N-82026-2027 GRA Appendix 9-13
34 passages
COST OF CAPITAL REPORT PREPARED FOR NOVA SCOTIA POWER INC. B. Risk Analysis 53 Section 7: Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 82
AI summary The text references a Cost of Capital Report prepared for Nova Scotia Power Inc., including sections on risk analysis and overall conclusions and recommendations.
C. Executive Summary We have prepared this report on behalf of Nova Scotia Power Inc. ("NSPI" or the "Company"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Emera Inc. Specifically, we have been asked to provide an estimate of the cost of capital for NSP...
AI summary This executive summary outlines the preparation of a report for Nova Scotia Power Inc. to estimate the cost of capital for rate-making purposes, focusing on return on equity and capital structure. The report uses standard analytical tools and references past regulatory decisions.
1 • selection of Canadian, U.S. Electric and North American Electric proxy groups with 2 companies comparable to NSPI with respect to business and financial risks; 3 • estimation of the cost of common equity for the proxy group companies u...
AI summary The text discusses the estimation of the cost of common equity for proxy groups of NSPI using models such as DCF, CAPM, and Risk Premium. It also compares the average return on equity (ROE) for Canadian, U.S. Electric, and North American Electric proxy groups, emphasizing that the North American Electric group is most representative of NSPI due to similar risk profiles.
3 The average of all three methods for the North American Electric proxy group is 9.87 percent, 4 within the range of 9.29 percent to 10.32 percent. Based on this analysis, we believe a reasonable 5 estimate of NSPI's required ROE is 9.9 p...
AI summary The document discusses Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's (NSPI) required return on equity (ROE), analyzing proxy group data and concluding that a 9.9% ROE is reasonable. However, NSPI proposes maintaining its current authorized ROE of 9.0% to promote rate stability and affordability. The analysis also considers the common equity ratio and the need for a competitive ROE to attract investment and manage the energy transition.
2026-2027 GRA Direct Evidence Appendix 10A Page 10 of 87 COST OF CAPITAL REPORT PREPARED FOR NOVA SCOTIA POWER INC. 1 to the average deemed equity ratio for Canadian electric utilities, many of which do not own any 2 generation assets, and...
AI summary The report compares Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s deemed equity ratio to that of Canadian and U.S. electric utilities, indicating that NSPI has greater financial risk due to higher leverage compared to its U.S. counterparts.
5 D. Report Organization 6 The remainder of the report is organized as follows: Section II discusses the legal requirements 7 and regulatory precedents for the determination of a fair rate of return. Section III provides an 8 overview of e...
AI summary The document outlines the structure of the report, detailing sections that cover legal requirements, economic conditions, proxy group company selection, methods for estimating return on equity (ROE), capital structure assessment, and overall conclusions and recommendations.
ficiently broad that the regulator that applies it must still use informed judgment and apply its discretion in the determination of a rate regulated entity's cost of capital.[7](#page-39-1) \ \ \ … all three standards or requirements (com...
AI summary The document discusses the Fair Return Standard, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach to meet all three requirements: comparable investment, financial integrity, and capital attraction. It highlights the importance of a fair return on rate base for the sustainability of NS Power and the potential consequences of a low return, such as poor credit ratings and increased borrowing costs.
17 B. The Stand-Alone Principle The Stand-Alone Principle provides that the utility must be regulated as if it were a stand-alone entity, raising capital on the merits of its own business and financial characteristics. In this way, capital...
AI summary The Stand-Alone Principle requires utilities to be regulated as independent entities, ensuring capital is allocated based on their unique risk profiles and financial characteristics. NSPI, part of the Emera corporate structure, must compete for capital with other subsidiaries, such as Tampa Electric Company, which has a different authorized return on equity and common equity ratio.
1 C. The Relationship Between Capital Structure and ROE 2 The cost of common equity depends in part on the company's capital structure. The common 3 equity ratio and equity rate of return must therefore be considered together to determine...
AI summary The relationship between a company's capital structure and its return on common equity (ROE) is explored, emphasizing that lower common equity ratios increase financial risk and thus require higher rates of return. The capital structure decision by regulators affects the required rate of return, and both business and financial risks must be considered in setting the structure.
3 A. Summary and Relevance to Utility Cost of Capital 4 Utilities raise debt and equity in a global market influenced by macroeconomic fundamentals, 5 capital markets and central bank policies. The cost of debt for utilities is observable...
AI summary This section discusses how macroeconomic factors, including real GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, central bank policy, and financial market volatility, influence the cost of capital for utilities, particularly focusing on the estimation of return on equity (ROE) for regulated utilities.
2 SELECTION OF PROXY COMPANIES 3 Since ROE is a market-based concept and given that NSPI is not publicly-traded, it is necessary to 4 establish a group of companies that are both publicly-traded and comparable to the Company's 5 business a...
AI summary The document discusses the selection of proxy companies for estimating NSPI's return on equity (ROE). NSPI is not publicly traded, so proxy companies with similar business and financial characteristics are used. The Canadian proxy group includes five publicly-traded, regulated utility companies, excluding Emera Inc. and TC Energy due to their relationship with NSPI and differing risk profiles.
1 Canadian regulators have adopted a pragmatic view of the use of U.S. data and proxy groups to 2 estimate the allowed ROE for Canadian regulated utilities. The development of a proxy group 3 comprised entirely of Canadian electric utiliti...
AI summary Canadian regulators have adopted a pragmatic approach to using U.S. data and proxy groups to determine the allowed return on equity (ROE) for regulated utilities, due to the limited number of publicly traded Canadian electric utilities and the integration of North American financial markets.
d of utility companies in both Canada and the U.S. to set the authorized ROE for utilities under their jurisdiction. The BCUC explained its rationale for using a North American proxy group as follows: For the reasons outlined above, we fin...
AI summary The BCUC and AUC have both adopted approaches to selecting proxy groups for determining the authorized rate of return (ROE) for utilities, emphasizing the use of North American comparators due to the integration of financial markets and similar regulatory regimes across the region. The BCUC found that a North American proxy group is preferable to separate Canadian and US groups, while the AUC established screening criteria for selecting comparator companies.
percent) were either U.S. electric or U.S. gas utilities (or both). In addition, several of the Canadian companies in the AUC's comparator group have significant U.S. operations, including Emera, Fortis, and Algonquin Power. In Ontario, th...
AI summary The text discusses the use of U.S. proxy group data in determining the cost of capital for Canadian utilities, noting challenges in finding truly comparable companies due to structural and risk differences. It references the OEB's 2009 decision and the NEB's TQM decision, which support the use of North American proxy groups despite these challenges.
METHODS FOR ESTIMATING THE RETURN ON EQUITY Analysts use multiple approaches to estimate the cost of common equity. The required ROE can be estimated using one or more analytical techniques that rely on market-based data to quantify invest...
AI summary The document discusses methods for estimating return on equity (ROE), emphasizing the use of multiple analytical techniques to reflect investor expectations. It notes that no single model is definitive and that regulators like the BCUC, OEB, and AUC recommend using multiple methodologies to determine a fair ROE.
5 4. Multi-Stage DCF Model 6 In order to address some of the limiting assumptions underlying the Constant Growth form of the 7 DCF model, our ROE analysis and recommendation relies on the results of a multi-period (three-8 stage) DCF Model...
AI summary The document discusses the use of a multi-stage DCF model to refine the assumptions of the Constant Growth model. It transitions from near-term to long-term growth rates, using nominal GDP growth forecasts for the terminal stage. The model calculates ROE based on dividend cash flow and stock price.
3 4. CAPM Results 4 Our CAPM analysis for the integrated electric utilities produces an ROE estimate of 9.7 percent 5 for the Canadian Utilities proxy group, 10.7 percent for the U.S. Electric Utilities proxy group, and 6 10.3 percent for...
AI summary The CAPM analysis for integrated electric utilities estimates a return on equity (ROE) of 9.7% for the Canadian Utilities proxy group, 10.7% for the U.S. Electric Utilities proxy group, and 10.3% for the North American Electric proxy group.
e ten jurisdictions examined, seven have 25 historically granted the 50-basis point adjustment. Only Quebec deviates from 50 basis points by 1 allowing 30 to 40 basis points, and Manitoba and Saskatchewan, which have only Crown utilities,...
AI summary The text compares financing and flexibility adjustments across various jurisdictions, noting that seven out of ten historically granted a 50-basis point adjustment. Quebec, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan deviate from this norm. Nova Scotia's Board did not specify if flotation costs were included in the authorized ROE for Nova Scotia Power. The BCUC and OEB have made different decisions regarding flotation costs and financing flexibility.
Jurisdiction Adj. Docket/Proceeding Notes Alberta 50 bps 2018 GCOC Decision 22570-D01-2018 and 2024 GCOC Decision 27084- D02-2023 Adjustment of 50 bps is normally included in the allowed return to account for administrative and equity issu...
AI summary The text outlines various adjustments to allowed returns across different jurisdictions, primarily focusing on flotation costs and financing flexibility. These adjustments range from 25 bps to 50 bps, with some jurisdictions specifying the inclusion of flotation costs in the allowed return. Nova Scotia's 2023 rate application was resolved through a settlement agreement that did not explicitly address flotation costs or financing flexibility.
1 D. Risk Premium Analysis - 2 In general terms, the Risk Premium approach recognizes that equity is riskier than debt because 3 equity investors bear the residual risk associated with ownership. Equity investors, therefore, 4 require a gr...
AI summary The document discusses the Risk Premium approach to estimating Return on Equity (ROE) by considering the relationship between risk premium and interest rates. It uses regression analysis and data from U.S. electric utility rate cases to determine how risk premium varies with bond yields.
Using 30-Day Average Yield on 30-Year Treasury Bond Using Q2 2025–Q2 2026 Forecast for Yield on 30-Year Treasury Bond52 Using 2026- 2030 Forecast for Yield 30- Year Treasury Bond53 Yield 4.82% 4.66% 4.30% Risk Premium 5.85% 5.95% 6.15% Res...
AI summary The text presents a table showing different yield and risk premium scenarios for a 30-year Treasury bond and their impact on resulting ROE. A risk premium analysis based on Canadian decisions from 1994 to 2024 is also referenced, indicating an inverse relationship between interest rates and the equity risk premium.
3 Authorized ROEs and common equity ratios for other investor-owned electric utilities in Canada 4 and the U.S. are another relevant benchmark when setting authorized returns. Given the 5 "opportunity cost" concept underlying a fair return...
AI summary The text discusses authorized returns on equity (ROE) for investor-owned electric utilities in Canada and the U.S., highlighting differences in average ROE between the two regions and noting that Canadian companies in the sample do not own significant regulated generation, unlike NSPI.
1 Figure 30: Authorized Electric ROEs and Equity Ratios Generation ROE Equity Ratio NSPI (existing) Yes 9.00% 40.0% NSPI (Concentric analysis) Yes 9.90% 45.0% NSPI (proposed) Yes 9.00% 40.0% Newfoundland Power Minimal 8.60% 45.0% Maritime...
AI summary Figure 30 presents authorized electric return on equity (ROE) and equity ratios for various electric utilities, including Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI), Newfoundland Power, and others, with data sourced from SNL Financial for the period January 1, 2024, through January 31, 2025.
b. Implication of Capital Structure on Rate of Return The capital structure relates to a company's financial risk, which represents the risk that a company may not have adequate cash flows to meet its financial obligations, and is a functi...
AI summary The capital structure of a company affects its financial risk, particularly as the percentage of debt increases, leading to higher fixed obligations and increased financial risk for equity holders. This relationship is crucial in determining a fair rate of return for the company.
c. Comparison to Other Investor-Owned Utilities As explained in Section IV, we selected proxy groups consisting of Canadian, U.S. Electric, and North American Electric utilities for purposes of establishing our ROE recommendation for NSPI....
AI summary The document compares NSPI's deemed common equity ratio of 40.0% with other investor-owned electric utilities in Canada and the U.S. It notes that NSPI's ratio is in line with most Canadian utilities but lower than the average of 52.0% for U.S. integrated electric utilities, attributing the difference to NSPI's higher business risk as an integrated utility.
1 e. Change in NSPI's Credit Rating Since 2021 S&P Global downgraded NSPI by two notches to BBB- from BBB+ in February 2023, 2 [65](#page-88-0) and DBRS Morningstar downgraded NSPI to BBB (high) from A (low) in December 2022.[66](#page-88-...
AI summary S&P Global downgraded NSPI's credit rating in 2023 and 2022 due to concerns over political intervention and regulatory changes, including caps on base rate increases and return on equity. The rating agency also cited risks related to coal-based generation and limited financial cushion, though it reaffirmed the BBB- rating in 2024 with a negative outlook.
rid and the Lower Business Risk (LBR) Grid. In our view, the different types of utility entities covered under this methodology have different levels of business risk. 16 70 FortisBC, Annual Information Form for the Year Ended December 31,...
AI summary The document discusses the different levels of business risk associated with various types of utility entities, emphasizing that generation utilities and vertically integrated utilities have higher business risk due to the complexities and costs involved in power generation. It also highlights the differences in authorized ROE and common equity ratios between U.S. integrated electric utilities and T&D only utilities, noting that integrated utilities face greater risk.
h. Regulatory Risk 2 There have been decisions by the UARB where operating and capital costs have been disallowed. 3 Cost disallowances are always within the scope of utility regulation, but in Concentric's 4 experience, significant disall...
AI summary The text discusses regulatory risks faced by Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI), including cost disallowances by the Utility and Review Board (UARB), such as the 2018 AMI decision and treatment of operating expenses. It also mentions the impact of amortizing costs from Hurricane Fiona and penalties under the Public Utilities Act.
i. Political Risk NSPI is also subject to significant political risk, as evidenced by the legislation that was passed following the hearing in the previous GRA but prior to the UARB's order, when the Provincial government placed a cap on t...
AI summary NSPI faces significant political risk due to provincial legislation capping its authorized ROE and equity ratio, as noted by DBRS and S&P Global. This intervention raises concerns about cost recovery and ROE, increasing the company's cost of capital and negatively impacting both customers and the utility.
Criteria Score Deemed Equity Below Average Allowed ROE Good Energy Cost Recovery Below Average Capital and Operating Cost Recovery Good Cost of Service vs. Incentive Rate Excellent Mechanism Political Interference Poor Stranded Cost Recove...
AI summary The document presents a table with various criteria and their respective scores, highlighting areas such as 'Deemed Equity' and 'Allowed ROE.' The section '2 e. Capital Cost Recovery' is mentioned, indicating a focus on capital cost recovery mechanisms.
5. Risk Analysis Conclusions - 4 Based on the results of the financial and business risk analyses discussed throughout this report, 5 Concentric concludes that: - NSPI's generation ownership distinguishes the Company from other investor-ow...
AI summary Concentric concludes that NSPI's business risk remains elevated due to environmental compliance requirements and regulatory challenges. The company faces higher risks compared to other Canadian and U.S. utilities, including failure to achieve authorized ROE and regulatory lag from the FAM audit process.
2026-2027 GRA Direct Evidence Appendix 10A Page 85 of 87 COST OF CAPITAL REPORT PREPARED FOR NOVA SCOTIA POWER INC. 1 2027. Absent approval of this proposal, NSPI has higher risk relative to the proxy groups 2 on this factor. 3 • The finan...
AI summary The document discusses the financial risk profile of Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) and recommends increasing its deemed common equity ratio to 45.0 percent, aligning it with Canadian electric utilities. NSPI, however, prefers to maintain its current 40.0 percent ratio, citing the need for a supportive regulatory environment to access capital during its transition toward environmental goals.
2 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 For the reasons discussed throughout this report, it is appropriate to consider the CAPM using a 4 historical market risk premium, the multi-stage DCF model and Risk Premium results for both 5 Ca...
AI summary The report concludes that the CAPM, multi-stage DCF model, and Risk Premium results from Canada and the U.S. should be considered when determining the authorized ROE for NSPI.
COST OF CAPITAL REPORT PREPARED FOR NOVA SCOTIA POWER INC. 1 the additional financial risks. If the deemed common equity ratio for NSPI is maintained at the 2 current level of 40.0 percent, our ROE recommendation of 9.9 percent is understa...
AI summary The document discusses the financial risks associated with maintaining the deemed common equity ratio for Nova Scotia Power Inc. at 40.0 percent, suggesting that the recommended ROE of 9.9 percent may be understated compared to market data for comparable companies.
N-142026-2027 GRA OP 01-15 - Redacted
120 passages
INTRODUCTION AND STRATEGIC OVERVIEW NSPI is a vertically integrated regulated electric utility. It is the primary electricity supplier in Nova Scotia, Canada, providing electricity generation, transmission and distribution services to appr...
AI summary NSPI is a vertically integrated utility with a ROE range of 8.75-9.25%, committed to 80% renewable electricity by 2030. Owned by Emera, it operates in Nova Scotia and the US energy market. The energy industry's seasonality affects demand and costs.
Operations NSPI's earnings are most directly impacted by the range of ROE and capital structure approved by the NSEB, the prudent management and approved recovery of operating costs, electric sales volumes, weather, the approved recovery o...
AI summary NSPI's 2025 earnings are projected to rise but remain below the NSEB-approved ROE range, influenced by higher sales volumes, increased capital investment ($680M), and cost recovery mechanisms. The company emphasizes investments in system reliability and service.
Significant changes in the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets between June 30, 2025 and December 31, 2024 include: millions of dollars Increase (Decrease) Explanation Assets Receivables, net $ 145 Increased due to timing of activity Inc...
AI summary The condensed consolidated balance sheets show significant changes between June 30, 2025, and December 31, 2024, including increases in receivables, income taxes receivable, and inventory, and decreases in derivative instruments and regulatory liabilities. These changes are attributed to factors such as timing of activity, clean technology investment tax credits, and capital investment.
Florida Electric Utility TEC anticipates earning within the upper half of its ROE range in 2025. As a result of new base rates effective January 1, 2025, TEC's 2025 USD earnings are expected to be higher than in 2024. TEC expects customer...
AI summary TEC anticipates earning within the upper half of its ROE range in 2025, with higher USD earnings expected due to new base rates effective January 1, 2025. Customer growth rates in 2025 are expected to be comparable to 2024, reflecting Florida's economic growth. The text also mentions adjustments to net income and MTM losses and gains for the periods ending June 30, 2025.
NSPI NSPI anticipates earning below its allowed ROE range in 2025. NSPI expects earnings in 2025 to be higher than 2024. Sales volumes are expected to be higher in 2025 than 2024. On March 5, 2025, NSPI, the Canada Infrastructure Bank ("CI...
AI summary NSPI expects to earn below its allowed ROE range in 2025 but anticipates higher earnings than in 2024. Sales volumes are also expected to increase. NSPI is involved in the Wasoqonatl transmission line project with CIB and WMA, and is investing approximately $680 million in capital projects to support power system reliability.
PGS PGS anticipates earning at the bottom of its allowed ROE range in 2025. USD earnings for 2025 are expected to be consistent with 2024 primarily due to higher operating costs and depreciation driven by ongoing capital investments to sup...
AI summary PGS expects to earn at the lower end of its allowed ROE range in 2025, with USD earnings consistent with 2024 due to increased operating costs and depreciation from capital investments. PGS filed a rate case with the FPSC in March 2025, requesting a USD 93 million increase in annual base rates and additional adjustments for 2027. A settlement agreement in principle was reached in August 2025, with details expected to be filed with the FPSC.
NSP 2022 GRA Settlement Details - New rates will result in $160M in incremental nonfuel revenues through 2024 - No change to midpoint ROE of 9.0% or earnings band of 8.75% - 9.25%
AI summary The NSP 2022 GRA Settlement Details outline new rates that will generate $160M in incremental nonfuel revenues through 2024, with no changes to the midpoint ROE of 9.0% or the earnings band of 8.75% - 9.25%.
New Mexico Gas - In September 2023, NMGC filed a formal rate application with the NMPRC for new rates effective October 2024. NMGC requested a ~$49M USD increase in annual base rates, reflecting an ROE of 10.5% (currently 9.375%) and a cap...
AI summary NMGC filed a rate application with the NMPRC in September 2023, requesting a ~$49M USD increase in annual base rates, reflecting a higher return on equity and adjusted capital structure. The filing also includes requests for new regulatory assets and recovery/refund of existing ones.
Regulatory Construct 9.25% - 11.25% approved ROE 54% approved equity $9.5 billion rate base In year 2 of a 3 year rate agreement
AI summary The document outlines a regulatory construct with an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.25% to 11.25%, 54% approved equity, a rate base of $9.5 billion, and notes that this is the second year of a three-year rate agreement.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 40% approved equity $4.6 billion rate base In year 1 of a 2 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%, 40% equity, a $4.6 billion rate base, and a two-year rate agreement starting in year 1.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 30% approved equity $1.7 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%, 30% equity, and a rate base of $1.7 billion, which are key financial parameters set by the regulatory authority.
Regulatory Construct 8.9% - 11.0% approved ROE 54.7% approved equity $1.9 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved ROE range of 8.9% to 11.0%, 54.7% approved equity, and a rate base of $1.9 billion. These figures are key components in the determination of utility rates and financial structures.
Regulatory Arrangements In November 2023, the FPSC voted to approve the FPSC staff recommendation which supported an $107 million USD increase in annual base rates, as well as $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement r...
AI summary In November 2023, the FPSC approved a recommendation to increase annual base rates by $107 million USD and added $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement rider, reflecting a 10.15% midpoint ROE with an allowed equity capital structure of 54.7%.
Regulatory Construct 9.375% approved ROE 52% approved equity $0.8 billion rate base Effective January 1, 2023 the NMPRC is comprised of three appointed commissioners (previously 5 elected commissioners).
AI summary The document outlines the NMPRC's approved ROE of 9.375%, equity of 52%, and a rate base of $0.8 billion, effective January 1, 2023. It also notes the change in NMPRC structure from five elected commissioners to three appointed commissioners.
Regulatory Arrangements In September 2023, NMGC filed a formal rate application with the NMPRC for new rates effective October 2024. NMGC requested a ~$49M USD increase in annual base rates, reflecting an ROE of 10.5% (currently 9.375%) an...
AI summary NMGC submitted a rate application to the NMPRC in September 2023, requesting a ~$49M USD annual base rate increase, which includes a proposed ROE of 10.5% and a capital structure of 53%/47% equity/debt.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($420M rate base) GBPC: 8.37% approved return on rate base ($275M rate base)
AI summary The document outlines approved return on rate base percentages for two entities: BLPC with a 10.0% return on a $420M rate base and GBPC with an 8.37% return on a $275M rate base.
- Grid modernization and customer focused technologies Earnings Impact of Capital Profile Florida Nova Scotia Capital Investment $ 100 $ 100 Equity %5 54% 40% Equity $ $ 54 $ 40 Return on equity5 10.2% 9.0% EARNINGS IMPACT $ 5.51 $ 3.60 20...
AI summary The document outlines the earnings impact of capital investment profiles in Florida and Nova Scotia, comparing equity percentages, returns on equity, and earnings impact for the 2024-2026 Capital Plan. Nova Scotia's equity percentage and earnings impact are lower than Florida's.
Regulatory Construct 9.25% - 11.25% approved ROE 54% approved equity $10.2 billion rate base In year 3 of a 3 year rate agreement
AI summary The document outlines a regulatory construct with an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.25% to 11.25%, 54% approved equity, a rate base of $10.2 billion, and specifies that this is in the third year of a three-year rate agreement.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 40% approved equity $5.4 billion rate base In year 2 of a 2 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 8.75% to 9.25%, with 40% equity, a rate base of $5.4 billion, and specifies that this is the second year of a two-year rate agreement.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 30% approved equity $1.7 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct sets an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 8.75% to 9.25%, with 30% equity and a rate base of $1.7 billion.
Regulatory Construct 9.15% - 11.15% approved ROE 54.7% approved equity $2.2 billion rate base
AI summary The document outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.15% to 11.15%, an approved equity percentage of 54.7%, and a rate base of $2.2 billion, which are key components of the regulatory construct being discussed.
Regulatory Arrangements In November 2023, the FPSC voted to approve the FPSC staff recommendation which supported an $107 million USD increase in annual base rates, as well as $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement r...
AI summary In November 2023, the FPSC approved a $107 million USD annual base rate increase and $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement rider, reflecting a 10.15% midpoint ROE with an allowed equity capital structure of 54.7%.
Regulatory Construct 9.375% approved ROE 52% approved equity $0.8 billion rate base Effective January 1, 2023 the NMPRC is comprised of three appointed commissioners (previously 5 elected commissioners).
AI summary The NMPRC has approved a 9.375% return on equity with 52% equity and a $0.8 billion rate base. Effective January 1, 2023, the NMPRC transitioned from five elected commissioners to three appointed commissioners.
Regulatory Arrangements In September 2023, NMGC filed a formal rate application with the NMPRC for new rates effective October 2024. NMGC requested a ~$49M USD increase in annual base rates, reflecting an ROE of 10.5% (currently 9.375%) an...
AI summary NMGC submitted a rate application to the NMPRC in September 2023, requesting a ~$49M USD annual base rate increase effective October 2024. The request includes a higher return on equity (ROE) of 10.5% and a capital structure of 53%/47% equity/debt.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($440M rate base) GBPC: 8.52% approved return on rate base
AI summary The document outlines approved return on rate base percentages for BLPC and GBPC, with BLPC at 10.0% and GBPC at 8.52%, along with a rate base of $440M for BLPC.
2 Forecasted USD capital spend translated at $1.30 in 2024-2026 o Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in - Reached an unopposed settlement agreement with all intervenors on its active rate case in March 2024 - o Se...
AI summary The document outlines a settlement agreement reached in March 2024 for an active rate case, including a new base rate increase of $30M effective October 1, 2024, set at a 9.375% return on equity and 52% equity, with a weather normalization mechanism becoming a standard tariff. A final regulatory decision is expected in Q3 2024.
Peoples Gas Rate Case Details - $107M USD increase in annual base rates - $11M USD Cast Iron Bare Steel rider - 10.15% mid-point ROE up from 9.95% - Allowed equity thickness of 54.7% unchanged - Received 85% of the ask as filed
AI summary The Peoples Gas Rate Case details a proposed $107M USD annual base rate increase, a $11M USD Cast Iron Bare Steel rider, and a mid-point ROE of 10.15%, up from 9.95%. The allowed equity thickness of 54.7% remains unchanged, and the applicant received 85% of the requested rate increase.
Tampa Electric - Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025 - o Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026 and $72M USD in 2027; - o 11.50% ROE midpoint up from the current 10.2...
AI summary Tampa Electric filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025, requesting increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026, and $72M USD in 2027, with a 11.50% ROE midpoint and maintaining the current 54% equity thickness.
New Mexico Gas - Reached an unopposed settlement agreement with all intervenors on its active rate case in March 2024 - o Settlement includes $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024 - o Rates set on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity, u...
AI summary New Mexico Gas reached an unopposed settlement agreement in March 2024, including new base rates of $30M effective October 1, 2024, with a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity. The weather normalization mechanism is a permanent tariff, and the final regulatory decision is expected in Q3 2024.
Regulatory Construct 9.25% - 11.25% approved ROE 54% approved equity $10.2 billion rate base In year 3 of a 3 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.25% to 11.25%, with 54% approved equity, a rate base of $10.2 billion, and specifies that this is in year 3 of a 3-year rate agreement.
Recent Regulatory Activity Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025. Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026 and $72M USD in 2027; an 11.50% ROE midpoint – up from the curr...
AI summary A rate filing was submitted in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025, requesting increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026, and $72M USD in 2027. The request also includes an increase in the return on equity (ROE) midpoint from 10.20% to 11.50% and maintains the current 54% equity thickness.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 40% approved equity $5.4 billion rate base In year 2 of a 2 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 8.75% to 9.25%, 40% equity, a rate base of $5.4 billion, and specifies that this is in the second year of a two-year rate agreement.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 30% approved equity $1.7 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 8.75% to 9.25%, 30% approved equity, and a rate base of $1.7 billion.
Regulatory Construct 9.15% - 11.15% approved ROE 54.7% approved equity $2.2 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.15% to 11.15%, an approved equity percentage of 54.7%, and a rate base of $2.2 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements In November 2023, the FPSC voted to approve the FPSC staff recommendation which supported an $107 million USD increase in annual base rates, as well as $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement r...
AI summary In November 2023, the FPSC approved a recommendation to increase annual base rates by $107 million USD and include a $11 million USD rider for cast iron and bare steel replacement, reflecting a 10.15% midpoint ROE with an allowed equity capital structure of 54.7%.
Regulatory Construct 9.375% approved ROE 52% approved equity $0.8 billion rate base Effective January 1, 2023 the NMPRC is comprised of three appointed commissioners (previously 5 elected commissioners).
AI summary The NMPRC has approved a 9.375% ROE, 52% equity, and a $0.8 billion rate base. The commission structure changed in 2023, transitioning from five elected commissioners to three appointed ones.
Regulatory Arrangements Reached an unopposed settlement agreement which included $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024. Rates set on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity, unchanged from current. Settlement makes weather normalization me...
AI summary An unopposed settlement agreement was reached, setting new base rates of $30M effective October 1, 2024, with a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity. The weather normalization mechanism is now a standard tariff, with a final regulatory decision expected in Q3 2024.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($440M rate base) GBPC: 8.52% approved return on rate base ($270M rate base)
AI summary The document presents approved return on rate base percentages for two entities: BLPC with a 10.0% return on a $440M rate base and GBPC with an 8.52% return on a $270M rate base.
Tampa Electric - Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025 - o Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026 and $72M USD in 2027; - o 11.50% ROE midpoint up from the current 10.2...
AI summary Tampa Electric has filed for new rates effective January 1, 2025, requesting increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026, and $72M USD in 2027, along with a higher return on equity (ROE) midpoint of 11.50% compared to the current 10.20%, while maintaining the current 54% equity thickness. The hearing is scheduled for August 26-30, 2024, with a decision expected in November.
New Mexico Gas - On July 25, 2024, the New Mexico Gas rate case settlement agreement was unanimously approved by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission - o Settlement includes $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024 - o Rate...
AI summary The New Mexico Public Regulation Commission unanimously approved a rate case settlement agreement for New Mexico Gas on July 25, 2024. The agreement includes a $30M increase in base rates, effective October 1, 2024, with the rate of return on equity and equity percentage remaining unchanged. The weather normalization mechanism will transition from a pilot program to a standard tariff.
Grand Bahama Power Corporation ("GBPC") - On August 1, 2024, GBPC filed a rate plan proposal with their regulator - Proposal seeks a revision in base rates, charges and tariff classifications effective January 1, 2025 for a three-year peri...
AI summary Grand Bahama Power Corporation (GBPC) filed a rate plan proposal with their regulator on August 1, 2024, seeking a revision in base rates, charges, and tariff classifications effective January 1, 2025, for a three-year period. The proposed rates are based on an 8.5-8.7% allowable regulated return on rate base and a target regulatory ROE of 12.87%, with a decision expected by the end of 2024.
Visible Growth Plan - $8.8B baseline capital investment plan through 2026 1 - 7-8% forecasted rate base growth through 2029 - 5-7% three-year average target EPS growth though 2027 2
AI summary The Visible Growth Plan outlines an $8.8B capital investment plan through 2026, with a forecasted 7-8% rate base growth through 2029 and a target of 5-7% three-year average EPS growth through 2027.
Visible Growth Plan - $8.8B baseline capital investment plan through 2026 1,6 - 7-8% forecasted rate base growth through 2029 6 - 5-7% three-year average target adjusted EPS 2 growth though 2027
AI summary The Visible Growth Plan outlines an $8.8B capital investment plan through 2026, with a forecasted 7-8% rate base growth through 2029 and a target of 5-7% three-year average adjusted EPS growth through 2027.
New Mexico Gas 2024 Rate Case Details - $30M USD increase in annual base rates effective October 1, 2024 - 9.375% ROE and 52% equity thickness, unchanged from current - Weather normalization mechanism formalized in the tariff, after five y...
AI summary The 2024 Rate Case for New Mexico Gas includes a $30M USD annual base rate increase effective October 1, 2024, with a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity thickness remaining unchanged. A weather normalization mechanism has been formalized in the tariff following a five-year pilot period.
NSP 2022 GRA Settlement Details - New rates will result in $160M in incremental non-fuel revenues through 2024 - No change to midpoint ROE of 9.0% or earnings band of 8.75% - 9.25% - Equity thickness set at 40% for rate setting purposes –...
AI summary The NSP 2022 GRA Settlement Details outline new rates that will generate an additional $160M in non-fuel revenues by 2024. The midpoint ROE remains at 9.0%, and the earnings band stays between 8.75% and 9.25%. The equity thickness for rate setting has been increased from 37.5% to 40%.
2. Earnings Growth • Translate rate base growth into 5-7% adjusted EPS 1 growth through 2027 by managing capital deployment with timing of regulatory filings and through prudent cost management
AI summary The document outlines a strategy to achieve 5-7% adjusted EPS growth through 2027 by translating rate base growth into earnings through careful management of capital deployment, timing of regulatory filings, and prudent cost management.
4. Payout Ratio • Achieve earnings growth in excess of dividend growth, reducing payout to ~80% by the end of 2027 with continued improvement in the following years
AI summary The document discusses the target of achieving earnings growth that exceeds dividend growth, aiming to reduce the payout ratio to approximately 80% by the end of 2027, with further improvements expected in subsequent years.
Regulatory Construct 9.25% - 11.25% approved ROE 54% approved equity $10.2 billion rate base In year 3 of a 3 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.25% to 11.25%, 54% approved equity, a rate base of $10.2 billion, and specifies that this is in the third year of a three-year rate agreement.
Recent Regulatory Activity Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025. Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026 and $72M USD in 2027; an 11.50% ROE midpoint – up from the curr...
AI summary A rate filing was submitted in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025, requesting increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026, and $72M USD in 2027, along with an increase in the return on equity midpoint from 10.20% to 11.50%. The hearing was completed in August 2024, with a decision expected in November 2024.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 40% approved equity $5.4 billion rate base In year 2 of a 2 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity range of 8.75% to 9.25%, 40% equity, a rate base of $5.4 billion, and specifies that this is the second year of a two-year rate agreement.
Regulatory Construct 8.75% - 9.25% approved ROE 30% approved equity $1.7 billion rate base
AI summary The approved return on equity (ROE) range is 8.75% to 9.25%, with 30% equity approved and a rate base of $1.7 billion.
Regulatory Construct 9.15% - 11.15% approved ROE 54.7% approved equity $2.2 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.15% to 11.15%, an approved equity percentage of 54.7%, and a rate base of $2.2 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements In November 2023, the FPSC voted to approve the FPSC staff recommendation which supported an $107 million USD increase in annual base rates, as well as $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement r...
AI summary In November 2023, the FPSC approved an increase in annual base rates by $107 million USD and $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement rider, reflecting a 10.15 per cent midpoint ROE with an allowed equity capital structure of 54.7 per cent.
Regulatory Construct 9.375% approved ROE 52% approved equity $0.8 billion rate base
AI summary The document outlines a regulatory construct with an approved ROE of 9.375%, 52% approved equity, and a rate base of $0.8 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements Reached an unopposed settlement agreement which included $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024. Rates set on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity, unchanged from current. Settlement makes weather normalization me...
AI summary An unopposed settlement agreement was reached, setting new base rates of $30M effective October 1, 2024, with a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity. The weather normalization mechanism was incorporated into the normal tariff, and final regulatory approval was granted on July 25, 2024.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($440M rate base) GBPC: 8.52% approved return on rate base ($270M rate base)
AI summary The document outlines approved return on rate base percentages for BLPC and GBPC, with BLPC receiving 10.0% on a $440M rate base and GBPC receiving 8.52% on a $270M rate base.
Regulatory Arrangements - On August 1, 2024, GBPC filed a rate plan proposal, to be effective effective on January 1, 2025, for a three-year period, based on an 8.5-8.7% allowable regulated return on rate base and a target regulatory ROE o...
AI summary GBPC filed a rate plan proposal for 2025-2027 with an 8.5-8.7% allowable return on rate base and a target ROE of 12.87%. BLPC's motion to review was dismissed by the FTC but successfully appealed to the High Court of Barbados.
Tampa Electric - Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025 - o Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026 and $72M USD in 2027; - o 11.50% ROE midpoint up from the current 10.2...
AI summary Tampa Electric has filed for new rates effective January 1, 2025, requesting increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026, and $72M USD in 2027. The request includes a 11.50% ROE midpoint, up from the current 10.20%, and maintaining a 54% equity thickness. A staff recommendation is expected on November 22nd, with a hearing on December 3rd.
Visible Growth Plan - $8.8B baseline capital investment plan through 2026 1,6 - 7-8% forecasted rate base growth through 2029 6 - 5-7% three-year average target adjusted EPS 2 growth though 2027
AI summary The Visible Growth Plan outlines an $8.8B capital investment plan through 2026, with a forecasted 7-8% rate base growth through 2029 and a target of 5-7% three-year average adjusted EPS growth through 2027.
Peoples Gas 2023 Rate Case - $107M USD increase in annual base rates - $11M USD Cast Iron Bare Steel rider - 10.15% mid-point ROE up from 9.95% - Allowed equity thickness of 54.7% unchanged - Received 85% of the ask as filed
AI summary The Peoples Gas 2023 Rate Case proposes a $107M USD annual base rate increase and a $11M USD Cast Iron Bare Steel rider. The mid-point return on equity (ROE) is set at 10.15%, up from 9.95%, while the allowed equity thickness remains at 54.7%. The applicant received 85% of their requested rate increase.
Tampa Electric - Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025 - o Request included increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026 and $72M USD in 2027; - o 11.50% ROE midpoint up from the current 10.2...
AI summary Tampa Electric filed a request in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025, including increased revenue requirements of $297M USD in 2025, $100M USD in 2026, and $72M USD in 2027. The request includes a 11.50% ROE midpoint, up from the current 10.20%, and maintaining the current 54% equity thickness. A staff recommendation is expected on November 22nd, with a hearing on December 3rd.
Regulatory Arrangements - On August 1, 2024, GBPC filed a rate plan proposal, to be effective effective on January 1, 2025, for a three-year period, based on an 8.5-8.7% allowable regulated return on rate base and a target regulatory ROE o...
AI summary GBPC filed a rate plan proposal for a three-year period starting January 1, 2025, with an allowable regulated return on rate base of 8.5-8.7% and a target regulatory ROE of 12.87%. BLPC's motion to review was dismissed by the FTC, but the company appealed the decision to the High Court of Barbados.
Constructive Outcome at Tampa Electric Enables Customer Focused Investment 10.5% ROE midpoint with range of 9.5% - 11.5% 54% Equity thickness unchanged from current 2024 Emera Investor Day
AI summary The document highlights a 10.5% return on equity (ROE) midpoint with a range of 9.5% to 11.5% and notes that equity thickness remains unchanged at 54%. It references the 2024 Emera Investor Day and includes images related to the discussion.
TAMPA ELECTRIC OTHER - 10.5% ROE midpoint - 54% equity thickness - Operating & Capital Expenditures substantially approved - No stay out requirement
AI summary The document outlines a 10.5% return on equity midpoint, 54% equity thickness, substantial approval of operating and capital expenditures, and the absence of a stay out requirement for Tampa Electric.
PGS Effective January 1, 2024 $107M USD annual base rate increase & $11M cast iron bare steel rider 10.15% ROE and 54.7% equity thickness
AI summary The document outlines a base rate increase of $107M USD annually and a $11M cast iron bare steel rider, effective January 1, 2024, with a return on equity (ROE) of 10.15% and an equity thickness of 54.7%.
NMGC Effective October 1, 2024 $30M USD annual base rate increase 9.375% ROE and 52% equity thickness Formalized weather normalization mechanism
AI summary The NMGC document outlines an effective October 1, 2024 base rate increase of $30M USD, a 9.375% return on equity, and 52% equity thickness, along with the formalization of a weather normalization mechanism.
Balanced Rate Case Outcome at Tampa Electric Enables Customer Focused Investment ROE midpoint of 10.5% with range of 9.5% - 11.5% No change to equity thickness of 54% No Stay Out period requirement Operating expenses and capital expenditur...
AI summary The rate case outcome at Tampa Electric sets a return on equity (ROE) midpoint of 10.5%, with no changes to equity thickness or a 'Stay Out' period. Operating expenses and capital expenditures were largely approved, with 72% of a combined 2-year request approved, leading to a total revenue increase of $281M USD.
Tampa Electric Peoples Gas Nova Scotia Power Date filed FSPC Decision December 2024 FSPC Decision November 2023 Settlement approved February 2023 Test Year Forward test year Forward test year Forward test year ROE 9.5-11.5% 9.15-11.15% 8.7...
AI summary The document compares regulatory decisions and key financial metrics for Tampa Electric, Peoples Gas, and Nova Scotia Power, including return on equity (ROE) ranges, equity thickness percentages, and effective dates for new rates or settlements. These metrics are relevant to rate-setting and financial planning in the utility sector.
Clear Financial Objectives Drive Reliable Outcomes Deliver 7%-8% Rate Base CAGR Through 2029 Translate Rate Base Growth Into 5%-7% Annual Adjusted EPS 1 Growth Through 2027 2 2 3 Deliver Sustainable Annual Dividend Growth Of 1%-2% Achieve...
AI summary The document outlines financial objectives including a 7%-8% annual rate base growth through 2029, translating into 5%-7% adjusted EPS growth through 2027, sustainable dividend growth of 1%-2%, and a target payout ratio of ~80% by 2027. It also emphasizes achieving credit metrics on a sustainable basis.
Regulatory Construct – Rates Effective Jan 1, 2025 - 9.5%–11.5% approved ROE - 54% approved equity - $10.2 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct for rates effective January 1, 2025, includes an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.5%–11.5%, an approved equity of 54%, and a rate base of $10.2 billion.
Recent Regulatory Activity Filed in April 2024 for new rates effective January 1, 2025. The FPSC reached a final decision on December 3rd, 2024 approving new revenues of $281M ($185M in 2025, $87M in 2026 and $9M USD in 2027). This reflect...
AI summary In April 2024, new rates were filed for implementation on January 1, 2025. The FPSC approved new revenues of $281M, including $185M in 2025, $87M in 2026, and $9M USD in 2027. The ROE midpoint increased to 10.5%, and equity thickness remained at 54%. Tampa Electric's operating expenses and capital expenditures were approved without a stay out requirement.
Regulatory Construct - 8.75%–9.25% approved ROE - 40% approved equity - $5.4 billion rate base - In year 2 of a 2 year rate agreement
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved ROE range of 8.75%–9.25%, 40% equity, a $5.4 billion rate base, and specifies that this is the second year of a two-year rate agreement.
Regulatory Construct - 8.75% –9.25% approved ROE - 30% approved equity - $1.7 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%, an approved equity of 30%, and a rate base of $1.7 billion, reflecting key financial parameters set by the regulatory authority.
Regulatory Construct - 9.15%-11.15% approved ROE - 54.7% approved equity - $2.2 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved ROE range of 9.15%-11.15%, an approved equity of 54.7%, and a rate base of $2.2 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements In November 2023, the FPSC voted to approve the FPSC staff recommendation which supported an $107 million USD increase in annual base rates, as well as $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement r...
AI summary In November 2023, the FPSC approved a recommendation for an increase in annual base rates by $107 million USD and an additional $11 million USD from the cast iron and bare steel replacement rider, reflecting a 10.15% midpoint ROE with an allowed equity capital structure of 54.7%.
Regulatory Construct - 9.375% approved ROE - 52% approved equity - $0.8 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved ROE of 9.375%, an approved equity of 52%, and a rate base of $0.8 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements Reached an unopposed settlement agreement which included $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024. Rates set on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity, unchanged from current. Settlement makes weather normalization me...
AI summary An unopposed settlement agreement was reached, setting new base rates of $30M effective October 1, 2024, with a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity. The weather normalization mechanism is now a standard tariff, and final regulatory approval was granted on July 25, 2024.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($0.4B rate base) GBPC: 8.52% approved return on rate base ($0.3B rate base)
AI summary The document outlines the approved return on rate base for BLPC and GBPC, with BLPC receiving 10.0% on a $0.4B rate base and GBPC receiving 8.52% on a $0.3B rate base.
Regulatory Arrangements On August 1, 2024, GBPC filed a rate plan proposal, to be effective effective on January 1, 2025, for a three-year period, based on an 8.5- 8.7% allowable regulated return on rate base and a target regulatory ROE of...
AI summary GBPC filed a rate plan proposal effective January 1, 2025, based on an 8.5-8.7% allowable return on rate base and a 12.87% target ROE. BLPC's motion to review was dismissed by the FTC but successfully appealed to the High Court of Barbados.
Tampa Electric Peoples Gas Nova Scotia Power Key Regulatory Features • Forward test year • Storm reserve • Storm protection plan recovery mechanism • Forward test year • Forward test year • Storm cost recovery mechanism ROE & Equity 9.5-11...
AI summary The table compares key regulatory features, ROE and equity metrics, and key dates for Tampa Electric, Peoples Gas, and Nova Scotia Power. It highlights differences in forward test years, storm cost recovery mechanisms, and equity thickness, as well as regulatory decisions and rate-effective dates.
Peoples Gas 1 General rate application expected March 31, 2025 Anticipate requesting revenue requirements of $90M - $110M USD in 2026 and $25M - $40M USD in 2027 Anticipate requesting 11.1% ROE midpoint New rates expected January 1, 2026
AI summary Peoples Gas anticipates submitting a general rate application by March 31, 2025, requesting revenue requirements of $90M - $110M USD in 2026 and $25M - $40M USD in 2027. The company expects a 11.1% ROE midpoint and new rates to take effect on January 1, 2026.
Rate Case $281M USD total revenue increase 2 Increase in ROE midpoint to 10.5% from 10.2% and no change to equity thickness 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures approved No stay out period required
AI summary The rate case includes a $281M USD total revenue increase, an increase in the ROE midpoint to 10.5%, approval of 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures, and no stay out period required.
Financial Highlights 5 % - 7 % Target adj. EPS CAGR through 2027 7%-8% Forecasted rate base growth through 2029 1%-2% Annual dividend growth target
AI summary The financial highlights section outlines key financial targets, including a 5% to 7% adjusted earnings per share compound annual growth rate through 2027, a 7% to 8% forecasted rate base growth through 2029, and a 1% to 2% annual dividend growth target.
Emera's capital program Delivers exceptional value to customers Drives top-tier rate base growth 1 Supports target annual adjusted EPS 2 growth of 5%-7% through 2027 3 7%-8% Rate Base CAGR through 2029 1 Compared to Canadian Utility Peers...
AI summary Emera's capital program aims to deliver value to customers by driving rate base growth and supporting a target annual adjusted EPS growth of 5%-7% through 2027. The program projects a 7%-8% rate base compound annual growth rate through 2029.
Executive Summary Over the past year we have executed against our plan to improve our credit profile. Our actions have improved our FX normalized FFO adjusted leverage 1 ratio to 6.1x and reduced our proportion of holding company debt to a...
AI summary Over the past year, the company has improved its credit profile by reducing leverage and increasing exposure to premium regulatory jurisdictions. The company remains committed to maintaining its investment grade rating and has focused its portfolio on regulated utilities in Florida.
Peoples Gas 1 General rate application filed March 31, 2025 Requesting a total revenue increase of approximately $130M USD 2 Requesting an increase in ROE midpoint to 11.1% from 10.15% and no change to equity thickness of 54.7% 84% of the...
AI summary Peoples Gas has filed a general rate application requesting a total revenue increase of approximately $130M USD. They are seeking to raise the ROE midpoint to 11.1% from 10.15%, with no change to the equity thickness of 54.7%. In the 2023 rate case, 84% of the requested revenue increase was granted, and new rates are expected to take effect on January 1, 2026.
Rate Case $281M USD total revenue increase 3 Increase in ROE midpoint to 10.5% from 10.2% and no change to equity thickness of 54% 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures approved No stay out period required Storm Cost Recovery...
AI summary The rate case approved a $281M USD revenue increase, raised ROE midpoint to 10.5%, and allowed recovery of $464M USD in storm costs over an 18-month period starting March 1, 2025. 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures were approved, and no stay out period was required.
General Rate Application Rate application expected this spring Application anticipated to include 2026 and 2027 and include total incremental base revenues of $240M 1 Average annual rate increase expected to be ~3.7% Application expected t...
AI summary A general rate application is anticipated this spring, covering 2026 and 2027 with total incremental base revenues of $240M. The average annual rate increase is expected to be ~3.7%, incorporating $724M of thermal asset securitization. The application will request a 9.0% ROE midpoint and 40% equity thickness, with new rates effective January 1, 2026.
PGS 2026 Revenue Requirement + 2027 Subsequent Year Adjustment 2026 2027 Rate Base Growth 48 - Depreciation 19 6 O&M 23 - Taxes Other Than Income Taxes 9 7 Cost of Capital 15 14 Revenue Growth, excluding CI/BS1 Rider (10) - BASE REVENUE RE...
AI summary The document presents the 2026 Revenue Requirement and 2027 Subsequent Year Adjustment for PGS, including details on rate base growth, depreciation, O&M, taxes, cost of capital, and net revenue required. The table outlines financial figures for both years.
Peoples Gas 1 General rate application filed March 31, 2025 Requesting a total revenue increase of approximately $130M USD 2 Requesting an increase in ROE midpoint to 11.1% from 10.15% and no change to equity thickness of 54.7% 84% of the...
AI summary Peoples Gas has filed a general rate application requesting a $130M USD revenue increase and a higher return on equity midpoint. 84% of the requested increase was granted in the 2023 rate case, with new rates expected to take effect in January 2026.
Rate Case $281M USD total revenue increase 3 Increase in ROE midpoint to 10.5% from 10.2% and no change to equity thickness of 54% 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures approved No stay out period required Storm Cost Recovery...
AI summary The rate case includes a $281M USD revenue increase, a raise in ROE midpoint to 10.5%, approval of 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures, and approval to recover $464M USD in storm costs over an 18-month period starting March 1, 2025.
General Rate Application Rate application expected this spring Application anticipated to include 2026 and 2027 and include total incremental base revenues of $240M 1 Average annual rate increase expected to be ~3.7% Application expected t...
AI summary The General Rate Application is expected this spring, covering 2026 and 2027, with a total incremental base revenue of $240M and an average annual rate increase of ~3.7%. The application will include $724M in thermal asset securitization, request a 9.0% ROE midpoint and 40% equity thickness, with new rates effective January 1, 2026.
Peoples Gas General rate application filed March 31, 2025 Requested revenue requirements of $104M USD in 2026 and $27M USD in 2027 Requested 11.1% ROE midpoint (from current 10.15%) Hearings scheduled for September 9-12, 2025 with final de...
AI summary Peoples Gas has filed a general rate application requesting revenue requirements of $104M USD in 2026 and $27M USD in 2027, along with an increase in the requested return on equity midpoint from 10.15% to 11.1%. Hearings are scheduled for September 2025, with a final decision expected in Q4 2025 and new rates to take effect on January 1, 2026.
Rate Case $281M USD total revenue increase 1 Increase in ROE midpoint to 10.5% from 10.2% and no change to equity thickness 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures approved No stay out period required
AI summary The rate case involves a $281M USD total revenue increase, an increase in the ROE midpoint to 10.5%, approval of 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures, and no stay out period required.
Regulatory Construct - 9.15%-11.15% approved ROE - 54.7% approved equity - $2.4 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved ROE range of 9.15%-11.15%, an approved equity percentage of 54.7%, and a rate base of $2.4 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements PGS filed a general rate application on March 31, 2025, requesting revenue requirements of approximately $104 million and subsequent year adjustment for 2027 of approximately $27 million. Also requested a 11.1% ROE...
AI summary PGS submitted a general rate application requesting revenue requirements of approximately $104 million and a subsequent year adjustment of $27 million, along with a requested increase in ROE from 10.15% to 11.1%. The hearing is set for September 9-12, 2025, with a decision expected in Q4 2025 and new rates to begin on January 1, 2026.
Regulatory Construct - 9.375% approved ROE - 52% approved equity - $0.9 billion rate base
AI summary The document outlines key regulatory parameters including an approved return on equity (ROE) of 9.375%, an approved equity of 52%, and a rate base of $0.9 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements Reached an unopposed settlement agreement which included $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024. Rates set on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity, unchanged from current. Settlement makes weather normalization me...
AI summary An unopposed settlement agreement was reached, setting new base rates of $30M effective October 1, 2024, with rates based on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity. The agreement includes making the weather normalization mechanism a normal tariff, with final regulatory approval given on July 25, 2024.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($0.5B rate base) GBPC: 8.52% approved return on rate base ($0.3B rate base)
AI summary The document outlines the approved return on rate base for BLPC and GBPC, with BLPC receiving 10.0% on a $0.5B rate base and GBPC receiving 8.52% on a $0.3B rate base.
Peoples Gas - Settlement agreement filed in August 2026 reflecting: - Revenue increase of $97M USD through 2028 (inclusive of CIBS rider) - $67M USD in 2026 - $25M USD in 2027 and - $5M USD in 2028 - Represents 81% of revised ask - ROE of...
AI summary A settlement agreement for Peoples Gas, filed in August 2026, includes a revenue increase of $97M USD through 2028, with an 81% approval of the revised ask. The return on equity (ROE) is set at 10.3%, up from 10.15%, with equity thickness remaining at 54.7%. The final order is expected in Q4 2025, with new rates effective January 1, 2026.
Rate Case - $281M USD total revenue increase1 - Increase in ROE midpoint to 10.5% from 10.2% and no change to equity thickness - 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures approved - No stay out period required
AI summary The Rate Case involves a $281M USD revenue increase, an increase in the ROE midpoint to 10.5%, approval of 99% of operating expenses and capital expenditures, and no stay out period required.
Clear Financial Objectives Drive Reliable Outcomes Deliver 7-8% Rate Base CAGR Through 2029 Translate Rate Base Growth Into 5-7% Annual Adjusted EPS 1 Growth Through 2027 2 Deliver Sustainable Annual Dividend Growth of 1-2% Achieve Target...
AI summary The document outlines financial objectives including a 7-8% annual rate base growth through 2029, translating into 5-7% annual adjusted EPS growth through 2027, sustainable dividend growth of 1-2%, and achieving an 80% payout ratio by 2027, while maintaining sustainable credit metrics.
Emera's capital program - Delivers exceptional value to customers - Drives top-tier rate base growth1 - Supports target annual adjusted EPS2 growth of 5-7% through 20273 7-8% Rate Base CAGR through 2029 - 1. Compared to Canadian Utility Pe...
AI summary Emera's capital program aims to deliver value to customers and drive rate base growth, targeting a 7-8% compound annual growth rate through 2029. It also seeks to achieve 5-7% annual adjusted EPS growth through 2027, using 2024 as the base year for guidance.
Regulatory Construct – Rates Effective Jan 1, 2025 - 9.5%–11.5% approved ROE - 54% approved equity - $11.1 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines the approved return on equity (ROE) range of 9.5%–11.5%, an approved equity percentage of 54%, and a rate base of $11.1 billion effective January 1, 2025.
Recent Regulatory Activity The FPSC reached a final decision in December 2024 approving new revenues of $281M ($185M in 2025, $87M in 2026 and $9M in 2027). This reflects a 10.5% ROE midpoint (up from 10.2%) and a 54% equity thickness (unc...
AI summary The FPSC approved new revenues of $281M for Tampa Electric, with a 10.5% ROE midpoint and 54% equity thickness. Operating expenses and capital expenditures were substantially approved, and there is no stay out requirement.
Regulatory Construct - 8.75%–9.25% approved ROE - 40% approved equity - $5.7 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved return on equity range of 8.75%–9.25%, 40% approved equity, and a rate base of $5.7 billion.
Regulatory Construct - 8.75%–9.25% approved ROE - 30% approved equity - $1.6 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct includes an approved return on equity (ROE) range of 8.75%–9.25%, an approved equity percentage of 30%, and a rate base of $1.6 billion.
Regulatory Construct - 9.15%-11.15% approved ROE - 54.7% approved equity - $2.4 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity range of 9.15%-11.15%, an approved equity percentage of 54.7%, and a rate base of $2.4 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements PGS filed a general rate application on March 31, 2025. In August 2026, PGS filed settlement agreement reflecting: - Revenue increase of $97M USD through 2028 (inclusive of CIBS rider) - $67M USD in 2026 - $25M USD...
AI summary PGS filed a general rate application on March 31, 2025, and a settlement agreement in August 2026, proposing a revenue increase of $97M USD through 2028, including a CIBS rider, and increasing ROE to 10.3%. The final order is expected in Q4 2025 with new rates effective January 1, 2026.
Regulatory Construct - 9.375% approved ROE - 52% approved equity - $0.9 billion rate base
AI summary The regulatory construct outlines an approved return on equity (ROE) of 9.375%, an approved equity of 52%, and a rate base of $0.9 billion.
Regulatory Arrangements Reached an unopposed settlement agreement which included $30M of new base rates, effective October 1, 2024. Rates set on a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity, unchanged from current. Settlement makes weather normalization me...
AI summary An unopposed settlement agreement was reached, setting new base rates of $30M effective October 1, 2024, with a 9.375% ROE and 52% equity. The weather normalization mechanism was incorporated into a normal tariff, and final regulatory approval was granted on July 25, 2024.
Regulatory Construct BLPC: 10.0% approved return on rate base ($0.5B rate base) GBPC: 8.52% approved return on rate base ($0.3B rate base)
AI summary The document outlines the approved return on rate base for BLPC and GBPC, with BLPC receiving 10.0% on a $0.5B rate base and GBPC receiving 8.52% on a $0.3B rate base.
Nova Scotia Powerata Glance 1 Regulated integrated electric utility serving the province of Nova Scotia $4.6B 2022 Average Rate Base $131M 2022 Net Income 8.6% 2022 Earned ROE 541K Customers 1.1% Customer Growth CAGR 2020 – 2022 40%+ Renew...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power is a regulated integrated electric utility serving Nova Scotia with a 2022 average rate base of $4.6B, net income of $131M, and an earned return on equity of 8.6%. It serves 541K customers with a customer growth CAGR of 1.1% and expects over 40% renewable energy by 2023.
Well established cost of service regulatory environment •Allowed ROE: 8.75% - 9.25% •Maximum Allowed Equity: 40% - • Approved rider mechanisms allow for the timely recovery of prudently incurred costs: - 〉 Fuel adjustment mechanism allows...
AI summary The regulatory environment in Nova Scotia allows for a return on equity between 8.75% and 9.25% and a maximum allowed equity of 40%. Approved rider mechanisms, such as the fuel adjustment and DSM rider, enable the recovery of prudently incurred costs. The UARB is an independent regulatory body responsible for oversight.
Numbers in CAD MM Financial/Regulatory Metrics 2019A 2020A 2021A 2022A Q3 2023 LTM 2023F 2024F 2025F Earnings 138 125 141 131 124 150 152 182 Regulated Equity (average) 40% 39% 37% 36% 35% 36% 35% 36% Regulated ROE achieved 9.25% 7.88% 9.0...
AI summary The table presents financial and regulatory metrics including earnings, regulated equity, return on equity (ROE), and credit metrics for various years from 2019 to 2025. Key metrics include earnings, regulated ROE achieved, and credit coverage ratios, with adjustments for non-cash GHG emissions accruals related to Nova Scotia's Cap-and-Trade program.
Nova Scotia Power at a Glance 1 Regulated integrated electric utility serving the province of Nova Scotia $5.4B 2023 Average Rate Base $141M 2023 Net Income 8.25 % 2023 Earned ROE 549K 3.4% Residential Sales (GWh) CAGR - 2021 – 2023 43% Sa...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power is a regulated integrated electric utility serving Nova Scotia. Key figures include a 2023 average rate base of $5.4B, net income of $141M, and an earned ROE of 8.25%. Renewable energy accounted for 43% of sales in 2024. The company serves approximately 549K customers.
Well-established cost of service regulatory environment - Allowed ROE: 8.75% - 9.25% - Maximum Allowed Equity: 40% - Approved rider mechanisms allow for the timely recovery of prudently incurred costs: - 〉 Fuel adjustment mechanism (FAM) a...
AI summary The document outlines the regulatory environment for cost of service in Nova Scotia, including an allowed ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%, a maximum allowed equity of 40%, and rider mechanisms for recovering prudently incurred costs. The UARB is described as an independent regulatory body.
2024 Highlights Our commitment to customers remained front and centre in our operating companies throughout the year. Tampa Electric carried out its largest ever storm response after backto-back hurricanes. Following Hurricane Milton, more...
AI summary In 2024, Tampa Electric led a major storm response following hurricanes, restoring service to hundreds of thousands of customers with no safety incidents. Regulatory updates included new rates at Peoples Gas and New Mexico Gas, and the Florida Public Service Commission approved Tampa Electric's capital plan with a midpoint return on equity of 10.5%.
3.1 Message from the Management Resources and Compensation Committee to Our Shareholders Dear Shareholder. In 2024, the Emera team made significant progress in advancing the corporate strategy through the execution of key transactions, inc...
AI summary The Management Resources and Compensation Committee (MRCC) outlines Emera's executive compensation strategy, emphasizing alignment with performance, share price, and corporate objectives. The MRCC oversees compensation programs and ensures compliance with governance principles and regulations.
Deferred Share Unit Plan The Deferred Share Unit ("DSU") Plan is another component of Emera's Long-term Incentive Program for senior leaders. A DSU is a notional share unit that is based on the value of an Emera common share – the value of...
AI summary The Deferred Share Unit (DSU) Plan is part of Emera's Long-Term Incentive Program for senior leaders. DSUs are notional shares that correlate with Emera's common shares and earn dividend equivalents. They are deferred until the participant leaves the company and are paid based on the average share price over 50 trading days. Special DSU awards may be made for significant achievements, but none were given to NEOs in 2024.
N-22NSPI (Cleary) RIR 1-11 - Redacted
52 passages
restoration costs, demonstrating the company's exposure to physical risks. Additionally, NSPI relies on high-cost coal-based generation (about 44%), which increases its exposure to environmental risk. We assess NSPI's financial risk profil...
AI summary S&P Global Ratings assesses NSPI's financial risk profile as aggressive due to high-cost coal-based generation and rate increases. The NSUARB's rate order allows NSPI to raise electricity rates annually. Emera's reduced capital investment in NSPI weakens long-term support but does not change its strategic importance.
Nova Scotia Power Inc. Financial Summary Period ending Dec-31-2018 Dec-31-2019 Dec-31-2020 Dec-31-2021 Dec-31-2022 Dec-31-2023 Reporting period 2018a 2019a 2020a 2021a 2022a 2023a Display currency (mil.) C$ C$ C$ C$ C$ C$ Revenues 1,440 1,...
AI summary This financial summary presents Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s financial metrics from 2018 to 2023, including revenues, EBITDA, FFO, capital expenditures, and debt levels. The data highlights trends in financial performance, including fluctuations in operating cash flow and increasing debt.
n average rate increase higher than the projected rate increase during the rate stability period (1.0% to 1.5% yearly through 2017 to 2019), DBRS expects NSPI's rate increase in 2020 to be manageable. NSPI continues to operate under a reas...
AI summary DBRS expects NSPI's 2020 rate increase to be manageable despite being higher than the projected rate stability period increase. NSPI operates under a reasonable regulatory system with a return on equity band of 8.75% to 9.25%. The company has maintained profitability within this range and received regulatory approval for an interim assessment payment related to the Maritime Link Project.
1. Low-risk regulated electricity business The current regulatory framework is based on a COS methodology, in which the Company is allowed to recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and to earn a reasonable return on approved ca...
AI summary The current regulatory framework for NSPI allows recovery of prudently estimated operating expenses and a reasonable return on capital investments. NSPI's target ROE range is considered reasonable. A fuel adjustment mechanism is in place to manage fuel price risks, deferring differences between actual and recovered fuel costs and adjusting them with customers in subsequent years.
Earnings and Outlook 9 mos. September 30 12 mos. September 30 For the year ended December 31 (CAD millions) 2017 2016 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 Net revenues 647 650 863 866 875 837 778 Fuel cost 1 336 354 472 490 543 512 557 Operating costs...
AI summary The document presents financial data for a utility company, including net revenues, fuel costs, operating costs, EBITDA, EBIT, interest expenses, and net income over several years. It also includes the regulated rate base and actual regulated return on equity percentages.
Summary - NSPI's earnings remained stable. The Company operates under a COS model wherein NSPI is allowed to recover all prudently incurred costs from providing electricity and earnings are primarily impacted by the range of ROE and capita...
AI summary NSPI's earnings remained stable under a COS model, with earnings influenced by ROE and capital structure approved by the NSUARB. Lower operating expenses and fuel costs contributed to moderately higher earnings in 9M 2017 compared to 9M 2016. NSPI recovers actual fuel costs via the FAM. The NSUARB's ROE calculations use specific regulatory methods, and earnings above the ROE band are directed to the FAM as per the Electricity Plan Act.
Outlook • DBRS expects NSPI to achieve its actual regulated ROE within the target range (of 8.75% to 9.25%) over 2017 to 2018, partly benefitting from the Company's focus on improving operating efficiency.
AI summary DBRS anticipates that NSPI will achieve its regulated ROE within the target range of 8.75% to 9.25% during 2017 to 2018, due in part to the company's efforts to improve operating efficiency.
Financial Profile 9 mos. September 30 12 mos. September 30 For the year ended December 31 (CAD millions) 2017 2016 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 Net income before non-recurring items 106 96 140 130 139 133 134 Depreciation & amortization 160 15...
AI summary The financial profile presents key financial metrics for the period, including net income, depreciation, cash flow, capital expenditures, free cash flow, and total debt. It highlights trends in financial performance and capital structure over several years.
Regulation - NSPI operates under a reasonable regulatory environment of the NSUARB, using a COS methodology that allows the Company to recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on the approved capital...
AI summary NSPI operates under the NSUARB's regulation, using a COS methodology to recover operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on capital investments. The company's target ROE range is between 8.75% and 9.25%, and its 2017 rates are based on a 9.0% ROE. NSPI files an annual ACE plan with the NSUARB, and the Province's Electricity Reform (2013) Act allows licensed renewable generators to sell directly to retail customers, though DBRS does not expect significant competition from new entrants.
Regulatory Environment Assessment Criteria 1. Deemed Equity Ratio Score Excellent Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor Analysis NSPI's target regulated ROE is based on an actual five-quarter average regulated common equity component of up...
AI summary The document assesses the regulatory environment, focusing on NSPI's equity ratio, allowed ROE, and fuel cost recovery. NSPI's target ROE is between 8.75% and 9.25%, with actual ROE historically in the upper range. Fuel costs are recovered through the FAM, with variances deferred and subject to audit by the NSUARB.
On December 21, 2018, DBRS Limited (DBRS) confirmed the ratings of Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI or the Company) as listed above. All trends are Stable. The ratings reflect the stable operations of the Company's regulated utilities in Nova...
AI summary DBRS Limited confirmed the credit ratings of Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) as stable, noting that NSPI's key credit metrics and operations remain robust. The rating outlook considers post-2019 rate increases due to renewable energy costs, but expects 2020 rate increases to be manageable. NSPI operates under a reasonable regulatory framework allowing a return on equity of 8.75% to 9.25% and is preparing for Nova Scotia's carbon cap-and-trade program.
mix when the Muskrat Falls project starts producing full power (expected in early 2020). NSPI expects to recover prudently incurred costs associated with the program through the regulatory framework. NSPI's business risk assessment (BRA) o...
AI summary NSPI expects to recover costs through the regulatory framework, citing a low business risk assessment. Fuel costs are subject to audit by NSUARB, and NSPI's high electricity rates may hinder timely cost recovery. NSPI plans to maintain its debt-to-capital ratio within regulatory limits through flexible dividend policies.
Rating Report Nova Scotia Power Inc. DBRS.COM 11 For the year ended December 31 Earnings Quality/Operating Efficiency 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Fuel for generation and purchase power/Revenues 35.7% 36.1% 38.3% 38.0% 41.7% 40.0% EBIT ma...
AI summary The document presents financial and operational metrics for Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) over several years, including earnings quality, operating efficiency, return on equity, customer growth, and cost structures. It provides data on metrics such as EBIT margin, profit margin, and total costs, along with details on customer accounts and rate base.
On November 29, 2019, DBRS Limited (DBRS Morningstar) confirmed the ratings of Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI or the Company) as listed above. All trends are Stable. The ratings reflect stable operations in the Company's regulated utilities...
AI summary DBRS Limited confirmed Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s credit ratings as stable, citing strong operations and credit metrics. The company operates under a reasonable regulatory system that allows it to earn a return on equity within a specified range. Its business risk assessment is favorable, though challenges related to high electricity rates and fuel cost-recovery mechanisms are noted.
1. Unfavourable generation mix As a result of the current generation mix, NSPI is dependent on international suppliers for its fuel supply, exposing the Company to volatile global pricing. This exposure, combined with continued investment...
AI summary NSPI is dependent on international fuel suppliers, leading to volatile pricing and higher electricity rates. Coal-based generation remains a significant part of the energy mix, though the Muskrat Falls project will reduce reliance on coal. Federal regulations require coal plant closures by 2030, necessitating a new Equivalency Agreement for NSPI.
Rating Report Nova Scotia Power Inc. For the year ended December 31 Earnings Quality/Operating Efficiency 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Fuel for generation and purchase power/Revenues 44.4% 35.7% 36.1% 38.3% 38.0% EBIT margin 37.6% 33.3% 31.2%...
AI summary The document provides a rating report for Nova Scotia Power Inc. with financial metrics including earnings quality, operating efficiency, profit margin, return on average equity, and customer growth over several years. It also includes details on costs, employee numbers, and rate base figures.
On December 2, 2020, DBRS Limited (DBRS Morningstar) confirmed Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s (NSPI or the Company) Issuer Rating and Unsecured Debentures & Medium-Term Notes rating at A (low). DBRS Morningstar also confirmed NSPI's Commercial P...
AI summary DBRS Limited confirmed Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s credit ratings at A (low) and R-1 (low) with stable trends, citing a reasonable regulatory framework by the NSUARB and the Company's ability to recover fuel costs through a fuel adjustment mechanism. The Company's reliance on coal-based generation and transition to renewables is noted as a long-term challenge.
Strengths 1. Low-risk regulated electricity business The Company's current regulatory framework is based on a COS methodology, under which NSPI can recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on approved...
AI summary NSPI operates under a COS methodology that allows recovery of prudently estimated expenses and a reasonable return on capital investments. DBRS Morningstar considers NSPI's target ROE range as reasonable. The FAM helps mitigate fuel price risks by deferring and collecting fuel cost differences from or refunding customers.
1. Unfavourable generation mix As a result of the current generation mix, NSPI is dependent on international suppliers for its fuel supply, exposing the Company to volatile global pricing. This exposure, combined with continued investment...
AI summary NSPI faces challenges due to its reliance on international fuel suppliers and high electricity rates, partly caused by its current generation mix dominated by coal. While the Muskrat Falls project will reduce coal's role, coal-based assets will still be part of the mix beyond 2029. Federal regulations require coal plant closures by 2030, and NSPI may need an extended Equivalency Agreement to continue operating coal-based assets.
Earnings and Outlook 12 mos. ended September 30 For the year ended December 31 (CAD millions where applicable) 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 Revenues 1,481 1,430 1,440 1,338 1,356 1,417 Fuel cost1 (685) (663) (639) (477) (490) (543) Net re...
AI summary This table presents financial data for a company over several years, including revenues, fuel costs, net revenues, EBITDA, EBIT, interest expenses, earnings before taxes, and net income. It also includes return on equity and regulated rate base information.
2019 Summary - Earnings for NSPI have been relatively stable, reflecting the regulated nature of its operations. - DBRS Morningstar notes that NSPI has a FAM in place that allows the Company to recover actual fuel costs from customers thro...
AI summary NSPI's 2019 earnings were stable due to its regulated operations and the FAM, which allows recovery of actual fuel costs. EBITDA and EBIT decreased due to lower sales volumes and higher depreciation, but net income increased from a tax recovery. NSPI continued to earn its maximum allowed ROE of 9.25% based on NSUARB calculations, and surplus earnings were applied to the FAM per the Electricity Plan Act.
2020 Summary/Outlook - EBITDA and EBIT for the LTM 2020 remained relatively stable compared with 2019. - Net income before nonrecurring items decreased, however, because of higher income taxes for the period. - The ongoing coronavirus pand...
AI summary NSPI's EBITDA and EBIT for the LTM 2020 remained stable compared to 2019, with net income before nonrecurring items decreasing due to higher income taxes. The coronavirus pandemic had no material impact on NSPI's financial results, as residential usage offset decreased commercial and industrial revenues. DBRS Morningstar expects modest earnings growth due to rate base growth and operating efficiencies, with NSPI likely to achieve its regulated ROE target of 8.75% to 9.25%.
Assessment of Regulatory Framework Criteria Score Analysis 1. Deemed Equity Excellent Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor NSPI's target regulated ROE is based on an actual five quarter average-regulated common equity component of up to 40...
AI summary The document assesses the regulatory framework, focusing on NSPI's deemed equity and allowed return on equity (ROE). NSPI's target ROE range is between 8.75% and 9.25%, with actual ROE historically falling on the higher end. The common equity ratio used for rate-setting purposes is 37.5%.
r rating at R-1 (low). All trends are Stable. The confirmations reflect the stability of the Company's regulated electricity operations and key credit metrics that are in line with the current rating. NSPI's business risk assessment was st...
AI summary NSPI maintains a stable credit rating due to its reasonable regulatory framework and ability to recover prudent expenditures. However, challenges such as transitioning from coal-based generation and meeting renewable energy targets may impact its credit metrics if not managed prudently.
(1) Low-risk regulated electricity business The Company's current regulatory framework is based on a cost-of-service (COS) methodology, under which NSPI can recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on...
AI summary NSPI operates under a cost-of-service regulatory framework, allowing recovery of operating expenses and a reasonable return on capital investments. DBRS Morningstar considers NSPI's target ROE range reasonable. The fuel adjustment mechanism (FAM) helps manage fuel price fluctuations by deferring and collecting or refunding differences between actual fuel costs and customer recoveries.
2021 Summary/Outlook - EBITDA and EBIT decreased for LTM 2021 because of less favourable weather and higher depreciation. - Net income before nonrecurring items was in line with expectations. - Overall, DBRS Morningstar expects NSPI's earn...
AI summary In 2021, NSPI experienced a decrease in EBITDA and EBIT due to less favourable weather and higher depreciation. However, DBRS Morningstar anticipates modest earnings growth year over year, driven by an expanding rate base and operating efficiencies, with NSPI expected to meet its regulated ROE target of 8.75% to 9.25%.
Page 9 of 14 Assessment of Regulatory Framework Page 9 of 14 Criteria Score Analysis Page 9 of 14 1. Deemed Equity Page 9 of 14 Page 9 of 14 Excellent Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor NSPI's target-regulated ROE is based on an actual f...
AI summary The document assesses the regulatory framework, focusing on NSPI's target-regulated ROE and common equity ratio. NSPI's ROE range is between 8.75% and 9.25%, with actual ROE historically at the higher end. The common equity ratio used for rate-setting is 37.5%, based on a five-quarter average of up to 40.0%.
Page 11 of 14 Nova Scotia Power Inc. January 4, 2022 Operating Statistics For the year ended December 31 Earnings Quality/Operating Efficiency 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 Fuel for generation and purchase power/Revenues (%) 48.3 46.4 44.4 35.7...
AI summary The document presents operating statistics for Nova Scotia Power Inc. from 2016 to 2020, including metrics like fuel costs, approved ROE, customer growth, and employee productivity. It also outlines total costs, customer accounts, and rate base figures, providing a detailed view of the company's financial and operational performance over the years.
ess under the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB), and greater uncertainty on NSPI's plans and ability to meet renewable generation targets and to shut down its coal-fired generation plants. On November 8, 2022, the Province pass...
AI summary The NSUARB is under increased regulatory and political pressure due to amendments to the Public Utilities Act, which cap base rate increases and limit ROE for NSPI. DBRS Morningstar has downgraded NSPI's credit rating due to these constraints, which may hinder NSPI's ability to meet renewable generation targets and retire coal-fired plants by 2030.
cial restraints on NSPI over the near term, as well as the heightened regulatory risk on the Company's ability to receive rate increases to recover and earn a reasonable return on any new investments. Given this precedent, DBRS Morningstar...
AI summary DBRS Morningstar is concerned about potential government interventions that could destabilize NSPI's regulatory framework. It expects NSPI's earnings to be moderately weaker but supportive of the BBB (high) rating. NSPI is focusing on reliability and safety projects, and its parent company, Emera Inc., supports it financially. A positive rating action may occur with regulatory independence, progress on renewable energy, and improved credit metrics.
1. Low-risk regulated electricity business The Company's current regulatory framework is based on a cost-of-service (COS) methodology, under which NSPI can recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on...
AI summary NSPI operates under a cost-of-service regulatory framework that allows recovery of operating expenses and a reasonable return on capital. DBRS Morningstar finds the ROE range reasonable but notes that recent provincial intervention in the GRA process has increased regulatory risk and instability for the company.
2. Reasonable financial profile NSPI's overall key credit metrics for the last 12 months ended September 30, 2022 (LTM 2022), were supportive of the BBB (high) rating.
AI summary NSPI's key credit metrics for the last 12 months ended September 30, 2022, support a BBB (high) rating, indicating a reasonable financial profile.
1. Political intervention in the ratemaking process In November 2022, the Province passed Bill 212, which amended the Public Utilities Act to cap the base rate increase for NSPI's ongoing GRA at 1.8% during the 2022 to 2024 period, excludi...
AI summary In November 2022, Nova Scotia passed Bill 212, which capped NSPI's base rate increase and limited its ROE and deemed equity. DBRS Morningstar views this political intervention as credit negative, citing instability and reduced regulatory independence.
2021 Summary - Earnings for NSPI have been relatively stable, reflecting the regulated nature of its operations. - DBRS Morningstar notes that NSPI has a FAM in place that allows the Company to recover actual fuel costs from customers thro...
AI summary NSPI's earnings remained stable in 2021 due to its regulated operations and the FAM, which allows recovery of actual fuel costs. EBITDA and EBIT were steady, with higher sales volumes offset by increased depreciation from a growing rate base. Net income before nonrecurring items increased due to higher other income and lower income taxes.
2022 Summary/Outlook - EBIT decreased for LTM 2022 because of higher depreciation. - Net income before nonrecurring items increased though because of higher other income. 2 Adjusted for accumulated other comprehensive income. - DBRS Mornin...
AI summary In 2022, EBIT decreased due to higher depreciation, though net income before nonrecurring items increased due to higher other income. DBRS Morningstar expects NSPI's earnings to be pressured in 2023 and 2024, with base rates limited to a 1.8% increase, but additional DSM and fuel rate increases allowed. NSPI must find operational efficiencies and reduce capex to achieve its allowed ROE.
Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor Criteria Score Analysis 1. Deemed Equity Excellent Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor NSPI's target-regulated ROE is based on an actual five-quarter average-regulated common equity component of up to...
AI summary The document evaluates NSPI's regulatory framework, focusing on deemed equity, allowed ROE, energy cost recovery, capital and operating cost recovery, COS versus incentive rate mechanism, political interference, and stranded cost recovery. Key points include ROE caps under Bill 212, fuel cost recovery through FAM and FSP, and regulatory impacts from political interference.
Environmental Carbon and GHG costs had a relevant effect on the credit analysis of NSPI. DBRS Morningstar considers the Company's transition from reliance on coal-based generation (51% of 2021 installed generation capacity) to lower-emitti...
AI summary The transition of NSPI from coal-based generation to lower-emitting sources impacts credit analysis, with DBRS Morningstar highlighting challenges due to the need for significant investments and financial constraints from political intervention in the 2022 to 2024 GRA.
2. Unfavourable generation mix As a result of the current generation mix, NSPI is dependent on international suppliers for its fuel supply, exposing the Company to volatile global pricing. This exposure, combined with continued investment...
AI summary NSPI's reliance on international fuel suppliers and higher electricity rates due to its current generation mix pose challenges in passing on costs to ratepayers. While the Muskrat Falls Hydroelectric Project will reduce coal-based generation, coal plants will remain in the mix until 2030, requiring significant investments for replacement.
2023 Summary/Outlook - EBITDA and EBIT both increased for LTM 2023 because of a base-rate increase of 1.8% effective February 2, 2023, partly offset by higher operating costs and depreciation. - Reported net income includes a $10 million p...
AI summary In 2023, EBITDA and EBIT increased for LTM 2023 due to a 1.8% base-rate increase effective February 2, 2023, although this was partially offset by higher operating costs and depreciation. NSPI expects ROE to be weaker than the allowed 9.0%, and Morningstar DBRS anticipates no significant improvement in financial performance until the next GRA filing.
1 Adjusted for operating leases. ESG Factor ESG Credit Consideration Applicable to the Credit Analysis: Y/N Extent of the Effect on the ESG Factor on the Credit Analysis: Relevant (R) or Significant (S) Balance Sheet & Liquidity & Capital...
AI summary The document presents financial metrics related to balance sheet, liquidity, capital ratios, and profitability for a company, including current ratios, debt in capital structure, cash flow to debt ratios, and coverage ratios, with data spanning from 2017 to 2022.
Earnings Outlook Earnings for NSPI have generally been very stable, reflecting the regulated nature of its operations. The Company has a FAM in place that allows it to recover actual fuel costs from customers through annual rate adjustment...
AI summary NSPI's earnings have been stable due to its regulated operations and FAM, which allows recovery of actual fuel costs. Earnings increased in 2023 due to a base-rate increase, but ROE was below the approved band. Financial performance is expected to improve only after the next GRA and rate rebase in 2026.
2. Political intervention in the ratemaking process In November 2022, the Province passed Bill 212, which amended the Public Utilities Act to cap the baserate increase for NSPI's most recent GRA at 1.8% during the 2022 to 2024 period, excl...
AI summary In November 2022, Nova Scotia passed Bill 212, amending the Public Utilities Act to cap NSPI's base rate increase at 1.8% and limit ROE and deemed equity. This political intervention is viewed as credit negative due to its impact on regulatory independence and framework stability.
3. Unfavourable generation mix As a result of the current generation mix, NSPI is dependent on international suppliers for its fuel supply, exposing the Company to volatile global pricing. This exposure, combined with continued investment...
AI summary NSPI faces challenges due to its reliance on international fuel suppliers and higher electricity rates, influenced by the current generation mix. While renewable energy and the Muskrat Falls Hydroelectric Project will reduce coal dependency, coal-based assets will remain until 2030, requiring significant investment for replacement.
Appendix 2—Regulation - NSPI operates under the NSUARB's regulatory environment using a COS methodology that allows the Company to recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on approved capital investme...
AI summary NSPI operates under the NSUARB's regulatory framework with a target ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%. In 2022, the Province amended the Public Utilities Act to cap base-rate increases and ROE. NSUARB approved a negotiated settlement for the GRA in 2023, including rate increases and a Storm Rider. NSPI also manages the FAM and submitted a 2024 ACE plan for approval.
Page 12 of 13 Assessment of Regulatory Framework Criteria Score Analysis Page 12 of 13 1. Deemed Equity Page 12 of 13 Page 12 of 13 Excellent Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor NSPI's target-regulated ROE is based on an actual five-quart...
AI summary The document evaluates the regulatory framework for Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI), focusing on deemed equity, allowed return on equity (ROE), energy cost recovery, and political interference. Key points include a cap on deemed equity and ROE under Bill 212, the use of the Fuel Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) for cost recovery, and the impact of political interventions on the regulatory environment.
(a) on page 9 of Appendix 10A, Concentric provides Figure 1 (copied below) that summarizes its return on equity (ROE) estimates for NS Power: Figure 1. Summary of Results1 rigure Summary or resums- 8 9 Canadian Regulated Utilities US Elect...
AI summary The text discusses Concentric's return on equity (ROE) estimates for NS Power and NSP Maritime Link Inc. (NSMPL) based on figures provided in regulatory appendices. The figures include various methods such as CAPM, DCF, and Risk Premium, with percentages for different utility regions.
2026-2027 General Rate Application (M12451) NSPI Responses to CLEARY Information Requests 1 Monetary Policy Report (MPR), Figure 8 provides yield data for 30-year versus 10-year 2 Government of Canada bonds up to March of 2025, as does Fig...
AI summary The document discusses the timing and methodology of return-on-equity (ROE) analyses conducted for NSPI's 2026-2027 General Rate Application and NSPML's 2026 Assessment Application, including references to the Bank of Canada's Monetary Policy Report and the use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in estimating ROE.
6 (d) NS Power's borrowing costs are not addressed in Concentric's report, but Canadian utility 7 companies borrow in both Canadian and U.S. markets for many reasons, including 8 diversification of capital market access, currency risk mana...
AI summary The text discusses NS Power's borrowing costs and return on equity (ROE) estimates, noting that Concentric's report does not address NS Power's borrowing costs directly. The Risk Premium model using Canadian market inputs suggests an ROE estimate higher than the 9.0% requested by NS Power. NS Power is seeking to continue its existing authorized ROE.
3 (a) Confirmed. The primary reason for the difference between Concentric's proxy groups for 4 NS Power and NSPML is that NS Power is a vertically integrated electric utility, while 5 NSPML is an electric transmission utility. Therefore, i...
AI summary The difference between Concentric's proxy groups for NS Power and NSPML is due to their distinct business models: NS Power is a vertically integrated electric utility, while NSPML is an electric transmission utility. This distinction influenced the selection criteria for each proxy group.
ween the two groups. The purpose of a proxy group is to select companies that 10 are comparable in business and financial risks to the subject company for which the return 11 is being established. 12 13 (b) As Dr. Cleary is aware, the Onta...
AI summary The text discusses the methodology used to form proxy groups for determining return on equity (ROE), comparing companies with similar business and financial risks. It contrasts the approach used by the Ontario Energy Board with that of Concentric in Nova Scotia, noting differences in the inclusion of electric generation, gas utilities, and transmission and distribution companies.
NON-CONFIDENTIAL 1 America) equal to its respective estimates of average long-term nominal GDP growth. 2 Therefore, this approach assumes that utilities' earnings and dividends will grow at 3 rates above nominal GDP growth for 10 years, th...
AI summary The text discusses the assumptions made in estimating the cost of equity (Ke) using a multi-stage DCF model, including growth rates for earnings and dividends over different time periods and the relationship between dividend yield and growth rate in the Constant-Growth DCF model.
16. King, op. cit. Number of . Standard Number of BETAS less than Fractiles Period Companies Mean Deviation Zero .10 .25 .50 .75 .90 7/26-6/33 415 1.051 0.462 1 0.498 0.711 1.023 1.352 1.616 7/33-6/40 604 1.036 0.474 0 0.436 0.701 1.015 1....
AI summary The text presents a table with statistical data on beta values for different time periods, including the number of companies, mean, standard deviation, and fractiles. It is part of a confidential attachment from a regulatory proceeding document.
N-27NSPI (NSEB) RIR 1-152 - Redacted (settlement agreement attached at IR-1)
25 passages
Appendix "A" GRA Element Settlement Terms underspend to customers will be changed from $5 million to $2.5 million. Cost of Capital and Earnings Band a) An overall return on equity of 9% for rate setting purposes retained, as well as an ear...
AI summary The document outlines changes to the settlement terms for GRA Element, including a reduction in underspend to customers from $5 million to $2.5 million. It also retains a return on equity of 9% and an earnings band of 8.75% to 9.25% for cost of capital and earnings purposes.
5. REGULATORY MATTERS The Company is a public utility as defined in the Act and is subject to regulation under the Act by the UARB. The Act gives the UARB supervisory powers over NSPI's operations and expenditures. Electricity rates for NS...
AI summary NSPI operates as a regulated public utility under the Act, with the UARB overseeing its operations and approving electricity rates. NSPI follows a cost-of-service model, with rates set to recover prudently incurred costs and provide an appropriate return to investors, with an approved ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%.
The ABO for the defined benefit pension plans was $1,270 million as at December 31, 2024 (2023 – $1,260 million). The aggregate financial position for those plans with an ABO in excess of the plan assets for the years ended December 31 is...
AI summary The ABO for the defined benefit pension plans was reported as $1,270 million as of December 31, 2024, an increase from $1,260 million in 2023. The financial position of these plans, where ABO exceeds plan assets, is outlined for the years ended December 31.
The expected long-term rate of return on plan assets is based on projected real rates of return for the plan's current asset allocation and assumed inflation. A real rate of return is determined for each asset class. Based on the asset all...
AI summary The document discusses the methodology for determining the expected long-term rate of return on pension plan assets, which considers real rates of return for each asset class, inflation, and expenses. It also explains that discount rates are derived from high-quality long-term Canadian corporate bonds, aligned with the pension plan's cash flow estimates.
Regulatory and Political Risk NSPI is subject to complex legislative and regulatory frameworks that impact matters such as industry, business, rates and cost structures, revenue requirements, allowable ROE, capital structure, rate base and...
AI summary NSPI operates under a complex regulatory framework that affects its rates, costs, and operations. Regulatory approval is required for rate changes, and delays or disallowances could cause financial harm. Changes in government or policy could also impact regulatory stability and outcomes, potentially leading to a Material Adverse Effect.
Interest Rate Risk: NSPI utilizes a combination of fixed and floating rate debt financing for operations and capital expenditures, resulting in an exposure to interest rate risk. The allowed range of ROE will generally follow the direction...
AI summary NSPI uses a mix of fixed and floating rate debt, exposing it to interest rate risk. The allowed ROE range correlates with interest rates, with a lag due to the regulatory process. 95% of NSPI's debt is fixed rate as of December 31, 2024, with an average term of 17 years.
d further in "Outlook" below. In 2024, NSPI derived 42 per cent of its electric sales from renewable sources and achieved a 61 per cent reduction in generation from solid fuel compared to 2005 levels. NSPI is working closely with the provi...
AI summary NSPI has significantly increased its renewable energy sales and is committed to achieving 80% renewable electricity sales by 2030. It is regulated under the Public Utilities Act by the UARB, with rates set to recover prudently incurred costs and provide a reasonable return to investors.
Operations NSPI's earnings are most directly impacted by the range of ROE and capital structure approved by the UARB, the prudent management and approved recovery of operating costs, electric sales volumes, weather, the approved recovery o...
AI summary NSPI's earnings are influenced by factors such as approved ROE, capital structure, operating costs, electric sales volumes, and capital investment. In 2025, NSPI expects earnings to remain consistent with 2024 but to fall below its allowed ROE range, with increased sales volumes and capital investment of approximately $480 million.
Regulatory and Political Risk NSPI is subject to complex legislative and regulatory frameworks that cover material aspects of their businesses. These frameworks influence key factors such as rates and cost structures, revenue requirements,...
AI summary NSPI operates under a complex regulatory framework that impacts rates, cost recovery, and capital investments. Regulatory approvals are required for significant business changes, and delays or disallowances could lead to Material Adverse Effects. Changes in government or policy could also impact regulatory stability and outcomes.
16 17 Capital Project Depreciation Incurred at Net book value at 25 this is an expected increase in income tax accounts receivable. 1 Request IR-100: 2 3 Section 30(5)(b) of the Public Utilities Act directs the Board to set different level...
AI summary The text discusses the Public Utilities Act's Section 30(5)(b), which requires the Board to set different return on equity levels for NS Power's capital assets. NS Power's response states that this section is inapplicable to the current GRA as no such objectives have been submitted and customer representatives support the current capital structure.
Earnings Outlook Earnings for NSPI have generally been very stable, reflecting the regulated nature of its operations. The Company has a FAM in place that allows it to recover actual fuel costs from customers through annual rate adjustment...
AI summary NSPI's earnings have been stable due to its regulated operations and a Fuel-Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) that recovers fuel costs. Earnings rose in 2023 due to a 1.8% base-rate increase, but ROE was below the approved band. Financial improvement is expected with the next General Rate Application (GRA) in 2026.
1. Low-risk regulated electricity business The Company's current regulatory framework is based on a cost-of-service (COS) methodology, under which NSPI can recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on...
AI summary NSPI operates under a cost-of-service regulatory framework that allows recovery of operating expenses and a reasonable return on capital investments. The company's target ROE range is considered reasonable. A FAM is used to mitigate fuel price risks, but recent provincial intervention in the GRA process has increased regulatory risk and instability for the company.
2. Political intervention in the ratemaking process In November 2022, the Province passed Bill 212, which amended the Public Utilities Act to cap the baserate increase for NSPI's most recent GRA at 1.8% during the 2022 to 2024 period, excl...
AI summary In November 2022, Nova Scotia passed Bill 212, which amended the Public Utilities Act to cap the baserate increase for NSPI's GRA at 1.8% and limit the allowed ROE and deemed equity. This political intervention is seen as credit negative due to its impact on regulatory stability and independence.
3. Unfavourable generation mix As a result of the current generation mix, NSPI is dependent on international suppliers for its fuel supply, exposing the Company to volatile global pricing. This exposure, combined with continued investment...
AI summary NSPI faces challenges due to its reliance on international fuel suppliers, leading to higher electricity rates. While the Muskrat Falls project will reduce coal use, coal-based assets will remain until 2030. Compliance with the Canada-Nova Scotia Equivalency Agreement is expected until 2029, but full coal plant closure by 2030 will require significant investment.
Appendix 2—Regulation - NSPI operates under the NSUARB's regulatory environment using a COS methodology that allows the Company to recover all prudently estimated operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on approved capital investme...
AI summary NSPI operates under the NSUARB's regulatory framework, with a target ROE range of 8.75% to 9.25%. Bill 212 in 2022 imposed caps on base-rate increases and ROE. In 2023, the NSUARB approved a negotiated settlement with a 6.9% average rate increase for 2023 and 2024, including a Storm Rider and a FAM. In 2024, the NSUARB approved a Storm Rider of $24 million and the 2024 ACE plan. NSPI also sold a portion of its FAM asset to the Province and issued debt guaranteed by the federal government.
Page 12 of 13 Assessment of Regulatory Framework Page 12 of 13 Criteria Score Analysis Page 12 of 13 1. Deemed Equity Page 12 of 13 Page 12 of 13 Excellent Good Satisfactory Below Average Poor NSPI's target-regulated ROE is based on an act...
AI summary The document assesses the regulatory framework for NSPI, focusing on deemed equity, allowed ROE, energy cost recovery, capital and operating cost recovery, COS versus incentive rate mechanisms, political interference, stranded cost recovery, and rate freezes. Bill 212 is highlighted as a key legislative change impacting NSPI's regulatory environment and cost recovery mechanisms.
NON-CONFIDENTIAL 1 Request IR-103: 2 3 Reference: Exhibit N-8, Appendix 10A, Cost of Capital Report 4 5 (a) Please confirm the dates and target overnight rates (i.e., policy rate) for each change 6 in the policy rate announced by the Bank...
AI summary The request asks for confirmation of the Bank of Canada's policy rate changes from January 2022 to the present and how the decrease in interest rates has been considered in Concentric's assessment of return on equity (ROE) since NS Power's last General Rate Application (GRA) in 2022.
NON-CONFIDENTIAL 1 Request IR-106: 28 Recognizing that Emera raises capital in global capital markets, NS Power is subject to that same 29 competition for equity capital. NS Power has the lowest allowed weighted return on equity 30 (includ...
AI summary The text discusses the competitive disadvantage faced by NS Power due to its low allowed weighted return on equity compared to other North American utilities, affecting its ability to raise capital internally. It also references a cost of capital report and a generic decision from the Ontario Energy Board.
1 Request IR-112: 2 3 Reference: Exhibit N-8, Appendix 10A, Cost of Capital Report, page 17 of 87 4 5 Concentric notes Canada's unemployment rate was 6.6% in February 2025 and explains that 6 the unemployment rate is an indicator of the st...
AI summary The text discusses a request and response regarding unemployment rates in Canada and the U.S. over the past decade, excluding the pandemic period, and references inflation-control targets by the Bank of Canada. The discussion includes comparisons of economic indicators and their implications for cost of capital analysis.
CI C0041651 Tufts Cove Heavy Fuel Oil Tank 4 Refurbishment (NSEB M10984) NSPI Responses to NSEB Information Requests 1 Request IR-119 2 3 Reference: Exhibit N-8, Appendix 10A, CEA exhibits EO, CEA Summary -1 4 5 In CEA Summary -1, why do t...
AI summary The document addresses information requests (IR-119 and IR-120) related to NSPI's responses to NSEB inquiries regarding return on equity (ROE) calculations and macroeconomic data. The response explains that ROE for NS Power is based on a three-model average for the North American Electric proxy group and provides data on GDP and CPI from various sources.
- 1 (b) How did Concentric reflect the above factors in its ROE analysis prepared for NS 2 Power? - 4 (c) Given the above developments, why was Concentric's recommended ROE for NS 5 Power not materially lower than in its evidence in the 20...
AI summary The question asks how Concentric incorporated specific factors into its ROE analysis for NS Power and why its recommended ROE was not significantly lower than in the 2023-2024 GRA. A response (IR-123) is referenced but not provided in the text.
Power? - 4 (c) Given the above developments, why was Concentric's recommended ROE for NS 5 Power not materially lower than in its evidence in the 2023-2024 GRA? - 7 Response IR-123: 3 6 8 - 9 (a) Impact on NSPI's business and/or financial...
AI summary The response discusses the impact of the Fuel Adjustment Mechanism (FAM) Rider and a Supplemental Assessment on NS Power's financial risk and customer benefits. These provisions help manage short-term fuel cost issues over a longer period, improving NS Power's cash position and credit outlook, although they do not fully resolve prior fuel cost recovery issues.
26 portion of NS Power's rate base (approximately 12% of ending 2025 rate base). On 27 balance, Concentric views the securitization plan as a mechanism that will improve 28 NS Power's credit metrics, provide a benefit to customers through...
AI summary Concentric discusses its securitization plan, which it believes will improve NS Power's credit metrics, lower customer rates, and support the Province's energy transition. The plan addresses risks and impacts related to FAM, Bank of Canada actions, and the Energy Reform (2024) Act in its cost of capital analysis.
REDACTED 1 Request IR-124: 2 3 Reference: Exhibit N-3, 11.2 Revenue Requirement Categories 4 5 Please reproduce Figure 11-1 with additional columns to show the revenue breakdown for 6 each of 2023, 2024, and 2025. 7 8 Response IR-124: 9 10...
AI summary The response to Request IR-124 provides a revenue breakdown for 2023, 2024, and 2025, noting that NS Power earned below its allowed return on equity range in these years and expects to continue doing so in 2025. The equity ratio was also below the approved 40 percent, affecting the return on equity element of the revenue requirement.
NON-CONFIDENTIAL Category ($ Million) 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 15 NSIESO in 2025/2026? If so, please provide the details. 16 17 (c) If the total employees forecast to be transferred in 2025/2026 are less than 23, please 18 explain the diff...
AI summary The document outlines questions and responses regarding employee transfers from NS Power to the IESO-NS and related financial considerations, including potential deferrals of salaries and impacts on the utility's financial position and return on equity.
N-32Evidence - Cleary
28 passages
1.1 Qualifications This evidence is prepared by Dr. Sean Cleary, CFA of Queen's University. I am a Professor of Finance at the Smith School of Business at Queen's University. I earned my Ph.D. in Finance at the University of Toronto in 199...
AI summary Dr. Sean Cleary, a finance professor and expert witness, has extensive experience in cost of capital proceedings, having worked with multiple regulatory bodies and organizations across Canada. His expertise includes consulting for the Nova Scotia Energy and Regulatory Boards Tribunal, the Ontario Energy Board, and the Office of the Utilities Consumer Advocate of Alberta, among others.
2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY NS Power is requesting a continuation of its current allowed return on equity (ROE) of 9% and its 40% equity ratio (ER). NS Power notes in its application that Concentric recommended a much higher allowed ROE of 9.9% an...
AI summary NS Power is requesting a continuation of its current allowed return on equity (ROE) of 9% and equity ratio (ER) of 40%. Concentric recommended higher figures of 9.9% ROE and 45% ER, but the applicant argues that these are too high. The analysis suggests an appropriate ROE of 7.6% based on current market conditions and required returns.
3 ISSUES WITH CONCENTRIC'S ROE RECOMMENDATIONS Concentric's recommended allowed ROE of 9.9% is far too high for several reasons, which are discussed below.
AI summary Concentric's recommended allowed ROE of 9.9% is criticized as being too high, with several reasons discussed in the document.
3.1 Heavy Reliance on Allowed ROEs in Other (mostly U.S.) Jurisdictions Concentric's ROE and ER recommendations rely heavily on the main argument that since allowed ROEs and ERs in mainly U.S. jurisdictions are higher than those for NS Pow...
AI summary Concentric's recommendation to increase allowed ROE and ER is based on higher ROEs in U.S. jurisdictions, but this approach is criticized as flawed. Previous Alberta Utilities Commission decisions emphasize that regulators should not use ROEs from other jurisdictions and should consider market expectations and specific utility factors instead.
3.2 Concentric's Proxy Groups Concentric constructs a Canadian proxy group of five utilities, a U.S. Integrated Electric proxy group of 10 utilities, and a North American Electric proxy group that is comprised of three Canadian utilities a...
AI summary Concentric uses different proxy groups for determining the cost of equity for NS Power, including a North American Electric proxy group with a high proportion of U.S. utilities. The argument is that U.S. utilities are not suitable comparators for Canadian utilities due to higher business risk, supported by beta estimates showing significantly higher market risk for U.S. utilities compared to Canadian ones.
the actual return earned on a bond will reflect both components over a given period. In short, considering only the income return on a bond neglects an important component of the return on bonds. Consider for example the data provided in i...
AI summary This section discusses the importance of considering both income and capital gain/loss components in bond returns, using historical data from 1938 to 2024. It highlights that while income returns on bonds are always positive, total returns can be negative or exceed 15% due to capital losses or gains. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is used to estimate the required return on equity for Nova Scotia Power, incorporating the market risk premium (MRP).
3.5 Risk Premium Model Estimates In response to NS Power (NSEB - CLEARY) IR-11 Concentric confirmed the following regarding the Risk Premium Model it uses in its current evidence: • that the Risk Premium approach discussed on pages 52-56 o...
AI summary The document discusses the flaws in the Risk Premium Model used by NS Power, citing the Alberta 2018 GCOC Decision. It highlights two key concerns: the model's reliance on government bond yields instead of credit spreads and the use of U.S. approved ROEs as proxies for market returns, which are not considered strictly market data.
5.1 Some Notes on Allowed ROEs This section provides evidence demonstrating that allowed ROEs have not declined adequately in response to the reduction in the cost of capital that utilities' have experienced, as long-term government bond y...
AI summary This section argues that allowed return on equity (ROEs) have not sufficiently declined despite lower cost of capital for utilities, citing reduced long-term government and A-rated utility bond yields. Expected stock returns of 8.3% to 9.5% are noted, which are higher than current market estimates.
y close to those for Canada, and are slightly below long-term real GDP growth for Canada, but in line with long-term inflation in Canada, at least since the 2% inflation target was introduced in 1991. over the last two decades. Figure 9 sh...
AI summary The document discusses the evolution of the allowed return on equity (ROE) for Nova Scotia Power (NS Power) compared to risk-free (RF) and A-rated utility yields over the past two decades. It highlights that while allowed ROEs have declined slightly, RF and A yields have dropped more significantly, leading to an increase in the spreads between ROE and these measures, which directly affect the cost of capital for utilities.
5.2.1 CAPM Overview This section employs the commonly used CAPM to estimate the allowed ROE for a typical regulated Canadian utility. Essentially CAPM can be used to estimate the required ROE (or Ke) for a firm from the point of view of a...
AI summary This section explains the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its use in estimating the required rate of return on common equity for regulated Canadian utilities. It highlights the model's widespread adoption by financial analysts and CFOs, and emphasizes its continued relevance despite limitations, as it aligns with investor behavior.
5.2.2 Estimating the Risk-Free Rate (RF) Technically, the CAPM is a one-period model, and the government T-bill rate should be used as the appropriate RF, since it is virtually guaranteed and does not fluctuate. However, it is common pract...
AI summary The document discusses estimating the risk-free rate (RF) using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It explains that while T-bill rates are technically appropriate for short-term models, long-term government bond yields are more suitable for multi-period analyses, such as those used in utility regulation. The author uses a long-term government yield of 3.66% as of November 20, 2025, for RF, noting it is close to forecasted averages.
5.2.3 Expected Market Returns and Estimating the Market Risk Premium (MRP) The next CAPM input is the MRP that is measured by the expected long-term return on the equity market less the long-term government bond yield (which measures RF)....
AI summary The text discusses estimating the market risk premium (MRP) using expected long-term returns on the equity market and long-term government bond yields. It references Table 7, which includes historical returns and current forecasts from multiple financial institutions. The Alberta Utility Commission (AUC) is cited as affirming the relevance of financial professionals' return expectations for determining a fair return on equity (ROE) for regulated utilities. The author argues that market participant beliefs are more relevant than unrealistic assumptions used in previous proceedings.
urn of 7.5% represents an upper bound for the cost of equity to regulated utilities (before adding 0.50% for flotation costs), since they are less risky than the average company in the market. Figure 11 shows that the world market MRP, as...
AI summary The text discusses the estimation of the market risk premium (MRP) and expected market returns, highlighting that the 7.5% cost of equity for regulated utilities is an upper bound. It compares historical MRP figures for Canada, the U.S., and globally, noting that Canadian figures are slightly lower than U.S. figures. The analysis is supported by a Globe and Mail article discussing the performance of the iShare S&P/TSX 60 Index ETF (XIU).
5.2.4 Estimating Beta We now require a beta estimate to apply the CAPM, and my approach is justified based on the extensive empirical analysis and discussion regarding estimating beta that is provided in Appendix C of my evidence. In parti...
AI summary The text discusses estimating beta for Canadian utilities using the CAPM, noting that Canadian utility betas average between 0.20 and 0.40, with 0.35 as the best estimate. It argues against using traditional adjusted betas and highlights that U.S. utility betas are significantly higher and should not be used for Canadian utilities due to differences in business risk.
5.2.5 Final CAPM Estimates While government bond yields have risen over the past few years, they still remain relatively low, both in absolute terms and by historical standards. A-rated Canadian utility bond yield spreads were sitting at 1...
AI summary The document discusses the final CAPM estimates for Nova Scotia Power, adjusting for bond yield spreads, risk premiums, and financial flexibility. It accounts for lower-than-average yield spreads, adds a risk premium, and includes a flotation cost adjustment, resulting in a suggested ROE of 6.84%.
5.3.1 DCF Model Overview I use two approaches to apply the DCF model to estimate the appropriate ROE for regulated Canadian utilities using data as at the end of 2024 to: - 1. find the implied rate of return for the overall market, which s...
AI summary This section outlines the use of the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) within the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model to estimate the appropriate Return on Equity (ROE) for regulated Canadian utilities, using data from the end of 2024. The model assumes that the value of common shares is based on the present value of expected future dividends, with a constant growth rate applied indefinitely.
and Gregory A. Sommers. "Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts." Journal of Accounting Research 45 no. 5 (December 2007), pp. 983-1016. bias in analysts' growth forecasts inf...
AI summary The text discusses the impact of analyst optimism on DCF estimates, noting that overly optimistic growth forecasts can inflate cost of equity estimates. It references studies by Woolridge and Cornell, highlighting that forecasted EPS growth rates are often significantly higher than actual growth rates, which can be unrealistic for mature utilities.
It is difficult to find "typical" or representative Canadian regulated publicly-traded utilities. However, using averages and medians (which offset to some extent the influence of extreme observations) provides a useful starting point. Col...
AI summary The text discusses growth rate estimates for Canadian and U.S. regulated utilities using ROE and payout ratios, with a focus on the limitations of growth rates in the Dividend Discount Model (DDM). It references the AUC's position that growth rates should not exceed long-term GDP growth due to the monopolistic nature of utilities in mature markets.
us target for regulated utilities that operate virtual monopolies in mature markets, with little opportunity for dramatic growth, as also acknowledged previously by the AUC, in the 2013 GCOC Decision: However, the Commission is also mindfu...
AI summary The document discusses the use of GDP growth rates in DCF models for regulated utilities, cautioning against using analyst growth estimates that exceed GDP growth. It references past decisions and highlights the need to align growth assumptions with realistic GDP projections, as seen in Concentric's DCF estimates.
5.5 Price-to-Book Ratios and Equity Returns Table 10 reported a 2018-2024 average ROE for the 5 Canadian utilities in the Canadian sample of 7.51%. This figure is well below the 2024 allowed ROE for NS Power for example of 9%. This allowed...
AI summary The section discusses the relationship between allowed ROEs, earned ROEs, and investor required returns on equity by analyzing P/B ratios and stock returns for Canadian and U.S. utilities from 2018-2024. The average P/B ratios for Canadian utilities ranged between 1.44 and 1.85, while U.S. utilities had higher ratios, ranging from 1.69 to 2.36.
5.6 Summary of ROE Calculations I have weighted all three of my Ke estimates equally because all three methods are used in practice and provide different perspectives on Ke. As discussed previously, CAPM is more heavily relied upon in prac...
AI summary The document discusses the calculation of the allowed Canadian utility Return on Equity (ROE) using three methods: CAPM, DCF, and BYPRP. The author gives equal weighting to each method and calculates an estimated ROE of 7.6%. CAPM is highlighted as the most commonly used method due to its intuitive nature and conceptual advantages.
6.3 NS Power's Ability to Earn its Allowed ROE A useful way of reviewing the performance of utilities is to examine their ability to earn their allowed ROEs on a consistent basis. Table 13 reports the earned versus allowed ROEs for NS Powe...
AI summary This section discusses NS Power's ability to earn its allowed Return on Equity (ROE) from 2012 to 2024, showing that it has consistently met or exceeded its allowed ROE, with only slight underperformance in the last three years. This suggests NS Power has low total risk.
Table 13 NS Power Allowed versus Earned ROEs Earned Allowed Difference 2012 9.40 9.2 0.20 2013 9.24 9 0.24 2014 2015 9.25 9 0.25 2016 9.25 9 0.25 2017 9.25 9 0.25 2018 9.25 9 0.25 2019 9.25 9 0.25 2020 7.88 9 -1.12 2021 9.08 9 0.08 I was u...
AI summary Table 13 compares the earned and allowed return on equity (ROE) for NS Power from 2012 to 2021, showing a consistent difference between earned and allowed ROE, with the earned ROE generally being higher than the allowed ROE, except in recent years where the earned ROE has fallen below the allowed ROE.
6.5 Summary Overall, this section highlights that NS Power is a low-risk Canadian utility; however, it is slightly riskier than the average A-rated Canadian operating utility. This conclusion is consistent with the following main points re...
AI summary NS Power is characterized as a low-risk Canadian utility, though slightly riskier than average A-rated utilities. Its BBB ratings from DBRS and S&P are stable, and its financial risk profile is reasonable. A 40% equity ratio is deemed reasonable, considering its lower debt ratings and higher generational assets, though supported by Emera Inc.'s higher debt ratings.
Comparing the Risk of Canadian Utilities to U.S. Utilities The DBRS Morningstar January 15, 2025, debt rating report for NS Power identified "low- risk regulated electricity business" as the #1 consideration in its business risk assessment...
AI summary The text compares the business risk of Canadian utilities to U.S. utilities, noting that Canadian regulated utilities like NS Power and Ontario and Alberta transmission and distribution utilities have very low business risk. It highlights that these utilities consistently earn returns on equity (ROE) above allowed levels, indicating strong performance and regulatory support.
Beta Estimation In order to apply the CAPM, we require beta estimates. I copy below two figures and some of the discussion from previous Alberta GCOC proceedings, that discusses historical beta estimates: 1. I make reference to Figure 6 at...
AI summary The text discusses historical beta estimates for Canadian utility companies, referencing data from Alberta GCOC proceedings. It highlights that average betas over long periods (1988-2016 and 1995-2017) range between 0.31 and 0.35, with maximums not exceeding 0.72. The argument is made that adjusting betas toward 1 is not supported by historical evidence.
storical evidence above confirms the following three important facts: 1. Canadian utility beta estimates have averaged somewhere between 0.20 and 0.40 – with 0.35 representing the best estimate. - 2. Canadian utility beta estimates have ne...
AI summary The text discusses historical beta estimates for Canadian and U.S. utilities, noting that Canadian utilities have beta estimates between 0.20 and 0.40, with 0.35 as the best estimate. It argues against using traditional adjusted betas and U.S. utility betas, recommending a range of 0.30 to 0.60 for Canadian utilities.
e realistic. See for example: "Monitoring changes in analysts' advice gives key insight: report," (Tim Shufelt, Globe and Mail, Report on Business, May 24, 2019, page B7. three witnesses in their single-stage DCF models are in excess of th...
AI summary The Commission states that long-term growth rates in single-stage DCF models must not exceed long-term GDP growth estimates, citing that utilities operate in mature markets as monopolies. It also notes that analyst growth estimates are upwardly biased and should not be used in DCF models.
N-44STATE OF CONNECTICUT
PUBLIC UTILITIES REGULATORY AUTHORITY
42 passages
A. SUMMARY The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (Authority or PURA) approves an annual revenue requirement for The United Illuminating Company (UI or Company) in the amount of $450,789,348 for the rate year November 1, 2025, through O...
AI summary The Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) approves a revenue requirement of $450,789,348 for The United Illuminating Company for the rate year 2025-2026. This includes a reduced return on equity of 9.25%, down from the 10.5% proposed by the Company. The Company may recover additional executive compensation if certain performance targets are met.
ated that a revenue increase of $63.7 million "is sufficient to enable the Company to operate its business and continue providing excellent service to its customers in Connecticut." Id., Ex. 1, p. 6. OCC actively participated in this proce...
AI summary OCC actively participated in the proceeding, recommending the rejection of UI's rate increase application and proposing a lower rate of return, disallowing certain expenses, and addressing customer service incentives and unjustified plant investments.
A. SUMMARY Rate base is a fundamental concept of cost-of-service ratemaking. Rate base is the investor-supplied facilities and other investments necessary to supply a utility service to consumers in a safe, reliable, and cost-effective man...
AI summary Rate base is central to cost-of-service ratemaking, representing the capital on which a return is earned. It is determined by proving that the utility's plant is in use and serving the public and that the capital investment was prudent and reasonable. Legal precedents and statutes support this approach.
Table 24: Weighted Average Cost of Capital Without ROE Reductions Capital Source Allocation Cost Weighted Cost Common Equity 51% 9.450% 4.820% Long-Term Debt 49% 4.739% 2.322% Total Capitalization 100% 7.142% Table 25: Weighted Average Cos...
AI summary The tables present the weighted average cost of capital for a company, comparing scenarios with and without ROE reductions. Common equity and long-term debt are the capital sources considered, with slight differences in costs and weighted costs between the two scenarios.
The Authority identified a group of 26 prospective companies to ascertain the market-based range of the cost of equity (COE) for the Company. The Authority uses certain criteria (Authority Screening Criteria) to identify companies that hav...
AI summary The Authority identified 26 prospective companies to determine the market-based cost of equity (COE) for the Company, using specific screening criteria. The criteria include revenue sources, credit ratings, and financial stability. The Authority does not assess the prudence of future expenditures that may not materialize. Proxy groups were proposed by the Company, OCC, and EOE, with recommendations focusing on publicly traded electric companies.
1. Summary The Authority finds that a capital structure consisting of 51% common equity and 49% long-term debt is reasonable. The table below summarizes the authorized allocation.
AI summary The Authority determines that a capital structure with 51% common equity and 49% long-term debt is reasonable, as outlined in the summarized authorized allocation table.
1. Summary The Authority finds that a net ROE of 9.25% reflects a commensurate rate of return based on variety of factors, including current market conditions, the regulatory environment, and the level of service and management provided by...
AI summary The Authority determines that a net return on equity (ROE) of 9.25% is appropriate for the Company, considering market conditions, regulatory environment, and service quality. An unadjusted ROE of 9.45% was deemed reasonable, but a 20 basis point reduction is applied to address performance deficiencies and encourage improvement.
a. DCF Model Description The DCF model is a market-based financial model that attempts to replicate the valuation process used by investors. The DCF model assumes that investors evaluate stocks in a classical economic framework and buy and...
AI summary The DCF model is a financial tool used to estimate the value of a company based on its expected future cash flows. It assumes rational investment behavior and uses a discount rate to calculate present value. The model requires assumptions such as constant growth rates and stable dividend payouts, and it uses the formula K = D1/Po + G to determine the required rate of return (ROE).
's new mean growth rates for Value Line, Zacks, and S&P Cap IQ are 5.69%, 7.12%, and 6.93% respectively, for a calculated average growth rate mean of 6.58% and a median of 6.54%. PFT, Ex. AEB-4 CGDCF. OCC proposed a growth rate methodology...
AI summary The document discusses the proposed growth rate methodology by OCC, which uses a range of growth measures rather than solely EPS growth estimates. It highlights the upward bias in Wall Street analysts' forecasts and proposes a midpoint growth rate for the OCC Electric Proxy Group and the Company Proxy Group.
d. DCF Results Once the Expected Growth Rate and Expected Dividend Yield are determined, the ROE is determined by adding the two. As discussed in Section V.E.2.b, Expected Growth Rate, PURA determined a composite average expected growth ra...
AI summary The document discusses the calculation of Return on Equity (ROE) using the Dividend Discount Formula (DCF) based on Expected Growth Rate and Expected Dividend Yield ranges determined by PURA for the Authority Proxy Group, resulting in an estimated ROE range of 7.33% to 12.01%.
Table 33: DCF Results Company Forecasted Div'd Yield (%) Composite Growth Rate Average (%) Yield + Growth Rate (%) Alliant Energy Corporation 3.33 5.83 9.16 Ameren Corporation 2.92 6.49 9.41 American Electric Power 3.61 6.08 9.69 Avista Co...
AI summary Table 33 presents DCF results for various energy companies, showing forecasted dividend yields, composite growth rates, and combined yield plus growth rates. The ROEs for the 19 companies in the Authority Proxy Group ranged from 7.62% to 11.28%, with a mean of 9.25% and a median of 9.16%. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of these ROEs.
a. CAPM Model Description The CAPM evaluates the relationship between the expected return and risk of investing in a security; CAPM can be used to calculate the expected return of an asset. Therefore, like the DCF model, by incorporating p...
AI summary The CAPM model is used to evaluate the relationship between expected return and risk for investments. It calculates the required return on equity (ROE) by incorporating a risk-free rate, beta coefficient, and the equity risk premium. This model helps determine commensurate ROEs for utilities based on their risk profiles.
b. Beta Coefficient The measure of Beta in the CAPM analysis represents the volatility of a proxy group of companies as compared to the aggregate market. In its CAPM model, the Company used the betas of the Company Proxy Group as reported...
AI summary The document discusses the Beta Coefficient in the CAPM model used by the Company and OCC, highlighting different methods for calculating beta, including data from Bloomberg, Value Line, and S&P Capital IQ. The Company and OCC used various beta ranges and adjustments to determine the average beta for their proxy groups.
5.70% respectively), that there is no support from historical return data, surveys, and academic studies to support a market risk premium of 7.97% as used by the Company. Woolridge PFT, pp. 61, 78–79. EOE calculated its ERP by subtracting...
AI summary The document discusses the calculation of the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) by EOE, using the S&P 500's expected return and the risk-free rate. EOE's approach involves estimating the option-implied growth rate of the S&P 500 and adding the dividend yield before subtracting the risk-free rate. Four ERP estimates were derived using different methods and timeframes.
Table 36: ERP Data Range Mean/Proposed Company (application) 7.74% to 8.02% - Company (updated) 8.58% to 8.75% - OCC Proposed ERP - 5.00% Historical Risk Premium Studies 4.40% to 6.80% 5.57% Financial Surveys Kroll (formerly Duff & Phelps)...
AI summary Table 36 presents ERP data with various ranges and proposed values, including inputs from different studies and models. The data includes historical risk premium studies, financial surveys, and ex-ante models, along with proposed ERP values from the Office of the Commissioner of Competition (OCC).
e. CAPM Results Using the components as determined above, the Authority's CAPM results for the Authority Proxy Group provide an ROE range of 8.32% to 9.86%, as summarized in the table [below.](#page-74-2)
AI summary The Authority's CAPM results for the Authority Proxy Group indicate an ROE range of 8.32% to 9.86%, based on the components determined in the proceeding.
Table 37: CAPM Results Range Rf Beta ERP ROE Low 4.57% 0.75 5.00% 8.32% High 4.82% 0.84 6.00% 9.86% Average 4.70% 0.795 5.50% 9.067% 4. Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model The Company also included the results of an Empirical CAPM (ECAPM...
AI summary The document presents the results of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and discusses the use of the Empirical CAPM (ECAPM) in the Company's Application. The ECAPM formula is described, with weights applied to the market risk premium and beta.
5. Bond Yield Risk Premium The Company also proposed using the bond yield plus risk premium (BYPRP) model for determining ROE. Ex. UI-AEB-1, pp. 33–37. The BYPRP approach "is based on the fundamental principle that equity investors bear th...
AI summary The Company proposed using the bond yield plus risk premium (BYPRP) model to determine return on equity (ROE). However, the Authority rejected the BYPRP approach, citing its reliance on Commission-allowed ROEs rather than market-based methods like DCF or CAPM, and noting that it is not widely accepted in utility ratemaking.
6. Comparable Allowed ROEs Although the Authority will not consider financial models based on other public utility commission allowed ROEs, the Authority will examine the ROEs approved in other jurisdictions. Notably, the authorized ROE is...
AI summary The Authority acknowledges that previously allowed ROEs from other jurisdictions are historical and may not reflect current market conditions. It reviewed data from Regulatory Research Associates (RRA) showing that the average authorized ROE for electric utilities increased slightly to 9.74% in 2024.
7. Current Economic Conditions The Authority reviewed changes to certain financial indicators comparing current yields to those present at the 22-08-08 Decision. The purpose of this static analysis is to provide a barometer to establish th...
AI summary The Authority analyzed changes in financial indicators, comparing current yields to those from the 22-08-08 Decision to assess the direction of Return on Equity (ROE). Economic indicators like interest rates influence the allowed ROE, and the Authority uses its Cost of Equity (COE) models to determine the final allowed ROE.
a. Company's Financial Risk The Authority considers the financial risk of the Company as it compares to the Authority Proxy Group to determine if there are unique financial risks or risk mitigations to consider when establishing an ROE. Th...
AI summary The Authority evaluates the financial risk of the Company compared to the Authority Proxy Group and finds that UI's risk profile does not warrant special consideration in determining ROE. Bond ratings and risk mitigation mechanisms such as RAM and C&LM programs reduce financial risk, leading to the conclusion that UI's risk is comparable to other companies in the proxy group.
b. Environmental, Social, and Governance Scores When determining an appropriate ROE, the Authority considers a utility's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score in assessing the utility's risk profile. An ESG score measures how w...
AI summary The Authority considers a utility's ESG score when determining an appropriate ROE. The Company's ESG scores, including a CIS-3 from Moody's and a score of 3 from Fitch, indicate a neutral-to-moderate influence on its risk profile, suggesting that ESG issues are not a significant factor in assessing the Company's risk.
c. General Statutes § 16-kk Factors In establishing a Company's authorized return, the Authority must consider: Quality, reliability and cost of service provided by the Company, the reduced or shifted demand for electricity, gas or water r...
AI summary The Authority must consider factors such as service quality, cost, conservation programs, economic development, and energy policy when determining a company's authorized return. The Authority found that the record does not support an adjustment to the company's ROE based on these considerations.
9. Approved ROE In determining a reasonable ROE, the Authority considers the analytical models for commensurate utility returns, allowed ROEs in other jurisdictions, the prevailing market conditions, and the Company's risk profile. The Aut...
AI summary The Authority determines a reasonable Return on Equity (ROE) for the Company by evaluating analytical models (DCF and CAPM), market conditions, and the Company's financial profile. The DCF model suggests an ROE range of 8.70% to 9.60%, while the CAPM model suggests 8.05% to 9.86%. Considering the Company's financial stability and regulatory environment, the Authority adopts a 9.45% ROE.
a. Introduction The approved ROE is based on a similarly situated electric utility providing expert, efficient, and prudent management of the utility franchise; therefore, the Authority must consider whether to adjust the ROE for the Compa...
AI summary The Authority concludes that a 20 basis point reduction to the Company's allowed ROE is necessary due to its deficient performance in managing parts of its utility franchise, aiming to incentivize improvement and balance investor and consumer interests.
b. English Station The Authority determines that the Company's continuing failure to complete remediation of English Station represents both ongoing non-compliance with a condition of its Authority-approved merger with Iberdrola and defici...
AI summary The Authority criticizes the Company for failing to remediate English Station, leading to non-compliance with merger conditions and poor management. The failure to track labor costs for remediation has led to improper inclusion in base rates. A 10 basis point reduction in allowed ROE is proposed to encourage better management and expedite remediation.
tion site or pay the State of Connecticut the difference.· The court holds that PURA plainly has the statutory authority and regulatory discretion to consider whether compliance with PURA's own orders In the Company's last base distributio...
AI summary The document discusses a regulatory proceeding involving the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) and its authority to enforce compliance with its own orders. It references a past decision where a company was found non-compliant with remediation requirements, leading to a reduction in its Return on Equity (ROE).
dates—whether involving investigatory efforts, sampling, report submissions, document revisions, inspections, or physical remediation—is just 10 entries. Ex. UI-ERP-7; Interrog. Resp. RSR-212, Att. 1. Perhaps in a tacit acknowledgement of...
AI summary The document discusses the limited progress in UI's remediation efforts, noting only 10 entries related to these efforts. UI argues that the Authority's discretion in reducing its ROE is limited to specific findings of imprudent decisions, but the text emphasizes that the Authority must consider broader factors including technical, financial, and managerial efficiency, as well as compliance with state laws and regulations.
iii. Non-Compliance with Authority Direction related to English Station Costs The Company's decision to forego tracking internal employee labor costs at English Station violates an express condition of the Authority's prior approval for th...
AI summary The Company's failure to track internal employee labor costs at English Station violates a prior Authority condition on the sale of the facility, constituting evidence of imprudent management. This non-compliance justifies an ROE reduction in the current rate proceeding. The Authority previously approved the sale with terms ensuring ratepayers would not bear future environmental remediation costs beyond a bulkhead repair.
iv. Conclusion In balancing the limited progress that UI has made against the Authority's continued concerns with the Company's lingering remediation efforts and concerns with the Company's failure to comply with the English Station Transf...
AI summary The Authority reduces UI's ROE by 10 basis points to encourage better compliance with remediation efforts and Authority decisions related to the English Station Transfer Decision. The reduction remains in effect until UI complies with the Merger Decision or until the next rate case concludes.
c. Advanced Metering Infrastructure Plan and Benefits Cost Analysis The Authority determines that a five (5) basis point reduction to the Company's ROE is warranted for failure to comply with Authority orders and requirements for submittin...
AI summary The Authority imposes a five-basis-point reduction to the Company's ROE due to non-compliance with orders and requirements for submitting an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Plan, as per a decision dated January 3, 2024.
iv. Conclusion The Authority determines that a five (5) basis point reduction to the Company's ROE is warranted for failure to comply with the orders and requirements of the AMI Decision regarding the required content of a Final AMI Plan t...
AI summary The Authority reduces the Company's ROE by five basis points due to non-compliance with the AMI Decision's requirements for the Final AMI Plan. The reduction remains in effect until the Company submits a compliant AMI Plan or until the next rate case concludes.
d. Non-Compliance with Other Authority Orders In addition to the foregoing adjustments, the Authority finds an additional five (5) basis points reduction is warranted to address other instances where the Company failed to comply with expre...
AI summary The Authority imposes an additional 5 basis points reduction due to the Company's non-compliance with regulatory orders. This follows a failure to adhere to state and federal laws and the Authority's direction, as highlighted in legal precedents. The Authority also sought comments on continuing ROE reductions and other factors affecting rate of return.
rly 18 months prior to the March 14, 2024 direction. Id. [54](#page-97-0) Regardless of the rationale, it is clear that the Company made an affirmative decision to disregard the Authority's direction. As with the ROE reduction related to t...
AI summary The document discusses a company's non-compliance with PURA's directives related to DERMS and the Water Heater Rental Program, and the company's argument that reducing its ROE by 5 basis points without notice would violate its due process rights. The company also conflates the notice requirements for rate proceedings with the Authority's regulatory discretion.
("the Authority agrees that the program should be phased out as quickly as possible in order to avoid the replacement of such heaters and the possibility of future stranded assets") (emphasis added). Based on the record before it, the Auth...
AI summary The Authority agrees to phase out the Water Heater Rental Program quickly to avoid future stranded assets. It criticizes the Company for delaying phase-out efforts and insists on a definitive wind-down cost recovery decision, which the Authority deems noncompliant with its guidance. As a result, an ROE reduction is justified.
iii. Conclusion Even in isolation, individual instances of non-compliance with specific Authority orders and direction are concerning. Taken together, though, the above examples paint a broader picture of non-compliance with Authority orde...
AI summary The Authority has imposed an additional five basis point reduction in ROE due to the Company's repeated non-compliance with Authority orders, emphasizing the need for corrective action. This reduction will remain in effect until the next rate case, when compliance will be reassessed.
e. Summation of ROE Reductions Based on the above, the Authority concludes that a cumulative twenty (20) basis point reduction to the Company's ROE is warranted to account for instances where UI failed to provide expert, efficient, and pru...
AI summary The Authority concludes that a 20 basis point reduction in UI's ROE is warranted due to instances of inefficient and imprudent management, to align rates with service quality, and to incentivize improvement. UI's allowed ROE is adjusted from 9.45% to 9.25%.
2. Earnings Sharing Mechanism The Company proposes that its earnings sharing mechanism (ESM) continue as it is currently constructed with two adjustments: (1) the ESM calculation should reflect UI's actual equity ratio, not its authorized...
AI summary The Company proposes adjustments to its Earnings Sharing Mechanism (ESM), including reflecting its actual equity ratio and including disallowed expenses. The Authority rejects these proposals, maintaining the existing 50/50 split between ratepayers and shareholders for over-earnings above the allowed ROE, citing concerns over capital structure balance and legal principles.
ating company level—facts that support narrowly tailored reporting requirements. See Interrog. Resp. UPA-15; Interrog. Resp. UPA-26; Interrog. Resp.UPA-40; Interrog. Resp. UPA-41; Hr'g Tr., 475:16–22. Finally, the Company's assertion that...
AI summary The document discusses the need for transparency in ESG contributions by Avangrid, emphasizing that such contributions should be integral to the company's strategy and not contingent on regulatory outcomes. It highlights the importance of consistent local implementation and accountability to communities, with potential future ROE adjustments depending on ESG integration and outcomes.
formation in self-drafted word documents), 276–279 (detailing EOE's identification of numerous deficiencies on call recordings, as well as the revision lag for Company policy and procedure documents). As a result of these findings, the Aut...
AI summary The Authority identified multiple deficiencies in the Company's customer service practices, including issues with policy documents and call center performance. In response, the Authority directed the Company to hire additional staff, rectify violations, and reduce its ROE by 20 basis points to encourage improvement in customer service performance.
A. CONCLUSION The Authority approves an annual revenue requirement for UI in the amount of $450,789,348 for the rate year commencing November 1, 2025. This represents an increase of $65,924,348 from the Company's currently authorized reven...
AI summary The Authority approves an annual revenue requirement of $450,789,348 for UI, an increase from the current $384,865,000. This includes an allowed return on equity of 9.45%, reduced by 20 basis points to 9.25% due to performance and management issues. The Authority also addresses cost allocation, rate design, revenue adjustment mechanisms, and customer service.
- 16. In its next rate amendment application, the Company shall specifically identify any proposed rate base inclusion of completed plant that is not yet used and useful, as discussed in Section , . For any proposed inclusion in rate base...
AI summary The Company is required to clarify the inclusion of unused and unuseful plant in the rate base, justify any special circumstances for such inclusion, and refine load-carrying capacity adjustment values in consultation with the Office of Consumer Counsel. Additionally, the Company must continue calculating the ESM with a 50/50 split between ratepayers and shareholders for over-earning above the allowed ROE.
N-51Ontario Energy Board Decision EB-2024-0063
77 passages
This is a Decision and Order of the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) regarding a generic proceeding initiated on its own motion to consider the cost of capital and other matters for electricity transmitters, electricity distributors, natural gas...
AI summary The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) has finalized the cost of capital parameters for electricity transmitters, distributors, natural gas utilities, and rate-regulated generators, effective January 1, 2025. Key parameters include a 9.00% return on equity, 4.51% deemed long-term debt rate, and 3.91% deemed short-term debt rate. The new framework will be reviewed in five years, and Q2 2025 prescribed interest rates for deferral and variance accounts and construction work in progress accounts have been set.
eps in this proceeding included the Issues Conference, expert reports, interrogatories, a Presentation Day, a six-day oral hearing over three weeks, written submissions, and written reply submissions. The following schedules summarize and...
AI summary This proceeding involved various stages including an Issues Conference, expert reports, interrogatories, a Presentation Day, and a six-day oral hearing. Schedules C through H outline revised methodologies for calculating the cost of capital, ROE, DLTDR, DSTDR, and prescribed interest rates. The OEA is representing the CLD+ group of utilities.
3.1.1 Current Cost of Capital Framework Schedule H includes a detailed description of the OEB's 2009 Cost of Capital Framework. The OEB concurs with the Staff Report from 2016 which concluded that the 2009 Cost of Capital Framework worked...
AI summary The OEB confirms the effectiveness of the 2009 Cost of Capital Framework, which aligns with the Fair Return Standard (FRS). The FRS comprises three components: comparable investment standard, financial integrity standard, and capital attraction standard. The OEB is establishing a new Cost of Capital Framework in accordance with the FRS.
Regulatory and Rate-Setting Mechanisms LEI stated that as the perceived stability of future cash flows is a key consideration for investors, a regulated utility's ability to recover its capital and operating costs profoundly relies on avai...
AI summary The discussion centers on the importance of regulatory and rate-setting mechanisms for utilities, emphasizing their impact on investor confidence, debt ratings, and risk assessment. LEI and Dr. Cleary support retaining current policies on risk factors. Concentric suggests comparing Ontario's mechanisms with peer companies. Nexus highlights the influence of regulatory environments on utility risk and warns against approving a lower ROE for Ontario distributors.
s, March 28, 2024, p. 6. extent that energy transition increased or decreased the need for capital investments, this is dealt with through the regular rate cases, rather than a generic consideration. Several ratepayer groups submitted that...
AI summary Ratepayer groups and organizations discuss the impact of energy transition on capital investments and risk for electricity utilities. Some argue that energy transition is not yet significant and may reduce risk, while others emphasize the need to account for energy transition risk in rate cases. The EDA and OEA highlight that energy transition is inevitable and that new capital is required now, which introduces risk.
Regulatory and Rate-Setting Mechanisms OEB staff agreed with LEI and Dr. Cleary that any regulatory mechanism that can significantly impact the stability of future cash flows must be considered part of regulatory risks. OEB staff concluded...
AI summary OEB staff, LEI, and Dr. Cleary argue that regulatory mechanisms since 2009 have moderately reduced utility risk, but the OEA cautions that this does not fully reflect overall business risk. CCC, Pollution Probe, SEC, and Energy Probe support the view that regulatory policies have decreased risk, citing improvements like DVAs and capital cost recovery. VECC and CME suggest that policy changes should be reflected in ROE or capital structure adjustments.
Energy Transition There is an energy transition underway in this province and around the world. It has been defined as a shift from fossil fuels towards a sustainable, renewable energy future. It is expected to result in a greater demand f...
AI summary The document discusses the energy transition in Nova Scotia and its implications for the electricity sector, noting increased demand for electricity and its impact on utilities. The OEB acknowledges both the risks and opportunities this transition presents and has established a five-year Cost of Capital Framework without immediate adjustments for energy transition effects.
Other Risks and Regulatory and Rate-Setting Mechanisms Utilities have argued that in addition to energy transition, other risks are increasing such as cyber security, changes in sales volumes, extreme weather events, and changes in governm...
AI summary Utilities argue that risks such as cybersecurity and extreme weather have increased, but ratepayer groups and OEB staff claim regulatory mechanisms have reduced utility risk since 2009. The OEB finds no increased risk from energy transition or operations, and notes that Enbridge Gas and OPG will have their risk profiles reviewed in separate proceedings. Trade tariffs are not factored into the new Cost of Capital Framework due to limited evidence.
Expert Report Proposals The expert reports differed on their assessment of the OEB's current approach to the determination of debt and equity from the perspective of investors. LEI and Dr. Cleary both generally agreed that the OEB's existi...
AI summary Expert reports differ on the OEB's approach to determining debt and equity for investors. LEI and Dr. Cleary support the OEB's current methods, while Concentrics highlights challenges with ROE formulas. Nexus argues the OEB's approach fails to meet the FRS and does not adequately serve equity investors.
Submissions OEB staff agreed with Concentric's view that the perspectives of debt and equity investors in the utility sector are among the most relevant considerations in setting the cost of capital parameters and capital structure. These...
AI summary The OEB staff and various stakeholders discuss the relevance of debt and equity investors' perspectives in determining the cost of capital parameters. The OEA highlights the impact of increased capital spending on financial results and risk perception, while CCMBC argues that municipal investors differ from outside investors. VECC supports using market data and credit rating agencies' views in setting cost of capital parameters.
Findings Under Issue 11, the OEB asked about the perspectives of debt and equity investors related to cost of capital parameters and capital structure. There is little debate that the perspectives of debt and equity investors in the utilit...
AI summary The OEB inquired about the perspectives of debt and equity investors on cost of capital parameters and capital structure. Both investor groups are crucial in determining the balance of risk and return, influencing the cost of capital and capital structure of regulated utilities.
Equity Investors' Perspective Equity investors are more exposed to market volatility and regulatory changes and typically require a higher return to compensate for the greater risk of investing in a utility as an equity investor (versus a...
AI summary Equity investors require higher returns due to increased exposure to market and regulatory risks. A higher equity ratio can provide financial stability and reduce dilution of shareholder returns. The OEB faces the challenge of balancing cost of capital parameters and capital structure to satisfy both debt and equity investors while avoiding excessive rates for consumers.
Expert Report Proposals LEI stated that the OEB's existing methodology implicitly accounts for differences in sources of funding when approving rate applications. LEI recommended that this aspect of the OEB methodology be retained. Consist...
AI summary The document discusses the methodology used by the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) for determining the cost of capital parameters, emphasizing that the OEB's current approach, which does not consider ownership structure, is consistent with the Fair Return Standard and Canadian Supreme Court judgments. Experts such as LEI and Dr. Cleary support the status quo, while Concentric argues that the cost of capital should be based on the use of funds rather than the source of funds.
Submissions OEB staff submitted that the approach to setting the cost of capital parameters and capital structure should not depend on a utility's ownership and the source of funds. OEB staff noted that its view is consistent with the view...
AI summary The OEB, OEA, and EDA argue that the cost of capital and capital structure should not vary by ownership type, emphasizing consistency with the FRS and the use of funds over source. AMPCO/IGUA and CCMBC, along with Energy Probe, challenge this, stating that municipally owned utilities face different financial realities and should be treated differently due to their lack of competition in capital markets and differing levels of protection.
Findings Whether a utility finances its operations through capital markets, municipal debt, or government lending, the fundamental risk associated with the utility's activities (such as the regulatory environment, business model, and marke...
AI summary The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) emphasizes that the cost of capital for utilities should be determined based on risk profiles and use of funds, not ownership or financing sources. This approach ensures fairness and consistency in rate-setting, avoiding inequities and unnecessary complexity. The OEB maintains a stable regulatory framework aligned with financial theory and long-standing policy.
Overview of Recommended Base ROEs The two utility groups (the OEA and EDA) supported higher base ROEs, the ratepayer groups supported lower base ROEs, and OEB staff supported a middle ground approach. OEB staff recommended a 2025 base ROE...
AI summary OEB staff recommended a 2025 base ROE range of 8.79% to 9.32%, arguing it aligns with the status quo, Canadian energy regulators' approvals, and balances utility and ratepayer interests. They emphasized that risk differences are already addressed in equity ratios and used historical expert data for triangulation calculations.
Fair Return Standard and Economic Rent OEB staff noted that the general principles outlined in the 2009 Report were well accepted and none of the four experts (as well as OEB staff) in this proceeding appeared to take issue with them. Howe...
AI summary OEB staff emphasized that the 2009 Report's principles are well accepted, but noted that a return exceeding FRS constitutes economic rent. Ratepayer groups argued that the current allowed ROE amounts to economic rent. EDA and OEA stated that the deemed ROE must be increased to meet FRS and criticized Dr. Cleary's 7.05% base ROE proposal.
Multiple Methodologies In OEB staff's view, it was neither necessary nor advisable for the OEB to pick one of the four expert recommendations in this case, or to make a finding on which methodology (e.g., CAPM, DCF or Risk Premium) or whic...
AI summary OEB staff recommend using multiple methodologies (e.g., CAPM, DCF, Risk Premium) to determine ROE rather than selecting one approach. The EDA argues against averaging expert ROE figures, while the OEA supports using multiple models with corroboration to determine a fair ROE.
Non-Canadian Comparators OEB staff stated that investors are willing to accept lower returns in Ontario because the risk is lower and U.S. utilities are not actually comparable in risk to Ontario utilities. OEB staff noted that none of the...
AI summary OEB staff argue that U.S. utilities are not comparable to Ontario utilities due to lower risk and suggest expanding comparator scope globally. EDA supports using U.S. data, while OEA notes that models used by experts are simplified and have flaws. Different entities propose varying applications of ROE across utility segments.
Other ROE Matters Both the EDA and the OEA noted that their respective experts (Nexus and Concentric) made no adjustment to their proposed ROEs to reflect any risk associated with the energy transition. Several ratepayer groups noted that...
AI summary The EDA and OEA indicated that their experts did not adjust proposed ROEs for energy transition risks. Ratepayer groups argue that higher ROEs reinforce utility bias toward capital expenditures, hindering a cost-effective energy transition.
Findings The OEB affirms that in setting this important component of the determination of the cost of capital for regulated utilities it adopts the requirements of the FRS, as set out in the 2009 Report. These requirements mandate a regula...
AI summary The OEB sets a deemed ROE of 9.00% for 2025, incorporating a base ROE of 8.75% and 25 basis points for flotation costs. It affirms the FRS as the standard for determining the cost of capital and rejects using ROE to address differences among regulated utilities, opting instead for capital structure adjustments. Multiple methodologies were considered, but none were deemed without flaws.
Use of U.S. Based Utility Data in 2009 Report The 2009 Report provided a departure from the content used to determine what constituted comparable investments from previous utility regulation in Ontario and in other Canadian provinces.[28](...
AI summary The 2009 Report marked a shift in utility regulation by incorporating U.S. data for comparable investments, a practice later adopted by LEI, Nexus, and Concentric. This approach influenced the determination of cost of capital parameters and led to recommendations for higher ROE levels for Ontario utilities, with the claim that financial integrity and capital-raising ability are unaffected by the current framework.
Summary of ROE Findings The OEB has determined that the approved ROE to be allowed OEB-regulated utilities, in accordance with Section 3.6 of this Decision, will be firmly connected to the actual experience of the current 2009 Cost of Capi...
AI summary The OEB has determined that the approved ROE for regulated utilities will be based on the 2009 Cost of Capital Framework and future challenges. Concerns about using U.S. utility cost parameters are noted due to differences in risk and regulatory environments. The 2025 interim ROE of 8.75% is deemed appropriate, considering the energy transition and uncertainties.
Expert Report Proposals LEI's base ROE estimate did not include 50 basis points (or any basis points) of transaction costs implicitly assumed in the 2009 base ROE determination. LEI recommended considering the transaction costs associated...
AI summary LEI proposed excluding transaction costs from ROE estimates, while Concentric and Nexus disagreed, arguing that flotation costs should be included in ROE to ensure recovery. Nexus cited IFRS rules and suggested adding 50 basis points to the deemed ROE. Dr. Cleary supported the 50 basis point addition as a reasonable practice.
Submissions OEB staff noted that although the deemed ROE included a 50 basis point adder for "transactional costs" since the 2009 Report, the 2009 Report provided no rationale for embedding such costs in the ROE, nor for how the adder was...
AI summary OEB staff recommended eliminating the 50 basis point adder in the deemed ROE, which was originally included in the 2009 Report without rationale. They suggested utilities should recover actual transaction costs through rate applications. Concentric and Nexus provided arguments for retaining the adder, but OEB staff agreed with LEI that the adder may overcompensate utilities.
Findings The flotation cost adder of 50 basis points currently added to the ROE presents several difficulties in addressing costs attributed to have been incurred by Ontario utilities for maintaining equity. The adder is meant to recognize...
AI summary The flotation cost adder of 50 basis points added to the ROE faces challenges in addressing costs incurred by Ontario utilities. The adder is intended to cover expenses like underwriting fees, but few utilities rely on public equity markets. The 2009 Report lacks information on the derivation of the 50 basis point figure, and Nexus argues the adder should remain in perpetuity due to amortization over infinity, despite no evidence of initial scrutiny.
Expert Report Proposals Expert report proposals regarding two key components of the annual ROE adjustment formula (the Long Canada Bond Forecast (LCBF) and Utility Bond Yield Spread) are discussed in Section 3.4 of this Decision in more de...
AI summary The document discusses expert report proposals for adjusting the annual ROE formula, with varying recommendations from LEI, Concentric, Nexus, and Dr. Cleary on the adjustment factors for the LCBF and utility bond yield spread. Each entity provided different perspectives on the appropriate weights for the formula.
Submissions OEB staff submitted that LEI, Concentric, and Dr. Cleary proposed similar annual ROE adjustment formulas for adjusting the ROE beyond 2025, building on the approach approved in the 2009 consultation, but with revised factors. O...
AI summary OEB staff presented various proposals for adjusting the ROE beyond 2025, with differing views on how parameters should be revised. The OEA supported Concentric's proposals to adjust factors, while SEC argued for maintaining the 50% adjustment factor, citing its balance between macroeconomic changes and stability. CCC supported increasing adjustment factors, and SEC criticized reliance on historical relationships for determining adjustment factors.
Expert Report Proposals LEI stated that the OEB's current approach of revising the capital structure upon application if warranted due to an increase in business/financial risks is a reasonable practice, as the OEB has noted that risks rar...
AI summary LEI and Dr. Cleary support the OEB's approach to adjusting equity thickness based on risk assessments. Concentric argues that Ontario utilities have increased risks and lower equity ratios compared to U.S. peers, recommending a minimum deemed equity ratio of 45% for all Ontario utilities, with specific adjustments for OPG in its next payment amounts proceeding.
Submissions OEB staff and several ratepayer groups submitted that no changes need to be made to the OEB's policy on capital structure in this proceeding and the default equity thickness should remain at 40% for electricity distributors and...
AI summary OEB staff and ratepayer groups argue against changing the OEB's capital structure policy, maintaining the default equity thickness at 40% for electricity distributors and transmitters. They note that Ontario equity ratios are in line with other provinces and that risk levels have not changed significantly since 2009. OPG's equity ratio is to be reviewed in a future proceeding, and Enbridge Gas and EPCOR Natural Gas will continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Findings The OEB has reviewed the appropriateness of the capital structure for electricity transmitters, electricity distributors, natural gas utilities, and OPG considering the FRS. As part of the 2009 Report, the OEB determined that a de...
AI summary The OEB has reviewed and maintained a deemed capital structure of 60% debt and 40% equity for electricity distributors and transmitters, and 55% debt and 45% equity for OPG. It rejects the need for an upward adjustment to the base ROE if the capital structure remains unchanged, emphasizing the FRS requirement for reasonable returns based on risk.
Expert Report Proposals LEI recommended that the status quo approach (considering deemed capital structure regardless of the actual capital structure) should be retained. In LEI's view, this ensures fairness to both utilities (flexibility...
AI summary LEI, Concentric, and Dr. Cleary recommend retaining the status quo approach for deemed capital structure, emphasizing fairness to utilities and consumers, administrative simplicity, and flexibility in managing capital structures. The decision and order from March 27, 2025, references new transmission companies in Ontario.
Submissions OEB staff and several ratepayer groups agreed with LEI and Dr. Cleary that the status quo approach (considering deemed capital structure regardless of the actual capital structure) should be retained. OEB staff noted that this...
AI summary The discussion centers on the appropriate method for pricing notional debt in utility rate-making, with OEB staff, ratepayer groups, and others debating whether to use the weighted average cost of actual long-term debt, the DLTDR, or alternative approaches. There is emphasis on fairness, credit ratings, and the need for consistent policy.
Electricity Distributors and Transmitters The 2009 Report affirmed the deemed equity ratio of 40% equity / 60% debt for electricity distributors. Since the 2009 Report, the OEB has extended the deemed equity ratio of 40% to electricity tra...
AI summary The 2009 Report established a 40% equity / 60% debt deemed capital structure for electricity distributors, which the OEB has extended to transmitters. The OEB maintains this approach as it provides a standardized framework for rate-setting, balances fairness, and safeguards ratepayers from financial distortions.
Enbridge Gas The current OEB-approved capital structure for Enbridge Gas is based on a deemed 38% equity component, with the remaining 62% financed through short-term and longterm debt. The difference is that the deemed structure is not se...
AI summary The OEB has approved Enbridge Gas's capital structure, which is deemed to be 38% equity and 62% debt. This structure was adjusted in the EB-2022-0200 proceeding, reflecting updated assessments of business and financial risks. The OEB finds that the current approach to determining debt costs is appropriate and aligns with FRS.
OPG OPG's current approved equity ratio is 45%. The current OEB-approved capital structure is based on a deemed 45% equity component, with the remaining 55% financed through short-term and long-term debt. As with Enbridge Gas, the deemed c...
AI summary The document discusses OPG's approved equity ratio of 45% and its capital structure, which is set on a case-by-case basis. It explains how short-term debt is used to adjust OPG's deemed capitalization and how the OEB finds the current approach to determining debt costs appropriate. The OEB also concludes that this method ensures regulatory stability and compliance with FRS.
Use of the DLTDR No expert took issue with the OEB's general policy to rely primarily on the embedded or actual cost for existing long-term debt instruments. The experts disagreed on whether the DLTDR should be used as a cap in certain cir...
AI summary Experts generally support the OEB's use of embedded or actual costs for existing long-term debt, but disagree on whether the DLTDR should act as a cap. LEI and Dr. Cleary recommend using the DLTDR as a cap for all utilities, while Concentric argues that utilities should forecast their own debt rates with OEB approval.
Calculation of DLTDR OEB staff and Pollution Probe supported LEI's suggested approach. OEB staff noted that using updated data as at September 30, 2024, the base LCBF should be 3.127% and the base utility bond spread should be 1.427%, summ...
AI summary The document discusses the calculation of the Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate (DLTDR) with various stakeholders providing input. OEB staff and Pollution Probe supported LEI's approach, while Concentric recommended using bank forecasts. AMPCO/IGUA and CCC supported Dr. Cleary's method of using actual bond yields, and SEC suggested averaging yields over a slightly larger range to reduce noise. VECC supported the current 30-day historical average approach.
Findings The DLTDR will continue to be applicable to all electricity distributors and transmitters, as well as EPCOR Natural Gas (both Aylmer and South Bruce), rebasing rates in 2025 and beyond, in prescribed circumstances, unless some oth...
AI summary The OEB concludes that the DLTDR will continue to apply to electricity distributors and transmitters, as well as EPCOR Natural Gas, with rebasing rates in 2025 and beyond. However, for OPG and Enbridge Gas, the DLTDR will not cap the unfunded portion of their capital structure, and the OEB will assess the prudence of their debt management.
cludes that using the simplest approach is preferable. Evidence filed by Dr. Cleary also demonstrated that using actual values instead of a consensus forecast has been more accurate from 2011 to 2023. • The DLTDR shall be used as a ceiling...
AI summary The text discusses the Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate (DLTDR) and its application as a ceiling for certain types of debt, particularly for smaller municipally owned distributors. It highlights that the DLTDR should ideally not be used if utilities can source debt in the capital markets. The DLTDR applies to variable rate debt, debt without a fixed term, no debt, and callable debt. It also applies to affiliated debt with municipal government shareholders and requires utilities to justify why debt rates are not higher than market rates.
Expert Report Proposals LEI stated that the status quo DSTDR methodology which reflected a 3-month BA rate plus a spread is no longer appropriate. This is because major Canadian banks have transitioned all existing financial products that...
AI summary LEI and Concentric, along with Dr. Cleary, argue that the DSTDR methodology should transition from using the BA rate to the CORRA rate to better reflect current financial market conditions. They recommend using the average of 3-month CORRA futures rates for the next 12 months and adjusting the spread based on a broader survey of banks.
Submissions OEB staff submitted that broadly speaking, to calculate the DSTDR, there are three alternatives to the BA rate: (1) the CORRA reference rate published by the Bank of Canada (or possibly a CORRA futures rate); (2) the Bloomberg...
AI summary OEB staff proposed three alternatives for calculating the DSTDR, with option (2) being administratively simpler. The OEA opposed using the Bloomberg index, calling it a proprietary 'black box.' Ratepayer groups supported using CORRA futures rates, while CCC suggested different methodologies for 2025 and 2026 rates. VECC supported using the existing CORRA rate.
Specific Items Monitored LEI stated that consistent with the OEB's existing policy, OEB staff should continue to monitor the cost of capital parameters and test their reasonableness in the context of prevailing macroeconomic conditions on...
AI summary LEI, Dr. Cleary, and Nexus recommend quarterly monitoring of cost of capital parameters by the OEB, with Nexus and Concentric disagreeing on the frequency and scope of reporting. LEI also suggests including credit ratings and debt/equity issuance details in annual reports, while Concentric opposes this due to administrative burden. Concentric and Nexus propose annual benchmarking of ROEs against other jurisdictions and macroeconomic indicators.
Confirmation of Meeting the FRS LEI, Concentric, and Dr. Cleary stated that the OEB should continue to annually confirm that the FRS is being met. Concentric stated that periodic rate hearings remain the only reliable method for determinat...
AI summary LEI, Concentric, and Dr. Cleary recommend that the OEB annually confirm compliance with the FRS. Concentric emphasizes the importance of periodic rate hearings for determining ROEs consistent with FRS and suggests monitoring mechanisms to detect deviations. A 300-basis point trigger policy and earnings-sharing mechanisms are also recommended.
Specific Items Monitored OEB staff agreed with LEI and Dr. Cleary that consistent with the OEB's existing policy, the OEB should continue to monitor the cost of capital parameters and test their reasonableness in the context of prevailing...
AI summary The OEB is considering the frequency and scope of monitoring cost of capital parameters, with differing views on whether reports should be annual or quarterly and whether additional data on debt and equity issuances should be collected. The OEA and ratepayer groups support public disclosure, while the OEB and others are concerned about regulatory burden.
Findings The OEB will continue to monitor market conditions. It is expected that OEB staff will undertake this monitoring at least quarterly and will report internally on their assessment. This monitoring will include quarter-over-quarter...
AI summary The OEB will monitor market conditions, including DSTDR, DLTDR, and ROE formulas, and credit ratings for Ontario utilities. It will require reporting of major long-term debt issuances over $50 million by rate-regulated utilities. The OEB will provide annual assessments on the reasonableness of cost of capital parameters and whether FRS continues to be met.
Expert Report Proposals Consistent with the OEB's existing policy, LEI stated that the OEB should continue to publish its annual cost of capital parameter updates in October or November, but using 12-month trailing data as of the end of Se...
AI summary The OEB should continue updating its annual cost of capital parameters in October or November using 12-month trailing data, as recommended by LEI. Concentric suggested using 90-day averages instead, while Dr. Cleary proposed using October data to update the ROE adjustment formula if it does not disrupt existing processes.
Expert Report Proposals LEI and Concentric recommended that consistent with the OEB's existing policy, the OEB should commit to reviewing the cost of capital policy every five years. Nexus recommended that the OEB limit LEI's proposed annu...
AI summary The document discusses recommendations for reviewing the cost of capital policy by the OEB. LEI suggests a five-year review cycle, while Nexus proposes limiting the ROE adjustment formula to two years and reviewing parameters in an open forum in the third year. Dr. Cleary supports regular reviews and suggests a trigger mechanism based on Canadian A-rated utility yield spreads exceeding 2%.
Submissions OEB staff agreed with LEI and Concentric that the OEB should commit to reviewing the cost of capital policy every five years. OEB staff submitted that this issue is about balance and weighing the costs of performing an update o...
AI summary The document discusses the frequency of cost of capital policy reviews by the OEB, with various stakeholders proposing different intervals, ranging from three to ten years. There is a consensus on conducting reviews every five years, but some entities suggest more frequent or less frequent intervals based on their analysis and market considerations.
Submissions OEB staff and a number of ratepayer groups agreed with LEI and Dr. Cleary that consistent with the OEB's existing policy, the OEB should continue to implement changes in the cost of capital parameters and capital structure upon...
AI summary The OEB staff and ratepayer groups recommend aligning cost of capital changes with rebasing, while the CCC and SEC caution against mid-term adjustments in Price Cap IRM terms. The OEA supports implementing changes in the next rate year, and the OEB established variance accounts for utilities rebasing in 2025.
Findings The cost of capital parameters of ROE, DSTDR, and DLTDR are applicable to utilities rebasing rates for 2025 (if cost of capital is in scope). For other utilities, the new cost of capital parameters will be implemented on a one-tim...
AI summary The OEB determines that the current 2009 Cost of Capital Framework meets FRS, allowing the new framework to be implemented alongside other cost-of-service reviews. Variance accounts for 2025 rate adjustments will be addressed in IRM and Custom IR applications. Prescribed interest rates for DVAs and CWIP are effective April 1, 2025, and will be updated quarterly.
THE ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD ORDERS THAT: - 1. The following cost of capital parameters are approved on a final basis, effective January 1, 2025. Please refer to the Decision for details regarding implementation and applicability. - a. The Dee...
AI summary The Ontario Energy Board has finalized cost of capital parameters, including a Deemed Return on Equity of 9.00%, Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate of 4.51%, and Deemed Short-Term Debt Rate of 3.91%, effective January 1, 2025. Prescribed interest rates for deferral and variance accounts and construction work in progress are also set, with annual and quarterly updates required. Utilities must report on new long-term debt exceeding $50 million.
A. General Issues - 1. Should the approach to setting cost of capital parameters and capital structure differ depending on: - a) The source of the capital (i.e., whether a utility finances its business through the capital markets or throug...
AI summary The document outlines three key questions regarding the approach to setting cost of capital parameters and capital structure for utilities. It explores whether the approach should vary based on capital sources and ownership types, what risk factors should be considered, and how regulatory mechanisms influence utility risk.
D. Return on Equity - 10.What methodology should the OEB use to produce a return on equity that satisfies the Fair Return Standard (FRS)? - 11.Are the perspectives of debt and equity investors in the utility sector relevant to the setting...
AI summary The text raises two key questions regarding the methodology for determining return on equity (ROE) that meets the Fair Return Standard (FRS) and the relevance of perspectives from debt and equity investors in setting cost of capital parameters and capital structure.
F. Mechanics of Implementation - 14.What on-going monitoring indicators to test the reasonableness of the results generated by its cost of capital methodology should the OEB consider, including the monitoring of market conditions? - 15.How...
AI summary The section outlines questions regarding the monitoring and updating of cost of capital parameters, including the frequency of reviews, the implementation of changes, and ensuring financial viability of rate-regulated entities while maintaining a fair return.
SUMMARY OF REVISED COST OF CAPITAL METHODOLOGY March 27, 2025
AI summary This document outlines the revised cost of capital methodology as of March 27, 2025, providing an updated approach for determining the cost of capital in regulatory proceedings.
Schedule C – Revised Methodology – Cost of Capital The revised methodology for calculating the cost of capital is summarized in Table 2 below.
AI summary The document introduces a revised methodology for calculating the cost of capital, as outlined in Table 2. This section provides an overview of the updated approach used in determining the cost of capital for regulatory proceedings.
Table 2 – Summary of Revised Methodology – Cost of Capital Electricity Natural Gas Distributors OPG's Prescribed Distributors and Generation Assets Transmitters Enbridge Gas Inc. EPCOR Natural Gas LP
AI summary Table 2 outlines the revised methodology for calculating the cost of capital, focusing on electricity and natural gas distributors. It lists entities such as OPG, Enbridge Gas Inc., and EPCOR Natural Gas LP, indicating the scope of the analysis.
REVISED METHODOLOGY TO UPDATE THE RETURN ON EQUITY March 27, 2025
AI summary The document outlines a revised methodology for updating the Return on Equity (ROE) as of March 27, 2025. This update is likely related to regulatory proceedings concerning utility companies and their financial reporting standards.
Schedule D – Revised Methodology – Return on Equity The revised methodology for calculating the ROE is summarized below. With the release of this Decision, the OEB is resetting and refining its formulaic approach for determining a utility'...
AI summary The OEB has introduced a revised methodology for calculating the Return on Equity (ROE) for utilities, incorporating adjustments based on changes in the Long Canada Bond Yield Factor (LCBF) and the spread between A-rated utility bond yields and the Long Canada Bond yield. The base ROE is set at 9.00% with specific adjustment factors and baseline values provided.
Where: will be calculated using the actual Long Canada (30-year Government of Canada) Bond yield (taken from Bank of Canada series V39056) as at September 30 for year t. will be calculated as the spread between the 30-year A-rated Utility...
AI summary The calculation of ROE involves using the Long Canada Bond yield and the 30-year A-rated Utility Corporate Bond yield, with the ROE rounded to two decimal places and applied per Section 3.2 of the Decision.
REVISED METHODOLOGY TO UPDATE THE DEEMED LONG-TERM DEBT RATE March 27, 2025
AI summary The document outlines a revised methodology for updating the deemed long-term debt rate, effective March 27, 2025, which is relevant to regulatory proceedings involving debt valuation and financial modeling.
Schedule E – Revised Methodology – Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate The revised methodology for calculating the DLTDR is summarized below. The OEB will use the LCBF plus a spread of 30-year A-rated Corporate Utility bond yields over the actual L...
AI summary The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) has revised the methodology for calculating the Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate (DLTDR), using the Long Canada Bond Yield Factor (LCBF) plus a spread based on 30-year A-rated Corporate Utility bond yields. This update will affect future DLTDR calculations and align with Section 3.4 of the Decision.
REVISED METHODOLOGY TO UPDATE THE DEEMED SHORT-TERM DEBT RATE March 27, 2025
AI summary This document outlines a revised methodology for updating the Deemed Short-Term Debt Rate, effective March 27, 2025. The update aims to provide a more accurate and current approach for determining the rate, which is crucial for financial planning and regulatory compliance.
Schedule G – Revised Methodology – Prescribed Interest Rates The revised methodology for calculating the prescribed interest rates is summarized below. The prescribed interest rates applicable to DVAs and CWIP shall continue to be set quar...
AI summary The revised methodology for calculating prescribed interest rates for DVAs and CWIP sets quarterly updates only if changes exceed 25 basis points. Rates are based on data from one month before the quarter starts and published by the OEB for the following quarter.
SCHEDULE H DECISION AND ORDER EB-2024-0063 CURRENT COST OF CAPITAL FRAMEWORK March 27, 2025
AI summary This document outlines the current cost of capital framework as of March 27, 2025, under the Schedule H Decision and Order EB-2024-0063. It provides the basis for evaluating capital expenditures and returns within the regulatory proceeding.
Background of Current Framework The OEB last reviewed its cost of capital methodology in 2009 culminating in its 2009 Report dated December 11, 2009.[94](#page-136-0) The Staff Report on the cost of capital policy was published on January...
AI summary The OEB reviewed its cost of capital methodology in 2009 and reaffirmed the use of the ERP approach for setting the base ROE. The Staff Report from 2016 confirmed that the methodology was functioning as intended and that using multiple tests, including ERP-based ones, provides a stronger foundation for decision-making.
The Fair Return Standard The OEB confirmed six key regulatory principles with respect to its cost of capital policy in the 2009 Report, with one of those being the FRS.[100](#page-136-6) All three requirements of the FRS – comparable inves...
AI summary The OEB confirmed six key regulatory principles in its 2009 Report, including the Fair Return Standard, which requires that the overall ROE be determined based on a company's cost of equity capital and that each formulaic approach used to calculate ROE must meet the FRS requirements.
Base Return on Equity In the 2009 Report, the OEB determined a LCBF of 4.25% and an ERP of 5.50%, which summed to the base ROE of 9.75% (9.75% = 4.25% + 5.50%)[.101](#page-137-0) The ERP was determined based on the average ERP of participa...
AI summary The 2009 Report determined a base ROE of 9.75% by summing the LCBF of 4.25% and ERP of 5.50%, with the ERP including 50 basis points for flotation costs. For 2025 rates, the OEB approved an interim ROE of 9.25% along with a generic variance account.
Equity Transaction/Flotation Costs The current base ROE methodology includes 50 basis points for transaction costs (i.e., the base ROE of 9.75% includes 0.50% of transaction costs), as noted in the 2009 Report.[105](#page-137-4)
AI summary The current base ROE methodology includes 50 basis points for transaction costs, as noted in the 2009 Report. This reflects the inclusion of transaction costs within the base ROE of 9.75%.
Updates to Return on Equity In the 2009 Report, the annual ROE adjustment formula was set as below[:106](#page-137-5) $$ROE_t = 9.75\% + 0.5 \times (LCBF_t - 4.250\%) + 0.5 \times (UtilBondSpread_t - 1.415\%)$$ The OEB adjusted the ROE ann...
AI summary The document outlines the 2009 ROE adjustment formula used by the OEB, which includes fixed parameters such as base ROE, LCBF adjustment factor, utility bond spread adjustment factor, and base LCBF. The formula was annually adjusted based on current data for LCBF and utility bond spreads.
(v) Base A-rated utility bond yield spread. The OEB set the LCBF adjustment factor and utility bond spread adjustment factor as 0.5 based on regression analysis performed by participants, as noted in the 2009 Report.[107](#page-138-0) The...
AI summary The OEB established the LCBF adjustment factor and utility bond spread adjustment factor at 0.5 based on regression analysis from the 2009 Report. It also incorporated a corporate bond yield variable into the annual ROE adjustment formula, setting the base LCBF at 4.250% and the base utility bond spread at 1.415% using September 2009 data.
Capital Structure General Approach The 2009 Report continued the deemed equity ratio of 40% equity / 60% debt for electricity distributors established previously by the OEB in 2006. [110](#page-138-3) The 2009 Report said that for electric...
AI summary The document discusses the capital structure approach for electricity and gas utilities in Ontario, including the deemed equity ratios set by the OEB. It mentions that the 40% equity/60% debt ratio was extended to electricity transmitters and outlines the case-by-case determination for gas utilities and OPG. The OEB sets a uniform ROE and adjusts equity thickness based on business and financial risks.
Approach to Long-Term Debt The status quo approach to the long-term debt rate is to use the weighted average of embedded (actual) debt plus forecasted debt rate(s) of new debt in the test period. For Enbridge Gas and OPG, the DLTDR is not...
AI summary The document outlines the approach to long-term debt rates, noting that the status quo uses a weighted average of existing and forecasted debt rates. For Enbridge Gas and OPG, the DLTDR is not used. For electricity distributors and transmitters, a DLTDR formula serves as a ceiling in certain circumstances, as outlined in the 2009 Report.
Where: is the Long Canada (30-year Government of Canada) Bond yield forecast for year . is the spread between 30-year A-rated Utility Corporate Bond yields and Long Canada (30-year Government of Canada) Bond Yields. The data for and are de...
AI summary The document outlines the methodology for forecasting the Long Canada Bond yield and calculating the Deemed Long-Term Debt Rate (DLTDR) and Deemed Short-Term Debt Rate (DSTDR) for 2025. The OEB approved specific rates on an interim basis, including a DLTDR of 4.66% and a DSTDR of 5.04%, along with generic variance accounts. The approach to short-term debt involves using the Canada 3-month T-bill rate and bank survey data.
Implementation Changes to the cost of capital parameters from the 2009 Report were implemented when a utility filed a cost-based rates application (i.e., upon rebasing)[.129](#page-141-5) 124 OEB Letter, Updated Inputs to the OEB's Prescri...
AI summary The OEB updates cost of capital parameters annually, based on macroeconomic conditions. These parameters are used in rate-setting, and any formulaic approach for calculating ROE must align with the FRS. The OEB ensures that the parameters reflect market conditions and meet the FRS.
Prescribed Interest Rates The OEB's current practice is to set the prescribed interest rates applicable to DVAs and CWIP quarterly. These rates are only updated if the formulaic approach results in a change in interest rates of 25 basis po...
AI summary The OEB sets prescribed interest rates for DVAs and CWIP quarterly, using specific formulas. Prior to Q4 2024, DVA rates were based on the BA three-month rate with a 25-basis point spread. Since Q4 2024, DVA rates use the three-month T-bill rate with the same spread, reflecting the phase-out of BA rates. CWIP rates are based on the FTSE Canada Mid Term Bond Index All Corporate yield.
N-52Energy Institute WP 329R
44 passages
Abstract Utility companies recover their capital costs through regulator-approved rates of return. Using a comprehensive database of utility rate cases, we find a significant premium for regulated returns on equity relative to several capi...
AI summary This study examines how utility companies recover capital costs through regulator-approved rates of return and finds that regulated returns on equity are significantly higher than capital cost benchmarks, leading to increased capital ownership and excess costs to US consumers averaging $7 billion annually.
1 Introduction In the two decades from 1997 to 2017, real annual capital spending on electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure by major utilities in the United States has more than doubled (EIA [2018a,](#page-41-0) [2018b)](...
AI summary This section discusses the significant increase in capital spending on electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure in the US from 1997 to 2017, noting that utilities have earned high regulated returns despite low interest rates. This raises concerns about potential excess returns driving investment, highlighting the challenge of setting fair rates of return in natural monopoly regulation.
reasonable. For some expenses, like fuel purchases or labor expenses, it is relatively easy to calculate and evaluate the companies' costs. For others, like capital, the task is less straightforward. Utilities own significant amounts of ph...
AI summary The document discusses the complexity of calculating utility costs, particularly for capital, and explains the concept of rate base and the opportunity cost of capital. It describes how utilities fund operations through debt and equity and how public utilities commissions determine a reasonable cost of capital during rate case proceedings.
3 Data To answer our research questions, we use a database of all significant resolved utility rate cases from 1980 to 2022 for every electricity and natural gas utility (Regulatory Research Associates [2024)](#page-76-0).[2](#page-12-0) W...
AI summary The analysis uses a database of resolved utility rate cases from 1980 to 2022, merging data from EIA and FERC. It highlights a discrepancy between proposed and approved return on equity (ROE) by regulators, while other cost-of-capital elements show close alignment. The study fills in missing data using proposed values where applicable.
Table 1: Summary Statistics Characteristic N Electric Natural Gas Rate of Return Proposed (%) 3,589 9.93 (2.00) 9.94 (2.09) Rate of Return Approved (%) 3,535 9.53 (1.92) 9.40 (1.95) Return on Equity Proposed (%) 3,614 13.16 (2.70) 12.88 (2...
AI summary This table presents summary statistics from a rate case dataset, including proposed and approved rates of return, return on equity, rate increases, and other financial metrics for electric and natural gas utilities. The data highlights differences between proposed and approved values and provides insights into the financial structure and performance of these utilities.
Source: Regulatory Research Associates [(2024)](#page-76-0), Energy Information Administration [(2024a,](#page-75-0) [2024b)](#page-75-1), and Selvans et al. [(2024)](#page-76-1), and author calculations. over time. Consistent with a story...
AI summary The text discusses the approved return on equity (RoE) for investor-owned US electric and natural gas utilities, noting that it has fallen slightly over time but not as much as other costs of capital. This motivates an examination of the implications of RoE for utility investment incentives and consumer costs.
21a,](#page-75-2) [2021b,](#page-75-3) [2021c)](#page-75-4), and US Bureau of Labor Statistics [(2021)](#page-76-4). An inflation-adjusted version is presented in appendix Figure [A.2.](#page-46-0) into an unbalanced utility-by-month panel...
AI summary The text discusses the methodology used to analyze rate cases by constructing a utility-by-month panel, incorporating financial and macroeconomic data, and conducting a regression analysis on approved return on equity. It references data sources and aggregation techniques used in the analysis.
e case. Here we conduct an initial descriptive regression analysis where we regress the approved return on equity on a range of characteristics of the utility, the regulator, and the case in question. In Table [2](#page-17-0) we see fairly...
AI summary This text discusses a regression analysis of approved return on equity, highlighting that natural gas utilities and vertically integrated firms tend to have higher returns, while 'wires-only' distribution utilities have lower returns. It also mentions the use of historical data and references various data sources.
Signif. Codes: \ \ \ : 0.01, \ \ : 0.05, \ : 0.1 Notes: The dependent variable is approved RoE in percentage points. The omitted category for case type is Distribution. The omitted category for decision type is Settled. The omitted categor...
AI summary The analysis examines factors influencing approved return on equity (RoE) in rate cases, finding correlations between commissioner composition and RoE outcomes. Elected commissioners, longer tenures, and Democratic affiliations are associated with lower RoE, while larger utilities may receive higher returns. Data includes time-fixed effects and utility-specific variables from 1990 onwards.
4 Empirical Findings This section details our analysis strategy and results. Beginning with [4.1,](#page-18-0) we present estimates of the return on equity (RoE) gap using a variety of benchmarks. Section [4.2](#page-22-0) examines potenti...
AI summary This section outlines the analysis strategy and results, starting with estimates of the return on equity (RoE) gap using various benchmarks, followed by an examination of mechanisms explaining the RoE gap's growth and its impact on capital investment and consumer costs.
4.1 Quantifying The Return on Equity Gap Knowing the size of the RoE premium that companies receive is a challenge, and we take a couple of different approaches. Our primary approach draws on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The CAP...
AI summary The document discusses the challenge of quantifying the return on equity (RoE) gap using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). While CAPM is widely used by regulators, its application involves subjective interpretations, particularly in choosing key parameters, which can influence the negotiation process between regulators and utilities.
4.2 Potential Mechanisms The existence of a persistent gap between the return on equity that utilities earn and various measures of the cost of capital they face could have a number of explanations. To try and understand plausible mechanis...
AI summary The text explores potential mechanisms behind the persistent gap between utilities' return on equity and their cost of capital. It examines three areas: asymmetric adjustments to capital cost benchmarks, strategic timing of rate cases by utilities, and regulatory focus on overall prices rather than accurate cost of equity calculations.
4.2.1 Asymmetric Adjustment of Equity Returns Many studies in several industries have documented that positive shocks to firms' input costs feed through into prices faster than negative shocks (Peltzman [2000;](#page-43-2) Frey and Manera...
AI summary The text discusses the asymmetric adjustment of equity returns in utility regulation, noting that positive shocks to benchmark indices like US Treasuries lead to quicker adjustments in allowed returns on equity compared to negative shocks. This is linked to the 'rockets and feathers' phenomenon observed in other industries, where price increases occur faster than decreases. The analysis uses a vector error correction model to test this asymmetry.
4.2.3 Regulator Prioritizing Total Price Level One further explanation for the emergence of the RoE gap could be that regulators have different priorities besides setting a capital-cost-reflective rate of return. In particular, there is ev...
AI summary This section explores how regulators may prioritize the total price level of energy for consumers over capital-cost-reflective rates of return. It suggests that when wholesale costs are high, regulators may impose stricter rates of return, while allowing more generous returns when wholesale costs are low, as seen in the regression analysis of the RoE gap on wholesale prices.
4.3 Impacts on Capital Costs We turn now to the capital assets that utilities are able to earn a rate of return on: the rate base. To the extent a utility's approved RoE is higher than their actual cost of equity, they will have a too-stro...
AI summary Higher than actual cost of equity can lead to excessive capital investment by utilities, resulting in inefficient use of resources and increased costs for consumers.
4.3.1 Capital Investment Incentives The scope for rate of return regulation to distort utility capital investment incentives has long been theorized and studied (Averch and Johnson [1962)](#page-40-0). However, the empirical evidence for t...
AI summary This section discusses the theoretical and empirical analysis of how rate of return regulation may influence utility capital investment incentives, focusing on the Averch–Johnson effect. It addresses methodological limitations in prior studies and presents an improved approach using firm-level data and econometric techniques like fixed effects and first differences.
Table 4: Relationship Between Approved Rate of Return and Utility Capital, Opex, and Rate Base Model: Capital (1) Op Ex (2) Rate Base (3) Variables 0.0340∗∗ 0.0262∗∗∗ RoE gap (%) (0.0123) -0.0149 (0.0116) (0.0092) Fit statistics Observatio...
AI summary Table 4 presents statistical relationships between the approved rate of return and utility capital, operating expenses, and rate base, including variables, RoE gap, and fit statistics across different models.
Notes: The table uses the gap between approved RoE and 10-year US Treasuries. Dependent variables are logs of nominal USD. This table only includes utilities that report through FERC Form 1 and so is limited to electric utilities, or combi...
AI summary The analysis examines the relationship between the return on equity (RoE) gap and the rate base, finding a significant positive effect where a 1 percentage point increase in the RoE gap leads to a ∼3% increase in the approved rate base. This effect is comparable to the impact observed on capital assets, indicating a strong correlation between FERC-reported capital assets and the rate base.
crease in the rate base, depending on the choice of fixed effects. As such, we take our FERC-reported capital asset results as providing a good guide to the impact of the RoE gap on capital ownership. In addition to looking at total capita...
AI summary The analysis examines the impact of the RoE gap on capital investment and operating costs for electric utilities. It finds that distribution grid investments are the primary driver of increased capital assets, while generation costs remain stable. Some smaller operating costs show increases, possibly due to higher capital investments.
ich may in 13. In fact the negative coefficient we observe is consistent with the earlier analysis of the relationship between the RoE gap and wholesale prices. Table 5: Relationship Between Approved Rate of Return and Electric Utility Cap...
AI summary The text discusses the relationship between the approved rate of return and electric utility capital and operating expenses, noting a negative coefficient consistent with earlier analysis on the RoE gap and wholesale prices.
Model: Total (1) Dist (2) Trans (3) Gen (4) Other (5) Variables RoE gap (%) 0.0362∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0347 0.1095 0.0327∗ (0.0152) (0.0100) (0.0338) (0.0657) (0.0177) Fit statistics Observations 978 981 673 738 969 2 R 0.44 0.56 0.34 0.46 0.41...
AI summary This text presents statistical models analyzing the Return on Equity (RoE) gap across different sectors, including total, distribution, transmission, generation, and other categories. The models show varying significance levels and fit statistics, with standard errors clustered by year and company.
4.3.2 Excess Consumer Costs Utilities engaging in excess capital investment and earning inflated equity returns has implications for consumer costs. Here we take into account our findings on the scale of the RoE premium utilities may be ea...
AI summary The text discusses the implications of excess capital investment and inflated equity returns by utilities on consumer costs. Using CAPM measures, it estimates excess costs to consumers over the past three decades, ranging from $2.8–9.1 billion per year, with a central estimate of $6.2 billion annually. Adjusting for the RoE gap increases this estimate to $3.1–10.6 billion per year, with over four-fifths of these costs coming from the electricity sector.
5 Conclusion The utility sector is a capital-intensive industry, and a corporate utility structure requires investors in the industry be fairly compensated for the opportunity cost of their investments. Getting this rate of return correct,...
AI summary The conclusion emphasizes the importance of accurately determining the return on equity for utilities, noting that current approved rates are higher than financial benchmarks. This has implications for utility rates and the cost of electricity, though the impact on consumption decisions depends on rate structures.
- EIA. 2018a. Major utilities continue to increase spending on U.S. electric distribution systems. Report, Today In Energy. Energy Information Administration. [https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.ph...
AI summary The text provides references to various reports and studies related to energy infrastructure spending, rate of return formulas, and policy responses to energy price shocks, highlighting ongoing discussions around utility investments and cost of capital models.
A.2 Inflation-Adjusted Rates In addition to the nominal values plotted in Figure [1,](#page-15-0) we also plot here the same data in real terms. Real values are calculated by subtracting core CPI. Figure A.2: Return on Equity and Financial...
AI summary This section presents inflation-adjusted rates for investor-owned US electric and natural gas utilities, showing real return on equity and financial indicators. Real values are calculated by subtracting core CPI from nominal values. Data includes approved return on equity and financial indicators from March 2002 to March 2006, with 30-year Treasury rates extrapolated from 1- and 10-year rates.
B.1 Benchmarking to the Capital Asset Pricing Model CAPM: Risk-free rate The risk-free rate, , is intended to capture the base level of returns from an effectively zero risk investment. Yields on government bonds are the common source for...
AI summary This section discusses the use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in benchmarking, focusing on the risk-free rate derived from 10-year US Treasury bond yields. The choice of maturity and whether to use forecasted or historical rates can impact the final cost of equity.
CAPM: Market risk premium The market risk premium, MRP, captures the difference between the expected equity market rate of return and the risk-free rate.[3](#page-47-2) This is generally calculated by taking the average of the difference i...
AI summary The market risk premium (MRP) is calculated as the difference between the expected equity market return and the risk-free rate, with factors like the choice of index, averaging period, and method affecting the result. The central case uses historical and implied estimates, while 'low' and 'high' scenarios assume constant MRPs of 4.5% and 7.5% respectively.
B.2 Benchmarking to Debt Yields As an alternative to the CAPM approach we also consider measures based on benchmarking to wider measures of the cost of debt. The goal of these benchmarks is to answer the question: What would the RoE be tod...
AI summary This section discusses benchmarking return on equity (RoE) against debt yields, using January 1995 as a baseline. It explores how changes in the baseline date affect the gap between utilities' RoE and baseline RoE, noting that a more recent baseline would suggest utilities were under-compensated for many years.
B.3 Benchmarking to UK utilities Finally, our last measure involves benchmarking against allowed returns on equity for gas and electric utilities in the United Kingdom. Here we consider the contemporaneous gap in nominal allowed RoE betwee...
AI summary The document discusses benchmarking allowed returns on equity (RoE) for gas and electric utilities in the UK against those in the US, noting differences in the utility sector and investor environments. Data on UK RoE is sourced from the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem).
B.4 Results of RoE Gap Estimates For each of the strategies we utilize, we plot the timeseries of the RoE gap. These are plotted in figures [B.1](#page-53-0) to [B.8.](#page-56-1) In each plot, we present the median of our RoE gap estimate...
AI summary This section presents the results of return on equity (RoE) gap estimates across different strategies, using time-series data. The median RoE gap is weighted by the utility's rate base (in 2019 dollars), with bands indicating various percentile ranges. The analysis covers both gas and electric utilities and references data sources, including UK rates converted to nominal terms.
Table B.2: Return on Equity gap, by different benchmarks, by service type (percentage points) A: Electric CAPM central CAPM high CAPM low Corp RoD UST UST Auto UK 1982 −4.91 −1.33 3.19 −1.82 0.78 1986 1.05 4.16 1.83 2.16 3.14 3.09 1990 −1....
AI summary Table B.2 presents the Return on Equity (ROE) gap across different benchmarks and service types (Electric and Natural Gas) from 1982 to 2022. The gap is calculated as a weighted average across utilities, with data showing variations over time and benchmarks such as CAPM, corporate bonds, and US Treasuries.
C Detail on Asymmetric Adjustment Here we include additional information on the asymmetric adjustment analysis. The preferred specification presented in the main paper uses approved rates of return, a benchmark index of 10-year US Treasuri...
AI summary The text discusses an asymmetric adjustment analysis in the context of rate case decisions, using approved rates of return and a benchmark index of 10-year US Treasuries. The analysis shows a clear asymmetric adjustment path, with greater divergence and slower adjustment at the utility–state panel level. Results are illustrated through figures and tables, with emphasis on the impact of aggregation levels and the use of proposed versus approved rates of return.
Table C.1: Asymmetric Adjustments in Return on Equity Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) Prop. or Appr. Prop. Appr. Prop. Appr. Group (State) Yes Yes Yes Yes Group (Company) Yes Yes 𝜙 0.5673 0.5024 0.5786 0.4908 ∑ 𝛽+=∑ 𝛽- Fstat 5.848 19.15 5.765 8.139...
AI summary Table C.1 presents statistical results on asymmetric adjustments in return on equity, showing differences between proposed and approved models across various groups and statistical measures such as F-statistics and p-values. The data indicates significant differences in some models but not others, with varying levels of significance.
D Detail on Capital Impacts In addition to our first difference specification, we also estimate ̂from the following fixed effects specification. $$\log(Cap_{i,t}) = \alpha RoE_{i,t}^{gap} + \delta X_{i,t} + \sigma_i + \lambda_t + \epsilon_...
AI summary This section discusses the relationship between the approved rate of return (RoE) gap and utility capital assets using fixed effects and first difference specifications. Results show that a 1 percentage point increase in the RoE gap leads to a 2–4% increase in capital assets, with comparable findings across different measures of the RoE gap.
Notes: The table uses the gap between approved RoE and 10-year US Treasuries. The dependent variable is log of the utility's total plant in millions of nominal USD. This table only includes utilities that report through FERC Form 1 and so...
AI summary The text discusses a statistical analysis examining the relationship between approved return on equity (RoE) and the 10-year US Treasuries, using data from utilities that report through FERC Form 1. The analysis includes various specifications, with a preference for results from column 5, which uses first differences.
Table D.2: Relationship Between Approved Rate of Return and Utility Capital by Rate of Return Benchmark (Absolute Totals) CAPM Central CAPM Low CAPM High Corp RoD UK UST UST Auto Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (9) (7) (8) Variables RoE gap (%)...
AI summary Table D.2 presents the relationship between approved rate of return and utility capital across various rate of return benchmarks. The table includes statistical data such as RoE gap, observations, R-squared values, and other fit statistics for different models and variables.
Table E.1: Relationship Between Approved Rate of Return and Utility Capital, Opex, and Rate Base (per kWh) Model: Capital (1) Op Ex (2) Rate Base (3) Variables RoE gap (%) 0.0258∗∗ -0.0230∗ 0.0092 (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0160) Fit statistics...
AI summary Table E.1 presents statistical analysis showing the relationship between the approved rate of return and utility capital, operating expenses, and rate base, with data indicating varying levels of significance and fit statistics across different models.
Notes: The table uses approved RoE. Dependent variables are in $ per kWh. This table only includes utilities that report through FERC Form 1 and so is limited to electric utilities, or combined electricity and natural gas utilities. See no...
AI summary This table examines the relationship between approved rate of return and electric utility capital and operating expenses by expenditure type and vertical integration, measured in dollars per kWh. It includes utilities reporting through FERC Form 1, focusing on electric and combined electric-natural gas utilities.
(a) Capital Model: Total (1) Dist (2) Trans (3) Gen (4) Other (5) Variables RoE gap (%) -0.0125 0.0426∗∗ 0.0277 -0.0225 0.0198 (0.0151) (0.0206) (0.0457) (0.0173) (0.0137) Fit statistics Observations 905 905 683 685 905 2 R 0.47 0.42 0.45...
AI summary The text presents a statistical model analyzing the return on equity (RoE) gap across different sectors including total, distribution, transmission, generation, and other categories. The model includes variables, fit statistics, and standard errors, indicating an analysis of capital-related factors.
Notes: The table uses approved RoE. The dependent variable is log of the utility's total plant, in $ per kWh. This table only includes utilities that report through FERC Form 1 and so is limited to electric utilities, or combined electrici...
AI summary The text discusses a table that uses an approved Return on Equity (RoE) and includes utilities reporting through FERC Form 1, focusing on electric and combined electric-natural gas utilities. The dependent variable is the log of the utility's total plant value in dollars per kWh.
Table E.4: Relationship Between Approved Rate of Return and Utility Capital by Rate of Return Benchmark (per kWh) Model: CAPM Central (1) CAPM Low (2) CAPM High (3) Corp (4) RoD (5) UK (6) UST (7) UST Auto (8) Variables RoE gap (%) 0.0135...
AI summary Table E.4 presents the relationship between approved rate of return and utility capital by rate of return benchmark, using various models such as CAPM, RoD, UST, and others, with statistical measures including R-squared and standard errors.
F Detail on Instrumental Variables To try and further deal with concerns regarding identification, we explore a number of instrumental variables approaches. Ultimately, we do not consider these as one of our preferred results because of we...
AI summary The text discusses the use of instrumental variables (IV) approaches to address identification concerns in regulatory proceedings, particularly focusing on the rounding of Return on Equity (RoE) values. While the rounding of RoE introduces exogenous variation, it results in weak first stages and limited effectiveness as an IV. The impact of small rounding deviations on utility revenues is highlighted as significant.
G Detail on Excess Consumer Cost Table [G.1](#page-73-1) summarizes our estimates of the excess cost for utility customers. Here we multiply the rate base by the RoE gap to come up with a measure of the additional payments made to cover th...
AI summary The text discusses the calculation of excess consumer costs by multiplying the rate base by the RoE gap, highlighting the difference between 'fixed' and 'adjust' rows. It also mentions the need to remedy missing rate base data for some utilities using an estimated average growth rate.
Data - Australian Energy Regulator. 2020. International regulatory approaches to rate of return - Pathway to Rate of Return 2022. December 16, 2020. Accessed August 13, 2022. [https://www.aer.gov.au/](https://www.aer.gov.au/networks-pipeli...
AI summary The document provides references to regulatory and financial data sources, including the Australian Energy Regulator's 2020 report on rate of return approaches, and various U.S. Treasury rate data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. These sources are likely used for comparative analysis and regulatory decision-making.
101354Board Decision
28 passages
wer proposed. As a result, the value of the coal plant assets on which NS Power was able to earn a return was higher than it otherwise would have been if higher depreciation expenses had been applied. [10] However, as canvassed in this dec...
AI summary The text discusses the impact of depreciation methods on coal plant asset valuations and rate base calculations for NS Power. It argues that prior settlement agreements mitigated rate impacts by avoiding accelerated depreciation on retiring coal assets. The rate base value aligns with regulatory practices and the Public Utilities Act, ensuring fair returns for investors to maintain investment and avoid financial risks like poor credit ratings. Morrison Park reiterates concerns about low returns discouraging investment.
n s. 42(1) which states: - 42 (1) Every public utility shall be entitled to earn annually such return as the Board deems just and reasonable on the rate base as fixed and determined by the Board. … - 23 The concept of a utility securing a...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) determines that public utilities are entitled to earn a 'just and reasonable' annual return on their rate base, as defined by the Public Utilities Act (PUA). Rates must ensure this return after covering operating expenses and allowed capital expenditures, while preventing extravagance through strict oversight of rate base composition and allowable costs.
[37] The terms of the settlement agreement are set out in a schedule to the agreement and provide as follows: GRA Element Settlement Terms GRA Element Settlement Terms underspend to customers will be changed from $5 million to $2.5 million...
AI summary The settlement agreement adjusts the underspend to customers from $5 million to $2.5 million and retains an overall return on equity of 9% for rate setting purposes, along with an earnings band of 8.75% to 9.25%.
tion procedure, the impact on rate base should be a consideration. In their hearing testimony, both Mr. Wiedmayer and Mr. Madsen addressed the interaction between depreciation and return on rate base. [213] Mr. Wiedmayer testified that whi...
AI summary The text discusses the impact of depreciation methods (ELG vs. ALG) on rate base and return on equity. Mr. Wiedmayer presented a model showing ELG reduces rate base faster, leading to lower returns after a crossover point. Mr. Madsen acknowledged depreciation's effect on rate base but noted his analysis excluded financing costs, emphasizing the need for accurate depreciation methodology.
3.4.3.1 Findings [243] In Undertaking U-8, NS Power provided calculations showing the dollar effect of implementing the changes recommended in Table 8 of Mr. Madsen's evidence. NS Power performed the analysis using both the ALG and ELG dep...
AI summary NS Power provided calculations showing the financial impact of implementing Mr. Madsen's recommended average service life changes, showing reductions in depreciation expenses under both ALG and ELG procedures. These changes would lower average rate increases for customers, though partially offset by increased return on rate base. The Board must determine if Mr. Madsen's recommendations are warranted.
3.5.1.6 Payment of Interest on Deferral Accounts [362] The payment of interest to NS Power on its deferral accounts is subject to s. 64AB of the Public Utilities Act . In its 2023-2024 GRA Decision, the Board concluded that it was appropri...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Board) determines interest rates on Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s (NS Power) deferral accounts under s. 64AB of the Public Utilities Act. The Board set interest at NS Power's WACC in its 2023-2024 GRA Decision and reaffirmed this approach in the 2025 DCRRC proceeding (M11912). A generic proceeding will address s. 64AB issues, with London Economics International LLC preparing a report.
3.6 Rate Base [363] NS Power's rate base consists of the physical assets and related construction work in progress the utility has invested in to provide power to its customers, such as generating stations and transmission lines. It also i...
AI summary NS Power's rate base includes physical assets, construction in progress, materials inventory, and financial assets like tax receivables and regulatory deferrals. The forecasted rate base for 2026 and 2027 is estimated at $5.58 billion and $5.89 billion, respectively, and is used to calculate return on equity and depreciation expenses.
Power to determine value of property of utility - 30 (1) The Board may at any time, with the assistance of such engineers, accountants, valuators, counsel and others as it deems wise or advisable to employ, inquire into and determine the e...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Board) has authority to assess utility property values using prudent original cost or prescribed methods, deducting depreciation. It mandates valuation of Nova Scotia Power Incorporated's assets by March 31, 2024, and setting differentiated return on equity (ROE) levels for capital assets to align investment incentives with ratepayer objectives.
uation, every public utility shall report correctly to the Board changes in its property and file with the Board copies of all contracts for changes and improvements at the time the same are executed. [385] In its reply submissions, NS Pow...
AI summary NS Power argues for a 'fair return' based on the regulatory compact, citing historical and recent legal precedents. It proposed accelerated depreciation for generation units due to environmental regulations but faced opposition over retirement dates. A settlement agreement resolved disputes, lowering rates in the next general rate application.
[397] In essence: A public utility is obligated to provide services that are reasonably safe and adequate and is entitled to compensation therefor by the charging of rates that are not unjustly discriminatory and will provide the public ut...
AI summary Public utilities must provide safe, adequate services and earn fair rates to cover expenses and capital needs. The Supreme Court of Canada defined a fair return as equivalent to returns on alternative investments, emphasizing that low returns risk deterring investment, harming credit ratings, increasing borrowing costs, and limiting market access.
test years. Depending on the extent of the decline, this could put significant upward pressure on the depreciation expense in the test years, and therefore the revenue requirement and proposed rates. [417] The complexity and uncertainty as...
AI summary The text discusses the impact of asset depreciation on revenue requirements and proposed rates, arguing that an alternative valuation method would lead to higher return on equity but has been rejected in favor of the prudent original cost method as per the Public Utilities Act.
ROE and potentially a lower cost of debt than would be the case under a policy focused on the used and useful test. In the long run, the application of a lower ROE to the totality of a utility's rate base can be more beneficial to rate pay...
AI summary The Board discusses how a lower ROE can benefit rate payers by preventing over-investment by utilities like NSPI. Prudency reviews are emphasized to ensure investments are proper and avoid rate base inflation. Regulatory proceedings test utility investments to align rates with competitive market pricing rather than monopolistic pricing.
3.7 Return on Equity and Capital Structure [440] NS Power's existing rates are set based on a current capital structure that includes 40% equity and 60% debt, with an approved return on equity of 9%. Under the current framework, NS Power m...
AI summary NS Power's current rates are based on a 40% equity, 60% debt structure with a 9% ROE cap of 9.25%. They propose maintaining a 9% ROE range (8.75%-9.25%) and the same debt-to-equity ratio for rate-setting.
3.7.1 The Fair Return Requirement [442] NS Power operates as a natural monopoly in Nova Scotia, where the absence of meaningful competition means the competitive forces of the market do not apply. Section 45 of the Public Utilities Act ent...
AI summary NS Power, a natural monopoly in Nova Scotia, requires a fair return on its rate base to ensure financial stability and attract investment. The Board must set parameters for returns to maintain investor confidence, prevent rising borrowing costs, and avoid loss of debt market access, which could increase customer costs. Legal standards for approving returns are rooted in the Public Utilities Act.
3.7.2.1 Return on Equity [453] Determining a fair return on equity generally entails the use of several wellestablished financial models. These include, but are not limited to, the discounted cash flow (DCF) model; the capital asset pricin...
AI summary The document discusses methodologies for determining a fair return on equity (ROE) for Nova Scotia Power (NSP), including DCF, CAPM, and risk premium models. A consensus agreement sets NSP's ROE at 9% with an 8.75%-9.25% earnings band and retains a 40% equity thickness. Concentric Energy Advisors' analysis, using market data up to February 2025, supports these figures.
Summary of Return on Equity Results CAPM DCF Risk Premium Opinion Concentric 9.23% 9.02% 10.04% 9.43% Cleary 6.84% 7.86% 7.94% 7.6% 3.7.2.2 Capital Structure (Equity Ratios) [468] Concentric determined that a common equity ratio of 45% wou...
AI summary Concentric determined that a 45% common equity ratio is appropriate for NS Power, considering its financial and business risks and the need to retire thermal generation by 2030. The requested 40% equity ratio is seen as conservative compared to other Canadian and U.S. utilities.
[469] Dr. Cleary supported NS Power's requested 40% equity ratio, stating it is reasonable given its lower debt rating of BBB- and because NS Power holds a higher percentage of generation assets compared to other Canadian utilities.
AI summary Dr. Cleary supports NS Power's requested 40% equity ratio, arguing it is reasonable given its BBB- debt rating and higher percentage of generation assets compared to other Canadian utilities.
3.7.3 Return on Equity Modeling [470] In the discussion that follows, references to results from Concentric's analysis are to the update it provided in Undertaking U-14 using the analysis as generally described in its original report [Exhi...
AI summary The section references Concentric's updated analysis in Undertaking U-14, based on its original report in Exhibit N-8, Appendix 10A, for North American proxy group data.
3.7.3.1 CAPM Models [471] The CAPM accounts for the risk of common equity relative to risk free securities such as government bonds. The CAPM model estimates the required return of a security based on the relationship between the expected...
AI summary The text discusses the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its application in estimating the required return of a security based on risk. It outlines key components of the CAPM model, including the risk-free rate, market risk premium, and beta. Different estimates for return on equity (ROE) under the CAPM model are presented by Concentric and Dr. Cleary.
[474] A summary of the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary is set out in the table below: CA PM Concentric Cleary Risk-free Rate 3.87% (Canada) 3.66% 4.56% (U.S.) [Long-term government [Average long-term yield of 3.66% as...
AI summary The text provides a comparison of the risk-free rate and other formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary in their calculations. Concentric uses a forecasted 10-year government bond yield plus historical spreads, while Dr. Cleary uses the actual long-term government yield as of November 20, 2025.
3.7.3.2 DCF Models [486] The DCF model infers the required rate of return by replicating the actions of an investor in valuing the firm's securities by estimating the dividend yield and future growth rate. [487] Based on its assessment of...
AI summary The DCF model estimates the required rate of return by replicating investor actions, using dividend yield and growth rate. Concentric and Dr. Cleary provided different ROE estimates under their DCF analyses, with Concentric determining 9.02% and Dr. Cleary estimating 7.86%.
[488] A summary of the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary is set out in the table below: DC F Concentric Cleary Dividend Yield 3.49% 5.29% [Calculated from [Calculated from Bloomberg] Morningstar] Multi-Stage 6.62% (Mean)...
AI summary The text outlines the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary in their models, including dividend yield, growth rates, and financial metrics. Concentric's model uses a multi-stage DCF approach with near-term, transitional, and long-term growth phases, while Dr. Cleary's model uses the DDM approach with different growth assumptions.
3.7.3.3 Risk Premium Model [498] The risk premium model can be based on differences in the return between bonds and equity or the expected bond-equity return spread. The risk premium model accounts for equity holding more risk than debt be...
AI summary The risk premium model calculates return on equity based on bond yields and equity risk premiums. Concentric and Dr. Cleary applied the model differently, with distinct formula components as outlined in a table. The model reflects higher returns for equity due to residual risk compared to debt.
Risk Pr emium Concentric Cleary A-rated Utility Bond Yield 4.94% (Nova Scotia Power) [Bloomberg] Government Bond Yield 3.82% (average) (Canada) [Calculated from Bloomberg and Average long-term Consensus Forecast of 10-year government bond...
AI summary The text discusses the calculation of risk premiums and return on equity (ROE) for Nova Scotia Power, comparing Canadian and U.S. benchmarks. Concentric used regression analysis on data from over 700 U.S. and 60 Canadian utilities to determine risk premiums and ROE, incorporating government bond yields and historical data.
3.7.4 Party Submissions [503] The Affordable Energy Coalition's (AEC) opening statement submitted that the Board must ensure rates are sufficient to cover NS Power's cost-of-service, while preventing the recovery of excess spending and pro...
AI summary The Affordable Energy Coalition (AEC) argues that Nova Scotia Power's (NS Power) rates must cover costs without allowing excess profits, citing low-income affordability concerns and suggesting a reduced return on equity (ROE) of 7.6%. NS Power defends its current ROE and capital structure, citing Concentric's evidence, to balance affordability and investment needs.
3.7.5 Findings [511] It bears repeating that for at least a century, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that investors in regulated utilities are entitled to a fair return that is comparable to the return they would see from other...
AI summary The Supreme Court of Canada has long upheld that regulated utility investors deserve a fair return comparable to similar investments. Factors like comparable returns and financial integrity are key in setting allowed returns, while affordability and reliability are addressed through other regulatory tools. The NSUARB's 2005 decision on NS Power's rate request followed a major winter storm, highlighting regulatory considerations during crises.
3.7.5.1 Return on Equity [514] A utility's return on equity must be consistent with the fair return standard. There is no single test for determining an appropriate return on equity. Both experts in this proceeding used a variety of models...
AI summary The document discusses determining a utility's return on equity (ROE) using multiple models, with experts averaging results. Dr. Cleary emphasizes equal weighting of CAPM and BYPRP methods over DCF due to their conceptual advantages and intuitive nature, citing direct links to financing costs and market risk adjustments.
- Maintaining NS Power's current return on equity of 9.0%, with an earnings band of 8.75% to 9.25%. The equity thickness for rate setting purposes remains at 40.0%; - The establishment of the securitization deferral to defer depreciation e...
AI summary The summary outlines key directives and findings related to NS Power's return on equity, depreciation rates, cost-of-service methodology, and various deferral accounts. It includes the establishment of a securitization deferral, adjustments to depreciation studies, and the handling of revenue variances and tax expenses.
101354Board Decision
28 passages
return on and of its invested capital. To find otherwise could have significant negative financial implications for NS Power in the form of increased costs, leading to higher rates for its customers. [15] NS Power's proposed return on equi...
AI summary NS Power's proposed return on equity of 9.0% faces scrutiny as expert models suggest 9.4% (Concentric Energy Advisors) and 7.6% (Dr. Sean Cleary). The Board deems both extremes inappropriate, favoring a midpoint. NS Power seeks to maintain its current rate with an 8.75%-9.25% earnings band, supported by customer classes in the settlement agreement.
[37] The terms of the settlement agreement are set out in a schedule to the agreement and provide as follows: GRA Element Settlement Terms GRA Element Settlement Terms underspend to customers will be changed from $5 million to $2.5 million...
AI summary The settlement agreement modifies the underspend to customers from $5 million to $2.5 million. It retains an overall return on equity of 9% for rate setting purposes and maintains an earnings band of 8.75% to 9.25%.
s the composite remaining life for Nova Scotia Power. So fundamentally the analysis is not a Nova Scotia Power focused analysis and is providing a result that makes that is, in my mind, misleading. The final point that I would make before...
AI summary The analysis of Nova Scotia Power's asset life grouping procedures is criticized for being misleading due to its long-term focus and failure to account for net present value. The ALG procedure is shown to generate more revenue than the ELG procedure, but on a net present value basis, the ELG procedure is more favorable. The analysis also highlights the difficulty in accurately predicting future financial impacts and the importance of using the correct assumptions.
022 response to questions in its 2022-2024 General Rate Application ("GRA"), NS Power stated: "…there are other factors which make securitization not the preferred approach for NS Power at this time." The Settlement Agreement in the 2022-2...
AI summary NS Power stated securitization is not its preferred approach for recovering costs in its 2022-2024 GRA. The Board criticized NS Power for not addressing securitization in its DDA application (M11220) and ordered an investigation by April 2025. Intervenors highlighted NS Power's lack of economic analysis comparing securitization to its WACC.
principle that deferrals should only apply prospectively. [312] In its reply submissions, NS Power submitted that the intervenors' concerns about "overcollection or double recovery are unwarranted": - First, the current rates are based on...
AI summary NS Power argues that deferrals should apply prospectively, countering intervenors' concerns about overcollection or double recovery. It asserts that current rates are based on outdated forecasts, rates were capped in 2023-2024, the company has earned below its allowed return on equity, and unrecovered costs from peak winter periods should not be compounded. The FAM mechanism provides a safeguard against excessive earnings.
3.5.1.6 Payment of Interest on Deferral Accounts [362] The payment of interest to NS Power on its deferral accounts is subject to s. 64AB of the Public Utilities Act . In its 2023-2024 GRA Decision, the Board concluded that it was appropri...
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB) determines interest rates on NS Power's deferral accounts using its Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) under s. 64AB of the Public Utilities Act. This follows the 2023-2024 GRA Decision and a 2024 DCR Rider decision (M11912), with the Board planning a generic proceeding to further address s. 64AB issues. London Economics International LLC is engaged to prepare a report.
uation, every public utility shall report correctly to the Board changes in its property and file with the Board copies of all contracts for changes and improvements at the time the same are executed. [385] In its reply submissions, NS Pow...
AI summary NS Power argues for a 'fair return' under the regulatory compact, citing SCC and NSUARB precedents. It proposed accelerated depreciation for generation units due to carbon regulations but faced opposition over retirement dates. A settlement agreement resolved disputes, lowering rates in the next general rate application.
[397] In essence: A public utility is obligated to provide services that are reasonably safe and adequate and is entitled to compensation therefor by the charging of rates that are not unjustly discriminatory and will provide the public ut...
AI summary Public utilities must provide safe and adequate services, compensated through non-discriminatory rates ensuring revenue for operating expenses, depreciation, taxes, and capital needs. The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized fair returns on capital investment to attract investment and maintain credit ratings, with low returns risking higher borrowing costs and market exclusion.
test years. Depending on the extent of the decline, this could put significant upward pressure on the depreciation expense in the test years, and therefore the revenue requirement and proposed rates. [417] The complexity and uncertainty as...
AI summary The text discusses concerns that depreciation expense increases in test years could raise revenue requirements and rates. It argues that alternative valuation methods face regulatory rejection due to impracticality, favoring the Public Utilities Act's default approach. The Board emphasizes adherence to established regulatory practices over alternative methods.
ROE and potentially a lower cost of debt than would be the case under a policy focused on the used and useful test. In the long run, the application of a lower ROE to the totality of a utility's rate base can be more beneficial to rate pay...
AI summary The Board discusses how a lower ROE could benefit rate payers by discouraging unnecessary capital investments. It emphasizes the importance of prudence reviews to ensure NS Power's investments are justified and prevent rate base inflation. The prudency test is highlighted as critical to maintaining just and reasonable rates under the regulatory compact.
3.7 Return on Equity and Capital Structure [440] NS Power's existing rates are set based on a current capital structure that includes 40% equity and 60% debt, with an approved return on equity of 9%. Under the current framework, NS Power m...
AI summary NS Power's current rates are based on a 40% equity, 60% debt structure with a 9% return on equity (ROE), allowing up to 9.25% annually. They propose maintaining this ROE range and debt-to-equity ratio for rate-setting, returning excess earnings to customers.
3.7.1 The Fair Return Requirement [442] NS Power operates as a natural monopoly in Nova Scotia, where the absence of meaningful competition means the competitive forces of the market do not apply. Section 45 of the Public Utilities Act ent...
AI summary NS Power operates as a natural monopoly in Nova Scotia, requiring a fair return to ensure financial stability and attract investment. The Board must set parameters to ensure a just return, as insufficient returns could lead to higher borrowing costs and loss of investor confidence, ultimately affecting customers.
3.7.2 Overview of Cost of Capital Evidence
AI summary This section provides an overview of the evidence presented regarding the cost of capital in a regulatory proceeding, likely related to utility rate-setting or investment recovery. Key focus areas include methodologies for determining capital costs, regulatory considerations, and stakeholder arguments.
3.7.2.1 Return on Equity [453] Determining a fair return on equity generally entails the use of several wellestablished financial models. These include, but are not limited to, the discounted cash flow (DCF) model; the capital asset pricin...
AI summary The document discusses methodologies for determining a fair return on equity (ROE) for Nova Scotia Power (NS Power), including DCF, CAPM, and risk premium models. A consensus agreement sets NS Power's ROE at 9% with an 8.75%-9.25% earnings band and 40% equity thickness. NS Power's experts, James Coyne and John Trogonoski of Concentric Energy Advisors, provided evidence using market data up to February 2025.
Summary of Return on Equity Results CAPM DCF Risk Premium Opinion Concentric 9.23% 9.02% 10.04% 9.43% Cleary 6.84% 7.86% 7.94% 7.6% 3.7.2.2 Capital Structure (Equity Ratios) [468] Concentric determined that a common equity ratio of 45% wou...
AI summary Concentric recommends a 45% common equity ratio for NS Power, considering its financial and business risks and the need to retire thermal generation by 2030. The proposed 40% ratio is deemed conservative compared to other Canadian and U.S. utilities.
[469] Dr. Cleary supported NS Power's requested 40% equity ratio, stating it is reasonable given its lower debt rating of BBB- and because NS Power holds a higher percentage of generation assets compared to other Canadian utilities.
AI summary Dr. Cleary supports NS Power's requested 40% equity ratio, citing its lower debt rating of BBB- and its higher percentage of generation assets compared to other Canadian utilities.
3.7.3 Return on Equity Modeling [470] In the discussion that follows, references to results from Concentric's analysis are to the update it provided in Undertaking U-14 using the analysis as generally described in its original report [Exhi...
AI summary The section references Concentric's updated analysis in Undertaking U-14, which builds on its original report (Exhibit N-8, Appendix 10A) for the North American proxy group. The analysis is part of a regulatory proceeding involving Nova Scotia's energy sector.
3.7.3.1 CAPM Models [471] The CAPM accounts for the risk of common equity relative to risk free securities such as government bonds. The CAPM model estimates the required return of a security based on the relationship between the expected...
AI summary This section explains the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which calculates the required return on equity by considering the risk-free rate, market risk premium, and company beta. Different entities, including Concentric and Dr. Cleary, have estimated varying returns on equity using CAPM analysis.
[474] A summary of the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary is set out in the table below: CA PM Concentric Cleary Risk-free Rate 3.87% (Canada) 3.66% 4.56% (U.S.) [Long-term government [Average long-term yield of 3.66% as...
AI summary The text outlines the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary for calculating the risk-free rate and other financial metrics. Concentric uses a forecasted 10-year government bond yield plus historical spreads, while Dr. Cleary uses an actual long-term government bond yield as of November 20, 2025.
3.7.3.2 DCF Models [486] The DCF model infers the required rate of return by replicating the actions of an investor in valuing the firm's securities by estimating the dividend yield and future growth rate. [487] Based on its assessment of...
AI summary The DCF model is used to infer the required rate of return by estimating dividend yield and future growth rate. Concentric and Dr. Cleary provided different estimates for return on equity under their respective DCF analyses.
[488] A summary of the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary is set out in the table below: DC F Concentric Cleary Dividend Yield 3.49% 5.29% [Calculated from [Calculated from Bloomberg] Morningstar] Multi-Stage 6.62% (Mean)...
AI summary The text outlines the formula components used by Concentric and Dr. Cleary, including dividend yield, growth rates, and financial metrics. Concentric's multi-stage DCF model incorporates three phases of growth: near-term, transitional, and long-term, with growth rates derived from analyst forecasts and GDP projections.
3.7.3.3 Risk Premium Model [498] The risk premium model can be based on differences in the return between bonds and equity or the expected bond-equity return spread. The risk premium model accounts for equity holding more risk than debt be...
AI summary The risk premium model calculates equity returns as the sum of long-term bond yields and equity risk premiums, reflecting higher risks for equity investors. Concentric and Dr. Cleary applied the model differently, though specific formula variations are detailed in an accompanying table.
Risk Pr emium Concentric Cleary A-rated Utility Bond Yield 4.94% (Nova Scotia Power) [Bloomberg] Government Bond Yield 3.82% (average) (Canada) [Calculated from Bloomberg and Average long-term Consensus Forecast of 10-year government bond...
AI summary Concentric uses regression analysis to estimate the equity risk premium for utilities by analyzing data from over 700 U.S. and 60 Canadian electric utilities. The analysis considers long-term bond rates and risk premiums to calculate return on equity (ROE) for Canada and the U.S., resulting in an average ROE of 10.04%.
3.7.4 Party Submissions [503] The Affordable Energy Coalition's (AEC) opening statement submitted that the Board must ensure rates are sufficient to cover NS Power's cost-of-service, while preventing the recovery of excess spending and pro...
AI summary The Affordable Energy Coalition (AEC) argues that Nova Scotia Power's (NS Power) rates must cover costs without allowing excess profits, citing Emera's high shareholder returns and recommending a 7.6% return on equity. NS Power counters that a fair return requires a higher equity ratio but maintains current affordability-focused structures.
3.7.5 Findings [511] It bears repeating that for at least a century, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that investors in regulated utilities are entitled to a fair return that is comparable to the return they would see from other...
AI summary The Supreme Court of Canada emphasizes that regulated utilities must offer investors a fair return comparable to similar investments to ensure operational sustainability. Factors like comparable returns and financial integrity are key, while affordability and reliability are addressed through other regulatory tools. The NSUARB's 2005 decision on NS Power's rate request is referenced, influenced by a 2004 winter storm and Premier John Hamm's review request.
3.7.5.1 Return on Equity [514] A utility's return on equity must be consistent with the fair return standard. There is no single test for determining an appropriate return on equity. Both experts in this proceeding used a variety of models...
AI summary The document discusses determining a utility's return on equity using models like CAPM and BYPRP, with experts averaging results. Dr. Cleary emphasizes CAPM's conceptual advantages and direct financing cost link, while also weighting BYPRP due to its intuitive nature and wider use by Canadian CFOs. The Board acknowledges experts' use of multiple approaches to inform their recommendations.
3.7.5.2 Capital Structure [560] NS Power proposed to maintain its capital structure of 40% equity and 60% debt. This request was supported by its expert witness Concentric (which considered 45% would be appropriate), Board Counsel consulta...
AI summary NS Power proposed maintaining a 40% equity/60% debt capital structure, supported by Concentric, Dr. Cleary, and settlement agreement signatories. No opposition was raised, and the Board approved the proposal.
- Maintaining NS Power's current return on equity of 9.0%, with an earnings band of 8.75% to 9.25%. The equity thickness for rate setting purposes remains at 40.0%; - The establishment of the securitization deferral to defer depreciation e...
AI summary The proceeding outlines key directives for NS Power, including maintaining a 9.0% return on equity, establishing a securitization deferral for depreciation and financing costs related to coal plants, approving depreciation rates, and adjusting cost-of-service methodology. It also discusses the PHP Deferral account and the EIFEL deferral for potential tax expenses.