Topic:"Regulatory Oversight" in M08888

EfficiencyOne IN THE MATTER OF The Public Utilities Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380, as amended.

AI summary This document pertains to a regulatory proceeding under the Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380, as amended. The proceeding is related to EfficiencyOne, though no specific details about the case or arguments are provided in the text.

- Customer Calls and Collections - Notices - Rate Discounts - Safety Related Emergency Call s - Price Hedging - Improved Safety - Rental Units Marketability - Reduced Tenant Complaints 1 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Department of Pub...

AI summary The document outlines Action Item #2, requiring VEIC and EfficiencyOne to summarize Massachusetts' regulatory processes, focusing on non-energy benefits (NEBs) that influenced discussions. It notes that in Massachusetts, utility benefits are limited to low-income programs. Key entities include EfficiencyOne, VEIC, and Massachusetts' regulatory bodies.

Discussion and findings during regulatory review of Program Administrators' 2013-2015 Three-Year Plans 13 In the 2013- 2015 Order approving the Program Administrators' 2013-2015 Three-Year Plans, the Department stated that non-energy impac...

AI summary The Department of Public Utilities reviewed Program Administrators' 2013-2015 Three-Year Plans, focusing on non-energy impacts in cost-effectiveness analyses. The Attorney General argued for reevaluating the TRC test's reliance on non-energy benefits, questioning their reliability, uniformity, and whether they accrue to participants. The Department considered excluding three non-energy impacts (National Security, Refrigerator/Freezer Turn-In, Economic Development) due to societal vs. participant benefit distinctions.

NON-CONFIDENTIAL 1 Request IR-06: 2 3 Regarding the inclusion of Increased Rent Revenue as an NEB (Application, p. 9). 4 a) Please provide the studies that developed the values for increases in rent revenues. 5 b) Please explain how the an...

AI summary Request IR-06 seeks clarification on including Increased Rent Revenue as a Non-Energy Impact (NEB), asking for studies, explanations of revenue analysis, and evidence from Massachusetts programs. Responses direct references to EfficiencyOne's prior reply to Multeese IR-16.

References Allen, R. 2009. Vermont Public Service Board Memorandum, October 30. page 16. http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psb/files/projects/EEU/screening/VEICCommentsReAllenMemo200 9-12-04.pdf - Clean and Affordable Energy Act, Council of the...

AI summary The references include legal documents, studies, and legislation related to energy efficiency, non-energy benefits, and regulatory decisions. Key entities involve Vermont and Colorado regulatory bodies, ACEEE, and Brookings Institution. Topics focus on cost-effectiveness screening, TRC, and NEBs. Cross-references include Colorado PUC decisions and Vermont PSB memoranda.

NON-CONFIDENTIAL Request IR-19: - Please describe how non-energy benefits as described in E1's application fall within the - definition of 'electricity efficiency and conservation activities' in section 79A(b) of the - Public Utilities Act...

AI summary The response to Request IR-19 argues that non-energy benefits (NEBs) can be included in the TRC screening process under the Public Utilities Act, aligning with best practices. The legislation allows NEBs as part of DSM plans, emphasizing affordability and ratepayer interests. VEIC's opinion in IR-20 highlights NEBs' role in assessing cost-effectiveness by quantifying non-energy benefits like reduced labor costs and property value increases.

agrees that there may be no claims whatsoever for reimbursement from EfficiencyOne for any such costs. All costs incurred by the Proponent during the selection process and during any negotiations will be solely the responsibility of the Pr...

AI summary EfficiencyOne disclaims liability for Proponent costs during RFQ processes and negotiations. Proponents cannot claim compensation for participating in the RFQ. EfficiencyOne may require bonds for contractual agreements and reserves the right to extend contracts without new RFQs. The RFQ is governed by Nova Scotia law.

NON-CONFIDENTIAL Request IR-09: If a NEB benefit has no potential to reduce electric load or shift electric load, what provision of the Public Utilities Act permits the Board to take it into account? Response IR-09: Inclusion of NEB's in t...

AI summary The response to Request IR-09 explains that the Public Utilities Act permits the UARB to consider NEB benefits in DSM plans, even if they don't reduce load, by evaluating factors like customer interests, affordability, and other matters deemed appropriate. The Act mandates consideration of DSM plans' benefits, affordability, and other factors.

EFFICIENCYONE SUBMISSIONS ON THE PRELIMINARY ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

AI summary EfficiencyOne submits on the preliminary jurisdiction issue in a Nova Scotia regulatory proceeding, arguing over the board's authority to address energy efficiency programs. The submission focuses on legal interpretations of jurisdictional boundaries.

- Group representative, the following is the preliminary legal question to be determined by the NSUARB: - In assessing proposed electricity efficiency and conservation activities, does the NSUARB have the jurisdiction to take into account...

AI summary The NSUARB is asked whether it has the jurisdiction to consider non-energy impacts in cost effectiveness testing when evaluating proposed electricity efficiency and conservation activities.

LEGISLATION The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is a statutory regulatory body created by the Utility and Review Board Act S.N.S. 1992, c. 11 (the " UARB Act "). As such, the jurisdiction and authority of the Board is derived from leg...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) is established under the Utility and Review Board Act (UARB Act) and derives its authority from various statutes, including the Public Utilities Act (PUA). The Board has exclusive jurisdiction over matters conferred upon it by legislation and may hear and determine all legal and factual questions within its jurisdiction.

Public Utilities Act, RSNS 1989, c. 380, s 79C. 1 2 (b) "electricity efficiency and conservation activities" means activities, programs or plans relating to 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 (i) the efficient use of electricity, (ii) t...

AI summary The text defines 'electricity efficiency and conservation activities' under the Public Utilities Act, RSNS 1989, c. 380, s 79C, and outlines the NSUARB's supervisory role over franchise holders. It includes various activities aimed at promoting efficiency and conservation of electricity.

, the phrase "any other matters" means any matters. The phrase "any other matters considered appropriate by the Board", when read in its entire context along with the scheme and object of the PUA as well as the intention of the Legislature...

AI summary The text interprets the phrase 'any other matters' in the PUA to grant the NSUARB broad discretion to consider factors beyond affordability when assessing DSM plans. It references a court case and PUA provisions to support this interpretation, emphasizing the Board's implicit authority to evaluate relevant factors.

The Commission stated: "…A failure on our part to consider broader societal impact stemming from the implementation of energy efficiency programs would ignore the codified intent of the General Assembly "to provide affordable, reliable, an...

AI summary The Commission emphasizes the need to consider societal and non-energy benefits in energy efficiency programs, aligning with the Public Utilities Act's mandate for affordability. They assert that cost-effectiveness alone isn't sufficient, as the Board must also evaluate rate impacts, jobs, and environmental effects. Maryland's approach supports including non-energy benefits in cost-effectiveness tests.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT - Based upon the foregoing, EfficiencyOne respectfully submits that the Board's broad jurisdiction to - determine what matters are appropriate to consider in the assessment of DSM plans includes the - authority...

AI summary EfficiencyOne argues the NSUARB has jurisdiction to consider non-energy impacts in cost-effectiveness testing for DSM plans and requests approval of the NEB Application or a variation. The submission emphasizes the Board's authority to assess non-energy benefits in DSM evaluations.

M08888 IN THE MATTER OF The Public Utilities Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380, as amended. - and - IN THE MATTER OF an Application by EfficiencyOne for Approval of the Use of Measure Level Non-Energy Benefits Within Cost Effectiveness Testing

AI summary The document pertains to a regulatory proceeding under the Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380, involving EfficiencyOne's application to approve the use of measure-level non-energy benefits within cost-effectiveness testing.

CASE LAW - 1. Re: Efficiency Nova Scotia, 2011 NSUARB 99 - 2. Re: EfficiencyOne, 2015 NSUARB 204 - 3. Re: EfficiencyOne, 2017 NSUARB 174 - 4. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. S&D Smith Central Supplies Limited, 2019 NSCA 22 - 5. Re: Rizzo...

AI summary The document cites regulatory and legal cases involving Efficiency Nova Scotia, EfficiencyOne, a dispute between Nova Scotia's Attorney General and S&D Smith Central Supplies Limited, and a Supreme Court of Canada reference. Cases pertain to utility regulation, energy efficiency programs, and legal proceedings.

LEGISLATION - 6. Interpretation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 235 - 7. Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380 - 8. Utility and Review Board Act, S.N.S. 1992, c. 11

AI summary The document references three Nova Scotia legislative acts: the Interpretation Act, Public Utilities Act, and Utility and Review Board Act. These laws provide the legal framework for utility regulation, interpretation of statutes, and the operational authority of the Utility and Review Board in the province.

SECONDARY SOURCES - 9. Hansard, Sixty First General Assembly, First Session: October 27, 2009, pp. 1807-1816 - 10. Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board Order M08604, Re: EfficiencyOne Application for Approval of 2019 DSM Plan - 11. Public Se...

AI summary The document lists secondary sources relevant to a Nova Scotia regulatory proceeding, including a 2009 Hansard excerpt, an NSUARB order approving EfficiencyOne's 2019 DSM plan, and a 2015 Maryland Public Service Commission order. These sources provide context for the proceeding's analysis.

2.0 BACKGROUND [10] Prior to January 26, 2010, the electricity DSM conservation and energy plan for Nova Scotia was administered by NSPI. ENSC was established under the Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation Act, S.N.S. 2009, c. 3, as amended...

AI summary Prior to January 26, 2010, Nova Scotia's electricity demand-side management (DSM) conservation plan was administered by NSPI. ENSC was established under the Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation Act, S.N.S. 2009, c. 3, as amended.

[11 ] The relevant provisions of the ENSC Act are: - 2 The purpose of this Act is to - (a) establish an administrator to manage electricity demand-side management programs in the Province; - (b) establish a fund to be used to defray the co...

AI summary The ENSC Act establishes an administrator for electricity demand-side management programs, creates a fund for related costs, and mandates regulatory oversight. The Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation (ENSC) operates not-for-profit, focusing on demand-side management and energy efficiency. Definitions include 'public utility' (e.g., Nova Scotia Power) and 'Review Board' (NSUARB).

3.0 EVALUATION AND VERIFICATION OF 2010 DSM PLAN

AI summary This section outlines the evaluation and verification process of the 2010 Demand-Side Management (DSM) Plan by the Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (NSUARB), involving entities such as Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) and Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation (ENS). Key stakeholders include the Nova Scotia Department of Energy (NSDOE) and the Consumer Advocate (CA).

5.5.1 Findings [125] The Board understands that ENSC's mandate is being expanded to manage non-electricity efficiency programs. Some transition is already underway and formal negotiations are to be concluded in the near future. ENSC, at th...

AI summary ENSC is expanding its mandate to manage non-electricity efficiency programs but lacks a formal policy to track time and costs. The Board shares intervenors' concerns about delays and potential cross-subsidization, ordering ENSC to submit its policy by September 30, 2011.

5.6 Multi Year Performance Based Model ("PBM") [127] ENSC seeks Board approval to engage stakeholders to assess the use of a Performance Based Model ("PBM") for future submissions to the Board. ENSC stated that: Under such a multi-year, pe...

AI summary ENSC requests approval to assess a Multi-Year Performance Based Model (PBM) for future submissions, shifting oversight from preapproving annual DSM plans to evaluating overall investments and savings targets. The current framework uses TRC tests for individual measures, whereas PBM emphasizes post-approval performance validation.

[138] In its Application, ENSC stated: The Program Development Working Group (PDWG), established during NSPl's tenure as interim DSM Administrator, has advised ENSC during the transition from NSPI to ENSC and during the preparation of the...

AI summary ENSC proposes continuing the Program Development Working Group (PDWG) in 2011, citing its value as a stakeholder forum. They committed to stakeholder consultation, with UARB's support. Intervenors did not oppose the proposal, and ENSC emphasized expert and stakeholder backing for the process.

7.1 Findings [147] The Board notes that while ENSC stated it has the "gas pedal hard to the floor going full out" in order to achieve targeted savings, Mr. Crandlemire has also indicated that the targets are achievable. He has not suggeste...

AI summary The Board acknowledges ENSC's efforts to meet energy savings targets but notes lingering doubts expressed by parties. Despite ENSC's assertion of full commitment and Mr. Crandlemire's confidence in achievability, the Board mandates quarterly reviews with staff and consultants to monitor progress, expenditures, and savings outcomes.

2.0 BACKGROUND - [6] The Board considers it useful to set out some of the background of DSM in Nova Scotia to provide some context for this Decision. - [7] For a number of years prior to 2010, NSPI included requests for approval of spendin...

AI summary The document outlines the transition of DSM programming in Nova Scotia from NSPI to ENSC under the ENSC Act, requiring Board oversight. ENSC administered DSM programs post-2010, with regular Board approvals for spending and cost allocations. The 2014 EECR Act amended DSM frameworks by repealing the ENSC Act and modifying the PUA, redefining efficiency and conservation activities.

3.2 Verification Report of 2014 DSM Programs (Peach) [38] As in previous years, the Board engaged the services of H. Gil Peach & Associates to conduct an independent verification of the 2014 evaluated DSM savings results. Dr. Peach filed h...

AI summary The Board engaged H. Gil Peach & Associates to verify 2014 DSM program savings, resulting in 20 recommendations. Seven programs exceeded energy savings targets, seven underperformed, and three had no targets. The report reviewed evaluation methods, data tracking, and conducted site visits to assess installation quality and compliance.

3.10 Agreed form of Supply Agreement [120] E1 included an Agreed Form of Supply Agreement as Appendix J of its application, effective January 2016. The Supply Agreement generally outlines the terms and conditions which each party is expect...

AI summary E1 included an Agreed Form of Supply Agreement as Appendix J of its application, effective January 2016, outlining terms under the PUA. Attached schedules were left blank pending the Board's decision and Compliance Filing.

3.12.1 Findings [126] The parties in the Consensus Agreement have agreed to work on a standardized filing template and other information and to submit a report to the Board for approval. [127] The Board approves this process and awaits the...

AI summary The Consensus Agreement parties agree to develop a standardized filing template and submit a report to the Board for approval, which the Board has approved and is awaiting the report.

ogramming for low income renters within the Plan approved by the Board. [136] The Board notes, however, its limited role, as pointed out by Counsel for the Industrial Group in its closing submission: 32. It is not the role of the Board to...

AI summary The Board emphasizes its limited role in job creation and industry support, citing the Public Utilities Act (PUA). It notes that job creation is a provincial policy matter, not the Board's responsibility. The Industrial Group argues that the Board should not prop up industries, while the Board reaffirms its jurisdiction under PUA sections 79L(8) and (9) to prioritize customer interests and affordability in DSM plans.

8) DSM Advisory Group Discussions a) If consensus is not achieved on any of the above items to be addressed within the DSM Advisory Group, such items will be presented to the UARB for determination.

AI summary If the DSM Advisory Group fails to reach consensus on specific items, those items will be forwarded to the UARB for final determination, highlighting the regulatory process for resolving disagreements within DSM initiatives.

- [1] This is an Application by EfficiencyOne (E1) requesting a determination that Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) must provide it with certain data fields in NSPI's possession pursuant to s. 79K of the Public Utilities Act , R.S.N.S. 1989,...

AI summary EfficiencyOne (E1) applied to the Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (NSUARB) to compel Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) to provide specific data fields under the Public Utilities Act (PUA). E1 is the exclusive provider of efficiency and conservation activities for NSPI. NSPI contested the applicability of s. 79K(1) of the PUA to some data fields, but the Board ruled in favor of E1, requiring NSPI to provide all requested data fields.

IV LEGISLATION [17] E1's authority to request information from NSPI, NSPI's obligation to respond to E1's request, and the Board's jurisdiction to determine the Application, are all set out in s. 79K of the PUA , which states:

AI summary The text outlines E1's authority to request information from NSPI, NSPI's obligation to comply, and the Board's jurisdiction under section 79K of the Public Utilities Act (PUA). This provision establishes the legal framework for information disclosure and regulatory oversight in the proceeding.

- (d) the object to be attained; - (e) the former law, including other enactments upon the same or similar subjects; - (f) the consequences of a particular interpretation; and - (g) the history of legislation on the subject. - [54] The mod...

AI summary The text discusses statutory interpretation principles, focusing on the purpose and scope of section 79 of the Public Utilities Act (PUA). It references a 2008 NSUARB proceeding where NSPI submitted a DSM plan, highlighting stakeholder concerns about NSPI's conflict of interest in administering DSM programs due to potential revenue reductions. The Board clarified its lack of jurisdiction to establish a DSM administration agency.

Transfer of business information - 4 (1) The Corporation shall, on or before the Implementation Date, transfer to the first franchise holder all of its business information, including any business information that is personal information....

AI summary The Corporation must transfer all business information, including personal data, to the first franchise holder by the Implementation Date, adhering to existing conditions and preserving privileges. The PUA allows similar transfers to subsequent franchise holders or NSPI on an interim basis.

the 2014 PUA amendments as a whole, it is apparent that the object of these provisions is to create a comprehensive DSM service delivery model, which is cost-effective, with measurable performance standards, subject to the Board's regulato...

AI summary The 2014 PUA amendments aim to establish a comprehensive, cost-effective DSM service model under regulatory oversight. The Board aligns with E1's position that E1 should have similar information access to NSPI to deliver DSM services without for-profit utility conflicts. Legislative text mandates information flow between entities to ensure service delivery.

bmissions, the CA also commented on an aspect of NSPI's position: One comment from NSP caught the attention of the Consumer Advocate. It occurs at line 17, page 27 of NSP's submission where NSP says: The legislation does not require NS Pow...

AI summary The proceeding examines whether NSPI must share customer names/emails with E1 for effective DSM programs. NSP argues legislation doesn't mandate data sharing, while the CA and SBA emphasize privacy concerns, opposing data release without consent. SBA asserts names are irrelevant to electricity usage, highlighting potential privacy breaches.

VII TIMELINE OF DATA REQUEST [130] E1 has requested the transfer of the requested data within 30 days of the Board's decision, and that, thereafter, the information be provided on a monthly basis. NSPI asks that it have 60 days to provide...

AI summary E1 requested data transfer within 30 days and monthly updates, while NSPI sought 60 days for initial transfer. The Board deemed 60 days reasonable for initial data sharing and mandated ongoing monthly updates for Names and Emails to support E1's research and marketing efforts, with potential for further direction if disputes arise.

Statutes and Regulations Cited Lois et r eglements cites´ ruptcy and Insolvency Act ], s. 121(1). art. 13(2). s. 13(2). art. 40(7). [rep. & sub. 1986, c. 51, s. 2], 40(1) [rep. & sub. 1981, ch. 22, art. 2. s. 5(1)]. L.R.O. 1990, ch. I-11],...

AI summary The document lists statutes, regulations, and legal references cited in a Nova Scotia regulatory proceeding, including the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Employment Standards Act amendments, and case law from Canadian courts. It includes legislative texts, legal commentaries, and judicial decisions relevant to statutory interpretation and employment standards.

Having disposed of several issues which do not 7 Apr es avoir tranche plusieurs points non sou- ´ arise on this appeal, Farley J. turned to the ques- leves dans le pr ´ esent pourvoi, le juge Farley est ´ tion of whether termination pay an...

AI summary The text discusses whether termination and severance pay are provable claims under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BA) in the context of employment standards. Farley J. references the case UFCW, Loc. 617P v. Royal Dressed Meats Inc. and concludes that such claims are provable if statutory obligations predate bankruptcy, invoking the Employment Standards Act (ESA) and its French counterpart, LNE.

ts en cause n ´ 'a issue appropriately recognized. I now turn to a dis- pas non plus et´ e pris en compte ad ´ equatement. Je ´ cussion of these issues. passe maintenant a l'analyse de ces questions. In Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd. ,...

AI summary The text references legal precedents emphasizing employment protection under the Employment Standards Act (ESA) and Labour Standards Act (LNE). It cites Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd. and Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd. to argue that interpretations favoring employee protections by enforcing minimum termination standards are preferred.

amended by The Employment Standards Act, 1974 , demnite de licenciement de l ´ ' ESA de 1970 ont et´ e´ S.O. 1974, c. 112. As amended, s. 40(7) of the modifiees par ´ The Employment Standards Act, 1974 ESA eliminated the requirement that n...

AI summary The text discusses amendments to the Employment Standards Act, 1974 (ESA), which removed the requirement for notice before termination. It clarifies that termination pay is owed regardless of notice, even for bankrupt employers. The court rejects the Malone Lynch decision as authority, citing differing statutory provisions applicable to bankrupt employers. References to Royal Dressed Meats and British Columbia (Director of Employment Standards) v. Eland Distributors are noted.

ection to the remnant, interest, and $6,739,281 for "disturbance" to Central's business. An award for "disturbance" is a category of compensation under ss. 26(b) and 27(3) of the Expropriation Act . The Province appealed. Central cross-app...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed appeals and cross-appeals regarding compensation under the Expropriation Act. The Province appealed the Board's decision to award disturbance compensation, while Central sought future disturbance losses. The Court held that factual issues are not appealable, and the standard of review is reasonableness.

- [6] Mr. Smith testified "our vision was to keep growing as we had the opportunity". The Board's Decision (2017 NSUARB 124, para. 22) said "while they had no idea of how much they would grow, they shared a vision of continued growth when...

AI summary Mr. Smith testified about Central's expansion plans, including retail stores and a distribution center. The Board's 2017 decision acknowledged Central's growth vision and land reclamation practices. The County extended water service to Lower South River, enabling fire protection for new developments. Central expanded operations across Nova Scotia, including warehouses and manufacturing facilities.

What Issues are Appealable? - [41] The reviewing court's "first order of business" is to determine what grounds of appeal are permitted by the legislation. Next is the selection of a standard of review to the appealable grounds. Canada (Ci...

AI summary The reviewing court first determines appealable grounds under the legislation, citing cases like Khosa and Teal Cedar. The Board's authority is governed by the Utility and Review Board Act and other statutes like the Expropriation Act.

Jurisdiction - 22(1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases and in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it. - (2) The Board, as to all matters within its jurisdiction pursuant to this Act, may hear and de...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility & Review Board (NSUARB) holds exclusive jurisdiction over all matters under the UARB Act. It has authority to adjudicate both legal and factual questions within its jurisdiction as defined by the Act.

Effect of judgement of court on pending matter - 23(1) In determining a question of fact, the Board is not bound by the finding or judgment of a court in a proceeding involved in the determination of the fact, but such finding or judgment...

AI summary The NSUARB is not bound by court findings on factual questions but may use them as prima facie evidence. The Board retains jurisdiction to determine factual issues even if a court proceeding on the same matter is pending.

(3) Contextual Analysis - [32] The Court of Appeal also conducted a review of the relevant contextual factors to support the conclusion that the standard of review is correctness. The presumption of reasonableness may be rebutted if the co...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal reviewed contextual factors to determine the standard of review, relying on precedents like Saguenay and Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada . It upheld the presumption of reasonableness for tribunals, noting expertise is institutional, not individual, and no unusual statutory language rebutted the presumption.

result of the process of expropriation. - I. Should Compensation Be Payable for Damages Which Arose Prior to the Actual Expropriation? - 38. The Court of Appeal accepted the approach taken by the Divisional Court which characterized the de...

AI summary The judge disputes the Court of Appeal's stance that pre-expropriation delays are non-compensable, arguing damages should be assessed by causation, not timing. Citing Shun Fung , the judge asserts expropriated parties may recover damages caused by expropriation even if they occurred before formal expropriation.

This is, I think, the appropriate approach to take to disturbance damages. [bolding added] - [118] In Central's case, the Board (paras. 672-81) analyzed the Province's submission and, based on Cory J.'s para. 29, concluded: - [680] Provide...

AI summary The text argues that disturbance damages should be compensated under s. 27(3) of the Expropriation Act for partial expropriations, citing Dell and rejecting the Province's reliance on Johnson para. 202. The Board's analysis of causal connections and the Supreme Court's ruling in Dell are central to this position.

th River site and focus on other aspects of his business. … To similar effect, see the Board's paras. 723 (quoted above, para. 32) and 862 (quoted below, para. 206) and see paras. 9, 15 and 33 above. - [150] The evidence supports the Board...

AI summary The Board's findings on Central's thwarted business plans due to expropriation are upheld as reasonable. A colleague argues against causation, claiming Central's failure to act was its own choice. The legal test for compensation hinges on 'reasonable and natural consequence,' citing Dell and Shun Fung . Nova Scotia's statutes align with Ontario's 'reasonable loss' criteria.

losses. PwC also set off the financing costs of the planned expansion which were delayed and thus saved. - [792] Mr. Wintrip's main adjustments to these amounts resulted from his use of a shorter loss period, one which ended in May 2005. H...

AI summary The Board evaluated PwC's loss calculations against Mr. Wintrip's adjustments, noting his use of a shorter loss period and uncertainty in future cost estimates. The Province argued speculative profits are unrecoverable, citing Loren and Neulib , but the Board distinguished Central's case, finding its claims based on reasonable assumptions and past performance. PwC's past loss calculations were preferred.

- costs on a tribunal appeal should follow a principled analysis: Smith v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Board of Inquiry) , 2017 NSCA 27, paras. 72-87 and 92. - [237] Generally, in an expropriation case, there is a principled basis for a sign...

AI summary The text discusses the principle that expropriation cases should award costs to owners based on indemnity and full compensation, citing cases like Smith v. Nova Scotia and Hill v. Nova Scotia . It references legal precedents where solicitor-client costs were awarded to successful expropriated owners, emphasizing alignment with expropriation statutes and tribunals.

Dissenting Reasons: [244] I have read my colleague's comprehensive reasons for judgment. With respect, while I would agree with his proposed disposition of the cross-appeal, I am unable to agree on the main appeal. I would allow the appeal...

AI summary The dissenting judge disagrees with the majority on the main appeal, allowing the appeal, quashing compensation for disturbance damages, and varying interest on compensation. The compensation claim lacks legal precedent and causal connection between Central's decision and expropriation.

2 by the Utility and Review Board Act , S.N.S. 1992, c. 11. This Act amalgamated a number of Boards, including the Expropriations Compensation Board, into one tribunal, the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board. The appeal provisions of the...

AI summary The Utility and Review Board Act (S.N.S. 1992, c. 11) amalgamated multiple boards into the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB), repealing the Expropriation Act 's appeal provisions. The new structure allows the Board, with leave from the Attorney General or Appeal Division, to request legal opinions and permits appeals on jurisdiction or legal questions.

Appeal - 30 (1) An appeal lies to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court from an order of the Board upon any question as to its jurisdiction or upon any question of law, upon filing with the Court a notice of appeal within thirty days af...

AI summary The text outlines the appeal process from the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) to the Supreme Court, emphasizing the standard of review. It references the Expropriation Act and the Utility and Review Board Act, stating that factual findings are subject to 'patent unreasonableness' review, while legal/jurisdictional questions are reviewed for 'correctness.'

ility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.

AI summary The text examines the Board's decision-making process, emphasizing the need for decisions to be within a range of acceptable, legally defensible outcomes based on facts and law. It highlights concerns about errors in regulatory proceedings and their alignment with legal standards.

- [351] At some point in 2008, or later, he may have said to Mr. Smith as they were looking out his office window that it would be hard for him to expand his business to the south, as that is where the alignment was going through: - MR. Ma...

AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving Mr. Smith's claim related to expropriation compensation. It addresses a 2008 statement by Mr. Chaisson, later corrected to Mr. Bushell, and the Board's acceptance of Mr. Smith's evidence regarding advice from Mr. Bushell in 1998. The legal principle that post-expropriation capital improvements do not affect compensation is emphasized, citing precedents like R. v. Thompson and Drache v. Winnipeg (City) .

INTEREST [386] With respect, I am unable to agree with my colleague's proposed disposition of this ground of appeal. There is no legal justification to award 10% interest on the compensation awards of fair market value and injurious affect...

AI summary The text disputes awarding 10% interest on compensation awards for expropriation, arguing it constitutes double compensation and lacks legal justification. It references the Board's discretion under s. 53(4) to adjust interest rates but criticizes the Board's interpretation of the Act and its selection of May 1, 2001, as the interest start date. The Supreme Court's guidance in McLean v. British Columbia is cited as relevant legal precedent.

Interest on outstanding compensation 53 (1) Subject to Sections 13 and 15 , the owner of lands expropriated is entitled to be paid interest on the portion of the market value of his interest in the land and on the portion of any allowance...

AI summary The text outlines entitlement to interest on outstanding compensation for expropriated lands under the Expropriation Act (Nova Scotia). Interest accrues from the date the owner ceases residence or productive use, with compensation only becoming payable upon expropriation (May 1, 2012). Sections 13 and 15 mandate timely compensation offers, with interest calculated from the expropriation document's deposit date if delayed.

An Act Respecting the Form and Interpretation of Statutes

AI summary This legislative act outlines procedures for interpreting and standardizing the form of statutes in Nova Scotia. It serves as a foundational framework for legal clarity and consistency in regulatory proceedings.

(The table of contents is not part of the statute) Section Short title . 1 Form of Enacting Statutes Form and place of enacting clause . 2 Promulgation Indorsement on and effective date of Act . 3 Evidence of Act . 4 Rules of Construction...

AI summary The text outlines the structure and provisions of a legislative act, covering sections related to the form of enacting statutes, interpretation, application, and administrative procedures, including oath administration, penalties, and judicial references.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

AI summary The document outlines rules of construction, including definitions and interpretations of terms used in regulatory proceedings involving Nova Scotia utility and energy efficiency programs, with extensive acronym listings for organizations, legislation, and programs.

Repeal and substitution by amendment or revision - 24 (1) Where an enactment is repealed and other provisions are substituted by way of amendment, revision or consolidation, - (a) all regulations made under the repealed enactment remain in...

AI summary The provision outlines that when an enactment is repealed and replaced by amendment or revision, existing regulations remain in force unless inconsistent. References to repealed enactments are treated as references to substituted provisions, ensuring continuity unless the substituted enactment lacks relevant provisions.

Interpretation - 2 In this Act, - (a) "Board" means the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board; - (b) repealed 1992, c. 11, s. 43. - (c) "extension" includes any reasonable extension of the service and facilities of every public utility; - (...

AI summary The document defines key terms in the Utility and Review Board Act, including 'Board,' 'public utility,' and 'service,' with specific exclusions and inclusions. Several sections are repealed, referencing legislative amendments from 1992 and 1997. Definitions cover utilities, telecommunication, and geothermal energy services.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD

AI summary The section outlines the powers and duties of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB), including oversight of utility companies, regulation of rates, and enforcement of compliance with relevant legislation such as the Utility and Review Board Act and the Public Utilities Act.

Summary investigation by Board 19 Whenever the Board believes that any rate or charge is unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, or that any reasonable service is not supplied, or that an investigation of any matter relating to any public...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) has authority to investigate public utility matters if rates are unreasonable, service is unsupplied, or investigations are needed. This power is derived from R.S., c. 380, s. 19, which outlines the Board's investigatory responsibilities.

Power to exclude certain corporations from Act - 20 (1) The Board may, by order or regulation, exclude from the scope of this Act any corporation which does not, at the time of such exclusion, own, operate, manage or control any tramway fo...

AI summary The Board has authority to exclude corporations not involved in public utility services from the Act, with power to revoke or modify exclusions. Exclusions take effect from April 14, 1943, or the corporation's incorporation date, as per R.S., c. 380, s. 20.

Power to hear proposals and recommend legislation 21 Whenever any public utility or person shall propose any change in any law relating directly or indirectly to the property or operations of any public utility, the proposed change may be...

AI summary The Board has authority to hear proposals related to public utilities, conduct hearings, and recommend legislation to protect public and utility interests, as per R.S., c. 380, s. 21.

Powers imposed by contract or other Act preserved 24 Subject to this Act, the powers, rights, privileges and obligations secured to or imposed upon any public utility by any statute, or by any contract or agreement made under the authority...

AI summary The Act preserves the rights, powers, and obligations of public utilities under existing statutes or contracts, except for rate-related agreements. The Board may investigate these matters for public interest and recommend changes to the legislature.

Regulations respecting practice and procedure 25 The Board may, from time to time, make, revoke and alter rules and regulations for the effectual execution of its duties and of the intention and objects of this Act, and the regulation of t...

AI summary The Board has authority to create, revoke, and alter rules and regulations for effective execution of its duties, requiring Governor in Council approval to have legal force. This provision references R.S., c. 380, s. 25.

Form of books and records of utility 27 The Board may prescribe the forms of all books, accounts, papers and records required to be kept by any public utility and every public utility is required to keep and render its books, accounts, pap...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) has the authority to prescribe the forms of books, accounts, papers, and records that public utilities must maintain. Utilities are required to keep these records accurately and comply with UARB directives, as outlined in R.S., c. 380, s. 27.

Power to determine value of property of utility 30 (1) The Board may at any time, with the assistance of such engineers, accountants, valuators, counsel and others as it deems wise or advisable to employ, inquire into and determine the ext...

AI summary The Board has authority to determine utility property values using prudent original cost or prescribed methods, deducting depreciation calculated via straight-line or other methods, and may establish rules for these inquiries. This power is codified in R.S., c. 380, s. 30.

Revaluation 32 The Board may at any time make a revaluation of such property. R.S., c. 380, s. 32.

AI summary The Board has the authority to revalue property under section 32 of R.S., c. 380, as outlined in the regulatory proceeding document.

Exemption for large-scale public utility - 35AA (1) In this Section, "large-scale public utility" means a public utility with an annual revenue of one hundred million dollars or more. - (2) A large-scale public utility is not required to s...

AI summary This section defines a 'large-scale public utility' as one with annual revenue of $100M or more and exempts such utilities from Board approval for projects under $1M. The exemption is codified in 2019, c. 38, s. 1, part of Nova Scotia's legislative framework.

Application of Section 36 37 Section 36 does not change the law applicable to the Board with respect to new construction, improvements or betterments in, extensions or additions to, or conversions of the generation and transmission plant o...

AI summary Section 36 does not alter the Board's jurisdiction over Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's projects related to generation, transmission, or export facilities. Legal references include R.S., c. 380, s. 37 and 1992, c. 8, s. 35.

Separate rate base for each service supplied - 42 (1) The Board shall fix and determine a separate rate base for each type or kind of service furnished, rendered or supplied to the public by a public utility. - (2) In establishing a rate b...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) is mandated to establish separate rate bases for each service type provided by public utilities, considering factors like working capital, organization expenses, and construction overheads. The Board may revise rate bases and direct amortization of allowed sums as operating expenses.

Power to compel compliance by utility 46 The Board shall have power, after hearing and notice by order in writing, to require and compel every public utility to comply with the provisions of this Act and any municipal ordinance or regulati...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) is granted authority to compel public utilities to comply with the Act, municipal regulations, and their own charters. This power does not exempt utilities from penalties or limit court jurisdiction. Reference: R.S., c. 380, s. 46.

Inquiry into neglect or violation by utility 47 The Board may inquire into any neglect or violation of the laws or regulations in force in the Province by any public utility doing business therein, or by the officers, agents or employees t...

AI summary The Board has authority to investigate neglect or violations by public utilities in Nova Scotia and enforce relevant laws, as outlined in R.S., c. 380, s. 47.

Resources to be used - 48 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any enactment, the Nova Scotia Power Incorporated may in the operation of its generation and transmission plant or like facilities take steps to maximize the u...

AI summary Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) is permitted to prioritize indigenous resources in operations, prohibited from nuclear energy generation, and required to consider private power producers when seeking capacity increases. The Board must factor indigenous resource costs into revenue requirements. Legal references include R.S., c. 380, s. 48 and 1992, c. 8, s. 35.

Regulations respecting reports - 51A (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations - (a) requiring a public utility to prepare and provide reports to the Minister of Energy and Mines and the Board, or either of them, including such cont...

AI summary The Governor in Council may regulate public utility reporting requirements, mandating reports to the Minister of Energy and Mines and the Board. Public availability of such reports is also governed by these regulations, with references to the Regulations Act, 2015, and O.I.C. 2018-188.

Duty to furnish safe and adequate service 52 Every public utility is required to furnish service and facilities reasonably safe and adequate and in all respects just and reasonable. R.S., c. 380, s. 52.

AI summary Public utilities in Nova Scotia must provide service that is safe, adequate, and just, as mandated by R.S., c. 380, s. 52. This legal requirement ensures service facilities meet standards of safety and reasonableness.

Performance standards for customer service - 52B (1) The Board shall establish performance standards in respect of such areas of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's customer service as it determines appropriate. - (2) For the purpose of subse...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) is mandated to establish performance standards for Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's (NSPI) customer service. These standards must be based on baseline data collection, improvement objectives, and regulatory requirements as outlined in the 2015 legislation.

Administrative penalties - 52E (1) In this Section, "Fuel Adjustment Mechanism" means the fuel adjustment mechanism approved by the Board for use by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated in orders dated December 10, 2007, (Board Case Number M0049...

AI summary The section defines the Fuel Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) and outlines rules for administrative penalties against Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI). Penalties aim to promote compliance, not punitive measures, with an annual cap of $1 million. Penalties must be credited to customers via FAM or other methods, and they are excluded from NSPI's rate of return calculations under the 2015 Act.

Regulations respecting Sections 52A to 52E - 52F (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations - (a) applying Sections 52A to 52E, or any of them, mutatis mutandis to any other public utility; - (b) prescribing factors or requirements f...

AI summary The Governor in Council is authorized to extend Sections 52A to 52E to other public utilities and prescribe factors for specific clauses. This regulatory authority is governed by the Regulations Act, 2015, c. 31, s. 31, which defines the scope of such regulations.

Abandonment of operating line or works 53 No public utility shall abandon any part of its line or lines, or works, after the same has been operated, without notice to the Board, and without the consent in writing of the Board, which consen...

AI summary Nova Scotia regulations prohibit public utilities from abandoning operating lines or works without prior notice to the Board and written consent. Consent requires municipal notification and due inquiry. This is outlined in R.S., c. 380, s. 53.

If changes by utility detrimental to other utility - 55 (1) No public utility shall make any extensions to or changes in its line, plant or system which are likely to be detrimental to the service supplied by any other public utility witho...

AI summary Regulations require public utilities to notify others of changes likely to affect their service, with the Board resolving disputes through hearings and determining service territories. The Board may approve or modify changes and order service territories if justified, avoiding unreasonable financial burdens on utilities.

Right of entry if leakage suspected 58 If the public utility is reasonably satisfied, after making all proper examination by testing or otherwise, that at some part of a circuit, connection with the earth exists of such resistance as to be...

AI summary The public utility may enter a customer's premises to inspect for electrical leakage if testing indicates a potential issue. Entry requires one hour's notice, and the customer must allow inspection. This is governed by R.S., c. 380, s. 58.

Discontinuance of supply of electrical energy 59 If, on such inspection and testing, the officer or agent discovers that a connection exists between the customer's wires and the earth and that such connection has an electrical resistance o...

AI summary The regulation mandates that if a public utility discovers a dangerous electrical connection (resistance <5000 ohms) or a customer refuses inspection, the utility must immediately discontinue electrical supply and notify the customer. Service can only resume after verifying the issue is resolved. This is governed by R.S., c. 380, s. 59.

Dissatisfaction with action of utility 60 If any customer is dissatisfied with the action of the public utility, either as to the mode of making the test or in discontinuing the supply of electrical energy to his premises, the wires and fi...

AI summary Customers dissatisfied with a public utility's actions regarding electrical service or testing may request the Board to appoint an inspector to test for earth connections. This is governed by R.S., c. 380, s. 60, which outlines the process for such inspections.

Approval for transfer of undertaking 62 Notwithstanding the provisions of any Act of the Legislature, no public utility shall sell, assign or transfer the whole of its undertaking or any part thereof to any person or corporation except wit...

AI summary The regulation requires that public utilities in Nova Scotia cannot transfer their undertaking without the approval of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board, as stipulated in R.S., c. 380, s. 62.

Regulations respecting schedule - 65 (1) A public utility shall submit for the approval of the Board with and as part of any schedule of rates all rules and regulations that in any manner relate to such schedule. - (2) Upon such rules and...

AI summary Public utilities in Nova Scotia must submit rules and regulations related to rate schedules for approval by the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB). Approved rules become lawful until modified by the Board, as per R.S., c. 380, s. 65.

Interim approval of schedule - 69 (1) When a public utility has submitted for the approval of the Board a schedule of rates, tolls and charges, or a proposed change in any existing schedule of rates, tolls and charges, which, in the opinio...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board may grant interim approval of a public utility's rate schedule if it constitutes a reduction or applies to a new service. Interim approval can be granted ex parte without public hearing, and the existing schedule remains lawful until final approval or disapproval. Final approval requires filing the amended schedule with the Board.

Approval for change of telephone equipment - 70 (1) A public utility that owns, operates, manages or controls, or is incorporated for the purpose of owning, operating, managing or controlling any plant or equipment for the conveyance of te...

AI summary The regulation mandates that public utilities in Nova Scotia require approval from the Board before changing telephone equipment. Approval can be granted ex parte or after a hearing, with conditions set by the Board. The provision references R.S., c. 380, s. 70.

- (3) An application to the Board by a public utility for approval of any issue of its shares, stocks, bonds, debentures or other evidence of indebtedness, shall comply with and conform to the rules of procedure of the Board. - (4) After h...

AI summary The text outlines procedures for a public utility seeking Board approval to issue securities. The Board must ensure compliance with legal requirements, approve issuance amounts, set terms (e.g., prices, interest rates), and mandate shareholder resolutions for capital increases. The Board retains authority to amend orders post-approval.

Distribution of surplus profit 75 (1) Nothing in this Act shall be taken to prohibit a public utility from entering into any reasonable arrangement with its employees for the division or distribution of its surplus profits. - (2) No such a...

AI summary The Act permits public utilities to distribute surplus profits to employees via arrangements, but only after the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) determines them reasonable and just. The UARB oversees these arrangements to ensure compliance with the Act's objectives.

Use of equipment by another utility - 77 (1) Every public utility which furnishes telephone, heat, light or power service, and every telegraph company doing business within the Province, and having conduits, poles, wires or other equipment...

AI summary Nova Scotia law mandates that public utilities permit other utilities to use their equipment when public convenience and necessity require it, provided no substantial detriment occurs. The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Board) can enforce such use if parties cannot agree, with orders being legally binding.

Consent for erection of pole or wire in city or town 78 No public utility shall, in any city or town, erect or place in, upon, along, under or across any street, road or highway, any pole, wire, conduit or pipe, without first obtaining the...

AI summary Public utilities must obtain city/town council consent before erecting poles or wires. The council may impose terms or refuse, leading to Board intervention if unresolved within a month.

(2) A franchise - (a) gives the franchise holder the exclusive right to supply Nova Scotia Power Incorporated with reasonably available, costeffective electricity efficiency and conservation activities for the purpose of this Act; - (b) is...

AI summary The franchise grants Efficiency Nova Scotia Corporation (ENSC) exclusive rights to provide electricity efficiency services to Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) for nine years. It outlines termination conditions, compliance reviews by the Board, and requirements for Ministerial approval of transfers. The EECR Act (2014) is referenced as the legislative basis.

Transition of franchise activities to new franchise holder - 79F (1) Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, in the event of the termination or expiration of a franchise, any agreement between the franchise holder and any other pers...

AI summary The text outlines procedures for transferring franchise activities to a new holder, including assignment of agreements, liability divisions, and the Board's supervisory role. The Minister and Board determine compensation for information provided during transitions, with Nova Scotia Power Incorporated liable for reimbursements. Legal protections are specified for all parties involved.

(2) Each agreement must - (a) be for a term of three years, ending on December 31st of the third year of the agreement; - (b) not be terminable or terminated unless the franchise holder's franchise is terminated or the termination is appro...

AI summary Agreements must be three-year terms, non-terminable without Board approval, outline efficiency activities by franchise holders, and specify payments to them. If agreements fail, the Board may intervene to establish terms. Applications under subsection (3) are treated as Section 79L approvals.

Board's approval of agreements - 79L (1) No agreement between Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and a franchise holder, including an agreement amending such an agreement, is valid until it has been approved by the Board pursuant to this Secti...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Board) mandates approval of agreements between Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) and franchise holders. The process requires both parties to submit information, with franchise holders primarily responsible for justifying electricity efficiency activities. The Board must ensure affordability and alignment with customer interests, referencing Section 79J and the Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring (2014) Act.

Termination of agreements - 79N (1) Neither party to an agreement approved pursuant to Section 79L may terminate the agreement without the approval of the Board[.] - (2) Notwithstanding Sections 79I and 79J, upon receiving an application t...

AI summary The text outlines rules for terminating agreements approved under Section 79L, requiring Board approval. The Board may direct parties, terminate agreements, or allow NSPI to meet obligations under specific conditions, referencing the 2014 legislation.

Disagreement between parties to approved agreement - 79P (1) Where Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and a franchise holder are parties to an approved agreement, either or both of them may apply to the Board for directions relating to any dis...

AI summary Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) and franchise holders may apply to the Board for dispute resolution under approved agreements. The Board must ensure non-applicant parties have adequate notice and time to prepare evidence. Both parties must provide required information, and the Board may issue directions based on customer interests, per 2014 legislation.

Order by Minister to assign agreement - 79U (1) The Minister may make an order for the purpose of subsection 79F(1) assigning an agreement as referred to in that subsection, including attaching terms or conditions to any such assignment an...

AI summary The Minister is authorized to assign agreements under subsection 79F(1), including attaching terms/conditions and consequences for non-compliance. This authority is explicitly excluded from being classified as a regulation under the Regulations Act, 2014, c. 5, s. 15.

Regulations - 79V (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations for the purpose of Sections 79A to 79U, including regulations - (a) prescribing activities, programs or plans that are electricity efficiency and conservation activities; -...

AI summary The Governor in Council is authorized under section 79V to create regulations for electricity efficiency and conservation activities, franchise applications, reporting requirements, Board considerations, definitions, and other matters necessary for implementing Sections 79A to 79U. These regulations are governed by the Regulations Act, 2014.

Notice of complaint and setting down 84 The Board shall, prior to such formal hearing, notify the public utility complained of that a complaint has been made, and after reasonable notice has been given, the Board may proceed to set a time...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board must notify a public utility of a complaint before a formal hearing and set a hearing after reasonable notice, as per R.S., c. 380, s. 84.

Unjust or unreasonable rate or charge, regulation or service or action - 87 (1) If upon any investigation the rates, tolls, charges or schedules are found to be unjust, unreasonable, insufficient or unjustly discriminatory, or to be prefer...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) has authority to cancel or adjust rates, tolls, charges, or services deemed unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory under the Utility and Review Board Act. The Board may also mandate service extensions and set new terms, with specific reference to Revised Statutes, chapter 380, section 87.

Small business advocate - 92 (1) In this Section, - (a) "prescribed" means prescribed by the regulations made pursuant to subsection (7); - (b) "small business" means a business - (i) of a prescribed type, - (ii) to which prescribed rate c...

AI summary The section defines 'small business' and outlines the appointment of a small business advocate by the Board. The advocate acts as a full intervenor, with the Board's authority to set fees and expenses, including expert costs. Regulations by the Governor in Council define eligibility criteria and advocate qualifications.

No reduced compensation for provided facilities 108 It shall be unlawful for any public utility to demand, charge, collect or receive from any person, firm or corporation less compensation for any service rendered or to be rendered by said...

AI summary Section 108 of Nova Scotia's Revised Statutes prohibits public utilities from charging reduced compensation for services when facilities are provided by others, except for rentals and specific equipment. The Board may order exceptions for meters and appliances. This regulation ensures fair compensation for utility services while allowing limited exceptions.

Undue or unreasonable preference - 109 (1) If any public utility shall knowingly or wilfully make or give an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, firm or corporation, or shall subject any particular perso...

AI summary The section prohibits public utilities from engaging in undue or unreasonable preference or discrimination, declaring such actions unlawful and imposing penalties of at least $5 per offense, referencing R.S., c. 380, s. 109.

Unlawful rebate or concession - 110 (1) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation knowingly to solicit, accept or receive any rebate, concession or discrimination in respect to any service in or affecting or relating to any...

AI summary Section 110 prohibits soliciting, accepting, or receiving rebates, concessions, or discriminatory pricing in public utility services, imposing penalties of at least $25 per violation. The provision aims to ensure compliance with regulated service rates and prevent unfair advantages.

Penalty on public utility - 112 (1) If any public utility - (a) violates any provision of this Act; - (b) does any act by this Act prohibited; - (c) fails or refuses to perform any duty enjoined upon it for which a penalty has not been pro...

AI summary The section outlines penalties for public utilities violating the Public Utilities Act, imposing a $200 fine per offense, and holds utilities liable for employee actions within their employment scope.

Interpretation and construction of Act and powers of Board - 116 (1) This Act shall be interpreted and construed liberally in order to accomplish the purposes thereof, and where any specific power or authority is given the Board by the pro...

AI summary The Act mandates liberal interpretation to achieve its purposes, grants the Board implied powers necessary for its functions, and allows substantial compliance with its requirements. This aligns with the Utility and Review Board Act's provisions, ensuring flexibility in regulatory actions.

Conflict with and application of 117 (1) Any Act whether enacted before or after the fourteenth day of April, 1943, relating to a public utility as defined by this Act shall be read and construed as subject in all respects to the provision...

AI summary The Public Utilities Act (Nova Scotia) establishes precedence over other legislation relating to public utilities, applying specifically to Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI). The Act defines NSPI as a public utility and was amended in 1992 with the repeal of section 35. Legal references include Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, chapter 380, section 117.

Utility and Review Board Act CHAPTER 11 OF THE ACTS OF 1992 as amended by 1995, c. 7; 1998, c. 18, s. 582; 2007, c. 23; 2008, c. 68; 2018, c. 1, Sch. A, s. 153 © 2018 Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of Nova Scotia Published...

AI summary The text outlines Chapter 11 of the Utility and Review Board Act (1992) and its amendments through various legislative changes up to 2018. It highlights the legal framework governing utility regulation in Nova Scotia, emphasizing the role of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) in overseeing utility matters.

Conflict of interest - 8 (1) No member who acts in a matter affecting a public utility shall be directly or indirectly employed by or interested in a public utility or interested in a share, stock, bond, mortgage, security or contract of t...

AI summary The text outlines conflict-of-interest rules for members of regulatory bodies handling public utilities and municipalities. Members must not have financial interests in utilities, except for purchasing services. Failure to comply may lead to office vacancies. Exceptions exist for residents and ratepayers. The provisions are part of the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11, s. 8.

Rules of practice and procedure 12 The Board may make rules respecting practice and procedure in relation to matters coming before it. 1992, c. 11, s. 12.

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board has the authority to establish rules of practice and procedure for matters brought before it, as outlined in section 12 of the Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1992, chapter 11.

Inquiry - 15 (1) The Chair may authorize a member of the Board to inquire into and report to the Board upon a matter within the jurisdiction of the Board or pending before it, and when so authorized that member has, for the purpose of taki...

AI summary The Board may delegate inquiry powers to its members or appoint external persons to investigate matters within its jurisdiction, with such individuals retaining the Board's authority to gather evidence. This provision is codified in the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11, s. 15.

Public Inquiries Act 16 In a matter over which the Board has jurisdiction, the Board and each member has all the powers, privileges and immunities of a commissioner appointed pursuant to the Public Inquiries Act . 1992, c. 11, s. 16.

AI summary The Board has the same powers, privileges, and immunities as commissioners under the Public Inquiries Act, as outlined in section 16 of the Act, 1992, c. 11.

Jurisdiction - 22 (1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases and in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it. - (2) The Board, as to all matters within its jurisdiction pursuant to this Act, may hear and d...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) holds exclusive jurisdiction over all matters within its authority under the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11. It may adjudicate both legal and factual questions related to its jurisdiction as defined in section 22 of the Act.

Effect of judgment of court or pending matter - 23 (1) In determining a question of fact, the Board is not bound by the finding or judgment of a court in a proceeding involved in the determination of the fact, but such finding or judgment...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Board) is not bound by court findings on factual questions, which are only prima facie evidence. The Board retains jurisdiction to hear such matters even if a court proceeding is pending. This is established under section 23 of the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11.

Order 24 In any matter before the Board, it shall grant an order, either as specified in the application or notice of appeal or as the Board decides. 1992, c. 11, s. 24.

AI summary The Board is authorized to grant orders in matters before it, as specified in applications, notices of appeal, or as determined by the Board, per section 24 of the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11.

Costs and witness fees - 28 (1) Except in respect of a proceeding pursuant to the Planning Act , costs of and incidental to a proceeding before the Board are in the discretion of the Board and may be fixed at a sum certain or may be taxed....

AI summary The Board has discretion to set costs for proceedings and determine witness fees. It may assign cost taxation responsibilities and scales. Witnesses are entitled to fees as determined by the Board under section 28 of the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11.

Stated case 31 (1) The Board may, upon its own motion with leave of the Attorney General or the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court or upon the request of the Governor in Council, state a case in writing for the opinion of the Appeal Divi...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) may refer legal questions to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court under the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11, s. 31. The court must then determine the legal question and return its opinion to the Board. This process requires leave from the Attorney General, the Appeal Division, or the Governor in Council.

Regulations - 34 (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations - (a) prescribing the terms and conditions, including remuneration, for the Board engaging the services of professional persons, technical persons and experts to advise the...

AI summary Section 34 outlines the Governor in Council's authority to regulate the Board's operations, including terms for engaging experts, public notice requirements, participation rules, record-keeping, information release, and definitions. Regulations may apply generally or to specific classes of matters, with legislative supremacy over conflicting Acts. The power is governed by the Regulations Act, 1992.

Expropriation Act amended 36 amendments

AI summary Amendments to the Expropriation Act (Nova Scotia) are discussed, focusing on regulatory changes and their implications for utility and review board procedures.

h greater quantities of coal. That would help the rate base and stabilize that base so that - consumers don't have this revolving door at the URB by Nova Scotia Power looking for rate - increases. - So like my colleague, the member for Dar...

AI summary The text discusses proposals to increase coal usage to stabilize the rate base and reduce rate increases, with concerns about unresolved questions affecting consumer clarity. A member emphasizes the need for answers to protect ratepayers, while referencing Nova Scotia Power's role in the process.

Supply Agreement 1 2 (b) provide sufficient resources to enable EfficiencyOne to perform its obligations on time and in accordance with this Agreement; 3 4 (c) carry out the EECA in a professional, expeditious and economical manner, in acc...

AI summary The Supply Agreement outlines obligations for EfficiencyOne, including providing sufficient resources to perform its duties and carrying out the Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Agreement in a professional, expeditious, and economical manner as required by the Act.

Permitted Disclosures - 6. The Recipient shall be permitted to disclose relevant aspects of the Confidential Information to its employees and professional advisors to the extent that such disclosure is reasonably necessary for the performa...

AI summary The permitted disclosures section outlines the conditions under which a recipient may share confidential information with employees and advisors, ensuring they are aware of confidentiality obligations. It also allows disclosure under legal requirements, with prior notice to the disclosing party and efforts to remove commercially sensitive information.

Governing Law 14 14. This Agreement is governed and shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the Province of Nova Scotia.

AI summary The agreement is governed by the laws of the Province of Nova Scotia, as stated in section 14 of the document.

I. Future Cost-Effectiveness Screening We have a statutory duty to require each gas and electric company to establish any program or service that the Commission deems appropriate and cost effective to encourage and promote the efficient us...

AI summary The document outlines the statutory duty to ensure energy efficiency programs are cost-effective and discusses the transition from retrospective to prospective cost-effectiveness screening to foster innovation in Maryland's energy efficiency industry.

Residential Business, Non-Profit, and Institutional Thermal comfort Reduced Operations and Maintenance Noise Reduction Reduction in Other Labour Costs Property Value Increased Rent Revenue Equipment Maintenance Increased Sales Revenue Ligh...

AI summary The document discusses the benefits of EfficiencyOne programs but argues that assessing their cost effectiveness based on certain benefits is outside the Board's jurisdiction to approve and oversee electricity efficiency and conservation activities.

Jurisdiction - 22 (1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases and in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it. - (2) The Board, as to all matters within its jurisdiction pursuant to this Act, may hear and d...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) has exclusive jurisdiction over utility regulation under the Public Utilities Act (PUA). The PUA was amended in 2014 via the Electricity Efficiency and Conservation Restructuring Act to mandate Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) to purchase cost-effective efficiency programs. The Board oversees these activities under section 79H of the PUA, which defines eligible electricity efficiency and conservation measures.

Board's approval of agreements 79L (1) No agreement between Nova Scotia Power Incorporated and a franchise holder, including an agreement amending such an agreement, is valid until it has been approved by the Board pursuant to this Section...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) must approve agreements between Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI) and franchise holders, ensuring they align with customer interests and Public Utilities Act (PUA) requirements. The Industrial Group argues the Board cannot consider incidental effects beyond direct electricity use impacts, opposing EfficiencyOne's interpretation of PUA jurisdiction regarding NEBs in cost-effectiveness testing. The Board emphasizes EfficiencyOne's dual regulated/non-regulated status.

Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board IN THE MATTER OF The Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380, as amended - and - IN THE MATTER OF an Application by EfficiencyOne for approval for the use of measure-level Non-Energy Benefits within...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board is considering an application by EfficiencyOne to use measure-level Non-Energy Benefits in Cost-Effectiveness testing for future Demand Side Management (DSM) planning under the Public Utilities Act. The proceeding involves regulatory processes related to DSM and non-energy benefits.

DATE FILED: March 9, 2020 Page 4 of 21 1 3.0 LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION 30 31 32 33 34 This Act shall be interpreted and construed liberally in order to accomplish the purposes thereof, and where any specific power or authority is give...

AI summary The text discusses the interpretation of legislation, emphasizing a liberal approach to achieve the Act's purposes. It highlights the continued application of section 116(2) of the Public Utilities Act, which grants broad powers to the Board.

DATE FILED: March 9, 2020 Page 7 of 21 E1 Submission, page 11, lines 8-11. This is discussed further at paragraph 51 of ATCO Gas : …[t]his rule allows for the application of the "doctrine of jurisdiction by necessary implication"; the powe...

AI summary The document discusses the jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) under the Public Utilities Act (PUA), emphasizing that its authority to consider non-energy impacts in cost effectiveness testing must be explicitly or implicitly granted by the legislation. The Board's primary mandate is rate setting and ensuring safe and adequate service.

ally, the Board's intended mandate or function under the PUA is the dual role of ensuring that rates are just and reasonable and that safe and adequate service, including service quality standards, is maintained. DATE FILED: March 9, 2020...

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) is tasked with ensuring that utility rates are just and reasonable while maintaining safe and adequate service, including adherence to service quality standards under the Public Utilities Act (PUA).

DATE FILED: March 9, 2020 Page 9 of 21 1 In Decision 2006 NSUARB 85, the Board explained as follows: 2 3 4 The role of the Board is to provide rates which permit the Utility to meet its obligation to provide reasonably safe and adequate se...

AI summary The document references a 2006 decision by the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB), explaining the Board's role in ensuring that utility rates are just, reasonable, and sufficient while providing safe and adequate services to the public, as outlined in the Public Utilities Act (PUA).

4.1 Explicit Powers - The relevant provisions that provide the Board with its jurisdiction regarding the assessment of - proposed electricity efficiency and conservation activities do not provide it with specific power - to account for or...

AI summary The document discusses the jurisdiction of the Board under the Public Utilities Act (PUA) regarding the assessment of electricity efficiency and conservation activities. It notes that while the Board has broad powers, such as under s. 116(2) of the PUA, its discretion is limited by the need to ensure rates are just and reasonable and that safety is maintained.

DATE FILED: March 9, 2020 Page 11 of 21 1 and adequate service is maintained. The exercise of any such authority must then also be 2 "necessary" for the Board to carryout its role as the regulator of public utilities under the PUA. 3 4 Acc...

AI summary The document discusses the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board's (NSUARB) jurisdiction in cost effectiveness testing, stating that non-energy impacts are not relevant to its role under the Public Utilities Act (PUA). It references a Federal Court of Appeal case regarding the National Energy Board's (NEB) jurisdiction to award costs.

conclusion cannot be drawn. While Demand Side Management (DSM) may have ancillary environmental policy implications, E1 Submission, page 14, lines 18-19. DATE FILED: March 9, 2020 Page 16 of 21 that does not somehow grant jurisdiction to t...

AI summary The text argues that while Demand Side Management (DSM) has environmental implications, the NSUARB lacks jurisdiction over environmental matters. The E1 Submission is criticized for not analyzing issues through the lens of the Public Utilities Act (PUA).

t does not somehow grant jurisdiction to the Board to consider environmental matters. Again, the E1 Submission fails to undertake its analysis through the lens of the PUA. Moreover, E1's reliance on Hansard to confer jurisdiction is not co...

AI summary The text argues that the E1 Submission incorrectly relies on Hansard to grant the Board jurisdiction over environmental matters, stating that policy statements do not confer jurisdiction. It emphasizes that administrative tribunals cannot grant themselves jurisdiction and that the PUA does not support the Board's involvement in environmental protection.

However, where the two pieces of legislation differ is with regard to the enumerated considerations of the respective regulators when determining whether the programs or activities put forward by the utilities fulfill the statutory require...

AI summary The text discusses differences between Nova Scotia and Maryland legislation regarding the considerations required when approving electricity efficiency programs. It highlights that Nova Scotia legislation focuses on affordability and customer interests, while Maryland explicitly requires consideration of non-energy impacts like job and environmental effects. This distinction supports NS Power's argument that non-energy impacts must be explicitly mandated in legislation.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS Based on the foregoing, when assessing proposed electricity efficiency and conservation activities, the Board does not have the jurisdiction, whether express or implied, to take into account non-energy impacts in cost effec...

AI summary The NSUARB concludes it lacks jurisdiction to consider non-energy impacts in cost-effectiveness testing for electricity efficiency programs. The PUA's core intent is to ensure just rates and reliable service, not to address societal or non-energy factors unless explicitly stated in legislation. Maryland's approach, which explicitly allows such considerations, is contrasted as a legislative example.

CASE LAW - Tab 1 ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4 (CanLII) - Tab 2 National Energy Board Act (Can.) (Re), 1986 CanLII 4033 (FCA) (CanLII) - Tab 3 Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Department of Agricultu...

AI summary The document lists case law references, including a 2006 Supreme Court of Canada case involving ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. and Alberta's Energy and Utilities Board. The City of Calgary and ATCO Gas are involved in a cross-appeal, with interveners including Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc., and Union Gas Limited. The case is indexed as ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), with a neutral citation of 2006 SCC 4.

ould be paid to ATCO's shareholders. The customers' interests were represented by the City of Calgary, who opposed ATCO's position with respect to the disposition of the sale proceeds to shareholders. Persuaded that customers would not be...

AI summary The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the Board's decision to allocate a portion of sale proceeds to customers, requiring full allocation to ATCO. The Board had relied on AEUBA s. 15(3) to protect public interest, but the Court found jurisdictional issues. The majority allowed the cross-appeal, dismissing the appeal, while dissenting judges disagreed.

Cases Cited By Bastarache J. Referred to: Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Decision 2001-65, July 31, 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Alta. E.U.B., Deci...

AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving ATCO's argument that allocating profits to customers is confiscatory. The court rejects this, noting that regulated utilities have rates set by regulators, not the market. The decision is prospective, not retroactive, and the Commission's authority to manage rates and monitor services is affirmed. The distinction between amortized and non-amortized assets is deemed less critical than ATCO claims.

Jurisprudence Citée par le juge Bastarache Arrêts mentionnés : Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Décision 2001-65, 31 juillet 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. c. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Cor...

AI summary The jurisprudence section cites multiple legal cases referenced by Judge Bastarache, including decisions from Alberta’s Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) and Public Utilities Board (PUBA), as well as Supreme Court of Canada rulings. Key cases involve utility regulation, energy disputes, and administrative law, highlighting precedents related to regulatory authority and utility company obligations.

By Binnie J. (dissenting) Atco Ltd. v. Calgary Power Ltd., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 557; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, 2003 SCC 29; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Dr...

AI summary Justice Binnie's dissenting opinion references numerous legal precedents and regulatory decisions from various jurisdictions, highlighting cases related to utility regulation, labor disputes, and administrative law. These citations underscore the complexity of regulatory frameworks and the reliance on past rulings in shaping current legal interpretations.

Citée par le juge Binnie (dissident) Atco Ltd. c. Calgary Power Ltd., [1982] 2 R.C.S. 557; S.C.F.P. c. Ontario (Ministre du Travail), [2003] 1 R.C.S. 539, 2003 CSC 29; TransAlta Utilities Corp. c. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68...

AI summary The text lists legal cases and regulatory decisions cited by Judge Binnie (dissident) in a Nova Scotia proceeding, including references to Canadian and international court rulings, utility regulatory decisions, and legislation related to energy and public utilities.

onomic Principles . Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1988. - MacAvoy, Paul W., and J. Gregory Sidak. « The Efficient Allocation of Proceeds from a Utility's Sale of Assets » (2001), 22 Energy L.J. 233. - Mullan, David J. Administrative Law ....

AI summary The text details an appeal and cross-appeal from an Alberta Court of Appeal decision reversing an Alberta Energy and Utilities Board ruling. The appeal was dismissed, and the cross-appeal allowed, with dissenting opinions from McLachlin C.J. and others. Key entities include legal counsel, interveners, and regulatory bodies.

1. Introduction At the heart of this appeal is the issue of the jurisdiction of an administrative board. More specifically, the Court must consider whether, on the appropriate standard of review, this utility board appropriately set out th...

AI summary The appeal centers on the jurisdiction of an administrative board, specifically whether the utility board correctly defined its powers and discretion. The case involves a natural gas utility in Alberta, subject to regulatory constraints. Legal references emphasize the importance of statutory limits on regulatory bodies' authority.

1. Introduction Le présent pourvoi a pour objet la compétence d'un tribunal administratif. Plus précisément, notre Cour doit déterminer, selon la norme de contrôle appropriée, si l'organisme de réglementation a correctement circonscrit ses...

AI summary The court examines whether a regulatory body correctly limited its authority and discretionary power within its legal jurisdiction. It emphasizes that administrative agencies must adhere to legislative boundaries when exercising discretion, citing legal scholars and texts on regulatory reform and administrative law.

1.1 Aperçu des faits ATCO Gas - South (« AGS »), une filiale d'ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. (« ATCO »), a fait parvenir à la Commission une lettre dans laquelle elle lui demandait, en application du par. 25.1(2) (l'actuel par. 26(2)) de la...

AI summary ATCO Gas - South (AGS) requested approval to sell Calgary land under GUA §25.1(2), arguing the sale would reduce customer rates by lowering the rate base. ATCO sought proceeds to pay book value, disposal costs, and distribute net gains to shareholders. The Commission reviewed the request without hearings, but opponents including the City and Gas Alberta Inc. opposed shareholder distribution.

che est compatible avec la manière dont elle a appliqué jusqu'à maintenant la formule TransAlta. [par. 28] En ce qui concerne son pouvoir de répartir le produit net de la vente, la Commission a dit : [TRADUCTION] Le fait qu'un service publ...

AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) asserts authority to redistribute net sales proceeds, citing its legislative power to regulate public utilities. It references the TransAlta case to counter AGS's argument that allocating more than the 'absence of harm' criterion would constitute retroactive pricing. The Commission emphasizes that applying the TransAlta formula avoids retroactive adjustments when a utility disposes of assets previously included in the rate base.

1.2.2 Court of Appeal of Alberta ((2004), 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 205, 2004 ABCA 3) ATCO appealed the Board's decision. It argued that the Board did not have any jurisdiction to allocate the proceeds of sale and that the proceeds should have b...

AI summary ATCO appealed a decision allocating proceeds from asset sales, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled in ATCO's favor, but the Commission later used the TransAlta formula to distribute proceeds between shareholders, clients, and expenses. The allocation included $4.07 million to clients, $2.01 million to shareholders, and $465,000 to ATCO for expenses.

1.2.2 La Cour d'appel de l'Alberta ((2004), 24 Alta. L.R. (4th) 205, 2004 ABCA 3) ATCO a interjeté appel de la décision. Elle a fait valoir que la Commission n'avait pas compétence pour attribuer le produit de la vente, qui aurait dû reven...

AI summary ATCO appealed a decision allocating sale proceeds to ratepayers, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction. The Alberta Court of Appeal agreed, ruling the Board must allocate all proceeds to ATCO. The decision was upheld, affirming the Board's lack of authority to allocate funds to ratepayers.

2.2 Standard of Review As this appeal stems from an administrative body's decision, it is necessary to determine the appropriate level of deference which must be shown to the body. Wittmann J.A., writing for the Court of Appeal, concluded...

AI summary The appeal concerns the standard of review for an administrative body's decision. Wittmann J.A. and ATCO agree that jurisdictional issues require a standard of correctness, not deference. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the Commission lacked authority to allocate sale proceeds to customers, requiring allocation per line 11 of the distribution table.

2.1 Questions en litige Nous sommes saisis d'un pourvoi et d'un pourvoi incident. Dans son pourvoi, la Ville affirme que contrairement à ce qu'a estimé la Cour d'appel, la Commission avait le pouvoir d'attribuer aux clients une partie du g...

AI summary The City and ATCO challenge the Commission's authority to allocate gains from the sale of public utility assets. The City argues the Commission can distribute some gains even if no harm was anticipated, while ATCO contests any allocation, particularly regarding amortization. The court must determine if the Commission has the power to allocate net gains from such sales.

2.2 Norme de contrôle Une décision administrative étant à l'origine du présent pourvoi, il faut déterminer le degré de déférence auquel a droit l'organisme qui l'a rendue. S'exprimant au nom de la Cour d'appel, le juge Wittmann a conclu qu...

AI summary The text discusses the standard of review for an administrative decision by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB), emphasizing the application of the 'decision correct' standard. It references Supreme Court of Canada cases ( Pushpanathan and United Taxi Drivers ) and analyzes AEUBA section 26(1), which limits appeals to questions of jurisdiction or law. The analysis stresses the need to evaluate all four factors from Pushpanathan before concluding on the standard of review.

se d'immunité de contrôle et d'un droit d'appel n'est pas décisive, de sorte qu'il nous faut examiner la nature de la question à trancher et l'expertise relative du tribunal administratif à cet égard. Deuxièmement, comme l'a fait remarquer...

AI summary The text discusses the administrative tribunal's expertise in energy regulation, emphasizing that while the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) has specialized knowledge, its authority to determine its own powers is subject to judicial review. The court focuses on the tribunal's specific expertise rather than general administrative competence, with references to legal precedents and case law.

2.3 Was the Board's Decision as to Its Jurisdiction Correct? Administrative tribunals or agencies are statutory creations: they cannot exceed the powers that were granted to them by their enabling statute; they question « touche la compéte...

AI summary The analysis examines whether the Board correctly determined its jurisdiction, referencing Pushpanathan's principle that tribunals cannot exceed statutory powers. It argues that the Commission's allocation method requires a less deferential standard due to legal complexity, while the Court of Appeal erred in not concluding the Commission lacked authority to allocate sale proceeds to customers.

2.3 La Commission a-t-elle rendu une décision correcte au sujet de sa compétence? Un tribunal ou un organisme administratif est une création de la loi : il ne peut outrepasser les pouvoirs que lui confère sa loi habilitante, il doit 33 35...

AI summary The text examines whether the Board correctly exercised its jurisdiction by interpreting its statutory authority under relevant legislation. It references legal principles from Mullan and Blake's work on administrative law, emphasizing that tribunals must adhere to their legislative mandates when allocating proceeds from utility asset sales.

2.3.1 General Principles of Statutory Interpretation For a number of years now, the Court has adopted E. A. Driedger's modern approach as the method to follow for statutory interpretation ( Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87...

AI summary The text outlines principles of statutory interpretation, referencing E. A. Driedger's approach and Supreme Court of Canada cases. It discusses administrative law jurisdiction sources and the City's argument that the Commission's authority is both explicit and implicit. The analysis emphasizes interpreting legislative frameworks to determine the Commission's power.

2.3.2 Explicit Powers: Grammatical and Ordinary Meaning As a preliminary submission, the City argues that given that ATCO applied to the Board for approval of both the sale transaction and the disposition of the proceeds of sale, this sugg...

AI summary The City argues that ATCO's application for sale approval implies Board jurisdiction over proceeds allocation, but this is rejected as the application alone does not confirm jurisdiction. Past cases show utility companies challenged the Board's authority to allocate sale proceeds, with references to multiple Board decisions (e.g., Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Re ATCO Gas-North ). The analysis focuses on statutory interpretation of GUA and AEUBA provisions.

2.3.2 Pouvoir explicite : sens grammatical et ordinaire La Ville soutient à titre préliminaire qu'en lui demandant d'autoriser la vente des biens et l'attribution du produit de l'opération, ATCO a reconnu le pouvoir de la Commission d'impo...

AI summary The City argues that ATCO's request for authorization implies the Commission's power to impose conditions on the sale of assets. However, the analysis rejects this, noting that past Commission decisions demonstrate its authority to regulate asset sales regardless of ATCO's claims. Key cases include Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. and Re ATCO Gas-North , which affirm the Commission's historical exercise of this power.

AEUBA 15(1) For the purposes of carrying out its functions, the Board has all the powers, rights and privileges of the ERCB [Energy Resources Conservation Board] and the PUB [Public Utilities Board] that are granted or provided for by any...

AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act (AEUBA) grants the Board powers similar to the ERCB and PUB, including authority to impose additional conditions on orders. The Gas Utilities Act (GUA) restricts gas service providers from transferring assets without Commission authorization, with exceptions for normal business operations.

PUBA 37 In matters within its jurisdiction the Board may order and require any person or local authority to do forthwith or within or at a specified time and in any manner prescribed by the Board, so far as it is not inconsistent with this...

AI summary The PUBA grants the Board authority to mandate actions or prohibit violations under its jurisdiction, with overlapping provisions in GUA. Section 26(2) of GUA prohibits utility asset sales outside ordinary business without Board approval, but does not specify conditional approval or profit allocation. ATCO argues approval power is limited to granting or denying without additional conditions, while the Board's concerns about ratepayer impact are addressed by this authority.

2.3.3 Pouvoir implicite : contexte global Les dispositions en cause figurent dans des lois qui font elles-mêmes partie d'un cadre législatif plus large dont on ne peut faire abstraction : Œuvre d'un législateur rationnel et logique, la loi...

AI summary The text discusses the interpretation of legislative frameworks governing regulatory boards, emphasizing the need to align with the legislature's intent and maintain coherence. It references legal principles from cases like Bell ExpressVu and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , highlighting that statutory discretion (e.g., under AEUBA and PUBA) is not unlimited but must adhere to statutory regimes. ATCO argues that regulatory decisions must respect legislative context and principles.

2.3.3.1 Historical Background and Broader Con‑ text The history of public utilities regulation in Alberta originated with the creation in 1915 of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners by The Public Utilities Act , S.A. 1915, c. 6. This...

AI summary Historical regulation of public utilities in Alberta began with the 1915 Public Utilities Act, influenced by American models. The text discusses legal cases and the City's claims regarding utility ownership and profit distribution, which are rebutted as conflicting with applicable law.

has all of the powers, 56 In addition to the powers found in the 1915 statute, which have remained virtually the same in the present PUBA, the Board now benefits from the following express powers to: (AEUBA, ss. 13, 15(1); GUA, s. 59). rig...

AI summary The document outlines the expanded regulatory powers of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) under the Public Utilities Board Act (PUBA) and Gas Utilities Act (GUA), including authority over service improvements, financial approvals, and mergers. It references the 1915 statute's enduring provisions and the 1995 merger of the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERC) and Public Utilities Board (PUB) into the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB). Legal citations from AEUBA, GUA, and PUBA are provided.

2.3.3.2 Rate Setting 63 Rate regulation serves several aims — sustainability, equity and efficiency — which underlie the reasoning as to how rates are fixed: 62 . . . the regulated company must be able to finance its operations, and any re...

AI summary Rate regulation aims to balance sustainability, equity, and efficiency, ensuring utilities can operate while limiting excessive shareholder returns. The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) regulates energy resources and utility tariffs, emphasizing fair pricing for consumers. The text references a 1999 manual on utility price controls and highlights the AEUB's role in overseeing Alberta's energy and utility sectors.

operations regulated (see Black, at pp. 356-57; Milner, at p. 101; Atco Ltd. , at p. 576; Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton , [1929] S.C.R. 186 (" Northwestern 1929 "), at pp. 192-93). Therefore, when interpreting the broad p...

AI summary The Board's authority to set 'just and reasonable' rates under the GUA and PUBA is central to balancing consumer and investor interests. Legal precedents like Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. City of Edmonton (1929 and 1979) emphasize the need for fair returns on the rate base while protecting customers. The statutes mandate a regulatory framework ensuring economic benefits for both stakeholders.

[TRADUCTION] - a) du coût du bien lors de son affectation initiale à l'utilisation publique et de sa juste valeur d'acquisition pour le propriétaire du service de gaz, moins la dépréciation, l'amortissement et l'épuisement; - b) du capital...

AI summary The text discusses the valuation of public utility assets, emphasizing the necessity of capital and fair returns for investors. It argues that allowing public utilities to profit from asset sales ensures investment, while distributing profits to customers may undermine investment processes. References to MacAvoy and Sidak highlight potential investor behavior impacts.

2.3.3.3 Le pouvoir d'imposer des conditions La Ville soutient en second lieu que le pouvoir d'attribuer le produit de la vente des biens d'un service public est nécessairement accessoire aux pouvoirs exprès que confèrent à la Commission l'...

AI summary The City argues that the Commission's power to assign proceeds from public utility sales is accessory to its express powers under AEUBA, GUA, and PUBA. It claims the Board can impose conditions on sales approvals. The author disagrees, citing the Ontario Energy Board's decision in Re Consumers' Gas Co. , which outlines when the doctrine of necessary implication applies, emphasizing that broadly drawn powers are less amenable to this doctrine than narrowly drawn ones.

are understood to include only what is rationally related to the purpose of the power. In this way the scope of the power expands or contracts as needed, in keeping with the purpose. [Emphasis added.] In the case at bar, s. 15 of the AEUBA...

AI summary The text discusses the interpretation of Alberta's AEUBA and GUA, emphasizing that s. 15 of the AEUBA cannot expand the Board's powers under s. 26(2) of the GUA. It references MacAvoy and Sidak's article, which outlines three reasons for requiring Board approval of utility sales: preventing service degradation, ensuring economic benefits, and avoiding investor favoritism.

2.4 Other Considerations Under the regulatory compact, customers are protected through the rate-setting process, under which the Board is required to make a wellbalanced determination. The record shows that the City did not submit to the B...

AI summary The regulatory compact ensures customer protection via the Board's rate-setting authority. Although the City did not submit a general rate review application in response to ATCO's sale request, the Board could independently convene hearings to adjust rates based on new economic data from the sale, citing PUBA and GUA provisions.

2.5 If Jurisdiction Had Been Found, Was the Board's Allocation Reasonable? In light of my conclusion with regard to jurisdiction, it is not necessary to determine whether n'est pas l'intention manifeste du législateur (voir Sullivan, p. 40...

AI summary The analysis concludes that determining allocation is unnecessary due to jurisdiction findings. It references legal precedents emphasizing legislative intent and economic freedom, noting Alberta's legislature could explicitly grant financial benefits to clients via legislation, similar to U.S. states like Connecticut.

2.5 À supposer que la Commission ait eu le pou‑ voir de répartir le produit de la vente, a-t-elle exercé ce pouvoir de manière raisonnable? Vu ma conclusion touchant à la compétence, il n'est pas nécessaire de déterminer si la Commission 8...

AI summary The judge concludes that even if the Commission had jurisdiction to allocate sale proceeds, its exercise of discretion was unreasonable. The Board's allocation did not meet a reasonable standard, and the judge references colleague Binnie's reasoning without fully addressing the jurisdictional question.

3. Conclusion 86 This Court's role in this case has been one of interpreting the enabling statutes using the appropriate interpretive tools, i.e., context, legislative intention and objective. Going further than required by reading in unne...

AI summary The court interprets enabling statutes, emphasizing that the Board overstepped its jurisdiction by allocating asset sale proceeds. The decision to dismiss the City's appeal and allow ATCO's cross-appeal is based on the Board's failure to meet the correctness standard. The dissenting opinion highlights concerns about utility companies' mixed business operations and the Board's policies on land speculation.

I. Analysis ATCO's argument boils down to the proposition announced at the outset of its factum: In the absence of any property right or interest and of any harm to the customers arising from the plus productifs ou qui pourraient l'être da...

AI summary ATCO argues that the Commission's decision to allocate profits from property sales to reduce utility costs infringes on its rights. The judge disagrees with the Alberta Court of Appeal's ruling, asserting the Commission's authority under the AEUBA to impose public interest conditions. The Commission's order required ATCO to share profits from a Calgary property sale, prioritizing rate stability over shareholder returns.

I. Analyse La thèse d'ATCO se résume à ce qu'elle affirme au début de son mémoire : [TRADUCTION] À défaut de tout droit de propriété et de tout préjudice causé à la clientèle par le 89 withdrawal from utility service, there was no proper g...

AI summary ATCO argues the case centers on property rights, claiming the Alberta Court of Appeal improperly restricted the Board's authority to consider public interest. The opposing view asserts the case concerns regulatory authority over returns in Alberta's gas industry, not property rights. Key issues include the Board's power and the Court of Appeal's interpretation of public interest considerations.

A. The Board's Statutory Authority The first question is one of jurisdiction. What gives the Board the authority to make the order ATCO complains about? The Board's answer is threefold. Section 22(1) of the Gas Utilities Act , R.S.A. 2000,...

AI summary The Board asserts jurisdiction under the Gas Utilities Act (GUA) and Public Utilities Board Act (PUBA) to regulate property sales by utilities, allowing ATCO's sale of land with conditions. ATCO argues the Board's authority is limited, and the appeal court's restriction on conditions is unjustified. Key legal provisions include GUA s. 26(2)(d)(i) and PUBA s. 101(2)(d)(i).

A. Les pouvoirs légaux de la Commission La première question qui se pose est celle de la compétence. D'où la Commission tient-elle le pouvoir de rendre l'ordonnance que conteste ATCO? La réponse de la Commission comporte trois volets. Le p...

AI summary The Commission asserts authority under the Gas Utilities Act (GUA) and Public Utilities Board Act (PUBA) to regulate ATCO Gas - South's property sale in Calgary. Key provisions include GUA 22(1) (general oversight) and 26(2)d)(i) (approval requirement for asset transfers). The Commission claims power to impose conditions on approvals, citing Decision 2002-037.

B. The Board's Decision 94 ATCO argues that the Board's decision should be seen as a stand-alone decision divorced from its rate-making responsibilities. However, I do not agree that the hearing under s. 26 of the GUA can be isolated in th...

AI summary ATCO argues the Board's decision under s. 26 of the GUA is separate from rate-making, but the Board disagrees, citing the TransAlta (1986) case as precedent. The case addresses asset disposal gains and the 'TransAlta Formula,' emphasizing the Board's regulatory authority over future rates and utility oversight.

first phase of its hearing. However, ATCO itself had agreed to the two-phase procedure, and indeed the second phase was devoted to ATCO's own application for an allocation of the profits on the sale. les questions de cette nature soient, s...

AI summary The Commission's decision links ATCO's profit allocation from asset sales in Calgary to future tariff increases, with two-thirds of profits factored into revenue needs. The process involved a two-phase hearing, with the Commission initially authorizing the sale due to 'absence of prejudice' but tying approval to subsequent financial impact assessments. Alberta's Court of Appeal precedents influenced the Commission's stance on procedural arguments.

C. Standard of Review The Court's modern approach to this vexed question was recently set out by McLachlin C.J. in Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia , [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19, at para. 26: In the prag...

AI summary The text discusses the standard of review in regulatory proceedings, emphasizing judicial deference to tribunals like the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) due to their expertise in gas utilities. It references the Supreme Court of Canada's approach, focusing on legislative intent, privative clauses, and the nature of questions (law vs. fact). The AEUBA's section 15(3)(d) is cited, granting broad discretion to impose public interest conditions.

ecessary"), the expertise of that decision maker and the nature of the decision to be made ("in the public interest"), in my view, call for the most deferential standard, patent unreasonableness. 104 As to the phrase "the Board considers n...

AI summary The text discusses the standard of review for regulatory decisions, emphasizing deference to the Board's expertise and the concept of 'necessary' as determined by the Minister. It references legal cases and scholars, highlighting the importance of specialized tribunals in administrative law.

1. The Confiscation Issue In its factum, ATCO says that "[t]he property belonged to the owner of the utility and the Board's proposed distribution cannot be characterized otherwise than as being confiscatory" (respondent's factum, at para....

AI summary ATCO argues that the Board's distribution proposal is confiscatory, but the distinction between regulated utilities and unregulated investments is key. The text references Re Southern California Gas Co. to highlight how regulated utilities insulate investors from market risks. The Commission's decision to address disparities in profit allocation is deemed reasonable, balancing public interest and investor returns.

tant équivalant aux deux tiers du profit est en fait pris en compte pour établir la base tarifaire actuelle d'ATCO. Le profit est donc réparti de manière abstraite entre les intéressés concurrents.) L'argument d'ATCO est fréquemment invoqu...

AI summary ATCO argues that a tariff structure allocating two-thirds of profits to competitors constitutes a confiscatory effect. The argument references U.S. constitutional property rights principles, notably the 1973 Democratic Central Committee case, where a court ruled against profit allocation to shareholders when public utility assets were sold. The decision emphasized balancing public interest against private gains.

ait qu'il s'agit d'un bien non amortissable — son utilisation ne diminuant habituellement pas sa valeur d'usage — n'a rien à voir avec la question de savoir qui a droit au produit de sa vente. [p. 26] Dans SoCalGas , l'organisme de régleme...

AI summary The text discusses regulatory decisions on non-depreciable assets (land), emphasizing that profit treatment from their sale should not differ from depreciable assets. Regulatory bodies in SoCalGas and Re California Water Service Co. (66 C.P.U.C. 2d 100) argue that customers pay based on book value regardless of depreciation status, with no distinction in regulatory treatment.

4. Lack of Reciprocity ATCO argues that the customers should not profit from a rising market because if the land loses value it is ATCO, and not the ratepayers, that will absorb the loss. However, the material put before the Court suggests...

AI summary ATCO argues customers shouldn't profit from rising markets, but the Board asserts profits/losses from asset sales should accrue to customers, citing past decisions like Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. and Re Alberta Government Telephones . The Board emphasizes case-specific fairness over rigid formulas, rejecting ATCO's claims of limited regulatory discretion.

II. Conclusion 148 In summary, s. 15(3) of the AEUBA authorized the Board in dealing with ATCO's application to approve the sale of the subject land and buildings to "impose any additional conditions that the Board considers necessary in t...

AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) was authorized under section 15(3) of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act (AEUBA) to impose conditions on ATCO's sale of land and buildings in the public interest. The Board allocated net gains from the transaction based on its supervisory role under the Gas Utilities Act (GUA), and the court affirmed this decision as within the Board's mandate.

III. Disposition 149 I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, and restore the decision of the Board, with costs to the City of Calgary both in this Court and in the court below. ATCO's cross-appeal s...

AI summary The appeal is allowed, restoring the Board's decision and dismissing ATCO's cross-appeal. The argument is that ATCO's claim about bearing land value risk is incorrect, referencing SoCalGas. The decision emphasizes that utilities benefit from historical cost-based returns even if market values decline.

II. Conclusion En résumé, le par. 15(3) de l'AEUBA conférait à la Commission le pouvoir d'[TRADUCTION] « imposer les conditions supplémentaires qu'elle juge nécessaires dans l'intérêt public » en statuant sur la demande d'autorisation de l...

AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act (AEUBA) and Gas Utilities Act (GUA) granted the Commission authority to impose conditions in the public interest when approving the sale of ATCO's assets. The Commission allocated proceeds from the sale based on public interest considerations, emphasizing its regulatory mandate under AEUBA and GUA. The decision affirms the Commission's discretion in such matters.

Powers of the Board - 15(1) For the purposes of carrying out its functions, the Board has all the powers, rights and privileges of the ERCB and the PUB that are granted or provided for by any enactment or by law. - (2) In any case where th...

AI summary The Board is granted powers equivalent to the ERCB and PUB, including acting on its own initiative, making orders, requiring approvals from the Lieutenant Governor in Council, and granting relief. It may impose additional conditions in the public interest and partially grant applications.

ANNEXE Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act , R.S.A. 2000, ch. A‑17 [TRADUCTION]

AI summary The document references the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act, part of the Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000, chapter A-17, within a Nova Scotia regulatory proceeding context.

Compétence 13 La Commission connaît de toute question dont peut connaître l'ERCB ou la PUB suivant un texte législatif ou le droit par ailleurs applicable, et sa compétence est exclusive.

AI summary The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over any matter that the ERCB or PUB could handle under applicable legislation or law, emphasizing its sole authority in such cases.

Pouvoirs de la Commission - 15(1) Dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, la Commission jouit des pouvoirs, des droits et des privilèges qu'un texte législatif ou le droit par ailleurs applicable confère à l'ERCB et à la PUB. - (2) La Commission...

AI summary The Commission possesses powers akin to the ERCB and PUB, enabling it to issue orders, act on matters, and require lieutenant-governor in council approvals. It may impose conditions and grant partial relief as deemed necessary.

Supervision - 22(1) The Board shall exercise a general supervision over all gas utilities, and the owners of them, and may make any orders regarding equipment, appliances, extensions of works or systems, reporting and other matters, that a...

AI summary The Board is granted general supervision over gas utilities and their owners, including authority to issue orders related to equipment, reporting, and compliance with laws. It must conduct inquiries to ensure adherence to contractual obligations and public convenience.

Investigation of gas utility 24(1) The Board, on its own initiative or on the application of a person having an interest, may investigate any matter concerning a gas utility. . . .

AI summary The Board has authority to investigate gas utility matters independently or upon application by interested parties, as per section 24(1). This provision outlines the regulatory framework for such investigations.

Designated gas utilities - 26(1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may by regulation designate those owners of gas utilities to which this section and section 27 apply. - (2) No owner of a gas utility designated under subsection (1) shall...

AI summary Section 26(1) allows the Lieutenant Governor in Council to designate gas utility owners under the Gas Utilities Act. Designated owners must obtain Board approval for issuing shares/bonds, capitalizing rights, leasing, or disposing of property. The Board's authorization is required for these corporate actions and asset-related decisions.

Pouvoirs généraux 59 Pour l'application de la présente loi, la Commission a, à l'égard des installations, des locaux, du matériel, des services, de l'organisation de la production, de la distribution et de la vente de gaz en Alberta, ainsi...

AI summary Section 59 grants the Commission broad regulatory powers over Alberta's gas utilities, including ownership, operations, and services, under the Public Utilities Board Act (PUBA). These powers mirror those applied to public utilities under PUBA, as outlined in the Revised Statutes of Alberta (R.S.A.) 2000, chapter P-45.

Compétence et pouvoirs 36(1) La Commission a la compétence et les pouvoirs nécessaires - (a) to deal with public utilities and the owners of them as provided in this Act; - (b) to deal with public utilities and related matters as they conc...

AI summary The Commission and Board are granted jurisdiction and powers to regulate public utilities, including suburban areas adjacent to cities, and to set prices for municipal purchases under the Municipal Government Act. The Board's authority extends to all duties assigned by statute.

General power 37 In matters within its jurisdiction the Board may order and require any person or local authority to do forthwith or within or at a specified time and in any manner prescribed by the Board, so far as it is not inconsistent...

AI summary Section 37 grants the Board broad authority to mandate actions or prohibit activities by individuals or local authorities within its jurisdiction, provided such actions align with applicable legislation or regulations. The Board's powers are exercised to enforce compliance with legal requirements and regulatory directives.

Investigation of utilities and rates - 80 When it is made to appear to the Board, on the application of an owner of a public utility or of a municipality or person having an interest, present or contingent, in the matter in respect of whic...

AI summary The document outlines the Board's authority to investigate utility rates if tolls exceed reasonable levels, the Commission's expanded regulatory powers, and its jurisdiction to set prices for municipal acquisitions under the Municipal Government Act. It emphasizes procedural steps for investigations and approvals.

Enquêtes sur les services publics et les tarifs - 80 Lorsqu'il lui est démontré à l'audition d'une demande présentée par le propriétaire d'une entreprise de services publics ou par une municipalité ou une personne ayant un intérêt actuel o...

AI summary The Commission has authority under the PUBA to investigate utility rates if they are deemed excessive or unreasonable, adjust tolls, and ensure service quality. It may consider existing contracts between utilities and municipalities when making decisions.

Supervision by Board 85(1) The Board shall exercise a general supervision over all public utilities, and the owners of them, and may make any orders regarding extension of works or systems, reporting and other matters, that are necessary f...

AI summary The Board exercises general oversight of public utilities, empowering it to issue orders regarding infrastructure expansion, reporting, and ensuring compliance with contracts or franchises involving public property for public convenience.

Surveillance 85(1) La Commission assure la surveillance générale des entreprises de services publics et de leurs propriétaires et peut, en ce qui concerne notamment les extensions d'ouvrages ou de systèmes et l'établissement de rapports, r...

AI summary The Commission oversees public utility companies and their owners, issuing orders to protect public interest and ensure proper execution of contracts involving public property or rights. This includes managing extensions of works/systems and report requirements.

Enquêtes 87(1) La Commission peut, d'office ou à la demande d'un intéressé, faire enquête sur toute question relative à une entreprise de services publics. . . . - (2) Lorsqu'elle estime nécessaire d'enquêter sur une entreprise de services...

AI summary The Commission has authority to investigate public utilities, access their documents, and require controlling parties to provide information. It may act on its own initiative or at the request of interested parties, with obligations on entities holding company records.

Revenue and costs considered - 91(1) In fixing just and reasonable rates, tolls or charges, or schedules of them, to be imposed, observed and followed by an owner of a public utility, - (a) the Board may consider all revenues and costs of...

AI summary The Board considers revenues and costs for setting just and reasonable rates, including the impact of the Small Power Research and Development Act on electric energy generation, transmission, and distribution. It may adjust for excess revenues or deficiencies tied to the fiscal year of the proceeding, excluding allocations to specific periods. The French text references capital, depreciation, and amortization in determining just returns.

Designated public utilities 101(1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may by regulation designate those owners of public utilities to which this section and section 102 apply. - (2) No owner of a public utility designated under subsection...

AI summary The Lieutenant Governor in Council may designate public utility owners under section 101(1), requiring Board approval for issuing shares, bonds, capitalizing rights, and disposing of property. The Board must ensure compliance with legal requirements and authorize such actions.

Services de gaz désignés 101(1) Le lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement, désigner les propriétaires d'entreprises de services publics assujettis au présent article et à l'article 102. - (2) Le propriétaire d'une entreprise...

AI summary The section outlines the designation of public utility owners under the Gas Utilities Act (GUA) and requires Commission authorization for certain financial and operational actions, including issuing securities, capitalizing rights, and mergers. Non-compliance may result in void transactions unless part of normal business operations.

onally, many other interested persons made submissions and written comment to the Board. On final argument, several parties, and, in particular, Flamborough Township, Hamilton-Wentworth Municipality, the Halton Region Conservation Authorit...

AI summary Multiple parties, including Flamborough Township and Flamborough Residents Against Propane Inc., requested the Board to award costs against I.P.L. Counsel for these parties argued the Board has jurisdiction under subsection 10(3) of the Act, by implication, and due to subsections 29.6 and 75.21. Opposing counsel, including I.P.L. and the Attorney-General of Canada, opposed such jurisdiction.

1. EXPRESS JURISDICTION - [7] Section 10 of the Act reads as follows: - 10(1) The Board is a court of record. - 10(2) The Board shall have an official seal, which shall be judicially noticed. - (3) The Board has, with respect to the attend...

AI summary Section 10 of the Act grants the Board powers akin to a superior court, including witness examination, document production, enforcement of orders, and property inspection, to ensure proper jurisdiction exercise.

(Emphasis added.) - [8] It is the submission of counsel for F.R.A.P. that costs are "other matters" which are "necessary or proper" for the "due exercise" of the Board's jurisdiction. Applying the ejusdem generis rule, he submits that the...

AI summary Counsel for F.R.A.P. argues costs fall under 'other matters' in s.10(3) via ejusdem generis , aligning with the Board's powers to subpoena and inspect. I.P.L. counters that preceding provisions relate to obtaining information, not costs, which are distinct. The debate centers on statutory interpretation of the Board's jurisdictional scope.

2. JURISDICTION BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION - [13] In the alternative, counsel for F.R.A.P. submitted that the powers conferred by an enabling statute such as the National Energy Board Act include not only expressly granted powers but also, b...

AI summary F.R.A.P. argues that the National Energy Board can imply powers necessary for regulation, citing past cases. I.P.L. counters that no practical necessity exists, as the Board has operated without cost-awarding powers since 1959, and legislatures typically explicitly grant such powers.

CONCLUSION - [17] I have concluded, for all of the foregoing reasons, that except in the very special circumstances referred to, the Board has no jurisdiction to award costs and, more particularly, no jurisdiction to award the more extraor...

AI summary The conclusion asserts that the regulatory board lacks jurisdiction to award costs under the relevant statute, emphasizing statutory interpretation and the absence of enabling language. It acknowledges intervenor funding benefits but states jurisdiction is a policy matter for Parliament, citing the National Energy Board as an example of a board without such jurisdiction.

and by sub-section (p) from time to time discontinue such works or any other of them \ and substitute others in their stead. By section 158, sub-sec. 2, it is provided that the plan of the railway, which by that section the company is dire...

AI summary The text discusses railway regulations requiring companies to submit plans for station locations to the Board for approval. It clarifies that the Board cannot compel companies to establish stations outside approved sites unless under specific provisions like sub-section 5 of section 284. The case 1910 GRAND TRUNK RY. Co. v. TURE OF ONTARIO is referenced, with Duff J. interpreting the Act's limitations on the Board's authority.

relevant in evaluating whether a given decision is reasonable. Such elements are not a checklist; they may vary in significance depending on the context and will necessarily interact with one another. Accordingly, a reviewing court may fin...

AI summary The text discusses the reasonableness standard in administrative decision-making, emphasizing the importance of statutory context, common law constraints, and legislative language. It highlights that reasonableness depends on contextual factors, including precedents and international law, and that courts must ensure decisions align with legislative intent.

Considered: Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation , [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission , [1969] 2 A.C. 147; Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and...

AI summary The document cites numerous Canadian and international legal cases, including Supreme Court of Canada decisions, relevant to regulatory proceedings. Cases span labor law, human rights, constitutional law, and judicial review, with references to courts in Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and the U.S.

and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Broadcasting, Films and Assistance to the Arts, Respecting Bill C-20, An Act respecting citizenship , No. 34, 1st Sess., 30th Parl., February 24, 1976, 34:23. - Coady, Jonathan M. "The Time Has Com...

AI summary The text lists legal references and academic works on administrative law, judicial review, and constitutional principles, including articles by scholars like Paul Daly and Thomas Cromwell, and legislative materials such as Bill C-20. These sources discuss standards of review, deference, and legal precedent in Canadian administrative law.

[7] The first aspect is the analysis for determining the standard of review. It has become clear that Dunsmuir 's promise of simplicity and predictability in this respect has not been fully realized. In Dunsmuir , a majority of the Court m...

AI summary The text discusses the unresolved complexity in applying the 'reasonableness' standard of review post- Dunsmuir , noting jurisprudential evolution while acknowledging lingering uncertainties. It references SCC cases affirming reasonableness as default but allowing rebuttals for correctness review in specific contexts.

ctful consideration of the earlier decision, and after giving due weight to all the circumstances, that a Justice may give effect to his own opinions in preference to an earlier decision of the Court. [20] Nonetheless, this Court has in th...

AI summary The text discusses the reconsideration of legal precedents when they are deemed unsound, unworkable, or criticized, citing cases like Craig , Henry , and Bernard . It emphasizes that adhering to prior decisions can perpetuate legal uncertainty, particularly in complex frameworks affecting standard of review analysis and access to justice.

rationales may all be reasons for a legislature to delegate decision-making authority, a reviewing court need not evaluate which of these rationales apply in the case of a particular decision maker in order to determine the standard of rev...

AI summary The text argues that the presumption of reasonableness review applies when a legislature delegates authority to administrative decision-makers, citing cases like Khosa, Edmonton East, and CHRC. This presumption respects legislative supremacy and institutional design, ensuring judicial deference to administrative decisions.

unds a presumption of reasonableness on the one hand, a legislative choice to enact a statutory right of appeal signals an intention to ascribe an appellate role to reviewing courts on the other hand. - [40] This Court has in the past held...

AI summary The text discusses the tension between the presumption of reasonableness and legislative intent in statutory appeal mechanisms. It critiques the Supreme Court of Canada's recent jurisprudence for disregarding statutory rights of appeal unless explicitly stated, citing cases like Tervita Corp. v. Canada and scholarly works challenging this approach.

shed as a separate category of questions of law": McLean , at para. 25, referring to Alberta Teachers , at para. 34; Edmonton East , at para. 26; Guérin , at paras. 32-36; CHRC , at paras. 31-41. [66] As Gascon J. noted in CHRC , the conce...

AI summary The text discusses the complexity of distinguishing 'truly jurisdictional' questions in administrative law from other legal issues, referencing cases like CHRC and Alberta Teachers . It highlights the challenges in identifying clear markers for jurisdictional questions and cites precedents where broad legislative delegations complicate legal interpretation.

C. Reasonableness Is a Single Standard That Accounts for Context [88] In any attempt to develop a coherent and unified approach to judicial review, the sheer variety of decisions and decision makers that such an approach must account for p...

AI summary The text discusses the challenge of creating a unified judicial review approach due to the diversity of decision-makers (e.g., tribunals, regulatory bodies, ministers) and the varying complexity of their decisions, ranging from routine to life-altering, and involving technical or common-sense considerations.

(2) A Reasonable Decision Is Justified in Light of the Legal and Factual Constraints That Bear on the Decision [105] In addition to the need for internally coherent reasoning, a decision, to be reasonable, must be justified in relation to...

AI summary The text emphasizes that administrative decisions must be reasonable, considering legal and factual constraints. It references cases like Dunsmuir, Catalyst, and Nor-Man Regional Health Authority, highlighting elements such as statutory schemes, evidence, past practices, and the impact on individuals as factors influencing reasonableness.

(b) Other Statutory or Common Law - [111] It is evident that both statutory and common law will impose constraints on how and what an administrative decision maker can lawfully decide: see Dunsmuir , at paras. 47 and 74. For example, an ad...

AI summary The text emphasizes that statutory and common law principles constrain administrative decision-makers, requiring adherence to established legal standards and precedents. Cases like Dunsmuir , Katz Group Canada Inc. v. Ontario , and Montréal (City) illustrate that decisions must align with existing legal frameworks, avoid arbitrary interpretations, and respect private law relationships.

ation Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21. - [118] This Court has adopted the "modern principle" as the proper approach to statutory interpretation, because legislative intent can be understood only by reading the language chosen by the legislature...

AI summary The text discusses the 'modern principle' of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that legislative intent must be understood through text, context, and purpose. Administrative decision-makers are not required to use formalistic methods but must align their interpretations with legislative intent, leveraging their expertise while respecting statutory frameworks.

(f) Past Practices and Past Decisions [129] Administrative decision makers are not bound by their previous decisions in the same sense that courts are bound by stare decisis . As this Court noted in Domtar , "a lack of unanimity is the pri...

AI summary Administrative decision-makers are not bound by stare decisis but must ensure general consistency in decisions. The text references the Domtar case, emphasizing that lack of unanimity is inherent to their independence, yet fairness and consistency in treating like cases remain critical to uphold the rule of law.

(g) Impact of the Decision on the Affected Individual - [133] It is well established that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection when the decision in question involves the potential for significant personal impact or har...

AI summary The text emphasizes that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protections when decisions risk significant personal harm. Courts must ensure decisions are justified, particularly when they threaten life, liberty, or dignity. Administrative bodies must explain why their decisions align with legislative intent, especially in cases with severe consequences. The Immigration Appeal Division's consideration of foreign hardship in removal cases is cited as an example.

G. A Note on Remedial Discretion [139] Where a court reviews an administrative decision, the question of the appropriate remedy is multi-faceted. It engages considerations that include the reviewing court's common law or statutory jurisdic...

AI summary The text discusses judicial review remedies, emphasizing remitting decisions to administrative bodies unless exceptions apply. Courts should generally remit matters for reconsideration but may decline if it leads to endless reviews, delays, or inefficiencies. Cases like Delta Air Lines and Alberta Teachers are cited, highlighting the balance between judicial oversight and administrative efficiency.

enship Act . He is a Canadian citizen. E. Disposition [197] The appeal is dismissed with costs throughout to Mr. Vavilov. The following are the reasons delivered by ABELLA AND KARAKATSANIS JJ. — [198] Forty years ago, in C.U.P.E., Local 96...

AI summary The appeal is dismissed with costs to Mr. Vavilov. The court references C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, emphasizing judicial deference to administrative decisions. The decision reinforces principles of administrative law established over four decades.

s decision with the greatest potential to undermine both the integrity of this Court's decisions, and public confidence in the stability of the law, is its disregard for precedent and stare decisis . [255] Stare decisis places significant...

AI summary The text criticizes a decision for disregarding legal precedent ( stare decisis ) and the Supreme Court of Canada's (SCC) reliance on past rulings. It emphasizes that overturning precedents requires compelling reasons, citing cases like Canada v. Craig and Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser , where the SCC stressed caution in overruling prior decisions, especially those with firm majorities.

Friedmann Equity Developments Inc. v. Final Note Ltd. , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 842, at para. 42; R. v. Kang-Brown , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at paras. 14-16, per Lebel J., and 73-74, per Binnie J., concurring.) [281] Lord Bingham's comments highlight...

AI summary The text emphasizes the importance of stare decisis in balancing common law stability and adaptability. It proposes a standard of review framework prioritizing deference to administrative decisions based on legislative intent and expertise, while eliminating 'true questions of jurisdiction' and retaining reasonableness review except for specific correctness categories from Dunsmuir .

he Al-Ghamdi decision, since her report stated that "[t]he jurisprudence that does exist only relates to individuals whose parents maintained diplomatic status in Canada at the time of their birth." - [339] The Registrar, in the end, inter...

AI summary The text discusses the interpretation of s. 3(2)(a) and (c) of a citizenship provision, arguing that the Registrar's broad reading conflicts with the Vienna Conventions and the Federal Court of Appeal's majority opinion. The analysis emphasizes aligning the provision's scope with diplomatic privileges and immunities, rejecting an expansive interpretation.

en appel de la cour d'appel fédérale Droit des communications — Radiodiffusion — Adoption par le Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes (« CRTC ») d'une politique établissant un régime réglementaire de compensat...

AI summary The Federal Court of Appeal examines whether the CRTC has authority under the Broadcasting Act to implement a market-based signal compensation regime, allowing broadcasters to negotiate direct compensation from cable/satellite providers. It also assesses if this regime conflicts with the Copyright Act, which may limit CRTC's regulatory discretion.

Jurisprudence Citée par le juge Rothstein Arrêts mentionnés : Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership c. Rex , 2002 CSC 42, [2002] 2 R.C.S. 559; Renvoi relatif à la Loi sur la radiodiffusion , 2012 CSC 4, [2012] 1 R.C.S. 142; Barrie Public Util...

AI summary The document lists numerous Supreme Court of Canada cases cited by Judge Rothstein, involving legal issues such as broadcasting, utility regulation, and property rights. Key cases include Bell ExpressVu v. Rex, ATCO Gas v. Alberta Energy and Utilities Board, and Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.

By Abella and Cromwell JJ. (dissenting) Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc. , 2007 SCC 14, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 591; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd. , 2001 SCC 56, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867; CKOY Ltd. v. The Queen , [1979] 1 S.C.R. 2...

AI summary The dissenting opinion by Abella and Cromwell JJ. cites multiple Supreme Court of Canada and other court decisions, including cases related to broadcasting, telecommunications, and public utilities, to support their arguments in the regulatory proceeding.

Statutes and Regulations Cited Broadcasting Act , S.C. 1991, c. 11, ss. 2 "broadcasting", "broadcasting undertaking", "distribution under Enterprises Ltd. , 2001 CSC 56, [2001] 2 R.C.S. 867; Pointe-Claire (Ville) c. Québec (Tribunal du tra...

AI summary The document lists statutes and legal precedents cited in a regulatory proceeding, including the Broadcasting Act and multiple Supreme Court of Canada cases related to broadcasting, labor, and environmental law. Key legal references span from 1954 to 2012, highlighting historical and contemporary jurisprudence.

I. Introduction [1] The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ("CRTC") has authority under the Broadcasting Act , S.C. 1991, c. 11, to regulate and supervise the Canadian broadcasting system. In 2010, the CRTC sought...

AI summary The CRTC's 2010 market-based signal regulatory regime allowing broadcasters to negotiate retransmission fees with BDUs is challenged. The appeal involves multiple broadcasters and BDUs, with the reference question being CarswellNat 6332. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision is under review.

II. Facts and Procedural History [4] Broadcasters acquire, create and produce television programming, and are licensed by the CRTC to serve a certain geographic area within the reach of their respective signal transmitters. BDUs, such as c...

AI summary The document discusses the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission's (CRTC) authority to implement a new regime allowing broadcasters to control retransmission by electronic distributors of rights (EDRs). The regime is challenged as ultra vires due to conflicts with the Copyright Act, citing the Supreme Court of Canada case Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex.

J.A. (Layden-Stevenson J.A. Concurring) - [9] Sharlow J.A., writing for the majority, found the proposed regime to be within the statutory authority of the CRTC. She found that the Broadcasting Act ainsi que le droit d'obliger les EDR à re...

AI summary The CRTC's proposed regime under the Broadcasting Act is challenged by EDR, citing conflicts with the Copyright Act. The majority opinion supports CRTC's authority, referencing the 2010 policy. EDR argues the regime conflicts with the Copyright Act, leading to a referral to the Federal Court of Appeal.

A. The CRTC's Jurisdiction Under the Broadcasting Act [14] The reference question asks whether the CRTC has the jurisdiction to implement the analysée suivant la méthode moderne d'interprétation législative qu'a formulée le professeur Elme...

AI summary The CRTC's jurisdiction under the Broadcasting Act is analyzed using Elmer A. Driedger's legislative interpretation method, emphasizing context, spirit, and legislative intent, as referenced in the Bell ExpressVu case and Driedger's 'Construction of Statutes.'

gulations "respecting such other matters as it deems necessary for the furtherance of its objects". - [18] Section 3(1) of the Broadcasting Act declares at length the broadcasting policy for Canada, œuvre le régime de compensation pour la...

AI summary The text examines the interpretation of the CRTC's regulatory powers under the Broadcasting Act and whether the Copyright Act limits its discretion in licensing and regulation. Key focus is on reconciling these legal frameworks to determine the scope of the CRTC's authority.

ion de ces objectifs. Comme l'a déclaré le juge Gonthier, au nom de la majorité, dans l'arrêt Barrie Public Utilities c. Assoc. canadienne de télévision par câble , 2003 CSC 28, [2003] 1 R.C.S. 476 : . . . les cours de justice et les tribu...

AI summary The text discusses the CRTC's jurisdiction under the Broadcasting Act, emphasizing that regulations must align with legislative objectives. It references the Supreme Court's decision in Barrie Public Utilities and CKOY Ltd. v. The Queen , arguing that policy statements limit the CRTC's discretion. The broadcasters contend that regulations under s. 10 must objectively link to s. 3's objectives, but the judge disputes this, stressing alignment with legislative intent.

(2) Types of Conflict [41] For the purposes of statutory interpretation, conflict is defined narrowly. It has been said that overlapping provisions will be given effect according to their terms, unless they "cannot stand together" ( Toront...

AI summary Statutory interpretation defines conflict narrowly, requiring laws to be directly contradictory or lead to absurd results to be repugnant. Cases like Toronto Railway Co. v. Paget and Lévis (City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc. emphasize that overlapping provisions coexist unless they cannot. The CRTC's regulatory authority is constrained by federal laws like the Loi sur la radiodiffusion and Loi sur le droit d'auteur .

- loi qui autorise la prorogation du délai de dépôt d'un appel uniquement avant l'expiration du délai est en conflit direct avec une autre loi qui autorise l'acceptation d'une demande de prorogation après l'expiration du délai ( Massicotte...

AI summary The text discusses legal conflicts between laws regarding appeal deadlines and regulatory powers. It references Massicotte c. Boutin and Colombie-Britannique (Procureur général) c. Lafarge Canada Inc. , highlighting conflicts of application and objects under federalism jurisprudence. The CRTC's authority is constrained by these conflicts.

ut only subject to the payment of royalties under a form of compulsory licence regime ( Copyright Act , s. 31(2)( a ) and ( d )). Both user rights are, subject to s. 31(2), beyond the owner's control. Ces redevances sont fixées par la Comm...

AI summary The text discusses royalty obligations under the Copyright Act, emphasizing that user rights under sections 31(2)(a) and (d) are beyond the owner's control. The Copyright Board sets royalties based on management societies' proposals, with local signals exempt from royalties when retransmitted under specific conditions. Definitions of 'local' and 'distant' signals are outlined in DORS/89-254.

r de signaux que propose le CRTC conférerait à certains radiodiffuseurs, advenant qu'ils choisissent d'être régis par ce régime, le droit d'interdire la retransmission simultanée de leurs émissions. - [61] As mentioned, the presumption of...

AI summary The CRTC's proposed signal regime may conflict with the Copyright Act by granting broadcasters the right to prohibit retransmission of their signals, conflicting with the Act's intent. Sections 21 and 31(2) of the Copyright Act are central to the analysis, with arguments about whether the CRTC's authority under the Broadcasting Act permits such regulation without violating the Copyright Act's balance of rights.

sion stations to choose to negotiate with broadcasting distribution undertakings a fair value in exchange for the distribution of the programming services broadcast by those local television stations? [91] We agree with the majority of the...

AI summary The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that local TV stations may negotiate fair value with BDUs for retransmitting signals, deeming the new regime an extension of existing conditions on BDUs. The court found no barrier in the Copyright Act to the CRTC's authority to enforce this regime.

[93] Analytically, the first question is whether the CRTC has jurisdiction to implement the proposed regime under the Broadcasting Act . The CRTC is granted a broad, flexible mandate to implement measures that further the broadcasting poli...

AI summary The text examines whether the CRTC has jurisdiction under the Broadcasting Act to implement a proposed regime. It references the CRTC's broad mandate under s. 5(1) and s. 9(1)(b)(i) of the Act, supported by case law like CKOY Ltd. v. The Queen and CTV Television Network Ltd. . It also discusses potential legal conflicts and judicial interpretations, citing Lévis (Ville) c. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc. .

d Utilities Board had jurisdiction to order that proceeds from an asset sale be allocated to a utility's customers under s. 15(3) of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act , R.S.A. 2000, c. A-17. [119] At the end of the day, the BDUs'...

AI summary The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB) asserted jurisdiction under s. 15(3) of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act (AEUBA) to allocate asset sale proceeds to customers. BDUs argued that a proposed regime creates a new copyright, violating the Copyright Act and SCC's ruling in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada , which emphasizes that copyright is statutory and cannot be created by regulation.

on devrait être de haute qualité; . . . s ) les réseaux et les entreprises de programmation privés devraient, dans la mesure où leurs ressources the financial and other resources available to them, - (i) contribute significantly to the cre...

AI summary The text outlines Canadian broadcasting policy objectives, emphasizing a unified system regulated by a single authority. It mandates the Commission to prioritize Canadian content, adapt to technological changes, and address regional and linguistic diversity under the Radiocommunication Act.

ed. T.D.); Order F-2006-031: Edmonton Police Service , September 22, 2008; Order M2004-001: Registrar of Motor Vehicle Services , March 29, 2005; Order 99-011: Legislative Assembly Office , August 18, 1999; Order F2007-012: Edmonton Police...

AI summary The document lists regulatory orders, legal cases, and legislation cited in a Nova Scotia proceeding, including Alberta government decisions, court rulings, and statutory references. Key entities involve Alberta agencies, police services, and legal precedents from Canadian courts and regulatory bodies.

ad the opportunity of considering jurisdiction at the hearing when, during the hearing, the Commissioner did bring to the litigants' attention the decision in the Ontario Court of Appeal in Cash Converters but failed to bring to their atte...

AI summary The Commissioner did not inform parties of a relevant court decision during a hearing, though jurisdiction was raised. The Commissioner argues that late jurisdictional challenges hinder evidentiary foundations, but the court notes this is not a case requiring tribunal re-evaluation. The proceeding involved a test case challenging the Edmonton Bylaw, inspired by the Cash Converters decision.

uir to the effect that a decision about whether the statutory grant of power gives a tribunal the authority to take jurisdiction is one requiring a correctness analysis: see para. 59 of the decision.

AI summary The text references a legal principle that decisions regarding statutory authority for tribunals require a correctness analysis, citing paragraph 59 of a referenced decision.

(ii) Is the Commissioner's decision that he had not lost jurisdiction reasonable? - [58] The Commissioner's decision that he had not lost jurisdiction in the circumstances here because the statutory time limits were merely directory is rea...

AI summary The Commissioner's decision not to have lost jurisdiction is deemed reasonable as statutory time limits were directory, not mandatory. Restarting the process would be futile since the decision was already issued, and the Commissioner had sufficient time to complete the inquiry. The court cannot use mandamus to expedite the process.

ly if one or more of the following are applicable: . . . (b) the collection of the information is pursuant to a statute or regulation of Alberta or Canada that authorizes or requires the collection.

AI summary The text discusses the standard of review for a decision, referencing Alberta and Canadian statutes that authorize information collection. It highlights regulatory frameworks like AEUBA, GUA, and PUBA, emphasizing legal compliance and jurisdictional authority.

c) Did the Commissioner have the jurisdiction to order the City of Edmonton to destroy BWI's database? [104] There are two reasons why the Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction to order the City of Edmonton to destroy BWI's database:...

AI summary The Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to order the City of Edmonton to destroy BWI's database because BWI is not an employee of the city, and the Commissioner's authority is limited to data collected in violation of statutes. Additionally, the Commissioner breached natural justice by devising a remedy without consulting parties.

ALBERTA

AI summary Document context focuses on Alberta's energy and utilities regulatory framework, listing acronyms related to legislation, boards, and programs. Key entities include Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (AEUB), Public Utilities Board (PUB), and relevant acts like the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board Act (AEUBA).

[para 16] Bylaw 13138 states, in part: - 33 Whenever goods are received and held as security for an advance of money the following information shall be accurately recorded: - (a) the date and time the goods were received; - (b) the full na...

AI summary Bylaw 13138 mandates pawnshops and second-hand stores to record detailed personal and item information, making it available to peace officers. EPS argues that the City Manager's authority to set the recording form implies requiring electronic storage for automated reporting.

n 40(b) or 40.8(b). [para 25] In ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board) , [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, Bastarache J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, noted: Few areas of our lives are now untouched...

AI summary The Supreme Court of Canada, in ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board) , emphasized that regulatory bodies must operate within their statutory authority, underscoring that actions outside legislative frameworks are legally invalid.

- (e) for the purpose of complying with an enactment of Alberta or Canada or with a treaty, arrangement or agreement made under an enactment of Alberta or Canada, - (f) for any purpose in accordance with an enactment of Alberta or Canada t...

AI summary The City of Edmonton's authority to disclose personal information to the Edmonton Police Service under section 40(1) of the FOIP Act is debated, focusing on subsections (e), (g), and (j) that permit disclosure for legal compliance, court orders, or enforcement of rights. The complainant challenges this authority, arguing it does not apply to police disclosure.

Case File Number P0363 [para 119] I make this Order under section 52 of PIPA. [para 120] I find that PIPA does not apply to the Complainant's personal information. Frank Work, Q.C. Information and Privacy Commissioner

AI summary The Information and Privacy Commissioner, Frank Work, QC, issued an order under section 52 of PIPA, concluding that PIPA does not apply to the complainant's personal information in this Nova Scotia regulatory proceeding.

Background - [4] On April 23, 2001, the Municipal District of Greenview No. 16 (the "Municipal District") received an application to amend its Land Use Bylaw to reclassify the NE 1/4 20-70- 24-5 (the "Land") from "agricultural" to "rural c...

AI summary The Municipal District of Greenview No. 16 sought to rezone land for an RV campground, requiring amendments to the Land Use Bylaw and the Sturgeon Lake Area Structure Plan. The applicant appealed, arguing insufficient consultation with the Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation regarding aboriginal rights. The SDAB denied the appeal, citing jurisdictional limits under the MGA.

EFFICIENCYONE REPLY SUBMISSIONS ON THE PRELIMINARY ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

AI summary EfficiencyOne submits a reply addressing the preliminary jurisdiction issue, arguing over the board's authority to regulate energy efficiency programs in Nova Scotia.

established by the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board ("NSUARB") in correspondence dated February 10, 2020. Interested parties have set out their positions on this issue in comments provided to the NSUARB, two of which align with the pos...

AI summary NS Power argues that the NSUARB's mandate under the Public Utilities Act includes ensuring just and reasonable rates and maintaining safe and adequate service. However, the argument is criticized for not considering the NSUARB's role in regulating the evolving energy efficiency industry and for relying on outdated court references.

Explicit and Implicit Powers of the NSUARB NS Power relies on ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. V. EUB (2006), 2006 SCC 4 to argue that the NSUARB's right to consider NEBs must be expressly granted or must be implied to be necessary for the fulf...

AI summary NS Power argues the NSUARB lacks explicit PUA authority to consider non-energy benefits (NEBs) in cost-effectiveness testing, citing a 2006 SCC case. However, the NSUARB asserts explicit jurisdiction under section 79L(9) of the PUA to assess matters in the best interests of customers, including affordability and other factors, despite no explicit mention of NEBs.

REPLY TO INDUSTRIAL GROUP SUBMISSIONS The Industrial Group submitted that the NSUARB does not have jurisdiction to take into account nonenergy benefits because (1) NEBs do not bear any relevance to EfficiencyOne's statutory mandate to unde...

AI summary The Industrial Group argues that the NSUARB lacks jurisdiction over non-energy benefits (NEBs), claiming NEBs are irrelevant to EfficiencyOne's mandate and that the NSUARB's discretionary power must be confined to its defined jurisdiction.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT - and - IN THE MATTER OF an application by EFFICIENCYONE for approval for the use of measurelevel Non-Energy Benefits within the context of Cost-Effectiveness testing associated with future Demand...

AI summary The document outlines an application by EfficiencyOne for approval to incorporate measure-level Non-Energy Benefits into Cost-Effectiveness testing for future Demand Side Management (DSM) planning under the Public Utilities Act. The proceeding is before a panel including Peter W. Gurnham, Roberta J. Clarke, and Steven M. Murphy.

2.2Legislation [6] The Board is a statutory regulatory body created by the Utility and Review Board Act, S.N.S. 1992, c. 11. The Board's functions, powers, duties and jurisdiction are outlined in the UARB Act as follows:

AI summary The Board is established by the Utility and Review Board Act, S.N.S. 1992, c. 11, with its functions, powers, duties, and jurisdiction outlined in the UARB Act.

Functions, powers and duties 4 (1) The Board has those functions, powers and duties that are, from time to time, conferred or imposed on it by - (a) this Act, the Assessment Act, the Expropriation Act, the Gasoline and Diesel Oil TaxAct, t...

AI summary The Board's functions, powers, and duties are conferred by various legislation, including the Assessment Act, Expropriation Act, and others, as well as the Governor in Council. This outlines the legal framework governing the Board's authority.

Jurisdiction - 22 (1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases and in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it. - (2) The Board, as to all matters within its jurisdiction pursuant to this Act, may hear and d...

AI summary The NSUARB has exclusive jurisdiction over utility regulation under the Public Utilities Act, including EfficiencyOne's regulation via Sections 79A-79V. Section 79A defines electricity efficiency and conservation activities as key regulatory focus areas.

2.3.1 EfficiencyOne - [12] EfficiencyOne argued that the Board has jurisdiction to decide what is in the best interests of customers and the appropriate factors to consider in that assessment, including how cost-effectiveness is determined...

AI summary EfficiencyOne argues that the NSUARB has broad jurisdiction under the Public Utilities Act to assess customer best interests, including non-energy benefits, and that cost-effectiveness of DSM programs falls within the Board's authority. It cites legislative intent and references Maryland's precedent, while NSP notes differences in Maryland's DSM legislation.

2.3.3 NS Power [17] NS Power took the position that the Board's discretion must be exercised within the confines of the statutory regime and principles generally applicable to regulatory matters, and that the ultimate goal is contained in...

AI summary NS Power argues that the NSUARB's discretion must adhere to the statutory framework under the Public Utilities Act, emphasizing affordability and rejecting non-energy benefits consideration. It cites the Supreme Court of Canada's Atco Gas decision, stressing that the Board's authority derives only from explicit or implied statutory provisions, not policy implementation.

2.3.4 Findings - [24] The starting point in this analysis is to clearly understand the Board's role in regulating EfficiencyOne and what electricity efficiency and conservation activities mean. Sections 79H and 791(1) state as follows: - 7...

AI summary The NSUARB's role in regulating EfficiencyOne is outlined, requiring cost-effective electricity efficiency and conservation activities under PUA sections 79H and 79I(1). NSP must implement such activities post-Implementation Date to reduce customer costs.

Interpretation and construction of Act and powers of Board 116 (1) This Act shall be interpreted and construed liberally in order to accomplish the purposes thereof, and where any specific power or authority is given the Board by the provi...

AI summary The Public Utility Act (PUA) mandates liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives, emphasizing the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board's (NSUARB) responsibility to exercise powers prudently. Statutory interpretation principles, including the 'modern contextual approach' from Supreme Court of Canada cases, guide the NSUARB's authority under the PUA.

3.0 CONCLUSION [48] The Board was asked the following question by the parties to this proceeding: In assessing proposed electricity efficiency and conservation activities, does the NSUARB have the jurisdiction to take into account non-ener...

AI summary The NSUARB was asked if it can consider non-energy impacts in cost-effectiveness testing for electricity efficiency programs. The Board ruled 'no,' stating it lacks jurisdiction over such impacts. An order will follow.

ORDER WHEREAS by Application dated September 19, 2018, EfficiencyOne applied to the Board for approval for the use of measure-level Non-Energy Benefits within the context of Cost-Effectiveness testing associated with future DSM planning re...

AI summary EfficiencyOne sought approval to include non-energy benefits in cost-effectiveness testing for DSM planning. The Board adjourned proceedings multiple times, with EfficiencyOne requesting deferrals and jurisdiction clarification. After submissions from multiple parties, the Board ruled it lacks jurisdiction to consider non-energy benefits in cost-effectiveness testing.

NOVA SCOTIA UTILITY AND REVIEW BOARD IN THE MATTER OF: an Application by EfficiencyOne for approval for the use of measure-level Non-Energy Benefits within the context of Cost-Effectiveness testing associated with future Demand Side Manage...

AI summary EfficiencyOne seeks approval from the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board to use measure-level Non-Energy Benefits in Cost-Effectiveness testing for future Demand Side Management (DSM) planning regulatory processes.

NOTICE OF INTERVENTION OF THE AFFORDABLE ENERGY COALITION The Affordable Energy Coalition will intervene in the hearing related to this matter. The Affordable Energy Coalition (AEC) advocates on behalf of low income customers served by Nov...

AI summary The Affordable Energy Coalition (AEC) will intervene in a regulatory proceeding, advocating for low-income customers of Nova Scotia Power and Efficiency One. The AEC represents these customers in matters related to Efficiency One's contract for energy efficiency services with Nova Scotia Power.

Request IR-4: - 9 Lines 4-8 on page 2 of 15 lists four shortcomings of the TRC, as it is currently applied in NS. Please - 10 comment on how each of these four is addressed by the inclusion of NEB's in the TRC calculation. - 11 If any of t...

AI summary The text requests comments on how the inclusion of NEB's in the TRC calculation addresses four identified shortcomings of the TRC in Nova Scotia. It also asks whether further modifications or work are needed if any shortcomings remain unaddressed and if similar efforts are underway elsewhere.

Request IR-9: - Line 3 on page 13 of 15 describes the values in the VEIC report as a "living document" and Lines 5 16 on the same page discuss how the values will be updated. - a) Line 5 notes E1's plan to undertake a full review of the NE...

AI summary Request IR-9 seeks clarification on E1's plan to review NEBs, the role of the UARB and intervenors in reviews, differences between triennial/ad-hoc processes and full reviews, and Massachusetts' NEB update procedures. It questions why some reviews require Board input while others do not and requests details on approval mechanisms for NEBs.

Request IR-18 : What does EfficiencyOne mean by the term "primary research" (page 15, line 13, of the Application) and what are the metrics EfficiencyOne will publish prior to conducting such research to allow the DSMAG to determine that t...

AI summary The proceeding seeks clarification from EfficiencyOne on the definition of 'primary research' and the metrics they will publish to enable the DSMAG to verify and assess the adequacy of research results.

NOVA SCOTIA UTILITY AND REVIEW BOARD IN THE MATTER OF : IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION by EfficiencyOne (E1) for approval for the use of measure-level Non-Energy Benefits (NEBs) within the context of Cost-Effectiveness testing associated...

AI summary EfficiencyOne (E1) seeks approval from the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board to use measure-level Non-Energy Benefits (NEBs) in Cost-Effectiveness testing for future Demand-Side Management (DSM) planning regulatory processes.

[[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) EfficiencyOne c/o James R. Gogan The Breton Law Group Suite 300, 292 Charlotte Street Sydney NS B1P1C7 Dear Mr. Gogan: M08888 - EfficiencyOne - Application for Approval for the Use...

AI summary EfficiencyOne seeks approval to use non-energy benefits in cost-effectiveness testing under the Public Utilities Act. The Board adjourned the matter without setting a day, emphasizing the need to confirm jurisdiction and appropriateness for NS Power ratepayers. The proceeding involves a potential consensus position after consultation.

NSUARB to make a preliminary legal determination on the issue of its jurisdiction to grant any form of approval relating to the inclusion of NEBs in future cost-effectiveness testing by EfficiencyOne. EfficiencyOne believes it is a prudent...

AI summary EfficiencyOne requests the NSUARB to determine its jurisdiction to consider Non-Energy Benefits (NEBs) in future DSM cost-effectiveness testing. EfficiencyOne proposes a preliminary hearing to address jurisdiction without resolving the NEB Application's specifics. If jurisdiction is denied, the application would be withdrawn; if granted, proceedings could continue. A paper process is preferred over an oral hearing.

rmination of the preliminary matter. EfficiencyOne, and key Stakeholders, believe that this preliminary matter can be adequately addressed through a paper process without the need for an oral hearing. Finally, and provided the NSUARB is ag...

AI summary EfficiencyOne and stakeholders request a paper process for the preliminary matter instead of an oral hearing. They seek a 60-day period post-NSUARB jurisdiction determination to finalize or amend their NEB Application before reconvening the regulatory process. The Breton Law Group represents EfficiencyOne in this request.

M08888 - EfficiencyOne - Approval for Use of Measure Level Non Energy Benefits (NEB) Application Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated November 28, 2019, requesting a preliminary determination of the jurisdiction of the Board to tak...

AI summary EfficiencyOne requests the NSUARB to determine its jurisdiction to consider Non Energy Benefits (NEB) in cost effectiveness testing of future DSM plans. The Board agrees to handle the matter through a paper process without an oral hearing, as proposed by EfficiencyOne and stakeholders. A 60-day period is requested for finalizing the NEB application if jurisdiction is confirmed.

s satisfied with the question, a Hearing Order could follow setting out the relevant timelines for determination of the preliminary matter through a paper process without the need for an oral hearing. ______________________________________...

AI summary EfficiencyOne seeks approval to include non-energy benefits (NEBs) in the Total Resource Cost (TRC) test for Cost-Effectiveness (CE) testing in demand-side management (DSM) planning. The application argues that including NEBs may allow more measures to pass the TRC test, though it does not guarantee increased program inclusion. The NSUARB is considering the NEB Application, which references the VEIC Report.

her metrics…remain unchanged. 2 The NEB Application requests " that the per measure values in Table 10 of Attachment 4 (VEIC Report) be approved for use in future CE testing." 3 EfficiencyOne worked collaboratively with stakeholders to dev...

AI summary EfficiencyOne seeks NSUARB approval to use NEB values in CE testing. The application focuses on NSUARB's jurisdiction to consider non-energy impacts. Stakeholders including Nova Scotia Power and advocates support the proposed question under the Public Utilities Act. References to prior filings (M08888, M0888) are included.

M08888 - EfficiencyOne - Approval for Use of Measure Level Non-Energy Benefits This is further to your letter dated February 5, 2020, requesting the Board establish a timeline to consider the question as to whether the Board has jurisdicti...

AI summary EfficiencyOne requests the NSUARB to consider non-energy impacts in cost-effectiveness testing. The Board establishes a timeline for submissions, with EfficiencyOne and other parties agreeing to the jurisdiction question. The panel includes specific members, and submissions are due on specified dates.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT - and - IN THE MATTER OF an application by EFFICIENCYONE for approval for the use of measure-level Non-Energy Benefits within the context of Cost-Effectiveness testing associated with future Demand...

AI summary EfficiencyOne applied to include non-energy benefits in cost-effectiveness testing for Demand Side Management (DSM) planning. The Board ruled it lacks jurisdiction to consider non-energy impacts in such testing. Key intervenors included consumer advocates, industry groups, and Nova Scotia Power.

2.0 DECISION AND ANALYSIS

AI summary The document outlines the decision and analysis section of a regulatory proceeding by the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB), focusing on utility-related matters in Nova Scotia. Key considerations involve Demand Side Management (DSM) programs and regulatory frameworks.

2.2Legislation [6] The Board is a statutory regulatory body created by the Utility and Review Board Act, S.N.S. 1992, c. 11. The Board's functions, powers, duties and jurisdiction are outlined in the UARB Act as follows:

AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) is established by the Utility and Review Board Act, S.N.S. 1992, c. 11. The Act outlines the Board's functions, powers, duties, and jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction - 22 (1) The Board has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases and in respect of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it. - (2) The Board, as to all matters within its jurisdiction pursuant to this Act, may hear and d...

AI summary The NSUARB has exclusive jurisdiction over utility regulation under the Public Utilities Act, including EfficiencyOne's regulation via Sections 79A-79V. Section 79A defines electricity efficiency and conservation activities as key regulatory focus areas.

Board determines required activities 79H The Board shall determine the cost-effective electricity efficiency and conservation activities that must be undertaken for the purpose of this Act.

AI summary The NSUARB is mandated to determine cost-effective electricity efficiency and conservation activities required under the UARB Act. These activities aim to promote energy efficiency and reduce consumption in accordance with regulatory obligations.

2.3.1 EfficiencyOne - [12] EfficiencyOne argued that the Board has jurisdiction to decide what is in the best interests of customers and the appropriate factors to consider in that assessment, including how cost-effectiveness is determined...

AI summary EfficiencyOne argues the NSUARB has jurisdiction to assess customer best interests, including non-energy benefits, under the Public Utilities Act. It cites Sections 79H and 79L(1) to assert cost-effectiveness falls within the Board's authority. EfficiencyOne contrasts this with NS Power's position that Maryland's DSM legislation explicitly allows non-energy benefits, unlike Nova Scotia's framework.

2.3.2 Industrial Group [16] The Industrial Group reviewed the provisions cited above concerning the Board's jurisdiction to regulate the activities of EfficiencyOne and said that nowhere can it be inferred that the Board is authorized to t...

AI summary The Industrial Group challenges EfficiencyOne's argument that the NSUARB can consider non-energy benefits when evaluating cost-effectiveness of electricity efficiency programs. They assert the Board's jurisdiction is limited to direct impacts on electricity use, as defined in Section 79A(b)(i)-(vi) of the PUA, and that Sections 79L(8) and (9) do not permit evaluation of benefits outside EfficiencyOne's statutory mandate.

2.3.3 NS Power [17] NS Power took the position that the Board's discretion must be exercised within the confines of the statutory regime and principles generally applicable to regulatory matters, and that the ultimate goal is contained in...

AI summary NS Power argues that the NSUARB's discretion must adhere to the PUA's statutory framework, emphasizing affordability and rejecting non-energy benefits consideration. It cites the Supreme Court's ATCO Gas decision, asserting the Board's jurisdiction derives from explicit or implicit statutory powers, not policy implementation.

[25] Section 79A(b) states: 79A In this Section and Sections 79B to 79V, - (b) "electricity efficiency and conservation activities" means activities, programs or plans relating to - (i) the efficient use of electricity, - (ii) the conserva...

AI summary Section 79A(b) defines 'electricity efficiency and conservation activities' to include demand reduction, cost-effective management, and energy delivery optimization. The NSUARB must assess such activities for customer benefit and affordability. EfficiencyOne and NS Power reference Section 116(1) of the Public Utilities Act regarding the Board's authority.

Interpretation and construction of Act and powers of Board 116 (1) This Act shall be interpreted and construed liberally in order to accomplish the purposes thereof, and where any specific power or authority is given the Board by the provi...

AI summary The document emphasizes the liberal interpretation of the Public Utility Act, granting the NSUARB broad powers while requiring prudent exercise. It references legal precedents like Verdun v. Toronto Dominion Bank and Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., adopting a modern contextual approach to statutory interpretation over older rules.

3.0 CONCLUSION [48] The Board was asked the following question by the parties to this proceeding: In assessing proposed electricity efficiency and conservation activities, does the NSUARB have the jurisdiction to take into account non-ener...

AI summary The NSUARB was asked if it can consider non-energy impacts in cost-effectiveness testing for electricity efficiency programs. The Board ruled 'no,' stating it lacks jurisdiction over non-energy impacts, and an order will follow.

ORDER WHEREAS by Application dated September 19, 2018, EfficiencyOne applied to the Board for approval for the use of measure-level Non-Energy Benefits within the context of Cost-Effectiveness testing associated with future DSM planning re...

AI summary EfficiencyOne sought approval to include non-energy benefits in DSM cost-effectiveness testing. The Board adjourned proceedings multiple times, with submissions from EfficiencyOne and stakeholders. The Board ultimately ruled it lacks jurisdiction to consider non-energy benefits in such testing.