N-1Application - Directory 5 filing
72 passages
December 12, 2025 Ms. Crystal Henwood Clerk of the Board Nova Scotia Energy Board 1601 Lower Water Street, 3rd Fl. Halifax, NS B3J3P6 Dear Ms. Henwood: Re: Fourth Quarter 2025 Application of the Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. f...
AI summary The Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. (NPCC) has submitted an application to the Nova Scotia Energy Board for approval of revised regional reliability criteria, specifically revisions to NPCC Directory #5 Reserve, under a 2010 Memorandum of Understanding involving Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (NSPI), NERC, and NPCC.
BEFORE THE NOVA SCOTIA ENERGY BOARD OF THE PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA NORTHEAST POWER ) COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC. ) FOURTH QUARTER 2025 APPLICATION OF THE NORTHEAST POWER COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC. FOR APPROVAL OF REVISED REGIONAL RELIABILIT...
AI summary The Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. has submitted an application to the Nova Scotia Energy Board for approval of revised regional reliability criteria for the fourth quarter of 2025.
BEFORE THE NOVA SCOTIA ENERGY BOARD OF THE PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA NORTHEAST POWER ) COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC. ) FOURTH QUARTER 2025 APPLICATION OF THE NORTHEAST POWER COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC. FOR APPROVAL OF REVISED REGIONAL RELIABILIT...
AI summary The Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. has submitted an application to the Nova Scotia Energy Board for approval of revised regional reliability criteria for the fourth quarter of 2025.
Version History Version Date Action Change Tracking (New, Errata or Revisions) 1 12/2/2010 New 2 10/11/2012 Revised/clarified Criteria: (radial source cont., time zero) Revisions 3 9/27/2019 NERC style reformat, Revised/clarified Criteria...
AI summary The document outlines the version history and table of contents for a regulatory proceeding related to reserve criteria and reliability standards. It includes multiple revisions and errata corrections over time, with references to NERC and NPCC standards.
Ten-Minute Reserve Requirements - R1. Each Balancing Authority shall have ten-minute reserve available to it that is at least equal to its Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC). NPCC ten-minute reserve meets the requirements for the Contin...
AI summary This section outlines the requirement for Balancing Authorities to maintain ten-minute reserve capacity equal to their Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC), in accordance with NERC standards. If deficiencies occur, authorities must restore the reserve as soon as possible or minimize the impact if restoration is not feasible.
Thirty-Minute Reserve Requirements - R2. Each Balancing Authority shall have thirty-minute reserve available to it that is at least equal to one-half its Second Most Severe Single Contingency (SMSSC) . - A Balancing Authority deficient in...
AI summary The regulation requires each Balancing Authority to maintain thirty-minute reserve equal to at least half of its Second Most Severe Single Contingency (SMSSC). Deficiencies in this reserve must be addressed promptly, with efforts to eliminate or minimize the deficiency.
Requirement for Synchronized Reserve Available Within Ten Minutes - R3. A Balancing Authority's requirement for synchronized reserve available within ten minutes shall be calculated by the twentieth day of each month, for the previous mont...
AI summary This section outlines requirements for synchronized reserve available within ten minutes, including calculation, adjustment, and restoration rules. It specifies that the requirement must be calculated monthly and adjusted based on performance, with penalties for failure to meet standards. The rules also address how deficiencies are restored.
Sustainability of Operating Reserve R6. A Balancing Authority's synchronized reserve, ten-minute reserve , and thirty-minute reserve , if activated, shall be sustainable for at least one hour from the time of activation.
AI summary The regulation outlines requirements for the sustainability of different types of operating reserves, specifying that synchronized, ten-minute, and thirty-minute reserves must be sustainable for at least one hour if activated.
Attachment A – Synchronized Reserve Detail Calculation Month ACE Recovery Failures and Successes Requirement Implementation Date Monthly Synchronized Reserve Penalty Total Synchronized Reserve Penalty Detail Behind Penalty September 2 Fail...
AI summary This attachment provides a detailed calculation of synchronized reserve penalties based on ACE recovery failures and successes across different months. It outlines the number of failures or successes, the implementation dates, monthly penalties, and the breakdown of penalties for each month.
1.1 Preliminary Reserve Assessment On a continuing basis, participating Balancing Authorities shall keep the SAR Coordinator(s) informed of the MSSC in their respective Balancing Areas. Information pertaining to a Balancing Authority's ina...
AI summary This section outlines the responsibilities of participating Balancing Authorities in providing information to the SAR Coordinator regarding their ability to participate in System Area Reserve (SAR) coordination, specifically concerning the Minimum System Separation Capability (MSSC) in their Balancing Areas.
1.2 Notification of Contingency A participating Balancing Authority that experiences a contingency and wishes to receive SAR assistance shall report the following information to the SAR Coordinator via the direct telephone lines: - Estimat...
AI summary This section outlines the procedures for reporting and requesting System Area Reliability (SAR) assistance following a contingency. A participating Balancing Authority must notify the SAR Coordinator with specific details, including the time of the contingency, resources affected, and the amount of assistance requested.
1.3 Allocation of SAR The SAR Coordinator shall assign 100% of the contingency to the contingent and assisting Balancing Authorities collectively. The SAR Coordinator shall assign allocations to the assisting Balancing Authorities that are...
AI summary The SAR Coordinator is responsible for allocating 100% of the contingency to the contingent and assisting Balancing Authorities, ensuring that no Balancing Authority is asked to provide more assistance than required to meet its own MSSC. SAR participants may activate additional reserve beyond SAR allocations to ensure ten-minute reserve is provided successfully.
1.4 Provision of SAR Assistance Assisting Balancing Authorities shall initiate immediate action to provide their allocated SAR assistance . The contingent Balancing Authority shall initiate immediate action to provide its share assigned by...
AI summary This section outlines the obligations of assisting Balancing Authorities to provide SAR assistance immediately upon allocation notification, including the use of ten-minute reserves and interchange schedules, and the need for contingent Balancing Authorities to recover from resource loss and prepare for replacement of SAR assistance energy.
1.5 Termination of SAR The contingent Balancing Authority shall notify the SAR Coordinator when it wishes to terminate the delivery of SAR assistance. - The SAR Coordinator shall notify all participating Balancing Authorities and confirm t...
AI summary The termination of SAR requires the contingent Balancing Authority to notify the SAR Coordinator, who then informs participating Balancing Authorities and establishes revised interchange schedules. Reserve assistance must be replaced in accordance with these schedules, and if the contingent Balancing Authority cannot fulfill its reserve obligation, it must arrange for additional assistance.
1.6 Reallocation and/or Subsequent Contingencies In the event that the reliability of an assisting Balancing Authority becomes jeopardized, that Balancing Authority may cancel all or part of its allocation (using a step Schedule change) by...
AI summary This section outlines procedures for reallocating System Area Reliability (SAR) assistance in the event of reliability issues, generation loss, or other contingencies. It specifies how Balancing Authorities may adjust their allocations and how the SAR Coordinator facilitates reallocation.
2.0 Handling of Radial Source Contingencies with Several Balancing Authorities Receiving Energy If the resource loss is an energy transaction from another Balancing Authority connecting via HVDC lines, see sections 2.0 through 4.0 below fo...
AI summary This section discusses the handling of radial source tie line contingencies when multiple Balancing Authorities receive energy. It outlines the methodology for allocating SAR assistance in cases of single or multiple contingencies on tie lines crossing Balancing Area boundaries.
3.0 Radial Source Contingencies with Counter flow Transactions Coincident with energy Transactions delivered out of the Balancing Authority on radial source tie line s, countervailing Transactions may be scheduled simultaneously into the B...
AI summary This section discusses radial source contingencies involving counter flow transactions on tie lines, highlighting the potential for large individual counter flow transactions and the methodology for allocating SAR assistance. It also addresses the challenges of reserve requirements when energy is delivered to multiple balancing authorities and the use of negative assistance shares in such scenarios.
4.1 Management of NPCC Radial Source Contingencies SAR support for radial source contingencies will be limited to SAR participants. Radial Source Transactions will be limited to only one intermediary Balancing Authority unless all Balancin...
AI summary The management of NPCC Radial Source contingencies is outlined, specifying that SAR support is limited to SAR participants. Non-SAR participants must recover energy sinking within their BAs. Hourly notifications of wheelthrough transactions among SAR participants are required, and e-tags will be curtailed via phone communication.
Example 1 Source BA and Sink BA1 The net energy flows from the radial Source BA and sinks in BA1 at the receiving end of that radial tie. BA1 is responsible to recover for the entire loss as if the source was a generator inside the BA 1 fo...
AI summary The document describes the handling of energy flows and responsibilities in the event of a contingency loss in a radial tie between Source BA and Sink BA1. BA1 is responsible for recovering losses as if the source were within its footprint and may request SAR if conditions are stressed or losses exceed NPCC thresholds.
Example 2 Source BA, intermediary BA1, and sink BA2 The net energy is wheeled from the radial Source BA through BA1 and sinks in BA2. This example applies to SAR participants. BA2 is responsible to recover the MW sinking in its BA. Immedia...
AI summary This example describes the process of net energy being wheeled from a source BA through an intermediary BA1 to a sink BA2, focusing on contingency loss scenarios and communication protocols between Balancing Authorities, particularly in cases involving reportable events or stressed system conditions.
Post Contingency : BA1 contacts SAR Coordinator to activate SAR. The SAR Coordinator issues shares. All E-tag(s) associated with the energy wheeled through BA1 and into BA2 will be curtailed upon termination of the SAR using a ten-minute R...
AI summary In the event of a contingency, BA1 contacts the SAR Coordinator to activate SAR, which results in the issuance of shares. Upon termination of SAR, all E-tag(s) associated with energy wheeled through BA1 into BA2 are curtailed using a ten-minute Ramp.
For non-SAR events: If SAR is not requested, all E-tag(s) associated with the energy wheeled through BA1 and into BA2 will be curtailed on a mutually agreed upon start time and Ramp duration by the affected BAs. PUBLIC Page 19 of 44
AI summary For non-SAR events, E-tags associated with energy wheeled through BA1 into BA2 will be curtailed on a mutually agreed start time and Ramp duration by the affected BAs.
Example 3 Source BA, intermediary sink BA1, and sink BA2 The energy is flowing from the radial Source BA with portions sinking in BA1, and BA 2. This example applies to SAR participants. BA1 and BA2 are responsible to recover the portions...
AI summary Energy flows from a Source BA to BA1 and BA2, with responsibilities for recovering lost MW. In case of a contingency loss exceeding the NPCC reportable event threshold, BA1 must notify the SAR Coordinator for SAR activation. Communication protocols are outlined between Balancing Authorities.
Pre- contingency : BA1 will communicate the BA1 and BA2 Schedules to SAR Coordinator
AI summary BA1 will communicate the BA1 and BA2 Schedules to SAR Coordinator as part of the pre-contingency process.
Post contingency : BA1 contacts SAR Coordinator to activate SAR. The SAR Coordinator issues shares. The E-tag(s) associated with the energy sinking in BA1 is curtailed immediately over a zero minute Ramp due to the flow path being removed....
AI summary In the event of a contingency, BA1 contacts the SAR Coordinator to activate SAR, leading to immediate curtailment of E-tags in BA1. E-tags wheeled through BA1 and sinking in BA2 are curtailed upon SAR termination with a ten-minute ramp.
4.2 Modification to the SAR Procedure The SAR procedure is modified to allocate portions of the total delivery to Balancing Authorities in addition to the directly connected Balancing Authority during an ordinary simultaneous activation of...
AI summary The SAR procedure is modified to allocate energy to Balancing Authorities during a contingency, with shares determined based on mutual assistance principles. When a tie line trips, the directly connected Balancing Authority may initiate the SAR process, and energy is shared according to pre-defined rules. This ensures that all Balancing Authorities contribute to and receive assistance for their portion of the contingency.
First Pass – NYISO is provided 600 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 200 MW each, among the other three participants – including PJM. Second Pass – PJM is provided 200 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equall...
AI summary The document discusses the allocation of 600 MW of assistance among NYISO and PJM, with subsequent adjustments and the impact on generation and ACE (Area Control Error) following a contingency. The restoration of ACE and the resulting generation changes are detailed in a table.
PUBLIC Page 23 of 44 IESO IESO NE NE PJM PJM NY NY Tot Tot Time Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Pre-contingency 0 0 0 0 -400 0 +400 0 0 0 Contingency 0 0 0 0 -400 0 +400 -1600 0 -1600 PJM/NY Schedule change 0 0 0 0 0 -400 0 -1200 0...
AI summary The document presents a table showing the changes in schedules and ACE (Area Control Error) values across different regions and entities, including IESO, PJM, and NYISO, following a contingency event. It illustrates the impact of schedule changes and SAR (System Area Reliability) entries on ACE values, with specific examples such as PJM buying 1200 MW from HQ-TE on MSC 7040 and NYISO buying 400 MW.
PUBLIC Page 24 of 44 First Pass – NYISO is provided 200 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 67 MW each, among the other three participants – including PJM. Second Pass – PJM is provided 600 MW of assistance. These shares...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of generation assistance among Balancing Authorities (BA) during a contingency, including the restoration of composite NPCC/PJM ACE and the cancellation of the SAR procedure. It outlines the process of returning ACE to zero and the resulting changes in generation schedules.
Time IESO Sch IESO ACE NE Sch NE ACE PJM Sch PJM ACE NY Sch NY ACE Tot Sch Tot ACE Pre-contingency 0 0 0 0 -1200 0 +1200 0 0 0 Contingency 0 0 0 0 -1200 0 +1200 -1600 0 -1600 PJM/NY Schedule change 0 0 0 0 0 -1200 0 -400 0 -1600 No respons...
AI summary The table presents a series of scenarios related to system area reliability (SAR) and area control error (ACE) across different regions, including pre-contingency, contingency, and schedule change scenarios, with adjustments made to balance the system and bring ACE back to zero.
First Pass – ISO-NE is provided with 600 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 200 MW each, among the other three participants. Second Pass – NYISO is provided 100 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 33 MW...
AI summary The text outlines three passes of assistance allocation among Balancing Authorities (BA1, BA2, and NYISO) during a contingency event. It discusses the restoration of composite NPCC/PJM ACE and the impact on generation after the SAR procedure is canceled and ACE is returned to zero.
IESO NE NE PJM PJM NY NY Tot Tot Time Sch IESO Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Pre-contingency 0 0 +400 0 -200 0 -200 0 0 0 Contingency 0 0 +400 -1600 -200 0 -200 0 0 -1600 PJM/NY/NE schedule change 0 0 0 -1200 0 -200 0 -200 0 -1600 No res...
AI summary The table presents data on schedule changes and system area reliability (SAR) entries across various regions (IESO, NE, PJM, NY) under different contingency scenarios. It includes pre-contingency and contingency timeframes, showing changes in schedules and SAR entries, as well as the impact on ACE (Area Control Error).
First Pass – ISO-NE is provided 350 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 117 MW each, among the other three participants. Second Pass – NYISO is provided 350 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 117 MW eac...
AI summary The document outlines the distribution of 350 MW of assistance among three participants in three different passes involving ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM. It also discusses the impact of these actions on generation levels, ACE, and the SAR procedure, highlighting changes in schedules and ACE before and after a contingency event.
IESO IESO NE NE PJM PJM NY NY Tot Tot Time Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Pre-contingency 0 0 +1400 0 -700 0 -700 0 0 0 Contingency 0 0 +1400 -2100 -700 0 -700 0 0 -2100 PJM/NY/NE Schedule change 0 0 0 -700 0 -700 0 -700 0 -2100 N...
AI summary The table presents data on time, schedule changes, ACE (Area Control Error), and SAR (System Area Reliability) entries for different regions (IESO, NE, PJM, NY) before and after contingency scenarios. It shows how ACE values change and how SAR entries are used to balance the system during these scenarios.
Initial Shares – NYISO and PJM are initially assigned one-half of their respective purchase from and delivery to HQ-TE. Consequently, under the ordinary SAR rules, they would be 'seeking' assistance for both flows into and out of Quebec. T...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of assistance shares among NYISO, PJM, and other participants during a contingency scenario involving energy flows into and out of Quebec. It outlines the first and second pass allocations and how they affect the net generation picked up by Balancing Authorities after the SAR procedure is canceled and ACE is restored to zero.
Sandy Pond flow = 1000 MW NYISO - HQ-TE transaction = -500 MW (flow is NY to HQ-TE) HQ-TE – ISONE transaction = 2000 MW PJM – HQ-TE transaction = -500 MW (flow is PJM to HQ-TE) Area Initial Share/ Assistance Sought First Pass Second Pass T...
AI summary The document presents a table showing energy transactions and generation data across various balancing authorities, including NYISO, ISO-NE, IESO, and PJM. It outlines initial shares, energy picked up during different passes, and total generation after adjustments. The context includes flow data between different entities like Sandy Pond and HQ-TE.
Initial Shares – ISO-NE, NYISO and PJM are initially assigned one-half of their respective purchase from and delivery to Quebec. Consequently, under the ordinary SAR rules, they would be 'seeking' assistance for flows into and out of Quebe...
AI summary This text outlines a process involving ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM in a contingency scenario where they are assigned shares of assistance for flows into and out of Quebec. The text describes how assistance is distributed in three passes, the impact on generation, and how the SAR procedure is canceled once the ACE is restored to zero.
Initial Shares – NYISO and ISO-NE are initially assigned one-half of their respective purchases from HQ-TE. Consequently, under the ordinary SAR rules, they would be 'seeking' assistance for an equal amount. The total assistance sought is...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of assistance during a contingency scenario involving NYISO, ISO-NE, and NBP-SO, with shares being distributed in two passes. It outlines how additional generation is picked up by Balancing Authorities and how the ACE is restored after the SAR procedure is canceled.
IESO IESO NE NE PJM PJM NY NY NB NB Tot Tot Time Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Pre 0 0 -300 0 0 0 +300 0 0 0 0 0 contingency Contingency 0 0 -300 0 0 0 +300 -1300 0 0 0 -1300 NE/NY Schedule 0 0 0 -300 0 0 0 -1000 0 0 0 -1...
AI summary The table presents data on scheduling and ACE (Area Control Error) values across various regions including IESO, NE, PJM, NY, and NB. It outlines pre-contingency and contingency scenarios, schedule changes, and SAR (System Area Reliability) entries and responses. The data shows ACE values and adjustments in different scenarios, ultimately balancing to zero.
Monitoring Criteria As an indication of the adequacy of ten-minute reserve , the monitoring and reporting criteria for Balancing Authorities within NPCC focus on performance during reportable events where the supply side resource loss is e...
AI summary The monitoring criteria for Balancing Authorities within NPCC focus on performance during reportable events where the supply side resource loss is equal to or less than the MSSC, as an indication of the adequacy of ten-minute reserve.
1.0 Introduction This procedure provides specific instructions to Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators for: making notifications upon the occurrence of deficiencies in operating reserve; restoration of ten-minute reserve , sy...
AI summary This procedure outlines instructions for Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators regarding notifications related to deficiencies in operating reserve and the restoration of ten-minute, synchronized, and thirty-minute reserves.
2.0 Objectives - 2.1 To mitigate the impact of an evolving event. - 2.2 To alert other Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators when any Balancing Authority is deficient operating reserve , or anticipates being deficient in ten-m...
AI summary The objectives outlined focus on mitigating impacts of evolving events, alerting Balancing Authorities and Reliability Coordinators about deficiencies in operating and ten-minute reserves, enhancing reliability through resource coordination, and restoring normal operations.
3.0 Action to Mitigate Ten-Minute Reserve Shortages 3.1 Actions When Becoming Deficient in Ten-Minute Reserve To minimize the magnitude and duration of a Ten-Minute Reserve deficiency, a Balancing Authority may implement any or all of the...
AI summary This section outlines actions a Balancing Authority can take to address deficiencies in ten-minute reserve and synchronized reserve. Measures include committing offline resources, recalling exports, obtaining external resources, and managing interruptible loads to ensure reliability and compliance with reserve requirements.
3.3 Notifications When a Balancing Authority becomes deficient or forecasts a deficiency in either the synchronized reserve available within ten minutes or ten-minute reserve , and the Balancing Authority cannot restore these reserves usin...
AI summary This section outlines the notification procedures for Balancing Authorities when they face deficiencies in synchronized or ten-minute reserves. The process involves informing the Reliability Coordinator and potentially initiating an NPCC Emergency Preparedness Conference Call.
4.0 Actions to Mitigate Thirty-Minute Reserve Shortages 4.1 Actions When Becoming Deficient in Thirty-Minute Reserve To minimize the magnitude and duration of a thirty-minute reserve deficiency, a Balancing Authority may implement any or a...
AI summary This section outlines actions a Balancing Authority can take to address a thirty-minute reserve shortage, including obtaining external resources, recalling planned outages, converting exports, and counting interruptible load and voltage reduction as reserve.
4.2 Actions When Forecasting a Deficiency of Thirty-Minute Reserve - Count additional resources from outside the Balancing Authority in accordance with regional and local practices. These additional resources shall not be from the portion...
AI summary This section outlines actions to be taken when forecasting a deficiency in thirty-minute reserve. It includes counting additional resources from outside the Balancing Authority and obtaining additional resources internally, following regional and local practices.
4.3 Notifications When a Balancing Authority becomes deficient in thirty-minute reserve and the Balancing Authority cannot restore these reserves using the actions specified in section 4.1 of this Appendix, the following actions are requir...
AI summary This section outlines the procedures for notifying and coordinating actions when a Balancing Authority is deficient in thirty-minute reserve and cannot restore it using specified actions. Notifications are sent to the Reliability Coordinator, who may then initiate emergency preparedness conference calls with other reliability coordinators.
Appendix D – Guideline for Determining the Time T+0 The determination of time T+0 for resource losses is consistent with the methodology described in the NERC Performance Standard Reference Guide. For performing compliance evaluations, tim...
AI summary This guideline outlines the methodology for determining time T+0 for resource losses in compliance with NERC standards. It specifies that T+0 is based on the first observation of declining output within a sliding 60-second interval, with the DCS computation taking precedence if there is a conflict. The guideline also excludes resource loss preceding the interval from the calculation of megawatts lost.
Version History Version Date Action Change Tracking (New, Errata or Revisions) 1.6.1 Functional Entities (Responsible Entities)4 1.6.2 Applicability of NPCC Criteria4 2Defined Terms 5 3 NERC ERO Reliability Standard Requirements 5 4NPCC Re...
AI summary The document outlines version history and various sections related to reliability standards and compliance requirements under the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NPCC). It includes appendices and attachments detailing monitoring procedures, reserve calculations, and contingency measures.
1. Introduction - 1.1 Title Reserve - 1.2 Directory Number 5 - 1.3 Objective The purpose of this Directory is to present the requirements with which the applicable entity must plan for and deploy adequate reserve . This Directory provides...
AI summary This document outlines the requirements for planning and deploying adequate reserve capacity, as governed by NERC standards and derived from the NPCC A-6 Operating Reserve Criteria. It applies to Reliability Coordinators, Balancing Authorities, Generator Operators, and Distribution Providers.
Distribution of Reserve R11. A Balancing Authority shall ensure that reserve is distributed so that it can be utilized without exceeding applicable element ratings or transfer limitations.
AI summary This section outlines the responsibility of a Balancing Authority to distribute reserve in a manner that ensures it can be utilized without exceeding applicable element ratings or transfer limitations.
Simultaneous Activation of Ten-Minute Reserve 1.1 Preliminary Reserve Assessment On a continuing basis, participating Balancing Authorities shall keep the SAR Coordinator(s) informed of the MSSC first contingency loss (FCL) in their respec...
AI summary The document outlines procedures for Balancing Authorities to report their first contingency loss (FCL) to the SAR Coordinator and notify them of any inability to participate in the Simultaneous Activation of Ten-Minute Reserve (SAR).
Example 1 Source BA and Sink BA1 The net energy flows from the radial Source BA and sinks in BA1 at the receiving end of that radial tie. BA1 is responsible to recover for the entire loss as if the source was a generator inside the BA 1 fo...
AI summary This text describes the process for handling energy flow disruptions in a radial transmission system, particularly focusing on the responsibilities of BA1 during a contingency loss and the potential need for SAR. The flow path is curtailed immediately, and communication between balancing authorities is emphasized.
Example 2 Source BA, intermediary BA1, and sink BA2 The net energy is wheeled from the radial Source BA through BA1 and sinks in BA2. This example applies to SAR participants. BA2 is responsible to recover the MW sinking in its BA. Immedia...
AI summary This example outlines the process for managing net energy flow through a radial system involving a source, intermediary, and sink balancing authorities. It highlights communication protocols during contingency losses and the activation of SAR under specific conditions.
Post Contingency: BA1 contacts SAR Coordinator to activate SAR. The SAR Coordinator issues shares. All E-tag(s) associated with the energy wheeled through BA1 and into BA2 will be curtailed upon termination of the SAR using a ten-minute Ra...
AI summary After a contingency, BA1 contacts the SAR Coordinator to activate SAR. The SAR Coordinator then issues shares, and all E-tag(s) associated with the energy wheeled through BA1 and into BA2 will be curtailed upon termination of the SAR using a ten-minute Ramp.
Example 3 Source BA, intermediary sink BA1, and sink BA2 The energy is flowing from the radial Source BA with portions sinking in BA1, and BA 2. This example applies to SAR participants. BA1 and BA2 are responsible to recover the portions...
AI summary This example describes energy flow from a source Balancing Authority (BA) to intermediary and sink BAs, focusing on communication protocols following a contingency loss and potential SAR activation based on NPCC reportable event thresholds.
▪ Pre- contingency : BA1 will communicate the BA1 and BA2 Schedules to SAR Coordinator
AI summary BA1 will communicate the BA1 and BA2 Schedules to the SAR Coordinator as part of the pre-contingency process.
4.2 Modification to the SAR Procedure The SAR procedure is modified to allocate portions of the total delivery to Balancing Authorities in addition to the directly connected Balancing Authority during an ordinary simultaneous activation of...
AI summary The SAR procedure is modified to allocate energy from the tie line to Balancing Authorities during a contingency, with each recipient contributing to and receiving assistance based on mutual support principles. The reserve requirement for the directly connected Balancing Authority remains based on the largest internal contingency or its share of the tie line flow. The methodology involves iterative allocation of shares and is illustrated with examples.
First Pass – NYISO is provided 600 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 200 MW each, among the other three participants – including PJM. Second Pass – PJM is provided 200 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equall...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of generation assistance among Balancing Authorities, including NYISO and PJM, and the restoration of ACE (Area Control Error) after a contingency. It also references the SAR (Simultaneous Activation of Ten-Minute Reserve) procedure and the impact on generation levels.
IESO IESO NE NE PJM PJM NY NY Tot Tot Time Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Sch ACE Pre-contingency 0 0 0 0 -400 0 +400 0 0 0 Contingency 0 0 0 0 -400 0 +400 -1600 0 -1600 PJM/NY Schedule change 0 0 0 0 0 -400 0 -1200 0 -1600 -200 -600 No r...
AI summary This table and example illustrate the coordination of simultaneous activation of ten-minute reserve (SAR) in PJM and NYISO systems, showing how ACE (Area Control Error) is managed through schedule changes, SAR entries, and cancellations to balance the grid. An example is provided where PJM and NYISO purchase power from HQ-TE to address imbalances.
Formatted: French (Canada) Area Initial Share/ Assistance Sought First Pass Second Pass Total Generation Picked Up When SAR Energy Is Total Gen. Picked Up After SAR Is Canceled And All ACEs = 0 Supplied Fully IESO 67 200 267 0 ISO-NE 67 20...
AI summary The table outlines the initial share and assistance sought by various entities during a contingency scenario, focusing on the total generation picked up when SAR energy is supplied fully and after SAR is canceled. NYISO and PJM are initially assigned half of their respective purchases from HQ-TE, resulting in a total assistance sought of 800 MW for the entire contingency amount.
First Pass – NYISO is provided 200 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 67 MW each, among the other three participants – including PJM. Second Pass – PJM is provided 600 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of generation assistance among Balancing Authorities, including NYISO and PJM, during a contingency event. It outlines the process of restoring the composite NPCC/PJM ACE and the impact on generation after the SAR procedure is canceled.
First Pass – The NYISO is provided 600 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated equally, 200 MW each, among the other three participants – including PJM. Second Pass – PJM is provided -200 MW of assistance. These shares are allocated e...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of assistance among Balancing Authorities, including the NYISO and PJM, and how negative shares reduce the net pick-ups required. It also references the restoration of the composite NPCC/PJM ACE and the cancellation of the SAR procedure, with an example involving ISO-NE purchasing power from multiple entities.
NYISO - HQ-TE transaction = -500 MW (flow is NY to HQ-TE) HQ-TE – ISONE transaction = 2000 MW PJM – HQ-TE transaction = -500 MW (flow is PJM to HQ-TE) Area Initial Share/ Assistance Sought First Pass Second Pass Third Pass Total Generation...
AI summary The document outlines power transactions between various regional grid operators and Hydro-Quebec (HQ-TE), including flows from NYISO, PJM, and ISONE to HQ-TE, and details a table showing the distribution of energy generation and assistance sought during a contingency scenario involving the activation of ten-minute reserve (SAR) energy.
First Pass – NYISO is provided 500 MW of assistance. NBP-SO is limited to 50 MW and is assigned a share of 50 MW. The remaining 450 MW of shares are allocated equally, 150 MW each, among the other three participants – including ISO-NE. Sec...
AI summary The document outlines the allocation of assistance during a contingency, detailing how NYISO, NBP-SO, and ISO-NE received shares of 500 MW and 150 MW in two passes. It also describes the total generation picked up by Balancing Authorities and the restoration of the NPCC/PJM ACE after the SAR procedure is canceled.
2.0 ADI Methodology Changes to the ADI states (enable/disable) and parameters are coordinated through the ADI Coordinator. The ADI Coordinator has the authority to globally disable ADI. Following this action, all participants shall be noti...
AI summary This section outlines the methodology for managing the ACE Diversity Interchange (ADI) process, including the roles and responsibilities of the ADI Coordinator, participating Balancing Authorities, and the NPCC Working Group CO-1. It covers enabling/disabling ADI, communication protocols, data requirements, and reliability monitoring.
Introduction This procedure establishes the monitoring and reporting processes for resource losses in addition to those required for meeting the NERC Disturbance Control Standard (DCS). The NPCC Control Performance Working Group (CO-1) has...
AI summary This procedure outlines the monitoring and reporting processes for resource losses, in addition to requirements from the NERC Disturbance Control Standard (DCS). The NPCC Control Performance Working Group (CO-1) is responsible for these processes.
Monthly Monitoring Procedures For each NPCC reportable event and NERC Balancing Contingency Event, a NERC CR-1 Form must be filled out. The CR1-Form has been modified to include a new tab for filling in additional information relative to s...
AI summary The document outlines monthly monitoring procedures for NPCC reportable events and NERC Balancing Contingency Events. It requires the completion of NERC CR-1 Forms, submission of reports to CO-1, and monitoring of the SAR program by CO-1, with any anomalies reported to the TFCO.
3.2 Deficiencies of the Synchronized Reserve Available Within Ten Minutes When a Balancing Authority becomes deficient in the synchronized reserve available within ten minutes but is not deficient in ten-minute reserve , the deficient Bala...
AI summary This section outlines the actions a Balancing Authority may take when it has a deficiency in synchronized reserve within ten minutes, including activating off-line generation, re-dispatching online generation, obtaining external resources, and disconnecting interruptible loads.
4.2 Actions When Forecasting a Deficiency of Thirty-Minute Reserve - Count additional resources from outside the Balancing Authority in accordance with regional and local practices. These additional resources shall not be from the portion...
AI summary When forecasting a deficiency in thirty-minute reserve, actions include counting additional resources from outside the Balancing Authority, ensuring they are not from another Balancing Authority's required reserve, and obtaining resources internally in accordance with regional practices.
4.3 Notifications When a Balancing Authority becomes deficient in thirty-minute reserve and the Balancing Authority cannot restore these reserves using the actions specified in section 4.1 of this Appendix, the following actions are requir...
AI summary When a Balancing Authority lacks thirty-minute reserve capacity and cannot restore it through specified actions, it must notify its Reliability Coordinator, who then informs other NPCC Areas and may initiate an emergency conference call with other reliability coordinators if needed. This process repeats as operating reserve status changes.
Appendix D – Guideline for Determining the Time T+0 The determination of time T+0 for resource losses is consistent with the methodology described in the NERC Performance Standard Reference Guide. For performing compliance evaluations, tim...
AI summary This appendix outlines the methodology for determining the time T+0 for resource losses, consistent with NERC standards. It involves using a sliding 60-second interval and evaluating changes in resource output against NPCC and DCS thresholds, with the DCS threshold taking precedence in case of discrepancies.
N-2Application - Directory 7 filing
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BEFORE THE NOVA SCOTIA ENERGY BOARD OF THE PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA NORTHEAST POWER ) COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC. ) FOURTH QUARTER 2025 APPLICATION OF THE NORTHEAST POWER COORDINATING COUNCIL, INC. FOR APPROVAL OF REVISED REGIONAL RELIABILIT...
AI summary The Northeast Power Coordinating Council, Inc. is applying for approval of revised regional reliability criteria for the fourth quarter of 2025. This application is before the Nova Scotia Energy Board.
C. Description of Directory #7 and Justification for Revisions In this application, NPCC requests the NSEB to approve revisions to the Regional Reliability Criteria contained in Directory #7 Remedial Action Schemes , effective, October 23,...
AI summary NPCC requests the NSEB to approve revisions to Directory #7, which outlines the design criteria and review process for Remedial Action Schemes (RAS). The revisions aim to address the impact of evolving NERC Standards and industry technologies, based on a triennial review conducted by the Task Force on Coordination of Planning and the Task Force on System Protection.
requirements associated with RAS. See clean (Exh. A) and redlined (Exh. B) versions of Directory #7. The proposed revisions are provided in the table below: Section No Title Notable Changes/Additions A new bullet added for the replacement...
AI summary The document outlines proposed revisions to the Reliability Assessment System (RAS) requirements, including changes to the review process for RAS equipment replacement and the removal of certain PRC-012 requirements. These updates align with the revised NPCC RAS review process and Directory #1 and #7 requirements.
1.3 Objective To ensure that RAS do not introduce unintentional or unacceptable reliability risks. 1.4 Effective Date: December 27, 2007
AI summary The objective is to ensure that RAS do not introduce unintentional or unacceptable reliability risks. The effective date of this measure is December 27, 2007.
1.6.1 Functional Entities Reliability Coordinator Planning Coordinator RAS -entity: Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that owns all or part of a RAS Other Functional Entities as appropriate
AI summary The section outlines functional entities involved in grid reliability and planning, including the Reliability Coordinator, Planning Coordinator, and entities associated with the Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), such as Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers.
1.6.2.2.2 Reclassification of RAS Any RAS that are identified as potentially requiring reclassification shall be submitted for review in accordance with Section 6. For Type I RAS , where the RAS -entity has determined that the cost and ris...
AI summary The reclassification of Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) is outlined, with Type I RAS requiring review by the Task Force on System Protection (TFSP) if the cost and risks of implementing more stringent NPCC criteria for physical separation cannot be justified.
1.6.2.2.3 Unplanned In-kind Replacement of RAS Equipment If a component of a RAS is replaced "in-kind" as a result of an un-planned event, then it is not required to upgrade the associated RAS to comply with these criteria. Reporting in ac...
AI summary Unplanned in-kind replacement of RAS equipment does not require upgrading the associated RAS to meet criteria, and reporting under Appendix B is not required.
5.0 NPCC Full Member More Stringent Criteria These criteria are in addition to and more stringent than or more specific than NERC continent-wide reliability standards.
AI summary The NPCC Full Member More Stringent Criteria are additional and more stringent than NERC continent-wide reliability standards, emphasizing higher reliability requirements for the Northeast Power Coordinating Council Inc.
5.1 General Criteria A RAS shall be designed to recognize the specific power system conditions associated with its intended function. Due consideration shall be given to dependability and security. The relative effect on the BES or BPS due...
AI summary Section 5.1 outlines general criteria for designing a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), emphasizing dependability, security, and the impact on the Bulk Electric System (BES) or Bulk Power System (BPS). It references PRC-012 and defines the scope of limited impact RAS to address events within a contained area.
5.2 Criteria for Dependability To enhance dependability, a RAS shall be designed with redundancy such that the RAS is capable of performing its intended function while itself experiencing a single component failure. - Multiple RAS Groups t...
AI summary The criteria for dependability require that a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) be designed with redundancy to ensure functionality even during a single component failure. RAS Groups must not share non-redundant components, and if they share redundant components, isolation and separation must not be compromised. These criteria apply only to Type II RAS if deemed necessary by the Planning Coordinator and RAS-entity.
5.3 Criteria for Security A RAS [Type I or Type II] shall be designed to avoid cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations, due to unintended operation...
AI summary This section outlines the design criteria for a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) to prevent cascading failures and other stability issues caused by the malfunction of a single component. The validation of these scenarios is a joint responsibility between the Planning Coordinator and the RAS-entity.
5.4 Criteria for Dependability and Security - 5.4.1 The thermal capability of all RAS components shall be rated to withstand the maximum short time, long time and continuous loading of the associated protected elements . - 5.4.2 Position o...
AI summary This section outlines criteria for dependability and security in the RAS , emphasizing the thermal capability of components, monitoring of control devices that can disable the RAS , and continuous monitoring of network elements used in the RAS to ensure system reliability.
5.11 Teleprotection Criteria - 5.11.1 Communication facilities required for teleprotection shall be designed to have a level of performance consistent with that required of the RAS , and shall meet the following: - 5.11.1.1 Where the desig...
AI summary This section outlines the communication facility design criteria for teleprotection systems, emphasizing performance consistency with the Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and physical separation requirements to ensure redundancy and reliability.
5.17 Commissioning Testing Each RAS Group shall be functionally tested to verify the dependability and security aspects of the design, when initially placed in service and when modifications are made.
AI summary This section outlines the requirement for functional testing of each RAS Group to ensure the dependability and security of the design upon initial deployment and after modifications.
6.0 RAS Review Requirements - 6.1 Each proposing entity, proposing to install a new RAS, to modify an existing RAS, or to retire an existing RAS shall submit documentation to TFCP as requested in Appendix B. - 6.1.1 For Type I and Type II,...
AI summary The document outlines the requirements for reviewing and evaluating Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) in the context of bulk electric system reliability. It specifies submission processes, design criteria, and periodic evaluation procedures to ensure the effectiveness and safety of RAS in preventing system instability and cascading failures.
2.1 General Considerations - 2.1.1 The general objective for any RAS is to perform its intended function (generator rejection, load rejection, etc.) in a dependable and secure manner. In this context, dependability relates to the degree of...
AI summary The text discusses the importance of ensuring that RAS (Remedial Action Scheme) functions reliably and securely, balancing dependability and security. It emphasizes the need for careful consideration of design parameters, coordination across disciplines, and reviewing RAS settings when system changes occur.
2.2 Issues Affecting Dependability 2.2.1 Dependability of a RAS can be provided by designing with redundancy. Redundancy is normally provided by duplication. Some aspects of duplication may be achieved by overarming, which is defined as pr...
AI summary The dependability of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) can be ensured through redundancy, such as duplication or overarming, which involves providing more corrective action than necessary under normal conditions. The redundancy criteria for a RAS apply in specific contexts.
2.6 Operating Time of a RAS Adequate time margin should be provided taking into account study inaccuracies, differences in equipment, and protection operating times. - Network configurations that impact the delivery or latency of GOOSE mes...
AI summary The operating time of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) must account for study inaccuracies and equipment differences. Network configurations affecting GOOSE message delivery in one RAS Group should not impact the redundant RAS Group unless studies confirm acceptable clearing times. GOOSE message configuration is critical for protection during events.
2.7 Arming of a RAS Arming is the selection, which may be external to the RAS , of desired output action based on power system conditions and recognized contingencies. Arming of a RAS is normally based upon the results of system studies, w...
AI summary This section discusses the arming of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), which involves selecting output actions based on power system conditions. Arming can be automatic or manual, with manual arming requiring sufficient time for analysis and corrective action. Additional considerations include voltage transformer design and relay systems.
2.10 Grounding Station grounding is critical to the correct operation of a RAS . The design of the ground grid directly impacts proper RAS operation and probability of false operation from fault currents or transient voltages.
AI summary Station grounding is essential for the proper operation of the Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). The design of the ground grid significantly affects RAS performance and the likelihood of false operations due to fault currents or transient voltages.
- 2.1. Documentation for the review and approval of a proposed new or functionally modified RAS should include: - 2.1.1. The need and location for the RAS . For modification of an existing RAS , the current Type, the reason for the change...
AI summary This section outlines the documentation requirements for reviewing and approving new or modified RAS (Remedial Action Schemes). It specifies the need for justification, technical analysis, and the involvement of TFCP and TFSS in the approval process.
FLOW CHART FOR THE RETIREMENT OF A RAS
AI summary The document presents a flow chart illustrating the process for retiring a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). It outlines the steps involved in the retirement of a RAS, including coordination among various task forces and committees responsible for system protection and planning.
1.6.2.2.2 Reclassification of RAS Any RAS that are identified as potentially requiring reclassification shall be submitted to the RAS for review processin accordance with Section 6. For Type I RAS , where the RAS -entity has determined tha...
AI summary The reclassification of Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) is governed by a process outlined in Section 6, with Type I RAS requiring justification for not meeting NPCC criteria. Exceptions must be reviewed by the Task Force on System Protection (TFSP) as per the RAS review process.
2.0 Terms Defined in this Directory The definitions of terms found in this Directory appearing in bold typeface, can be found in NPCC Glossary of Terms. 2 This classification was formerly known as Type III. 3 Consistent with PRC-012 Supple...
AI summary This section defines terms used in the document, referencing the NPCC Glossary of Terms and PRC-012 Supplemental Information. It explains that limited impact RAS is designed to address events confined to a 'contained area'.
3.0 NERC ERO Reliability Standard Requirements The NERC ERO Reliability Standards containing Requirements that are associated with this Directory include, but may not be limited to: - 3.1 PRC-012 [Remedial Action Schemes](http://www.nerc.c...
AI summary This section outlines the NERC ERO Reliability Standards, specifically PRC-012 and PRC-017, which relate to Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) and their maintenance and testing. The NPCC Reliability Coordinators will use the RAS review process to ensure compliance with PRC-012.
5.0 NPCC Full Member More Stringent Criteria These criteria are in addition to and more stringent than or more specific than NERC continent-wide reliability standards.
AI summary The NPCC Full Member More Stringent Criteria are additional and more stringent than NERC continent-wide reliability standards, emphasizing enhanced reliability requirements for the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.
5.1 General Criteria A RAS shall be designed to recognize the specific power system conditions associated with its intended function. Due consideration shall be given to dependability and security. The relative effect on the BES or BPS due...
AI summary This section outlines the general criteria for designing a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), emphasizing the need to consider dependability and security. It highlights the importance of evaluating the impact of RAS failure or unintended operation on the Bulk Electric System (BES) or Bulk Power System (BPS).
5.2 Criteria for Dependability To enhance dependability, a RAS shall be designed with redundancy such that the RAS is capable of performing its intended function while itself experiencing a single component failure. - Multiple RAS Groups t...
AI summary The document outlines criteria for enhancing dependability through the design of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) with redundancy. It specifies that multiple RAS Groups should not share non-redundant components and emphasizes the importance of physical separation and galvanic isolation when redundant components are shared, unless otherwise specified for Type II RAS.
he same DC battery system. - 5.4.5 Contact outputs used for tripping interrupting devices shall be properly rated to make and carry the DC current for the tripping circuits that they are applied to. - 5.4.6 RAS components with self-monitor...
AI summary This section outlines technical criteria for the design and operation of Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) components, focusing on DC battery systems, contact outputs, operating times, arming mechanisms, and current transformer specifications to ensure system reliability and safety.
RAS Group being disabled simultaneously by a single event or condition. Except as identified otherwise in these criteria, the redundant communication channels shall not share the same component .
AI summary The criteria specify that redundant communication channels in the RAS Group should not be disabled simultaneously by a single event or condition, and they should not share the same component, except as otherwise identified.
Appendix B. - 1.1.1. The information identified in NERC PRC-012 Attachment 1. - 6.1.1.1 The proposed RAS Type: I, II, or Limited Impact; and rationale for classification. - 6.1.1 For Type I and Type II, the proposing entity shall: - 6.1.2....
AI summary Appendix B outlines the requirements for designing, submitting, and reviewing Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) in accordance with NERC PRC-012 and NPCC criteria. Entities proposing RAS must follow specific procedures, including submitting documentation to the Task Force on System Protection (TFSP) and ensuring compliance with reliability standards.
2.1 General Considerations - 2.1.1 The general objective for any RAS is to perform its intended function (generator rejection, load rejection, etc.) in a dependable and secure manner. In this context, dependability relates to the degree of...
AI summary The document outlines the general considerations for RAS (Remedial Action Scheme), emphasizing the need for dependability and security in their operation. It highlights the importance of balancing redundancy and unintended operations, and the need for multi-disciplinary coordination in planning and maintenance.
2.2 Issues Affecting Dependability 2.2.1 Dependability of a RAS can be provided by designing with redundancy. Redundancy is normally provided by duplication. Some aspects of duplication may be achieved by overarming, which is defined as pr...
AI summary The dependability of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) can be enhanced through redundancy, typically achieved by duplication or overarming, which involves providing more corrective action than necessary in the absence of failures. Redundancy criteria for a RAS are specific to its response to the conditions it must detect.
2.7 Arming of a RAS Arming is the selection, which may be external to the RAS , of desired output action based on power system conditions and recognized contingencies. Arming of a RAS is normally based upon the results of system studies, w...
AI summary This section discusses the arming of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), which involves selecting output actions based on power system conditions. Arming can be automatic or manual, with manual arming requiring sufficient time for analysis and corrective action. The section also addresses design considerations for voltage transformers and relay systems in RAS voltage circuits.
2.9 RAS Communication - 2.9.1 RAS communication systems should be designed to prevent unwanted operations such as those caused by equipment or personnel. - 2.9.2 Two identical communication equipment models should not be used in independen...
AI summary This section outlines communication requirements for Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) systems to ensure reliability and prevent unwanted operations. It emphasizes the need for diverse communication paths, avoiding identical equipment in independent RAS Groups, and minimizing common exposure risks.
2.10 Grounding Station grounding is critical to the correct operation of a RAS . The design of the ground grid directly impacts proper RAS operation and probability of false operation from fault currents or transient voltages,. - 2.11 Batt...
AI summary This section discusses the importance of station grounding for the correct operation of the Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and the impact of ground grid design on RAS performance. It also covers design considerations for battery and direct current (dcDC) supply systems to prevent electrical shorts and ensure stable voltage regulation.
2.13 RAS System Testing and Maintenance - 2.13.1 Test facilities and test procedures should be designed such that they do not compromise the independence of RAS Groups operating for the same system condition. Test devices or switches shoul...
AI summary The section outlines guidelines for testing and maintaining the RAS system, emphasizing the importance of preserving RAS Group independence, simplifying IEC 61850 system configurations, and ensuring unique identification of GOOSE messages for easier maintenance. It also recommends end-to-end testing to ensure proper protection performance under dynamic conditions.
2.15 Logic System - 2.15.1 The design should recognize the effects of contact races, spurious operation due to battery grounds, dc transients, radio frequency interference or other such influences. - 2.15.2 It is recognized that timing is...
AI summary The logic system design must account for various operational influences such as contact races, battery grounds, and dc transients, as well as timing differences between devices to ensure reliable performance.
by the RAS - 3.1.3.2.2.3. Changes to the actions the RAS is designed to initiate - 3.1.4.2.2.4. Changes to RAS hardware beyond in-kind replacement - 3.1.5.2.2.5. Changes to RAS logic beyond correcting existing errors or minor modification...
AI summary The text outlines procedures for modifying the Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), including changes to hardware, logic, and redundancy levels. It describes the roles of various task forces, such as TFCP, TFSS, TFSP, and TFCO, in reviewing and approving proposed RAS modifications to ensure compliance with reliability standards.
5.04.0 Retiring Retirement of a Limited Impact RAS - A formal approval to retire a limited impact RAS is not required. 4.1 The RAS proposing entity shall informnotify TFCP of the proposed retirement and provide the technical justification,...
AI summary The document outlines the process for retiring a limited impact RAS, which does not require formal approval. The proposing entity must notify TFCP and provide technical justification. TFCP must inform Task Forces and RCC, and TFSS must update the NPCC RAS list. For planned replacement of RAS equipment, the proposing entity must notify TFSP and submit information for review.
FLOW CHART FOR THE RETIREMENT OF A RAS
AI summary The text presents flow charts illustrating the retirement process of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), which is part of system protection protocols in the electricity sector. It includes references to various task forces, standards, and entities involved in ensuring the reliability of the bulk electric system.
3.0 Data Required for Presentation and Review The RAS -entity will advise the TFSP of the basic design of the proposed system. The data will be supplied on the "Protection System Review Form" as listed below accompanied by a geographical m...
AI summary The RAS-entity must provide detailed data to the TFSP, including design specifications, geographical maps, diagrams, and physical layout details for the proposed RAS. This includes communication links, equipment details, and special conditions related to the power system.