P-1Application
4 passages
ATTACHMENT A This attachment outlines procedures by which the requirements of Availability Clause (1 ) and Special Condition (1) are to be satisfied. - (1) The customer shall apply in writing to take service under this rate, outlining the...
AI summary This document outlines procedures for customers to apply for service under a load retention rate, including economic and technical feasibility assessments, data confidentiality, and the determination of appropriate rates and terms by NSPI and the customer, with the option for UARB adjudication in case of disagreement.
rant Nova Scotia economy, and allow NSPI to provide more stable - 4 rates to other customers. - 5 To ensure that load retention rates are offered only in circumstances where they are justified, NSPI - 6 proposes that such rates be based on...
AI summary NSPI proposes a two-stage process to implement load retention rates that ensure fairness and confidentiality for customers. The process aims to satisfy the UARB's approval requirements while addressing customer concerns about data privacy.
- 4 A. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Table A presents a list of other utilities that offer load retention rates, as compiled by NSPI in a recent survey. Approximately one hundred (100) utilities were contacted and approximately thirty five (35) had r...
AI summary Table A lists utilities offering load retention rates, compiled by NSPI, with 35 responses from 100 contacted utilities. Fifteen offer rates to prevent load loss to alternate sources, while others use them for economic dispatch. These rates are often contractual and require regulatory approval, though details are rarely disclosed publicly.
TABLE A SAMPLE OF LOAD RETENTION RATES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS Utility Principle Reason for LR Rate Form of Load Retention Rate Approved By Regulator ? Public Disclosure of Contract Terms ? Comments Allegheny Power Alternate Supply Contract...
AI summary This table compares load retention rates across various utilities in different jurisdictions, highlighting the principle reasons, forms of load retention rates, and regulatory approvals. It includes information on whether contracts are publicly disclosed and provides comments specific to each utility.
P-2NSPI (UARB) IR-1 to IR-33; NSPI (Irving Oil) IR-1 to IR-7; NSPI (CBRM) IR-1 to IR-17 - Responses
14 passages
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: NSUARB FROM: NSPI Question IR-5: In Availability Clause 1 of NSPI's submission to this Hearing, it is stated that the load retention rate must not be less than necessary to make the customer in question...
AI summary NSPI responds to an information request regarding Availability Clause 1, which sets a minimum load retention rate to prevent customers from switching to alternative energy providers. The clause is discussed in the context of potential conflicts with the Canadian Competition Act Section 50(1), which prohibits discriminatory pricing practices. The response references the Public Utilities Act and the Load Retention Rate approval application.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: NSUARB FROM: NSPI Question IR-5: ( c) engages in a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor,...
AI summary NSPI responds to an information request from NSUARB regarding the load retention rate, asserting that it is consistent with the Competition Act's goal of maintaining competition and ensuring fair pricing. The response references the Public Utilities Act and an application for approval of the load retention rate.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: NSUARB FROM: NSPI Response IR-5: The differentiating factor is whether a customer has the facilities to receive alternate energy supply, which is not discriminatory from a pricing perspective. The custom...
AI summary NSPI responds to an information request regarding a load retention rate, stating that the rate does not discriminate based on geography and is not predatory. The rate is customer-specific and subject to approval by the UARB. NSPI argues that the rate is regulated conduct and does not affect competition.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: NSUARB FROM: NSPI Response IR-5: One important factor in assessing predatory pricing is a comparison between the price and the cost of the product sold. The proposed rate is not below costs; it will cove...
AI summary NSPI responds to an information request by NSUARB regarding predatory pricing, stating that the proposed rate covers marginal and fixed costs and does not intend to undercut competitors. The pricing mechanism aims to retain customer load beneficially for other NSPI customers and will be submitted to DARB for approval.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: NSUARB FROM: NSPI Question IR-9: In Attachment A, Paragraph ( 6) it is stated that none of the data or analysis used in the implementation of these procedures or the associated results shall be publicly...
AI summary NSPI confirms that the regulatory hearing process for Load Retention Rate contracts is generally closed, and contract terms are not publicly disclosed, as noted in Table A of Mr. Whalen's evidence.
ALTERNATIVE GENERATION SCHEDULE SCHEDULE "AGS" (Continued) MONTHLY RATE (Continued) Demand Charge (Continued) Firm or Interruptible Maintenance Power All Kilowatts of Maintenance Power Billing Demand ......$5.332 net per kilowatt All Kilov...
AI summary This document outlines the Alternative Generation Schedule (AGS) for electricity billing, including demand charges, energy charges, and fuel rates. It specifies billing procedures for maintenance and standby power and references regulatory orders and effective dates.
Cancelling RATE DESIGNATION: 450 CLASS OF SERVICE: COMPETITIVE RATE - LARGE POWER AND LIGHTING SERVICE AREA: ALL MINNESOTA SERVICE AREA Avai.lability: To individual customers or to groups of customers within the Company's Large Power and L...
AI summary This section outlines the competitive rate designation for large power and lighting customers in Minnesota, specifying eligibility, terms, and conditions for offering such rates, including MPUC approval processes and cost recovery mechanisms.
cmtomers demonstrates to the fmancial community Consumers' commitment to meet competitive challenges, and ( 4) the retention of the load ensures the contnbution of this customer to system fixed costs. Consumers says that it will serve Upjo...
AI summary The document discusses the approval of a contract between Consumers and Upjohn, highlighting that Consumers will serve Upjohn at rates above variable costs without requesting rate changes for other customers. The Commission concludes the contract is reasonable and in the public interest, noting mutual benefits and the need for Consumers to retain Upjohn as a customer.
REQUIRED INFORMATION: The Company shall obtain the following information from the Customer, and file that information with the New Mexico Public Utility Commission (NMPUC): - 1. The customer shall provide detailed engineering and economic...
AI summary The Company is required to obtain specific information from customers, including engineering studies, sworn affidavits, and agreements on energy usage limits, to be filed with the New Mexico Public Utility Commission.
TERMS AND CONl>ITIONS - Ontario Hydro's evaluation will include, among other things: a review and assessment of the third-party reviewer's report; the supporting documentation provided by the applicant; and the effect, if any, that grantin...
AI summary The document outlines the terms and conditions for the Load Retention and Expansion Price (LREP) agreement, including evaluation processes, contract duration, energy efficiency requirements, and approval requirements from the Ontario Hydro Board and the provincial government.
No Response 1 No Yes 39 11 For what utilities are such rates offered? (Illinois - 2. ·· Electric Only 15 Gas Only 5 Both 14 3. What rate mechanisms are available to do so? (Illinois - Tariffs Only 6 Special Contracts Only 3 4. fixed or fle...
AI summary The text discusses questions related to economic development/incentive rates, including for which utilities such rates are offered, available rate mechanisms, whether they are fixed or flexible, applicable load, and responsibilities for revenue shortfalls during rate cases. It includes responses from stakeholders and references to the Illinois Commission.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE Are utilities allowed to offer other economic development related rates? Yes If yes, what types? Please mark th e appropriate response (No te: more than one item p er question can be marked if necessar Wh...
AI summary The document discusses whether utilities are allowed to offer economic development-related rates, including types of rate mechanisms, their flexibility, cost considerations, and Commission monitoring. It also covers the allocation of benefits and Commission considerations such as enhancing industry competitiveness and utility efficiency.
NOVA SCOTIA UTILITY AND REVIEW BOARD IN THE MATIER OF: The Public Utilities Act, RS.N.S., 1989, c.380 as amended IN THE MATIER OF: An Application by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated for approval of a Load Retention Rate
AI summary This document pertains to an application by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated under the Public Utilities Act for approval of a Load Retention Rate. The proceeding involves regulatory oversight of utility rates and compliance with relevant legislation.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: IRVING OIL LIMITED FROM: NSPI Response S: - b) It is theoretically possible that two customers ofNSPI with identical energy requirements could receive energy under different prices, terms and conditions....
AI summary NSPI explains that different customers with identical energy needs may face different pricing and terms due to varying technical and economic conditions, which is considered reasonable and not discriminatory. The load retention rate is based on the cost of alternate supply, including standby power options.
P-3NSPI (Sempra) IR-1 to IR-14
12 passages
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: SEMPRA ATLANTIC GAS INC. FROM: NSPI Question IR-1: Application by Nova Scotia Power Inc. ("NSPI") for a Load Retention Rate. NSPI proposes a Load Retention Rate to retain existing customers it fears may...
AI summary NSPI is proposing a Load Retention Rate to retain customers who might switch to natural gas. The response indicates that NSPI is not currently planning any future expansion of its power generation capability and does not foresee a need to expand to meet future demand.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: SEMPRA ATLANTIC GAS INC. FROM: NSPI Question IR-3: Evidence of Christopher Huskilson, Application of Nova Scotia Power Inc., Page 2. Mr. Huskilson states "For some of our customers, preliminary studies i...
AI summary NSPI responds to SEMPRA's request regarding preliminary studies indicating some customers may leave NSPI's system for alternate energy. NSPI states it does not possess the studies and refers to a prior response for details.
NOV A SCOTIA UTILITY AND REVIEW BOARD IN THE MATTER OF: The Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S., 1989, c.380 as amended IN THE MATTER OF: An .. A.pplication by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated for approval of a Load Retention Rate
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is considering an application by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated for approval of a Load Retention Rate under the Public Utilities Act. This proceeding involves regulatory approval processes and may relate to rates and money topics.
IN THE MATTER·OF THE'PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT R.S.N.S., 1989, c. 380, as amended - and - IN THE MATTER OF an Application of Nova Scotia .Power Incorporated for approval of certain revisions to its Rates, Charges, and Regulations Prepared Testi...
AI summary This document is a prepared testimony from John H. Chamberlin on behalf of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board, submitted in a proceeding under the Public Utilities Act regarding Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's application for approval of revisions to its rates, charges, and regulations.
EXPERIENCE (1985 to present) Barakat & Chamberlin, Inc. Director of the firm's strategic planning work for utilities. Has been instrumental in developing competitive business pla.11S for utilities t.11.roughout the United States and Canada...
AI summary Barakat & Chamberlin, Inc. has extensive experience in strategic planning for utilities, including resource planning, business planning, and energy efficiency programs. The firm has worked with over 70 utilities and has provided testimony in more than 50 regulatory and civil proceedings in the US and Canada.
DR. CHAMBERLIN, CROSS-EXAM. BY MR. CAMPBELL 2808 competitive wholesale markets, and allow retail customers access, in one way or another, to those markets, and preserve the fiction of a vertically integrated utility. The problem with that,...
AI summary The discussion explores the challenges of vertically integrated utilities in competitive wholesale markets, highlighting how utilities functionally divest their generation businesses as markets become more competitive. It also touches on the limitations of Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) in a fully accessible market environment.
DR. CHAMBERLIN, CROSS-EXAM. BY MR. MCMANUS 2845 but that's the way that structure is set up. know. I think the real protection is with something like a price cap. That's why I think PVRs are a useful transition approach. You have to get fr...
AI summary Dr. Chamberlin discusses the importance of price caps and PVRs as a transition mechanism from a cost-of-service model to a competitive market, emphasizing the need to prevent price increases for customers during the transition. He also addresses concerns about potential 'milking operations' and asserts that a competitive market would prevent such issues.
DR. CHAMBERLIN, CROSS-EXAM. BY MR. ROBERTSON 2847 - raising the off-peak? - 2 A. Yes. I think what's important is I wouldn't be - 3 lowering the winter peak below the cost. - 4 O. No. - 5 A. I would be reducing it below the revenue reconci...
AI summary The discussion centers on the utility's role in developing flexible pricing protocols and the need for mechanisms to ensure accuracy in pricing strategies. There is a suggestion that the utility should approach the Board with a plan to transition into a competitive market and that shareholders may need to share costs if rates are set below cost.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: SEMPRA ATLANTIC GAS INC. FROM: NSPI Question IR-5: Evidence of M. E. Whalen, Application of Nova Scotia Power Inc., Page 8. In purporting to illustrate the "benefit to NSPl's customers of a load retentio...
AI summary The document is a response to an information request regarding Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s (NSPI) assumption that 20% of large industrial and commercial customers would switch to an alternate energy source. The request seeks clarification on the basis for this assumption, including pricing scenarios and the rationale for a 10% price reduction in the evidence provided.
RESPONSE TO INFORMATION REQUEST TO: SEMPRA ATLANTIC GAS INC. FROM: NSPI Question IR-6: - (e) If the answer to ( d) is "yes", why should residential and other customers subsidize the reduction ofrates to NSPl's large industrial and commerci...
AI summary NSPI responds to a question regarding subsidizing rate reductions for large industrial and commercial customers, stating that the Load Retention Rate aims to prevent losses and maintain stable prices for all customers. The response also references an application for approval under the Public Utilities Act.
3. Real Time Pricing. Does your company currently have any RTP tariffs in effect or are you planning to implement such pricing in the near future? If any of the information requested above is available on your web site please provide the w...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Inc. is being asked whether it currently has Real Time Pricing (RTP) tariffs in effect or plans to implement them soon. The request is part of a regulatory proceeding under the Public Utilities Act, involving a Load Retention Rate application.
Table Sempra IR-7A Donald F. Reck General Manager, Reg. Aff. Northern States Power Co. (WI) 100 N. Barstow St., P.O. Box 8 Eau Claire, WI 54 702-0008 Richard D. Reid Director, Regulatory Operations The Dayton Power and Light Co. 1065 Woodm...
AI summary This document contains contact information for various utility company representatives and references an application by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated for approval of a Load Retention Rate under the Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S., 1989, c.380 as amended.
P-10-a[Full Document] Development and Use of Natural Gas: Socio-Economic Impact on the Cape Breton Regional Municipality
7 passages
1. CONTEXT Development of the Sable gas fields is at its mid-point, with production expected late in 1999 or early 2000. SOEP received regulatory approval in 1997, following a lengthy review process. For many Nova Scotians, SOEP means jobs...
AI summary The Sable gas fields are nearing mid-point development, with production expected by late 1999 or early 2000. SOEP received regulatory approval in 1997, offering jobs and industrial opportunities. Natural gas is expected to displace other fuels, raising concerns for established energy suppliers and creating opportunities for industrial development, particularly in the CBRM.
Other Factors Two other factors could have a bearing on NSPI's gas utilization and system expansion plans, and hence on the impact on coal: - ➤ Industrial Generators: Existing NSPI customers could use gas to fire their own combined cycle e...
AI summary Two factors—industrial generators using gas and potential deregulation—could impact NSPI's coal utilization and system expansion. Industrial generators may switch to gas, reducing coal demand. Deregulation could lead to new competitors entering the market, potentially stranding NSPI's coal assets and requiring cost-spreading mechanisms for consumers.
Regulatory Changes in the Electric Industry The electric industry in the U.S. is in a period of deregulation and rapid restructuring. The legislative and regulatory landscape for electricity markets in the United States is changing almost...
AI summary The U.S. electric industry is undergoing deregulation and restructuring, shifting from local monopolies operated by investor-owned utilities to more competitive markets. This shift has led to a decline in coal's market share as natural gas becomes more dominant due to industry consolidation and regulatory changes.
Regulatory Changes There are three separate electricity systems in the United Kingdom: England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The previous structure of the nationalized industry in England and Wales was dominated by one large g...
AI summary The text describes the restructuring of the UK electricity industry following the 1989 Electricity Act, which introduced privatization and competition. The previous monopolistic structure was replaced with a competitive market for generation and supply, while transmission and distribution were regulated independently. This led to the separation of generation from transmission and distribution, with new entrants increasing competition and reliance on natural gas as a fuel source.
Conclusion Regulatory changes have lead to the elimination of monopolies and the reduction of governmental intervention in the electric power industry in the United Kingdom. Reforms include the reduction of price controls and tariff restri...
AI summary The conclusion discusses the restructuring of the UK's electric power industry, highlighting the elimination of monopolies, reduced government intervention, and privatization. While some reforms have been successful, issues like market power of generators, loose regulation, and reintegration threats have emerged. The shift to natural gas and improved emissions technologies has also influenced generating technology choices and emissions levels.
Restructuring of the Electric Industry The first step of the restructuring of Alberta's electricity industry was the passage of the Electric Utilities Act (EUA) in 1995. The Act created the open-access, independently operated Power Pool th...
AI summary The restructuring of Alberta's electricity industry began with the Electric Utilities Act of 1995, creating an open-access Power Pool and independent transmission administration. The 1998 Electric Utilities Amendment Act introduced customer choice, deregulation of generation by 2001, and market-based incentives. Coal remains the preferred fuel despite increased competition and efficiency.
Stranded Costs and Residual Benefits Stranded costs are not a major issue in Alberta, since coal will remain the preferred choice of fuel to generate new capacity and most existing generating units will be competitive in the new environmen...
AI summary Stranded costs and residual benefits are discussed in the context of Alberta's electricity market transition. Stranded costs occur when investments made under a regulated environment cannot be recovered in a competitive market, while residual benefits arise when plants gain excess profits due to deregulation. These are shared by consumers and utilities under the EUA, with a tradable instrument planned to replace the current arrangements by 2001.
P-13Direct Testimony of Dr. Alan Rosenberg
3 passages
HAS THIS LAST BENEFIT BEEN RECOGNIZED BY REGULATORS AS A RATIONALE FOR A CAR? Not as frequently as the other benefits. However, based on my firm's involvement with industrial clients over the past 30 years, I can testify that the existence...
AI summary The speaker notes that while the Customer Assistance Rate (CAR) is not always recognized by regulators as a rationale for its implementation, it is considered a factor, especially in attracting new load and promoting economic development, as observed in a Michigan Public Service Commission case.
Second, the punitive response could send a chilling signal to current and potential industrial customers that Nova Scotia does not welcome competition. This would not augur well for all residents of the province. Third, the potential of co...
AI summary The text argues against punitive measures and exit fees that could deter industrial competition, harm residential customers, and lead to inefficient resource use. It highlights the importance of competitive benchmarks and the negative impact of anti-competitive practices on both customers and the utility.
7 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE. I was awarded a Bachelor of Science Degree from the City College of New York in 9 1964 and a Doctorate of Philosophy in Mathematics from Brown University in 1969. 10 Subsequently...
AI summary The individual provides a detailed account of their educational background and professional experience, including roles in academia, industry, and consulting, with a focus on energy economics and regulatory matters, and highlights their extensive testimony before various regulatory bodies and commissions.
07373Board Decision
8 passages
IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT - and- IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION by NOVA SCOTIA POWER INCORPORATED for approval of a Load Retention Rate. BEFORE: John A. Morash, C.A., Chair Margaret A. M. Shears, Vice-chair John L. Harris,...
AI summary This proceeding involves Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's application for approval of a Load Retention Rate under the Public Utilities Act. Various intervenors, including municipalities, consumer groups, and industry representatives, participated in the hearing. The Board granted the application with modifications following hearings and submissions in early 2000.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND This is an application by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI, the Applicant) pursuant to Section 64 of the Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380. The Applicant seeks generic approval by the Board of the g...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) is seeking generic approval from the Board for a load retention rate under the Public Utilities Act. The rate aims to retain existing customers who might otherwise switch to an alternate supply of at least 2000 KVA or 1800 KW, provided it is technically and economically feasible and beneficial for other customers.
ic factor which elevates this possibility of serious load loss; (4) that approval of the ERR would increase the probability that needed industrial load will continue operating on the utility's system. In Re Northern Indiana Public Service...
AI summary The text discusses the legal basis for a load retention rate, referencing a case where a utility was allowed to offer negotiated rates to customers who defer on-site generation. The case emphasizes that such rates are not discriminatory if they apply to similarly situated customers and are responsive to individual circumstances.
ders. When asked in Sempra Information Request 13(5) why the shareholders should not bear the risk of the business decision on the part of NSPI to offer a load retention rate, NSPI replied as follows: The risk to be managed is the risk tha...
AI summary NSPI argues that a load retention rate is necessary to mitigate the risk of losing large customers to alternative energy suppliers, which would increase costs for remaining customers. NSPI claims the rate is a response to competitive forces, not a risk for shareholder benefit. Mr. Kumar advises the Board not to assume NSPI can recover all losses from the load retention rate, citing regulatory decisions on incentive rates.
THE LOAD RETENTION RATE AND RETAIL COMPETITION Mr. Kumar recommended that at such time as the electric utility industry is restructured in Nova Scotia to allow for competition in power generation and retail choice, customers under the load...
AI summary The document discusses the Load Retention Rate and its potential impact on retail competition in Nova Scotia's electricity market. Mr. Kumar and companies like Irving Oil and Sempra argue that long-term commitments under the rate may hinder competition. NSPI and the Board emphasize uncertainty in restructuring and suggest decisions should be made during the deregulation process rather than now.
CONFIDENTIALITY NSPI proposes that item 6 of the procedures set forth under Attachment A to the Load Retention Rate would read as follows: (6) To protect confidential NSPI and customer data, none of the data or analysis used in the impleme...
AI summary NSPI proposes confidentiality for data and analysis used in implementing the Load Retention Rate, citing concerns from customers about public disclosure of sensitive information. Stora Enso supports this, and Dr. Rosenberg's testimony is referenced. NSPI suggests a closed approval process involving only NSPI, the customer, and the DARB.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS The Board approves the load retention rate as submitted subject to the amendments to clause (1) ofthe Availability section discussed above. In agreeing to undertake the onerous task of approving individual prices, terms...
AI summary The Board approves the load retention rate with amendments to clause (1) of the Availability section. It emphasizes the need for thorough assessment of customer feasibility and intent, and anticipates using outside consultants. The Board may treat load retention as a separate rate class for cost allocation studies in future hearings.
ATTACHMENT "A" This attachment outlines procedures by which the requirements of Availability Clause (1) and Special Condition (1) are to be satisfied. - (1) The customer shall apply in writing to take service under this rate, outlining the...
AI summary This attachment outlines procedures for customers to apply for service under a load retention rate, including initial screening, determination of load retention price, and adjudication by the UARB if needed. It also details economic and technical feasibility criteria and the impact on NSPI's other customers.
07373Board Decision
5 passages
IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT - and- IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION by NOVA SCOTIA POWER INCORPORATED for approval of a Load Retention Rate. BEFORE: John A. Morash, C.A., Chair Margaret A. M. Shears, Vice-chair John L. Harris,...
AI summary This proceeding involves Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's application for approval of a Load Retention Rate under the Public Utilities Act. The hearing included appearances by the applicant, intervenors, and witnesses, with a decision granting the application with modifications.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND This is an application by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI, the Applicant) pursuant to Section 64 of the Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380. The Applicant seeks generic approval by the Board of the g...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) is seeking generic approval from the Board for a load retention rate to retain customers who might otherwise switch to alternate suppliers. The rate would apply to customers considering an alternate supply of at least 2000 KVA or 1800 KW, provided it is technically and economically feasible and beneficial for other customers.
THE LOAD RETENTION RATE AND RETAIL COMPETITION Mr. Kumar recommended that at such time as the electric utility industry is restructured in Nova Scotia to allow for competition in power generation and retail choice, customers under the load...
AI summary Mr. Kumar and companies like Irving Oil and Sempra argue that load retention rates could hinder retail competition in Nova Scotia by locking customers into long-term commitments. NSPI and the Board acknowledge the potential for impediments but emphasize uncertainty around restructuring and advocate for case-by-case evaluations rather than prescribing maximum terms.
strust and apprehension on the part of other consumers" and that "For the regulatory process to be seen and perceived as being fair and equitable, there must be final disclosure ofthe approved rate" . The Nova Scotia Municipal Electric Uti...
AI summary The document discusses concerns around confidentiality in rate proceedings, with NSPI proposing confidentiality for individual load retention rates. The Nova Scotia Municipal Electric Utilities Cooperative argues for transparency, while Sempra Atlantic suggests periodic summary reports. Mr. Kumar supports confidentiality if all relevant information is disclosed to the Board.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS The Board approves the load retention rate as submitted subject to the amendments to clause (1) ofthe Availability section discussed above. In agreeing to undertake the onerous task of approving individual prices, terms...
AI summary The Board approves the load retention rate with amendments to clause (1) of the Availability section. It emphasizes the need for thorough assessment of customer feasibility and intent, and may treat load retention as a separate rate class for future cost allocation studies.
07381Final Argument - CBRM
3 passages
Introduction The Cape Breton Regional Municipality would not ordinarily become involved in an issue of this nature; however, the application before the Boalrd is of significance far beyond Nova Scotia Power and a select group elf its large...
AI summary The Cape Breton Regional Municipality is involved in a regulatory proceeding concerning Nova Scotia Power's application for a load retention rate for large industrial and commercial customers. The rate would apply to customers using at least 2000 kVA or 1800 KW, and the application has broader implications for resource efficiency, customer fairness, and regional competitiveness.
natural gas would not be related to the G!);~t of service and it would be different from the rates being offered to firms receiving the same type of service in a region without access to natural gas. Mr. HuskHson defends the application by...
AI summary The text discusses concerns about a load retention rate being discriminatory under the Public Utilities Act, as it would result in different electricity rates for similar customers based on access to natural gas. Mr. Huskison argues the rate is fair, but the text criticizes this position, emphasizing that the only distinguishing factor is access to natural gas, which violates the principle of equal treatment under the law.
Conclusion Sometimes the reasons why something is being done actually clbscures what is being done. It is not wrong for Nova Scotia Power Incorporated to want to r€!tain customers. It is wrong, however, to create a privileged class of cust...
AI summary The Cape Breton Regional Municipality opposes Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's application for a generic load retention rate, arguing that it creates a privileged class of customers and undermines competition, which is inconsistent with the public interest and relevant legislation.
07383Post-Hearing Submission - Irving Oil Ltd.
4 passages
Concerns About the Proposed Load Retention Rate - 1. NSPI's proposed load retention rate represents an effort by a regulated monopoly to appropriate for itselfthe benefits of competition while avoiding the obligations associated with eithe...
AI summary The document expresses concerns about Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s proposed load retention rate, arguing that it allows a regulated monopoly to avoid competition obligations while retaining regulatory benefits. It criticizes the lack of transparency and potential for unfair pricing, and questions the relevance of outdated US regulatory decisions. The document also highlights the inevitability of competition from natural gas and the need for a level playing field.
Nova Scotia Has Not Yet Joined the Global Movement Towards a Competitive Market for Electricity 1. "In my view the electric industry is slowly, but surely, restructuring towards free and open competition for the supply, (i.e., production o...
AI summary The document highlights the global movement toward competitive electricity markets and notes that Nova Scotia has not yet joined this trend. It references expert opinions, regulatory decisions, and competitive pressures affecting the industry, emphasizing the need for restructuring to promote competition and innovation.
Length ofTerm ofContracts under the Load Retention Rate 6. Mr. Kumar regards the precedents from other jurisdictions regarding the adoption ofload retention rates to apply only so long as retail competition has not come to Nova Scotia. Jat...
AI summary Mr. Kumar argues that load retention rate contracts should not extend beyond the introduction of retail competition in Nova Scotia, as doing so could hinder competition and prevent new entrants from entering the market, thereby limiting consumer choice and price competition.
Summary In summary, Irving Oil submits that: - 1. the load retention rate be permitted only, if at all, on a temporary basis; - 2. that any approval by the Board ofthe load retention rate be tied to a concrete schedule for considering and...
AI summary Irving Oil submits that the load retention rate should be temporary, tied to a schedule for customer choice in electric purchases, and that conditions should ensure it does not hinder competition. Revenue shortfalls from the rate should be absorbed by NSPI shareholders, not ratepayers.
07385Closing Submission of Sempra Atlantic Gas
5 passages
1. INTRODUCTION The issue is not whether Nova Scotia Power Incorporated ("NSPI") should be given more flexibility to compete with natural gas; the issue is how best to ensure that the flexibility granted to NSPI enhances rather than distor...
AI summary The document discusses the proposed Load Retention Rate (LR Rate) by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) and Sempra Atlantic Gas Inc.'s position that the LR Rate needs amendments to ensure it is pro-competitive and includes adequate ratepayer safeguards.
2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST NSPI's application is brought pursuant to section 64 ofthe Public Utilities Act: - 64(1) No public utility shall charge, demand, collect or receive any compensation for any service performed by it until such public u...
AI summary NSPI's application for an LR Rate is scrutinized due to its monopolistic position and potential negative impact on non-industrial customers. The proposal is argued to be unfair and not in the public interest, as it may shift costs onto residential and smaller industrial customers. The Board's role in ensuring just and reasonable rates is emphasized, referencing past legal precedents.
4. THE LR RATE PRESENTLY PROPOSED BY NSPI DOES NOT HAVE ADEQUATE RATEPAYER SAFEGUARDS NSPI's rate offering creates distorted incentives and imposes the burden on the DARB to sort out the results. The proposed LR Rate imposes no requirement...
AI summary NSPI's proposed LR Rate lacks adequate safeguards for ratepayers, creating distorted incentives and placing the burden on the DARB to address potential issues. The DARB is urged to incorporate Mr. Kumar's recommendations to align incentives with the public interest.
not the customers' initial projections were sound? - A. (Huskilson) I think, in the end, the price that ends up being negotiated will relate to those risks. I believe that that's true. (pp. 353-354) The bottom line is that NSPI's proposed...
AI summary The document discusses the proposed Load Retention Rate (LR Rate) by NSPI and argues that the risk of loss associated with it should be borne by shareholders, not customers. It highlights the importance of regulatory oversight to ensure pro-competitive practices and protect customers from monopolistic behavior.
6. CONCLUSION Sempra Atlantic, while agreeing that NSPI should be allowed to have rate offerings that enable it to respond to competitive situations, submits that the Board should not approve the proposed LR Rate without first amending it...
AI summary Sempra Atlantic agrees that NSPI should have flexible rate offerings but argues that the proposed LR Rate should be amended to protect captive ratepayers and ensure it operates pro-competitively. Leaving the rate unchanged would be against the public interest as it may not be just or reasonable.
07386Post-Hearing Brief - Stora Enso
3 passages
A. Introduction This is the submission ofStora Enso Port Hawkesbury Limited ("Stora Enso") to the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (the "Board) in respect of an application ofNova Scotia Power Incorporated ("NSPI") for approval of a Lo...
AI summary Stora Enso submits to the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board regarding NSPI's application for a Load Retention Rate (LRR). All parties support the LRR, but the central issue is whether the Board should impose conditions on negotiations between NSPI and customers. The submission addresses various aspects including approval, discrimination, timing, eligibility, and confidentiality.
F. Eligibility for Open Access and Retail Choice Stora Enso agrees with the proposition that NSPI should allow open access and retail choice to all ofits LRR customers who could become eligible under any market restructuring which would pr...
AI summary Stora Enso supports allowing open access and retail choice for LRR customers under market restructuring, arguing that impacts on negotiated rates should be handled by the parties involved, not the Board. Dr. Kumar raises concerns about long-term contracts potentially inhibiting market opening, but the response questions the anti-competitive nature of such agreements in a free market.
Summary Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that: - 1. The Load Retention Rate as proposed by NSPI be approved by the Board subject to the deletion of the following condition: "The Price offered by this rate is not less...
AI summary The submission requests the Board to approve the Load Retention Rate (LRR) proposed by NSPI with specific conditions removed, including delaying implementation until customer generation is installed, exempting the LRR from ceasing after NSPI installs long-term capacity, and rejecting a proposed 10% margin above NSPI's marginal costs. It also requests exemption from confidentiality requirements.
07391Closing Submission (Rebuttal) - Stora Enso Port Hawkesbury Limited
3 passages
A. Does the Load Retention Rate Provide a "Benefit" or is it a "Discounted Rate"? In Section 2 ofthe Sempra Closing Submission, reference is made in the third full paragraph to "the cost ofthese discounts", referring to the lower electrici...
AI summary The document discusses the Load Retention Rate, arguing that it provides a benefit to all customers rather than being a discount or penalty. It criticizes the use of pejorative terms like 'discounts' and 'losses' and emphasizes that the rate is necessary to prevent customers from removing their load from the system. The DARB's role in approving such rates is highlighted as crucial for public understanding and acceptance.
C. The Question ofGuidelines or Conditions Sempra argues for guidelines for minimum and maximum length of LR Rate contracts (Section 4B ofthe Sempra Submission, page 10), and for minimum and maximum take provisions (Section 4C, pages 10 -...
AI summary Sempra advocates for setting guidelines on the length and take provisions of Load Retention Rate (LRR) contracts, arguing they would benefit NSPI's customers. However, the opposing view, supported by Stora Enso's Post-Hearing Brief, claims such conditions could hinder negotiations and prevent agreements on LRRs, which are preferable to customers leaving the system. The text questions the public interest basis for regulators imposing preconditions that may inhibit negotiations.
E. Competitiveness Section 5 ofthe Sempra Submission (pp. 13 - 18) is presented underthe heading "The LR Rate should be Pro-Competitive and not Anti-Competitive". From this general proposition, Sempra draws the conclusion that the NSPI sha...
AI summary The document critiques Sempra's argument that NSPI should bear the risk of load retention (LR) discounts, stating that NSPI's goal is to reduce customer risk, not shareholder risk. It refutes the 'normal business' analogy, noting that NSPI operates under a regulatory framework and cannot assume unregulated risks. The analysis also disputes the claim that LR contracts impose costs, arguing that they provide benefits and that NSPI, not ratepayers, bears the revenue impact.
77877Book of Authorities of Nova Scotia Power Inc.
17 passages
THE NEW BRUNSWICK BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES IN THE MATTER OF The Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.B. 1978, Ch. P-27 as amended IN THE MATTER OF an application by the New Brunswick Power Corporation for approval of changes in it...
AI summary This document outlines a regulatory proceeding involving the New Brunswick Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, concerning an application by New Brunswick Power Corporation for approval of changes in its charges, rates, and tolls, specifically an incentive rate. Key participants include NB Power, The Large Power Users Group, Public Intervenors, and People Against Lepreau Two Campaign.
CONCLUSIONS The Board directs NB Power to amend Page RSP N-9(a) to clearly state that the incentive rate is only available to a maximum of 100 MW in the aggregate and to file the amended page with the Board for approval. The Board will, up...
AI summary The Board has directed NB Power to amend a specific page to limit an incentive rate to 100 MW and denied Consumers Power Company's application for a new rate. The decision includes provisions for potential future orders and outlines the appeal process.
I. Proced u raJ History On December 31, 1986, Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) filed an application seeking authority to implement a proposed Schedule SUS Experimental Rider to Schedules LPS and LIS for lndusuial Service to Qualifying T...
AI summary Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) filed an application in 1986 to implement a new experimental rate schedule and associated contract amendment. The Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) suspended the implementation pending a final order. A prehearing conference was held in February 1987, and a hearing was scheduled for April 13, 1987, with appearances from GSU, Commission staff, and representatives from Chevron and Mobil Chemical.
C. OPC's SlalnnnlJ of PosiJum OPC filed a statement of position in this d ocket which raises a number of issues which the examiner has not attempted to address in detail, for three reasons. first, the statement was not timely filed by OPC,...
AI summary The OPC filed a late statement of position in the docket, which the examiner did not address in detail due to timing issues and lack of evidence. OPC argues that GSU's generation costs are inefficient and that Schedule SUS may be unnecessary if disallowances occur in GSU's rate case. However, the examiner finds that GSU's expedited filing is prudent to avoid load loss.
VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law The examiner further recommends adoption of the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
AI summary The examiner recommends the adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law in the proceeding, indicating a formal stage in the regulatory process.
A. Findings of Fact - l. Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) is an public utility providing electrical service within its certificated service area, under Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 30076. - 2. On December 31, 1986, GSU f...
AI summary The document outlines the findings of fact in a proceeding involving Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) seeking approval for a new tariff schedule and contract amendment. GSU filed an application for a Schedule SUS Experimental Rider, and the Office of Public Utility Counsel (OPC) was granted intervenor status but did not appear at the hearing.
B. Conclusions of Law l. Gulf States Utilities Company (CSU) is a public utility as defined in Section 3(c)( I) of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (the Act), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1446c (Vernon Supp. 1987). 2. The Commission has...
AI summary The document outlines legal conclusions regarding the proposed tariff revision by Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU), determining that the Schedule SUS Experimental Rider is equitable and does not violate relevant sections of the Public Utility Regulatory Act. The proceeding was properly suspended, and the rider is deemed just and reasonable for approval.
mount of steam/electrical load is different. - c. Use of WACOG and a hypothetical heat rate will result in SUS customers paying less than the equivalent cost of service paid by other LIS customers. - 3. OPC believes that the SUS rate is an...
AI summary The Office of Public Utility Counsel (OPC) argues that the SUS rate is anticompetitive, violating sections 38 and 46 of the Public Utilities Act (PURA). It claims the rate creates unfair advantages for certain industrial customers and acts as predatory pricing against competitors, disadvantaging smaller customers and creating barriers to market entry.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. The Utilities Board has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matt.er of this proceeding, pursuant to IOWA CODE §§ 476.1 and 476.3 (1987). 2. The proposed tariff, identified as TF-88-24, docs not grant an unreason...
AI summary The Utilities Board has jurisdiction over the proceeding based on Iowa Code sections 476.1 and 476.3 (1987). The proposed tariff, TF-88-24, does not grant unreasonable preferences or advantages and does not subject any person to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
By the COMMISSION: On August 28, 1987, Northern Indiana Public Service Company (UPetitioner" or "NIPSCO") filed its verified Petitio n with the Commission requesting approval of its Generation Alternative Rider ("Rider GA") and a new elect...
AI summary The Commission reviewed a proceeding initiated by Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) regarding its Generation Alternative Rider and a service contract with R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company. The filing included a stipulation and intervention by Bethlehem Steel Corporation. A public hearing was held, and the Commission affirmed its jurisdiction over the matter.
hould be rejected because NIPSCO may have other problems as well. Approval or rejection of Rider GA should depend on whether it is legal and whether it deals effectively with the problem of load loss. Similarly, Mr. Brosch's proposal of fl...
AI summary The text discusses the evaluation of Rider GA and flexible pricing proposals, emphasizing the need for legal compliance and effective problem-solving regarding load loss. It critiques Mr. Brosch's proposal for flexible rates, arguing it is premature and highlights the Commission's need for a more developed record before approving major regulatory changes. Concerns are raised about potential system 'gaming' by large customers and the impact on captive ratepayers.
ORDER NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDER.ED That Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company and US West Direct Company are authorized to enter into publishing agreements which are the subject matter of this proceeding to the extent necessary...
AI summary The order authorizes Pacific Northwest Bell and US West Direct to enter into publishing agreements for telephone directories until the next general rate proceeding. It also states that the current publishing fee will not be approved due to potential adverse effects on telecommunications service cost and availability. The Commission retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with public policy.
ORDER On May 19, 1988, Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L) filed a lelt.er application and proposed tariff in the abovestyled docket pursuant lO Rule 11.0l(d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. The tariff is applicable...
AI summary AP&L filed a tariff application for Mid-America Packaging, which operates 24/7 with high energy use and plans to install on-site generation. AEEC requested intervention to address potential revenue shortfalls affecting other ratepayers, and Commission Staff requested suspension for further investigation.
THE AGREEMENT The Agreement obligates Mid-America to purchase from AP&L all electricity required for its operations until the April 30, 1992, termination date of the AgreemenL The demand and energy rates to be paid by Mid-America will esca...
AI summary The Agreement outlines Mid-America's obligation to purchase electricity from AP&L until 1992, with escalating rates and a minimum demand charge. Section 9 was amended to address concerns raised by Mr. Strode, removing language that tied Mid-America's revenue requirement to AP&L's future retail rate proceedings. The amendment also acknowledges Mid-America's merger with Gaylord Container Corporation.
uring the life of lhc: Agreement, the Commission will be free to make a determination at that time, based on the facts and circumstances then presented, of the appropriate Mid-America revenue level. - 4. Co-gmmuion Option. Mr. Breeden stat...
AI summary The discussion covers AP&L's flexibility in constructing co-generation facilities and concerns over assigning rights under an agreement to an unregulated entity. AP&L argues that co-generation provides benefits due to shorter construction lead times, while concerns are raised about the assignability of rights.
CONCLUSION Based on the: evidence: presented, the Commission finds that substantial evidence: has bc:c:n presented that lhc: Agreement is in lhc: best overall interest of lhe public, AP&L. Mid-America and AP&L's olhc:r customers. It has be...
AI summary The Commission concludes that the Agreement is in the public interest and benefits AP&L and its customers. It highlights that Mid-America's continued participation as a full requirements customer contributes to AP&L's fixed costs and that the Agreement rates are just and reasonable. The Commission also reserves judgment on potential generation facilities under the Agreement.
3. RETURN, t 5 - Rc:gul:atory inccnti,'C plan - Sliding scale - Range of returns - Commission duties. (DELI The commi.ssion rejected an "incentive regulation" proposal that would have provided a range: of equity returns for a local telepho...
AI summary The commission rejected an 'incentive regulation' proposal that would have allowed a range of equity returns for a local telephone carrier, instead opting for a 'rate stability' plan that authorizes a specific return on equity in conjunction with rate reductions, while ensuring rates are unlikely to be further reduced even if actual returns exceed authorized figures.