Topic:"Unplanned Outage" in M12696

NS Block Deferred Energy had been redelivered.[19](#page-13-0) 1 The following chart illustrates Deferred Energy from April 2023 through December 2025[20](#page-13-1) : b) Meeting the 12-Month Performance Threshold: Subject to Board relief...

AI summary The document discusses the delivery performance of energy, highlighting that the 12-month threshold was met despite planned outages and an extreme weather event. Supplemental Make-up Energy was completed in November 2024, and figures are provided in appendices. March 2024 fell below the monthly delivery threshold due to a combination of planned and unplanned outages.

Outage Days Affected Summary of LIL Outages July 2023 5 days Good Utility Practice: Preparation for software update, correction of identified deficiencies, and to test SCADA indication points. September 2023 10 days Good Utility Practice:...

AI summary The document outlines several outages related to the Maritime Link (LIL) system, including planned maintenance, software updates, and repairs due to icing and extreme weather events. It also references a regulatory order (M11009) regarding the disposition of holdback funds.

ber and December is a pattern we support now and for the remainder of the ECA — performing work in the lower demand periods to enhance the performance of the assets in the more critical winter period. In terms of unplanned outages since th...

AI summary The text discusses planned maintenance during lower demand periods to improve asset performance during winter, and an unplanned outage related to bipole icing on NLH's transmission assets near Muskrat Falls in January 2025, which was remediated over several days.

3 TABLE 1: LIL OUTAGE HISTORY DATE LIL EVENT REASON FOR EVENT May 2024 Bipole outage troubleshoot, replace, and test DC current transformers July 2024 Single pole outages troubleshoot intermittent system alarms, replace faulty equipment En...

AI summary The table lists outages of the Maritime Link (LIL) system between May 2024 and September 2025, detailing the dates, events, and reasons for each outage, including troubleshooting, software updates, maintenance, and icing-related issues. The question asks whether the outages after the compliance period were considered a success.

3 In a filing with the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities investigating the 4 reliability of the LIL, Nalcor stated that "with the LIL in its early operation, the early level 5 of reliability is anticipated to be lower than the lon...

AI summary The text discusses the early reliability challenges of the LIL (Maritime Link) HVDC transmission line, noting that initial reliability is lower due to potential failures in new assets. It describes the 'bathtub' curve of reliability over time and emphasizes the importance of monitoring and maintenance during the early operation phase to improve long-term performance and sustainability of undersea transmission infrastructure.

1 2 VI. NSPML SHOULD BE GRANTED ITS REQUEST FOR OUTAGE RELIEF IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE HOLDBACK CAN NOW BE TERMINATED 3 Q42. DO YOU BELIEVE THE JULY 2023 AND SEPTEMBER 2023 PLANNED 4 OUTAGES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CALCULATION OF THE...

AI summary The text discusses whether planned and unplanned outages should be excluded from reliability thresholds and whether NSPML can meet the 12-month requirement for terminating the holdback mechanism without adjusting performance thresholds. The response supports excluding the 2023 outages due to scheduled maintenance and the 2024 LIL outage due to extreme weather, and argues that NSPML likely cannot meet the 12-month requirement without adjustments.

NSPML Responses to Bates White Information Requests 1 c-d) 2 The Maritime Link's transfer capability and actual flow delivered at the Woodbine (NS) 3 converter station is provided in Attachment 1 for each hour of the compliance period. 4 5...

AI summary NSPML provides data on the Maritime Link's transfer capability and actual energy flow at the Woodbine converter station, including projected availability performance and underlying assumptions about energy availability and outages.

- 1: Hardwoods 50 MW CT retired in 2022 - 2: 1 x 50 MW CT added - 3: Stephenville 50 MW CT retired in 2024 - 4: 2 x 50 MW CT added - 5: 3 x 50 MW CT added - 6: 4 x 50 MW CT added - 7: 5 x 50 MW CT added - 8: Portland Creek at 23 MW and new...

AI summary The document outlines the retirement and addition of combustion turbines (CT) and combined cycle combustion turbines (CCCT) in the energy sector, along with historical data on transmission line outages on the Avalon Peninsula due to icing events. A two-week repair window is used for outage analysis, with refined calculations based on observed icing events.

- 2.101 outages per pole per year, - With an average repair time of 1.78 hours per outage This translates into an unavailability and FOR of 0.0425% per pole. The common-mode failure of both overhead poles must also be taken into account. I...

AI summary The text discusses outage statistics for poles, including an average of 2.101 outages per pole per year and a repair time of 1.78 hours per outage, resulting in an unavailability and FOR of 0.0425% per pole. It also addresses common-mode failures, which are less likely but have longer repair times.

Table 4-4: Reduced Power Capability Modes Element Failure Rate(f/yr) Repair Time(hrs) Downtime(hrs/yr) Scheduled Maintenance 2.0 72 144 Converter-Muskrat Falls 1.64 13.8 22.42 Pole 1 2.04 6.3 12.87 Pole 2 2.04 6.3 12.87 Converter-Soldiers...

AI summary Table 4-4 outlines reduced power capability modes, detailing failure rates, repair times, and downtime for various elements. It notes that forced outage rates (FOR) could increase if the station ground cannot be used for mono-polar operation when the Muskrat Falls electrode line is also unavailable.

- e) Please provide definitions for "monopole outage" and "bipole outage," as used by NSPML in the Application. - f) Please explain how monopole outages differ from bipole outages in calculating performance metrics, such as availability fa...

AI summary The text requests definitions and explanations related to 'monopole outage' and 'bipole outage' as used by NSPML in their application. It also asks for an explanation of how these outages differ in performance metric calculations and details about the 'software' referenced in the July 2023 outage. The text mentions distinguishing between good and poor utility practices regarding outages.

NSPML Responses to Bates White Information Requests 1 ii. Explanation of the "software update" and why the update was needed. and/or duration of this outage been different? Please explain. v. Please provide all materials NSPML received fro...

AI summary The document contains a series of information requests from Bates White to NSPML regarding an outage in March 2024, including the technical causes, root cause analysis, design performance, and potential costs to Nova Scotia ratepayers.

NSPML Responses to Consumer Advocate Information Requests 1 2 3 4 5 accordance with the 30-day outage coordination period previously established by the system operators for outages affecting the delivery of the NS Block, including planned...

AI summary The document outlines NSPML's responses to consumer advocate information requests, detailing planned and forced outages, including cable switching deficiencies, software and hardware changes, and references to attachments and board orders.

NSPML Responses to Industrial Group Information Requests 1 Request IR-01: 25 has never been decided on by the Board, and in no way 26 informed the Board's 2023 NSUARB 175 decision or 1 setting of the flexible relief available to NSPML in 2...

AI summary NSPML responds to information requests from an industrial group regarding the Board's 2023 NSUARB 175 decision, the definition of 'Good Utility Practice,' and how NSPML defines planned versus unplanned outages, including scenarios where outages may fall outside the proposed definition.

3 Forced Outages - DCCT Transformers (See NSEB IR-16 and IG IR-11): Start Date and Time End Date and Time Duration [h] Cause 6-1-23 17:00 6-2-23 0:00 7 DC Current Transformer Noise 6-27-23 0:00 6-27-23 9:00 9 DC Current Transformer Noise 1...

AI summary The document lists multiple forced outages related to DCCT transformers and other infrastructure, detailing dates, durations, and causes, including transformer noise, cable switching, lightning strikes, ice accumulation, forest fires, and software errors.

Table 1: Outages Due to Extreme Icing (2020-2026) Date Location Description 2021- 11-25 Labrador East On November 25, 2021, at approximately 03:10 hours (AST), Hydro experienced an unplanned outage to customers in Labrador East. At the tim...

AI summary The text discusses two unplanned outages in Labrador East and Cartwright caused by extreme icing conditions, highlighting the impact of weather on infrastructure. It also references capital projects aimed at improving resilience through ice monitoring and reinforced designs.

1 c) Due to site conditions, limited access, and the extent of damage, repairs could not be undertaken immediately; the two impacted customers restored their service through their own backup power source. Repairs were completed and power w...

AI summary An unplanned outage occurred on January 15, 2022, in the Hawke's Bay area due to galloping conductor, snow, and ice buildup, leading to line slapping and damaged conductors. Repairs were carried out, and power was partially restored by sectionalizing the line, with full restoration achieved by 1605 hours.

- 2 The unplanned outage to the LIL began March 30, 2024 and concluded on April 10, 2024. 3 Pole 2 tripped at 0645 hours on March 30, 2024, resulting in the LIL being available at 4 450 MW due to the forced Monopole derating. Pole 1 subseq...

AI summary An unplanned outage occurred on the Lower Island Link (LIL) beginning March 30, 2024, due to an icing incident, which caused forced derating and tripping of poles. The LIL returned to service on April 10, 2024, but remained partially operational at 450 MW due to continued derating. Cleanup efforts began on April 4, 2024.

e ice at a density of 0.9 g/cm 3 (20.6 to 21.6 kg/m), and the damage likely occurred due to unbalanced ice loads from ice shedding. There were no other components damaged in this icing event. In March 2024 there was an icing event in south...

AI summary Multiple icing events between 2024 and 2025 caused damage to electrode crossarms and conductors in Labrador. Ice shedding led to unbalanced ice loads, resulting in failures at various locations. The damage was documented in Table 1, with a total of 30 electrode crossarms and 56 conductor locations affected.

Table of contents Executive summary ii Figure D-1: SEM backscatter image of a representative example of a zinc coated steel reinforcing strand for the intact conductor. The image shows the significant variation in the thickness of the zinc...

AI summary The document contains a table of contents and several figures and tables related to the inspection and analysis of a failed conductor following an incident on March 30, 2024. The content includes SEM images of zinc-coated steel reinforcing strands and tables summarizing damage and wire strand diameter measurements.

PARTIALLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 disallowance than an outage taken at a different time in the month. 2 (d) If NSPML's position is that the holdback mechanism structurally 3 creates perverse incentives regarding outage timing, explain how that 4 co...

AI summary The response discusses the holdback mechanism and its implications on outage timing, referencing the Energy and Capacity Agreement and the Labrador-Island Link (LIL) operations. It explains how historical energy shortfalls influenced the threshold for ending the holdback mechanism and how the elimination of these shortfalls affects the mitigation of outages.

Operating Assumptions for Generating Facility Check box if applicable [ ] 3 preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance arising 4 from known deficiencies, residual commissioning or 5 early-operation corrective work, or reliability 6 enh...

AI summary The text outlines operating assumptions related to a generating facility, focusing on planned and unplanned outages, maintenance practices, and factors influencing compliance with Good Utility Practice. It includes questions about preventive and corrective maintenance, outage scheduling, and documentation of decisions.

Table 4-4: Reduced Power Capability Modes Element Failure Rate(f/yr) Repair Time(hrs) Downtime(hrs/yr) Scheduled Maintenance 2.0 72 144 Converter-Muskrat Falls 1.64 13.8 22.42 Pole 1 2.04 6.3 12.87 Pole 2 2.04 6.3 12.87 Converter-Soldiers...

AI summary Table 4-4 outlines the reduced power capability modes, detailing failure rates, repair times, and downtime for various elements. It indicates that scheduled maintenance and converter failures contribute to forced outage rates (FOR), and the unavailability due to these factors is calculated at 0.81% and 1.64% respectively. If the station ground cannot be used for mono-polar operation, FOR increases slightly.

NSPML Responses to Small Business Advocate Information Requests 1 Request IR-01: commissioning performance, NSPML does not envision a circumstance or rationale that would support a holdback disallowance as it would not be reflective of any...

AI summary NSPML responds to information requests regarding holdback disallowance, unplanned outages, and financial figures for 2025. It argues that holdback disallowance is not justified unless due to imprudence by NSPML, and outlines the planned distribution of holdback amounts post-May 1, 2024.

1 configuration on Monday April 8, 2024."65 Separately, NSPML states that NLH 2 took an unrelated, one-day bipole outage on April 30, 2024 "to correct a software 3 deficiency relating to cable switching."66 Absent these outages, NSPML expl...

AI summary NSPML explains that unplanned outages, including a one-day bipole outage by NLH on April 30, 2024, impacted NS Block deliveries, which would have otherwise exceeded the 90% threshold. The reviewer agrees that without these outages, NSPML would have met the threshold but notes challenges in assessing 'good utility practice' due to subjectivity and multiple entities involved.

Questions regarding the sufficiency of LIL's design do not support NSPML's position that the March-April 2024 outage was excused by extraordinary circumstances. - (a) Please confirm whether the March 2024 icing event exceeded the design-ba...

AI summary The text raises questions about whether the March-April 2024 outage on the LIL was caused by design limitations and whether this qualifies as an 'exceptional circumstance' under the Board's test, challenging NSPML's claim that the outage was excused by extraordinary circumstances.

Date Filed: June 11, 2026 CA (IG) Page 1 of 5 1 M12696 2 3 Reference: N-8, Evidence of John D. Wilson (CA), p.5. 4 5 6 7 8 (a) Please set out the full definition or standard that Mr. Wilson applied in determining whether Event 4 (the March...

AI summary The document includes questions regarding the definition of 'exceptional circumstances' in the context of an unplanned icing outage in March-April 2024 and whether regulatory, contractual, or legal precedents were considered. The response indicates that the determination is subjective and that 'good utility practice' standards are not the standard set by the Board.

11 Q10. BATES WHITE SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONS EACH OF THE PLANNED AND 12 UNPLANNED OUTAGES NOTED IN NSPML'S EVIDENCE. PLEASE RESPOND 13 TO THESE QUESTIONS FOR EACH OUTAGE THAT BATES WHITE 14 ADDRESSES. 15 A10. Mr. Musco acknowledges that he i...

AI summary The response acknowledges that Mr. Musco is not an engineer and therefore does not provide an independent engineering assessment of outage causation or transmission system performance. However, the response addresses each of the Labrador-Island Link outages discussed by Mr. Musco.

12 Q28. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MARCH/APRIL 2024 ICING EVENT. 13 A28. The March-April 2024 event involved a forced LIL bipole outage resulting from a 14 significant icing event that caused physical damage to transmission facilities. The event...

AI summary The March-April 2024 icing event caused a forced outage of the LIL bipole due to physical damage from extreme weather conditions, affecting transmission facilities such as the electrode line, supporting structures, and the OGW. The event was not planned or a result of operational decisions.

1 Q29. WHAT DOES MR. MUSCO ASSERT REGARDING THE MARCH/ APRIL 2024 2 OUTAGE? 3 A29. Mr. Musco asserts that NLH's limited ability to handle certain icing conditions have been known for some time.21 4 He further suggests that whether the Marc...

AI summary Mr. Musco asserts that NLH's limited ability to handle icing conditions has been known for some time and that the March-April 2024 outage should not be considered an exceptional circumstance due to the known risks of severe icing in Labrador. He references the Haldar Report to question whether the outage qualifies for relief under the Board's exceptional circumstances provision.

1 Q40. WHY IS THAT DISTINCTION IMPORTANT? 2 A40. It is important because Bates White frequently identifies questions, concerns, or 3 observations regarding outage events without ultimately demonstrating that NSPML failed 4 the Board's test...

AI summary The distinction is important because the Board's framework does not consider the mere occurrence of an outage as sufficient to deny relief. Instead, it focuses on whether the outage resulted from imprudent conduct or exceptional circumstances beyond the utility's control. Bates White's testimony emphasizes outages without sufficient evidence of imprudent actions.

3 Q42. WHY IS THAT IMPORTANT? 4 A42. It is important because the existence of an outage is not evidence of imprudence. Electric 5 utilities routinely experience planned outages, forced outages, equipment failures, software 6 updates, inspe...

AI summary The response emphasizes that the existence of outages alone does not indicate imprudence by a utility. It highlights that utilities routinely experience various types of outages and that the key inquiry is whether the utility acted in accordance with prudent utility practice. The response also notes that the impact of the outages was minimal, as energy was still delivered to customers, and stresses that the focus should be on the quality of decisions and their impact, not just the existence of outages.

n intergenerational subsidization by NS Power’s customers today? Refer to the Application, Section 7. Request for Separate Process if Holdback is Maintained, page 28 of 37, lines 11-17, which states: The primary benefits of a separate proc...

AI summary The text discusses NSPML's hypothetical separate process for developing a mitigation mechanism if the Holdback is maintained, outlining benefits and potential changes to events, filings, and reporting under a new Holdback mechanism. It also references unplanned outages in 2024 and subsequent 'Deferred Energy' deliveries.

nism? Refer to the Application, Section 5. Future Asset Management Expectations, pages 23-25 of 37, that described unplanned outages during 2024 that were followed by deliveries of “Deferred Energy”.

AI summary The text references an application discussing future asset management expectations, specifically mentioning unplanned outages in 2024 and the subsequent delivery of 'Deferred Energy' as outlined in Section 5, pages 23-25 of 37.

1. NSPML states on page 24, lines 3-5, “Moreover, the Deferred Energy that accumulated during these outages was entirely redelivered by December 25, 2024.” 1. What was the replacement cost of Deferred Energy delivered in December 2024 vers...

AI summary The text raises questions about the replacement cost of Deferred Energy during and after outages, the definition of 'reasonable time' for redelivery, and the circumstances and responsibilities related to an unplanned outage in January 2025. It also inquires about NSPML's management of its relationship with NLH to prevent future incidents.

29 was essentially eliminated in June 2024. 1 2 highlight any planned or unplanned outages from May 2023 to present that would not meet that definition. 3 (d) Does NSPML take any position regarding whether planned or unplanned 4 outages sh...

AI summary The text discusses questions regarding planned and unplanned outages related to the NSPML, including whether they should be considered cumulatively or on a singular basis, and how inclement weather events are defined as 'exceptional circumstances.' It also references a benefit figure for 2025 and asks whether assessment costs include FLG2 repayment obligations.

19 Table at pages 17-18; and pages 23-25. 18 Reference: N-01 Application, Section 4.2, Relief for Planned and Unplanned Outages, 17 Request IR-7: 16 Block) was continuously satisfied throughout that period. 15 condition (net outstanding ba...

AI summary The document includes a request for explanations regarding the deferred energy balance increase and the interpretation of operational information related to the Board's holdback mechanism. It references the Application's Section 4.2, which includes a summary table of LIL outages.

- 21 relevant to the claimed Compliance Period, in which NSPML seeks relief from the - 22 compliance requirements. At pages 23-25, the Application summarizes the outages that - 23 followed the noted Compliance Period. - 24 (a) Please updat...

AI summary The text discusses an application by NSPML seeking relief from compliance requirements during a specific period, referencing outages that occurred during and after the Compliance Period. The application requests an updated summary of outages, including those from the LIL commissioning period to the present.

- 27 (i) the planned outage timeline as originally scheduled, 28 compared to the actual outage start and end dates, or 29 identify if unplanned; 1 (ii) the cause of each outage and whether within the control of 2 NSPML, NLH, or external; 3...

AI summary The text outlines a request for information regarding planned and unplanned outages, including their timelines, causes, affected assets, and impacts on delivery reliability and holdback funds. It also asks for outage schedule forecasts for the years 2023 to 2026.

- 28 (ii) whether this entire outage period related solely to the icing 29 incident, and if not, what else caused and/or was completed 30 during this period; and 1 (iii) the quantified reduction in Base NS Block deliveries 2 (excluding Mak...

AI summary The text outlines regulatory requests related to an icing event in March–April 2024, asking about the outage period's causes, quantified reductions in energy deliveries, and engineering reports. It also seeks information on outstanding punch list items and a discrepancy regarding the commissioning date of DC current transformers.

9 into early October as planned. 2 Reference: N-01 Application, Section 5.0, pages 23-24. Preamble: The Application describes a series of outages from July through October 2024, including: single pole outages in July to troubleshoot interm...

AI summary The text references a series of outages from July through October 2024, including software updates and maintenance activities, and requests confirmation on whether these outages were related to previously reported issues, the work required to address them, and the current status of any unresolved issues.

28 was considered; 1 (iii) The nature of the work scope performed during the outage 2 — specifically, whether the work constituted preventive 3 maintenance, corrective maintenance arising from known 4 deficiencies, residual commissioning o...

AI summary The text outlines factors to consider when evaluating whether a planned or unplanned outage falls within Good Utility Practice, including the nature of the work performed, whether the outage was scheduled or deferred, and whether preventive maintenance programs were in place.

t any "planned outage" on the LIL represents good utility practice by NLH? If not, please explain how NSPML distinguishes between planned outages that are good utility practice and those that are not. - d) Is it NSPML's view that any outag...

AI summary The text consists of a series of questions posed to NSPML regarding the classification and implications of outages on the LIL, including planned outages, icing events, definitions of monopole and bipole outages, software updates, identified deficiencies, and the financial impact of outages on Nova Scotia ratepayers.

- i. Please provide a list and detailed explanations of all "routine maintenance" done during this outage. 1 ii. Were there any additional maintenance activities that occurred during the outage, 24 v. Did design flaws in the LIL contribute...

AI summary The text outlines a series of questions related to an outage, focusing on routine maintenance, design flaws, costs to ratepayers, and the technical causes of the outage. It also asks for documentation and evidence from NSPML and NLH regarding the event.

cessity of the March 2024 outages. - b) Please provide all documents, workpapers, and analyses that the Witness relied upon to independently assess the details and necessity of the March 2024 outages. - Request IR-15: Please refer to Exhib...

AI summary The text contains a series of requests for information related to the March 2024 outages, the LIL's design and climate resistance, and the Witness's review of project financing agreements and outage reasonableness. These requests aim to assess the basis of the Witness's testimony and the supporting documentation.

in Exhibit N-1. 25. Please provide the expected availability (%) of the Muskrat Falls Generating Station, as modeled or assumed by NSPML in M05419. Please include the base case and any sensitivities for this assumption used in M05419. 26....

AI summary The text includes a series of questions directed at NSPML regarding the availability and forced outage rates of the Muskrat Falls Generating Station and the LIL, as well as definitions and distinctions related to monopole and bipole outages. It also asks for explanations of specific outages and software-related issues.

pers, and analyses that the Witness relied upon to independently assess the details and necessity of the July 2023 outage. 14. Please describe the Witness’s efforts to independently verify the details and necessity of the September 2023 ou...

AI summary The text consists of a series of questions directed at a witness regarding their verification of outages in 2023 and 2024, as well as their reliance on documents and analyses, and their understanding of the Labrador Island Link (LIL) and its design standards.

21 1 2025 M12696 2 3 NOVA SCOTIA ENERGY BOARD 4 5 IN THE MATTER OF: The Public Utilities Act and the Maritime Link Act and the Maritime Link Cost Recovery Process Regulations 6 7 8 IN THE MATTER OF: An Application by NSP Maritime Link Inc....

AI summary This document is an information request from The Industrial Group to John D. Wilson, the Consumer Advocate, regarding the definition or standard used to determine if the March-April 2024 unplanned icing outage qualifies as 'exceptional circumstances' under the Board's 'consistent deliveries' threshold.

Good Utilitv Practice The SBA acknowledges that there are times when, in order to ensure that the facilities operate efficiently and safely, they must be taken off-line to accomplish important work. That may occur on a planned or an unplan...

AI summary The SBA argues that while planned and unplanned outages may be necessary for efficient and safe facility operations, the criteria for determining good utility practice should be more substantive than just having a technical reason for an outage. The SBA emphasizes the need to evaluate whether the work is necessary, whether it can be scheduled to reduce outage duration, and whether the number of outages can be minimized.

Summary The SBA respectfully submits that, while the first part of the test, namely the delivery of previously undelivered energy, appears to have been satisfied by March, 2023, whether NSPML has achieved the second requirement of the test...

AI summary The SBA argues that while NSPML may have met the first part of the test for releasing the Holdback Mechanism, it has not clearly met the second requirement of delivering 90% of energy in 12 consecutive months. The SBA also questions the justification for NSPML's request for WACC, suggesting it should be calculated based on NSPML's approved cost of debt.

Date Filed: July 9, 2026 Page 10 of 20 1 only approved for operation up to 170 MW during this period. Although this limited 2 the ability for the full Supplemental Energy amount to be imported off-peak and 3 limited the amount of Make-up E...

AI summary The text discusses outages and maintenance events affecting the Labrador Island Link (LIL) and NSPML's coordination with NLH, including an ice event in April 2024 and a planned outage in April 2024. These events impacted NS Block delivery, but NSPML argues that the outages were in accordance with good utility practice.

1. September 2023 — The ML and LIL Bipole Outages Were Not Concurrent In NSPML's submission at page 11 (lines 8–29) and page 12 (lines 1–2), NSPML asserts that "additional evidence was provided by Concentric in their rebuttal to show that...

AI summary The document addresses the timing of the Maritime Link and Labrador Island Link (LIL) bipole outages in September 2023, clarifying that they were not concurrent. NSPML claims Concentric's rebuttal showed the outages were scheduled at the same time, but evidence indicates the Maritime Link outages ended before the LIL bipole outage began, and Concentric did not establish overlap during the relevant period.

Date Filed: July 23, 2026 Page 4 of 44 1 Evidence supports relief for the four months during the proposed Compliance Period that 2 did not meet the Board's 90 percent delivery threshold and also confirms that outages have 3 not resulted in...

AI summary The document discusses the termination of a holdback mechanism for NSPML, citing evidence that outages did not harm customers and that the original bargain has been fulfilled. The CA and consultant John Wilson support the application, stating that the four outage events meet the Board's criteria for relief. The argument is made that regulatory oversight should focus on asset management and arms-length contracts.

liveries exceeded 99%. 3. March 2024 Corrective Maintenance – Two-day outage to repair various systems. Absent the corrective maintenance outage (but including the subsequent icing outage), Concentric states that NS Block deliveries exceed...

AI summary The text discusses several outages affecting NS Block deliveries, including a corrective maintenance outage in March 2024 and an unplanned ice-accumulation outage on the Labrador Island Link (LIL) in March-April 2024. Concentric estimates delivery rates would have been higher in the absence of these outages.

nd coordinated for periods of lower load. [18](#page-13-0) 10 Indeed, the question should really be: Can anyone reasonably suggest 11 that the work should not have been carried out? Of course not. 12 13 The main counter argument appears to...

AI summary The text discusses the justification for outages during the commissioning of the Labrador Island Link (LIL), emphasizing that punch list items after commissioning are normal for complex projects. It refutes claims that the work should have been completed before commissioning and highlights that the LIL was validly commissioned in April 2023 with support from multiple entities.

In response to Industrial Group IR-9, NSPML has produced the LIL Strengthening Overview Report of NL Hydro which confirms that in total, there have been ten failure events on L3501/2 over the past five years; each was a localized issue aff...

AI summary The document discusses the structural failures of the LIL transmission line due to ice loading, referencing prior events and the Haldar Report, which identified known design vulnerabilities. The Industrial Group supports Bates White's conclusion that the 2024 outage was not excused by exceptional circumstances. NSPML disagrees with the Inspector General's position on the need for prior remediation.

13 Pre-2024 Weather Events Affecting the LIL 14 As the above ground portion of the LIL was constructed over eight years ago, it is not 15 surprising that there have been some weather impacts. As noted in NSPML's 16 submissions (including C...

AI summary The text discusses weather events affecting the Labrador Island Link (LIL) prior to 2024, noting that while there have been weather impacts, none resulted in complete transmission tower failures. The March/April 2024 event was more extreme than previous ones, but the damage was not classified as structural failure before this event.