Topic:"Return On Equity" in M08888

3. Discount Rate The National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency 14 establishes a standard methodology for the determination of an appropriate discount rate for an energy efficiency program. The Plan provides a brief review of discount rate...

AI summary The document discusses methodologies for determining discount rates in energy efficiency programs, emphasizing the use of social discount rates (e.g., California's 3% real rate) and VEIC's recommendation to use a 12-month average of 30-year Treasury yields. It highlights administrative efficiency and the need for universal discount rate application across screening tools, citing Massachusetts and Efficiency Vermont practices.

Administrative penalties - 52E (1) In this Section, "Fuel Adjustment Mechanism" means the fuel adjustment mechanism approved by the Board for use by Nova Scotia Power Incorporated in orders dated December 10, 2007, (Board Case Number M0049...

AI summary The section defines the Fuel Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) and outlines rules for administrative penalties against Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI). Penalties aim to promote compliance, not punitive measures, with an annual cap of $1 million. Penalties must be credited to customers via FAM or other methods, and they are excluded from NSPI's rate of return calculations under the 2015 Act.

ATCO's submission that an allocation of profit to the customers would amount to a confiscation of the corporation's property overlooks the obvious difference between investment in an unregulated business and investment in a regulated utili...

AI summary ATCO challenges the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board's (AEUB) profit allocation decision, arguing it constitutes property confiscation and impermissible retroactive rate-making. The Board counters that the allocation is within regulatory norms, prospective in effect, and consistent with jurisdictional mandates. ATCO also disputes the Board's treatment of depreciated vs. non-depreciated assets in regulatory practice.

Cases Cited By Bastarache J. Referred to: Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Decision 2001-65, July 31, 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Alta. E.U.B., Deci...

AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving ATCO's argument that allocating profits to customers is confiscatory. The court rejects this, noting that regulated utilities have rates set by regulators, not the market. The decision is prospective, not retroactive, and the Commission's authority to manage rates and monitor services is affirmed. The distinction between amortized and non-amortized assets is deemed less critical than ATCO claims.

2.3.3.2 Établissement des tarifs La réglementation tarifaire a plusieurs objectifs — viabilité, équité et efficacité — qui expliquent le mode de fixation des tarifs : [TRADUCTION] . . . l'entreprise réglementée doit être en mesure de finan...

AI summary Rate regulation in Nova Scotia balances viability, equity, and efficiency. Regulated utilities must ensure financial sustainability while preventing excessive shareholder returns. The 'regulatory compact' grants exclusivity in exchange for reliable service, with legal precedents like Northwestern 1929 cited to support rate-setting principles.

e Light Co. c. Barasch , 488 U.S. 299 (1989), qui s'appuie sur le même principe que celui appliqué dans l'arrêt Market St. Ry. Co. c. Railroad Commission of State of California , 324 U.S. 548 (1945). De plus, il faut reconnaître qu'une ent...

AI summary The text references U.S. Supreme Court cases ( Light Co. v. Barasch , Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission ) to argue that utilities are private entities, not state-owned, and that their capital investments are made by private parties expecting returns comparable to other investments. It emphasizes that utilities serve public interest but are distinct from cooperatives or mutual companies.

I. Analysis ATCO's argument boils down to the proposition announced at the outset of its factum: In the absence of any property right or interest and of any harm to the customers arising from the plus productifs ou qui pourraient l'être da...

AI summary ATCO argues that the Commission's decision to allocate profits from property sales to reduce utility costs infringes on its rights. The judge disagrees with the Alberta Court of Appeal's ruling, asserting the Commission's authority under the AEUBA to impose public interest conditions. The Commission's order required ATCO to share profits from a Calgary property sale, prioritizing rate stability over shareholder returns.

B. La décision de la Commission ATCO soutient que la décision de la Commission doit être considérée isolément, sans égard aux attributions de l'organisme en matière de tarification. Toutefois, je ne crois pas que l'audience tenue pour l'ap...

AI summary ATCO argues that the Commission's decision under article 26 should be considered separately from tariff-setting responsibilities. The Commission disagrees, citing Alberta's TransAlta (1986) case, which established a formula for allocating profits from public asset sales. ATCO claims the process was unrelated to tariff approval, but the Commission links it to broader regulatory authority.

s. ATCO reconnaît que sa prétention fondée sur le « droit de propriété » ne saurait tenir face à l'intention contraire du législateur, mais elle affirme qu'une telle intention ne ressort pas des lois. La plupart des organismes de réglement...

AI summary ATCO acknowledges legislative intent against property rights claims but argues such intent isn't evident in laws. Regulatory bodies often decide profit allocation from asset sales, balancing consumer protection, economic efficiency, and investor fairness. Precedents like Ontario Energy Board's 1976 'Re Consumers' Gas Co.' case and academic works on utility asset sales are cited.

F. ATCO's Arguments Most of ATCO's principal submissions have already been touched on but I will repeat them here for convenience. ATCO does not really dispute the Board's ability to impose conditions on the sale of land. Rather, ATCO says...

AI summary ATCO challenges the Board's decision to allocate profit from land sales to customers, arguing customers lack proprietary rights in corporate assets, profit retention is unrelated to the regulatory compact, and depreciation on land isn't included in the rate base. It claims retroactive rate setting and seeks judicial intervention.

rofit is included in the calculation of ATCO's current cost base for rate-making purposes. In that way, there is a notional distribution of the benefit of the gain amongst the competing stakeholders.) ATCO's argument is frequently asserted...

AI summary ATCO argues that profit inclusion in rate-making leads to a notional distribution of benefits among stakeholders. The U.S. case Democratic Central Committee... reversed a decision, allocating gains to ratepayers, directly applicable to ATCO's 'confiscation' argument.

2. The Regulatory Compact The Board referred in its decision to the "regulatory compact" which is a loose expression suggesting that in exchange for a statutory monopoly Cette considération liée aux « risques » vaut également en Alberta. P...

AI summary The regulatory compact in Alberta ensures that customers guarantee ATCO a fair return on land and buildings, even as risks and gains are shared. This approach, similar to the SoCalGas case, rejects ATCO's claim of 'confiscatory' profit allocation. The Board emphasizes that profit distribution is context-dependent and that the Commission's decision should not be overturned.

2. Le pacte réglementaire Dans sa décision, la Commission renvoie au « pacte réglementaire », notion aux contours flous selon laquelle, en contrepartie d'un monopole 133 134 and receipt of revenue on a cost plus basis, the utility accepts...

AI summary The document discusses the 'regulatory compact' concept, where utilities accept profit limitations in exchange for monopoly rights and cost-plus revenue. ATCO argues that the Board's profit allocation violates this compact through 'retroactive rate making,' citing the Gas Utilities Act and a Supreme Court of Canada case emphasizing prospective rate-setting.

Base tarifaire - 37(1) Pour fixer des tarifs, des taux ou des charges justes et raisonnables, ou leurs barèmes, opposables au propriétaire d'un service de gaz et applicables par lui, la Commission établit une base tarifaire pour les biens...

AI summary The text outlines the process for establishing a just and reasonable tariff base for gas services in Alberta. The Commission considers initial costs, depreciation, and necessary capital, while determining a fair return based on relevant factors.

Determining rate base 90(1) In fixing just and reasonable rates, tolls or charges, or schedules of them, to be imposed, observed and followed subsequently by an owner of a public utility, the Board shall determine a rate base for the prope...

AI summary The Board must determine a rate base for public utility property in Alberta, considering the cost of the property and prudent acquisition costs, and ensure a fair return on the rate base. Key considerations include initial cost and prudent acquisition expenses.

Base tarifaire 90(1) Pour fixer des tarifs, des taux ou des charges justes et raisonnables, ou leurs barèmes, opposables au propriétaire d'une entreprise de services public et applicables par lui, la Commission établit une base tarifaire p...

AI summary The text outlines the process for establishing a fair rate base for public utilities in Alberta, considering factors like initial costs, depreciation, working capital, and ensuring a just return for owners. The Commission evaluates these elements to determine equitable rates and charges applicable to public utility owners.