Topic:"System Reliability" in M12600

That, in itself is a major breach of trust, during an ongoing security breach. Even now, NS Power will not provide the basic NS Power profile information to a customer calling in and requesting same. I was born in this province and have li...

AI summary The letter highlights a breach of trust by NS Power due to a security breach and failure to inform customers promptly. It criticizes NS Power for poor infrastructure maintenance, frequent power outages, and excessive rate increases, leading to financial hardship for Nova Scotians. The writer questions the government's response to these issues.

Monday, April 28, 2025 Update Emera Inc. and Nova Scotia Power today announced on April 25, 2025 they discovered and are actively responding to a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access into certain parts of its Canadian netwo...

AI summary Emera Inc. and Nova Scotia Power disclosed a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to parts of their Canadian network. They have activated response protocols, engaged cybersecurity experts, and isolated affected servers. Operations in Nova Scotia remain unaffected, and there is no expected material financial impact.

Cybersecurity Accountability REDACTED continuity purposes. Given customer complaints about overestimated bills and inaccurate billings, it appears NSP's back up billing estimate methods should be further reviewed. We understand the CIS pla...

AI summary The document discusses NSP's billing estimation methods following a cybersecurity incident. Customer complaints about inaccurate billing led to a review of NSP's backup systems. NSP plans to replace the CIS platform by mid-2029 with more robust contingency methods. In the interim, the cloud-based AMI platform is being used to mitigate billing disruptions.

Weather Risk A Material Adverse Effect may arise from weather seasonal variations impacting energy consumption, as well as severe weather events, changing air temperatures, wildfires and other severe weather conditions that are expected to...

AI summary The document discusses how weather-related risks, including seasonal variations, severe weather events, and climate change impacts, can affect energy consumption, infrastructure, and financial stability. These risks may lead to reduced revenues, increased costs, and potential Material Adverse Effects if not mitigated through insurance or regulatory processes.

Transition Risk: As government policy related to the environment, renewable energy, and decarbonization continues to shift, the Company is exposed to increased uncertainty and risk arising from policy, legal, regulatory, technology, and ma...

AI summary The Company faces transition risks due to evolving environmental policies, renewable energy mandates, and decarbonization efforts. These changes require significant capital investment and may affect customer demand, rates, and the Company's ability to recover costs. Insurance and legal risks are also increasing as carbon-emitting assets become harder to insure and face potential litigation.

System Operating and Maintenance Risks The safe and reliable operation of electric generation transmission and distribution systems is critical to NSPl's operations. There are a variety of hazards and operational risks inherent in operatin...

AI summary The document discusses the operational and maintenance risks faced by Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) in managing its electric generation, transmission, and distribution systems. These risks include mechanical failures, cyberattacks, natural disasters, and supply chain issues, all of which could lead to infrastructure damage, public safety concerns, and financial losses. The regulatory framework allows NSPI to recover prudently incurred costs.

to physical operations at NS Power's generation, transmission and distribution facilities, and the Incident has not impacted the Company's ability to safely or reliably serve customers in Nova Scotia. However, the Incident impacted some bu...

AI summary An incident affected some business systems at NS Power's data center, including enterprise resource planning and customer billing, but did not impact the safe or reliable service to customers. A Recovery Program Office has been established to oversee system restoration, and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has initiated an investigation into the incident.

Technology Enablement The Incident disrupted foundational technology services, which created dependencies that impacted the restoration of some business functions and required employees to rely on contingency solutions. To address these ch...

AI summary The Incident disrupted foundational technology services, leading to dependencies that impacted business functions. A secure network rebuild, device re-imaging, and backup programs are underway to restore operations and ensure continuity.

Ongoing Regulatory Matters As a result of the impacts noted above, several matters before the Board have been affected, including: • rates-related, - customer billing, - capital and ACE Plan, - financial reporting and statements, - Fuel Ad...

AI summary The document outlines how various regulatory matters before the Nova Scotia Energy Board have been impacted by an incident, including rates, billing, capital, financial reporting, and demand-side management. The Board is being kept informed of evolving impacts, and communication with stakeholders is emphasized.

Rates-Related Matters Rates-related matters have been affected by the Incident. Time Varying Pricing As noted by the NSEB in its letter of September 17, 2025, the Time Varying Pricing (TVP) matter has been affected by the Incident. NS Powe...

AI summary The Incident has disrupted the preparation of reports and calculations related to Time Varying Pricing, TOU RTP tariffs, and the ELIADC tariff. NS Power is unable to produce the 2025 report due to missing data and is investigating file recovery. Systems required for cost calculations are currently unavailable, and NS Power plans to run retroactive calculations once systems are restored.

ecognize the remarkable efforts of Nova Scotia Power employees, who are also our customers. Their resilience and innovation have been critical in supporting our customers during this challenging time. While responding to this incident has...

AI summary Nova Scotia Power acknowledges the efforts of its employees and highlights investments in reliability. A General Rate Application was submitted, emphasizing the balance between affordability and reliability. The company cooperates with ongoing investigations and reaffirms its commitment to customer trust and correcting billing errors.

Technology Enablement NS Power has continued to strengthen foundational technology required to support core business operations. Key integrations across operational systems have been restored, and work to restore and further fortify networ...

AI summary NS Power has enhanced core technology infrastructure, restored system integrations, and advanced disaster recovery preparations. Efforts include replacing virtual firewalls with physical devices to improve reliability and configuring disaster recovery infrastructure to support system resiliency.

Additional Capabilities NS Power continues to expand access to real-time operational data, with progress made in restoring the plant information systems and onboarding users for access. Connections have now been established for several gen...

AI summary NS Power is enhancing real-time data access, restoring reporting systems, and rebuilding operational applications. Progress includes establishing connections for generating assets, restoring critical reports, and advancing asset management and fuel management systems to support decision-making and operational oversight.

Recovery Timeline NS Power remains focused on restoring its most critical business functions by continuing to rebuild and stabilize the supporting technologies and infrastructure that enable them. Over the past month, significant progress...

AI summary NS Power is focused on restoring critical business functions by rebuilding infrastructure and technology platforms, with progress made in data integration, networking, and disaster recovery. System restoration is expected to continue through 2026, prioritizing operational needs and long-term resiliency.

a. Steps to address potential failures or inaccuracies. - NS Power did act on contingency plans when billing resumed in June 2025. This included estimated billing, and the concurrent hiring, training and deployment of meter readers. - NS P...

AI summary NS Power implemented contingency plans, including estimated billing and meter reader deployment, after a 2025 billing system failure. Moving forward, they plan disaster recovery solutions for smart meters, enhanced monitoring, and CIS system modernization to improve bill accuracy and reliability.

Technology Enablement Progress has continued in strengthening the technology environment that supports core business operations and resilience objectives. Disaster recovery infrastructure has been configured and deployed, with backup and c...

AI summary The document highlights ongoing progress in enhancing the technology environment to support core business operations and resilience. Key initiatives include the deployment of disaster recovery infrastructure, network and security improvements, and the establishment of a fully operational Backup and Disaster Recovery (BDR) site.

Recovery Timeline Recovery activities remain ongoing and are expected to continue through 2026. Current priorities include restoring systems to perform reliably under normal operating conditions, strengthening disaster recovery and resilie...

AI summary Recovery activities are ongoing and will continue through 2026, focusing on restoring system reliability, enhancing disaster resilience, and managing interdependencies and resource constraints. NS Power is committed to providing monthly updates on progress.

- Explicitly warned that Russian state-sponsored actors were targeting Canadian critical - infrastructure in response to Canada's support for Ukraine. - NCTA 2025-2026 (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, 2024): Published in October 2024 -...

AI summary The text highlights the threat posed by Russian state-sponsored actors to Canadian critical infrastructure, including the electricity sector, as outlined in the NCTA 2025-2026 and CCCS assessments. Nova Scotia's strategic importance in Canada's defense posture and the documented use of cyber threats like phishing are emphasized, urging infrastructure operators to account for these risks.

A.4 The Ukrainian Grid Attacks as Proof of Concept - The academic and technical literature establishes beyond reasonable dispute that Russian-nexus - actors demonstrated both the capability and the intent to attack electricity infrastructu...

AI summary The text discusses the Ukrainian grid attacks as proof of concept, highlighting the capability and intent of Russian-nexus actors to attack electricity infrastructure. It outlines three major cyberattacks: the 2015 BlackEnergy/Sandworm attack, the 2016 Industroyer/CRASHOVERRIDE attack, and the 2022 Industroyer2 attack, all attributed to Sandworm, a GRU-affiliated group.

B. NSP's Acknowledged Risk and Inadequate Response - The evidentiary record before the Board contains a critical and damaging admission. On - February 27, 2025 NSP's Chief Operating Officer, Dave Pickles, filed a report with the UARB - tit...

AI summary Nova Scotia Power (NSP) acknowledged the rising cybersecurity threats but failed to implement a comprehensive response. Their plan focused only on operational technology (OT) systems, ignored IT systems and customer data, and did not address specific Russian-nexus threats. The breach went undetected for 37 days, and NSP lacked a backup site, leading to long-term system impairments and data exposure.

IR B-2 — IT/OT Segmentation - (a) Describe the segmentation controls that existed between NSP's IT and OT networks as of March 18, 2025. - (b) NSP's Monthly Update 6 (March 2026) disclosed that post-attack remediation included "the continu...

AI summary The document requests details about IT/OT network segmentation controls at NSP as of March 2025, the replacement of virtual firewalls with physical devices post-attack, and the attack path used by the threat actor, including failed segmentation controls.

GROUP G — POST-INCIDENT REMEDIATION AND FORWARD COMMITMENTS - These Interrogatories address NSP's post-attack remediation program, the adequacy and pace - of that program, and NSP's forward commitments to prevent recurrence. They are relev...

AI summary This section addresses NSP's post-incident remediation efforts, their adequacy and pace, and forward commitments to prevent recurrence. It is relevant to the Board's evaluation of NSP's accountability and whether ratepayers should bear remediation costs.

Incident Impact and Response During the reporting period, recovery efforts continued to progress in a controlled and sequenced manner. The focus remains on stabilizing operations, restoring trusted capabilities, and transitioning services...

AI summary Recovery efforts continued in a controlled and sequenced manner during the reporting period, focusing on stabilizing operations and transitioning services through defined readiness stages. Core services remained operational, and recovery activities emphasized structured validation, governance, and risk-based decisions. No new unplanned impacts were identified.

Technology Enablement Foundational technology capabilities have progressed through staged enablement into full operational use, effectively supporting broader restoration and stabilization efforts across dependent services. Core infrastruc...

AI summary The document discusses the progress of foundational technology capabilities, which have moved into full operational use, supporting restoration and stabilization efforts. Core infrastructure services are established, and remaining capabilities have completed validation and transitioned into operational readiness. Integration and optimization activities are ongoing, with a focus on reliability and governance.

The following projects experienced adjustments to their completion timeline. An overview of the changes and associated rationale is outlined below: Pillar Project Summary of Change Rationale Sy stem Planning System Planning Introduced NA N...

AI summary The document outlines adjustments to the completion timelines of several projects, including the transition of IRP Modelling to the IESO-NS and the resolution of an issue related to the Maritime Link Project, with updated reporting provided by NSPML in its October 15, 2025, Quarterly Report.

Technology Enablement Foundational technology capabilities remain fully restored and continue to operate as expected. Core infrastructure services, including compute, backup and recovery, and supporting technology platforms, provided relia...

AI summary Foundational technology capabilities are fully restored and operating as expected. Activities focused on routine operations, maintenance, and oversight to ensure service reliability and performance. Governance and operational controls are in place to maintain stability and alignment with business requirements.

NOVA SCOTIA POWER PANEL 389 Questions, (Melanson) 1 estimation had to continue beyond the period that it did, 16 for customers. 17 And in reading the evidence, it Q. 18 appeared to me that there might not be very much done to 19 the existi...

AI summary The text discusses the limitations of the Customer Information System (CIS) in improving estimation accuracy for customers. The discussion highlights the complexity of the system and the lack of feasible modifications to enhance accuracy, such as using data from multiple weather seasons. A new CIS project is mentioned, with a 24-month delivery timeline upon regulatory approval.