N-52024-2025 Bates White FAM Audit Report - Redacted
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Figure X-10 contains a summary of all outages by hour across all units in the Audit Period.
AI summary Figure X-10 provides a summary of all outages by hour across all units during the Audit Period, highlighting outage occurrences and their timing.
Figure X-10: Outage Hours of NSPI Thermal Generating Units (by Outage Category) Thermal Plant Planned Maintenance Forced Total Lingan 1 1,756 244 584 2,583 Lingan 2 2,808 0 37 2,845 Lingan 3 2,167 254 215 2,636 Lingan 4 2,388 559 78 3,025...
AI summary Figure X-10 presents outage hours for NSPI thermal generating units categorized into planned, maintenance, and forced outages. The data highlights the total outage hours for each plant and overall, with a note that NERC's GADS does not include biomass plants, leading to the use of alternative comparative technologies for certain units.
Fleetwide, total outage hours (52,260) increased by approximately 3.0 percent from the previous Audit Period.406 Planned outage hours (37,056) increased by 13.4 percent from the previous Audit Period's total of 32,671 hours.407 Forced outa...
AI summary Total outage hours increased by 3.0% during the audit period, with planned outages rising by 13.4% and forced outages decreasing by 22.7%. NSPI scheduled planned outages outside of winter months to avoid peak demand and reduce costs. De-rate incidents on thermal units decreased by 19%, but the average size and duration of de-rates increased.
X.B.3.b.iv. Failed oil pump supply system at Tufts Cove 5 From January 8, 2025 through January 13, 2025, Tufts Cove Unit 5 was forced offline due to a failed oil pump.432 Specifically, the scavenge oil pump was unable to maintain required...
AI summary Tufts Cove Unit 5 was forced offline for five days in January 2025 due to a failed oil pump caused by a partially obstructed inlet screen. The pump was found to be mechanically serviceable, and the failure was not due to NSPI failing to follow General Electric's maintenance guidelines. NSPI has since increased the frequency of preventive maintenance on the system to every six months.
p weakens materials, making them prone to fatigue crack initiation or initiating micro-cracking on its own, while cyclic loading can cause the cracks to propagate by fatigue which accelerates failure. On August 24, 2022, during start-up ac...
AI summary A crack was discovered on the Main Steam Line (MSL) at Tufts Cove 2 on August 24, 2022, leading to an extended forced outage until December 11, 2022. The Root Cause Analysis identified multiple issues with the MSL, including material degradation and fatigue crack propagation, and recommended further inspection and repair.
nspected to applicable inspection standards and therefore there were no prior indications of failure that could have been found and addressed prior to installation of the compressor blades and stator. The third-party investigation ( ) revi...
AI summary A third-party investigation reviewed the OEM's refurbishment of an engine in comparison to industry standards and lab analyses of failed components. It concluded that some refurbishment work may have been completed prior to the engine being pulled from inventory, and that some components may have been in use by another utility after refurbishment, leading to potential issues.
X.B.3.e.ii. 2024 Forced Outages for expansion joint failures On three separate occasions in 2024, Point Aconi was forced offline due to failures of an expansion joint on the air supply to a combustor return leg. Collectively, the three out...
AI summary In 2024, Point Aconi experienced three forced outages due to expansion joint failures linked to coal blend testing. The failures were caused by material buildup from higher coal blends, which NSPI addressed by adjusting fuel sizing. The outages highlight potential challenges from experimental fuel strategies under tightening emissions constraints.
X.B.3.f.iii. Root Cause Analysis Review We were provided and reviewed two Root Cause Analyses related to Point Tupper. One event associated with the Root Cause Analyses occurred in the prior Audit Period. The first Root Cause Analysis, com...
AI summary A Root Cause Analysis reviewed two incidents at Point Tupper, where circulating water pump failures led to forced outages. The failures were attributed to contamination and moisture, potentially exacerbated by failed cabinet heaters and environmental factors like humidity and roof leaks.
ach remains robust, appropriately uses root cause analysis in addressing outages, and provides solid structure and standardization in tracking, assessing, and seeking to improve generator performance. Conclusion X-12: Tufts Cove 2 and 3, t...
AI summary The audit highlights NSPI's robust outage management and successful fuel switching at Tufts Cove units. However, pipeline pressure limitations during winter months affect natural gas availability. NSPI conducted performance tests, completed root cause analyses, and addressed recurring generator faults, with improvements observed after July 2025.
system to replace lost generation or accommodate increased generation, to maintain reserves, to balance the gas position, to accommodate energy trading, or to respond to other real-time system needs. During the audit period, Wreck Cove uni...
AI summary Wreck Cove units were frequently out of service during the audit period due to the Life Extension and Modernization Project, impacting real-time dispatch capabilities. The NSPSO had to rely on less flexible coal and gas units when Wreck Cove was unavailable, leading to higher dispatch costs and reduced flexibility.
XV.B.6. Interruption PHP was not interrupted under the ELIADC tariff during the Audit Period. During capacity scarcity events, the order of interruption for NSPI's non-firm customers is specified in the ELIADC tariff:852 - 1. Generation Re...
AI summary During the audit period, PHP was not interrupted under the ELIADC tariff due to the ADC and cooperative nature of the tariff. The ELIADC tariff specifies the order of interruption for NSPI's non-firm customers during capacity scarcity events, with LLIR – Non-Telemetry & Control customers being interrupted 10 times.