for all utilities, while Concentric disagrees, arguing that a cap may not account for utility-specific borrowing costs. Dr. Cleary supports the current approach.
Expert Report Proposals LEI and Concentric recommended that consistent with the OEB's existing policy, the OEB should commit to reviewing the cost of capital policy every five years. Nexus recommended that the OEB limit LEI's proposed annu...
AI summary The text discusses recommendations for reviewing the cost of capital policy by the OEB, with varying intervals proposed by different entities. LEI and Concentric suggest five-year reviews, while Nexus advocates for a three-year cycle. Dr. Cleary supports reviews every three to five years and suggests triggering a review if Canadian A-rated utility yield spreads exceed 2%.
Submissions OEB staff and a number of ratepayer groups agreed with LEI and Dr. Cleary that consistent with the OEB's existing policy, the OEB should continue to implement changes in the cost of capital parameters and capital structure upon...
AI summary The OEB staff and ratepayer groups support aligning cost of capital changes with rebasing, while SEC and VECC recommend updating base rates to avoid variance account imbalances. CCC and SEC caution against mid-Price Cap incentive rate-setting mechanism (IRM) term changes, emphasizing that cost of capital should be treated like other cost components.
Findings The cost of capital parameters of ROE, DSTDR, and DLTDR are applicable to utilities rebasing rates for 2025 (if cost of capital is in scope). For other utilities, the new cost of capital parameters will be implemented on a one-tim...
AI summary The OEB outlines the application of new cost of capital parameters (ROE, DSTDR, DLTDR) for 2025 rate rebasing, emphasizing that they should be implemented alongside other cost of service reviews. Variance accounts are granted for utilities using interim parameters, and adjustments to base rates will be based on final revenue requirements. Prescribed interest rates for DVAs and CWIP are effective April 1, 2025.
Expert Report Proposals No expert made comments on this issue in its report, as the issues list focused on what interest rate should apply to the account. The OEB's Accounting Order suggests that the continuance of this DVA be addressed at...
AI summary The document discusses the regulatory treatment of cloud computing implementation costs for utilities, emphasizing that these costs should be addressed during the next rebasing rate proceeding. The OEB's Accounting Order suggests considering new deferral accounts or other approaches, informed by results from related generic proceedings.
page-142-3) No other comprehensive reviews of the formulaic cost of capital policy have been conducted by the OEB until the current proceeding. Schedule H – Current Cost of Capital Framework VII 130 OEB Letter, 2025 Cost of Capital Paramet...
AI summary The OEB has not conducted a comprehensive review of the formulaic cost of capital policy until the current proceeding. The current Cost of Capital Framework VII includes trigger mechanisms for potential adjustments, such as evidence filing by applicants or intervenors and off-ramp mechanisms for electricity distributors based on earnings deviations.
101936Board Decision
6 passages
PORT HAWKESBURY PAPER LP James MacDuff, Counsel David MacDougall, Counsel BOARD COUNSEL: William L. Mahody, K.C. HEARING DATES: December 15 and 16, 2025 ORAL SUBMISSIONS: December 18, 2025 DECISION DATE: May 11, 2026 DECISION: The Board ap...
AI summary The Board has approved NSPML's 2026 revenue requirement and cost assessment, reducing the return on equity from 9.0% to 8.75%. A compliance filing is required, and the $4 million monthly holdback remains in place until further order.
2.0 RATE BASE [7] In its Order dated February 25, 2022, following the Final Project Costs decision (2022 NSUARB 18 (M10206)), the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) confirmed NSPML's opening rate base, after adjustments, of $1,7...
AI summary The NSUARB confirmed NSPML's opening rate base of $1,752.4 million after adjustments in its February 2022 Order. NSPML stated that no further adjustments to the rate base have been made for outstanding claims and that any adjustments would occur after claims are settled. In its current application, NSPML outlined equity financing costs based on different equity thickness percentages for forecast 2026 rate base amounts.
ction, economic and political developments have contributed to a divergence in the previously aligned economic relationship between the U.S. and Canada, with the potential to become more disconnected. [65] Dr. Cleary presented estimates re...
AI summary The document discusses the return on equity for NS Power and NSPML, with Dr. Cleary recommending a 7.6% return based on financial models, while Concentric criticizes this as too low and potentially harmful to NSPML's credit rating and cost of debt.
A. To the best of my knowledge, 7.6 percent would be the lowest recommended [return on equity] in Canada. And also, I would add at 10.35 percent, Concentric's recommendation, I think it would be the highest allowed [return on equity] in Ca...
AI summary The testimony discusses recommended return on equity rates, noting that 7.6 percent is the lowest in Canada and 10.35 percent is the highest. It also references evidence submitted by Concentric and Dr. Cleary in a recent general rate application, highlighting similarities in their approaches and outcomes.
10.0 COMPLIANCE WITH BOARD DIRECTIVES [227] The Consumer Advocate asked the Board to caution NSPML about its failure to follow Board directives, citing the examples of NSPML's failure to file the LTAMP and a return on equity review over th...
AI summary The Board criticizes NSPML for repeatedly failing to comply with directives, such as not filing the LTAMP and return on equity review, leading to inefficiencies and increased regulatory costs. The Board warns that future non-compliance could result in disallowing regulatory costs.
11.0 REPORTING [231] NSPML's quarterly reports and NS Power's ML Benefits Reports have been useful to the Board and all participants in these proceedings. The Board directs that these reports continue as outlined in paragraph 232 of the Fi...
AI summary NSPML's quarterly reports and NS Power's ML Benefits Reports have been valuable in the proceedings. The Board has directed that these reports continue as outlined in the Final Project Costs decision, including specific documentation requirements and quarterly reporting on the LTAMP status.
101936Board Decision
6 passages
2.1 Findings - [9] NSPML said it would address the rate base treatment of any 2026 sustaining capital expenditures when it files its rate base reconciliation for outstanding insurance, warranty, expropriation and contract claims. It said t...
AI summary NSPML has committed to addressing the rate base treatment of 2026 sustaining capital expenditures in its rate base reconciliation. The Board emphasizes the importance of monitoring sustaining capital expenses to prevent undue rate pressures and intergenerational equity issues, and reiterates the need for NSPML to provide a rate base continuity schedule in future applications.
A. To the best of my knowledge, 7.6 percent would be the lowest recommended [return on equity] in Canada. And also, I would add at 10.35 percent, Concentric's recommendation, I think it would be the highest allowed [return on equity] in Ca...
AI summary The text discusses the recommended return on equity rates, with 7.6 percent being the lowest and 10.35 percent the highest in Canada. It also mentions Concentric and Dr. Cleary's similar evidence in NS Power's general rate application, noting differences in model outcomes due to proxy companies and data timing.
5.2.2 Relationship to NS Power's Return on Equity [113] As noted above, Dr. Cleary considers that NSPML and NS Power have similar total risk profiles and should continue to have the same return on equity for rate setting purposes. At the h...
AI summary Dr. Cleary argues that NSPML and NS Power should have the same return on equity for rate setting purposes, citing similar risk profiles and regulatory efficiency. Concentric agrees that tying NSPML's return on equity to NS Power's could improve efficiency but suggests a potential risk adjustment of 75 to 100 basis points for NSPML.
ng would not be required for sustaining capital if the Board approved its request for a 40% equity ratio for these capital expenditures. [119] In its response to Industrial Group IR-18, NSPML stated: NSPML has limited cash flow flexibility...
AI summary NSPML argues that due to limited cash flow flexibility, it needs a 31.5% equity payout cap to manage its capital structure, despite previous disallowances. The Board questioned whether this request is a benefit from those disallowances, but NSPML clarified it is related to corporate configuration, not the disallowances themselves.
10.0 COMPLIANCE WITH BOARD DIRECTIVES [227] The Consumer Advocate asked the Board to caution NSPML about its failure to follow Board directives, citing the examples of NSPML's failure to file the LTAMP and a return on equity review over th...
AI summary The Board criticizes NSPML for repeatedly failing to comply with directives, such as not filing the LTAMP and a return on equity review. This non-compliance has led to inefficiencies, delays, and increased regulatory costs. The Board warns that future non-compliance may result in disallowing regulatory costs.
11.0 REPORTING [231] NSPML's quarterly reports and NS Power's ML Benefits Reports have been useful to the Board and all participants in these proceedings. The Board directs that these reports continue as outlined in paragraph 232 of the Fi...
AI summary The Board acknowledges the usefulness of NSPML's quarterly reports and NS Power's ML Benefits Reports and directs their continuation as outlined in the Final Project Costs decision. The Board also mandates quarterly reporting on the status of the LTAMP.