E-10-(i)Book of Authorities
13 passages
2.0 BACKGROUND - [6] The Board considers it useful to set out some of the background of DSM in Nova Scotia to provide some context for this Decision. - [7] For a number of years prior to 2010, NSPI included requests for approval of spendin...
AI summary The document outlines the transition of DSM programming in Nova Scotia from NSPI to ENSC under the ENSC Act, requiring Board oversight. ENSC administered DSM programs post-2010, with regular Board approvals for spending and cost allocations. The 2014 EECR Act amended DSM frameworks by repealing the ENSC Act and modifying the PUA, redefining efficiency and conservation activities.
nant Governor of the Province or the chief executive officer or administrator carrying on the Government of the Province on behalf and in the name of the Sovereign by whatever title he is designated;
AI summary The text outlines the authority of the Governor of the Province or designated chief executive officer/administrator to act on behalf of the Sovereign in legal and governmental capacities, emphasizing the hierarchical structure of provincial governance.
Blank forms from Board 28 The Board may cause to be prepared suitable blank forms for carrying out the purposes of this Act and shall, when necessary, furnish such blank forms to each public utility. R.S., c. 380, s. 28.
AI summary The Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (UARB) is authorized to prepare and distribute blank forms for public utilities under the Act, as outlined in R.S., c. 380, s. 28. This provision ensures compliance with statutory requirements for utility operations.
Annual capital expenditure program of public utility - 35A (1) Notwithstanding Section 35, a public utility may submit to the Board for approval an annual capital expenditure program. - (2) Where the plan referred to in subsection (1) is a...
AI summary The text outlines provisions for public utilities to submit annual capital expenditure programs to the Board for approval. Approved programs allow expenditures without further approval, while expenditures under $250,000 not in the program require no Board approval. Statutory amendments in 1992 and 2010 are referenced.
Amount utility entitled to earn annually 45 (1) Every public utility shall be entitled to earn annually such return as the Board deems just and reasonable on the rate base as fixed and determined by the Board for each type or kind of servi...
AI summary Public utilities in Nova Scotia are entitled to a just and reasonable return on their rate base, as determined by the Board. However, if the Board mandates setting aside funds for amortization or reserves, those amounts are deducted from the utility's earnings unless authorized as operating expenses.
Agreement with N.S. Power Inc. 55A (1) Subject to the approval of the Board, Nova Scotia Power Incorporated may enter into an agreement on commercial terms with the owner or operator of an interconnected electric generation plant to export...
AI summary Nova Scotia Power Inc. may enter agreements for electricity exports with Board approval. If parties fail to agree, the Board may set terms and conditions. The provision is sourced from the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 8, s. 35.
in person or by proxy at a special general meeting duly called for the purpose or at an annual meeting of the shareholders of the public utility, if in the notice of such annual meeting, express reference is made to such purpose. - (8) Exc...
AI summary The text outlines procedures for offering new shares to shareholders of a public utility, requiring proportional distribution based on current holdings, with the Board determining pricing and handling declines. Exceptions apply under subsections (10) and (12).
Termination of agreements - 79N (1) Neither party to an agreement approved pursuant to Section 79L may terminate the agreement without the approval of the Board[.] - (2) Notwithstanding Sections 79I and 79J, upon receiving an application t...
AI summary The text outlines rules for terminating agreements approved under Section 79L, requiring Board approval. The Board may direct parties, terminate agreements, or allow NSPI to meet obligations under specific conditions, referencing the 2014 legislation.
Small business advocate - 92 (1) In this Section, - (a) "prescribed" means prescribed by the regulations made pursuant to subsection (7); - (b) "small business" means a business - (i) of a prescribed type, - (ii) to which prescribed rate c...
AI summary The section defines 'small business' and outlines the appointment of a small business advocate by the Board. The advocate acts as a full intervenor, with the Board's authority to set fees and expenses, including expert costs. Regulations by the Governor in Council define eligibility criteria and advocate qualifications.
Composition, oath of office and term of office - 5 (1) The Board consists of such number, not less than eight and not exceeding ten, of full-time members appointed by the Governor in Council and such number, not exceeding eight, of part-ti...
AI summary The Board consists of 8-10 full-time and up to 8 part-time members appointed by the Governor in Council. Full-time members serve until age 70, while part-time terms are determined by the Governor. Members from predecessor boards retain their positions under the same terms. Resigned or retired members may continue to handle unfinished matters as per Governor's determination. Legislative amendments are cited from 1992 to 2008.
Chair and Vice-chair 6 (1) The Governor in Council shall designate one of the full-time members to be the Chair of the Board and another full-time member to be the Vicechair. - (2) The Chair has the general supervision and direction over t...
AI summary The Governor in Council designates the Chair and Vice-chair of the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (NSUARB). The Chair oversees the Board's affairs, while the Vice-chair assumes the Chair's duties in their absence. This is governed by the Utility and Review Board Act, 1992, c. 11, s. 6.
creation of the new Energy Efficiency Corporation, our environment will also benefit, for - sure. Reducing the use of fossil fuels results in cleaner air for Nova Scotians. This brings us closer to - meeting our goals to have one of the cl...
AI summary Bill No. 49 proposes creating an independent Energy Efficiency Corporation to manage DSM funds, praised for reducing fossil fuel use but criticized for insufficient independence and governance oversight. The speaker supports the move but emphasizes concerns about the corporation's autonomy and lack of meaningful oversight mechanisms.
[[Page 1811]](https://nslegislature.ca/fr/legislative-business/hansard-debates/assembly-61-session-1/61_1_house_09oct27.htm#I[Page 1811]) - He had indicated, if I understood him correctly, that people there could apply for either other - p...
AI summary The text highlights uncertainty among Conserve Nova Scotia employees regarding their future roles post-reorganization, with unclear provisions in the bill about secondment status and union membership, leading to confusion about job definitions and potential afterthought provisions.
E-13-(i)Book of Authorities
10 passages
oceeds of sale — Al‑ berta Energy and Utilities Board Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A‑17, s. 15(3) — Public Utilities Board Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P‑45, s. 37 — Gas Utilities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. G‑5, s. 26(2). ATCO is a public utility in Alberta whi...
AI summary ATCO, an Alberta natural gas utility, applied to sell unused Calgary assets under the Gas Utilities Act, arguing the sale would not harm customers. Proceeds would retire asset book value, cover costs, and distribute profits to shareholders. The City of Calgary opposed shareholder distribution, prioritizing ratepayer interests. The Alberta Energy and Utilities Board and Public Utilities Board Act are cited in the proceeding.
Cases Cited By Bastarache J. Referred to: Re ATCO Gas-North , Alta. E.U.B., Decision 2001-65, July 31, 2001; TransAlta Utilities Corp. v. Public Utilities Board (Alta.) (1986), 68 A.R. 171; Re TransAlta Utilities Corp. , Alta. E.U.B., Deci...
AI summary The text discusses a regulatory proceeding involving ATCO's argument that allocating profits to customers is confiscatory. The court rejects this, noting that regulated utilities have rates set by regulators, not the market. The decision is prospective, not retroactive, and the Commission's authority to manage rates and monitor services is affirmed. The distinction between amortized and non-amortized assets is deemed less critical than ATCO claims.
Doctrine citée - Anisman, Philip, and Robert F. Reid. Administrative Law Issues and Practice . Scarborough, Ont. : Carswell, 1995. - Black, Alexander J. « Responsible Regulation : Incentive Rates for Natural Gas Pipelines » (1992), 28 Tuls...
AI summary The document lists legal references and academic works on administrative law, energy regulation, and utility management. Citations include books, articles, and legal commentaries by authors such as Anisman, Black, and Brown, focusing on regulatory frameworks, judicial review, and economic principles of regulation.
2.3.3.1 Historical Background and Broader Con‑ text The history of public utilities regulation in Alberta originated with the creation in 1915 of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners by The Public Utilities Act , S.A. 1915, c. 6. This...
AI summary Historical regulation of public utilities in Alberta began with the 1915 Public Utilities Act, influenced by American models. The text discusses legal cases and the City's claims regarding utility ownership and profit distribution, which are rebutted as conflicting with applicable law.
rer le pouvoir d'attribuer la totalité du profit tiré de la vente de biens. En fait, il n'est pas nécessaire à l'accomplissement de son mandat qu'elle puisse ordonner à l'entreprise de services 76 75 carrying out its mandate to order the u...
AI summary The Public Utilities Board (PUB) cannot require a utility to surrender all profits from asset sales but may impose conditions like reinvestment for system maintenance. Alternatives include refusing approval if a sale harms service quality or increases future costs. The PUB retains authority to attach conditions, such as asset replacement undertakings.
en dans le cadre d'une procédure ultérieure. Elle a donc conclu à l'absence de préjudice et décidé que la vente pouvait avoir lieu. [Soulignements et italiques ajoutés.] (Décision 2002-037, par. 13) ATCO fait abstraction de ce qui figure e...
AI summary The Commission approved the sale, allocating one-third of the net gain to ATCO and two-thirds to ratepayers. The Board emphasized balancing shareholder and ratepayer interests under the 'regulatory compact,' ensuring incentives for efficiency and preventing speculative behavior. ATCO argued the Commission was functus officio post-first hearing stage, but the Board had agreed to a two-phase process.
l'exigence générale que le profit soit attribué aux seuls actionnaires, mais seulement une interdiction générale de le répartir lorsque le coût du terrain n'a jamais été inclus dans la base tarifaire. (P. S. Cross, « Rate Treatment of Gain...
AI summary The text discusses the allocation of profits from land sales in utility companies, emphasizing that profits should be reinvested in the enterprise rather than distributed to shareholders or customers. It references legal cases like Re Arizona Public Service Co. and Re Southern California Water Co. , highlighting the principle of 'permanence of the enterprise' and the lack of automatic shareholder rights to such profits.
1. The Confiscation Issue In its factum, ATCO says that "[t]he property belonged to the owner of the utility and the Board's proposed distribution cannot be characterized otherwise than as being confiscatory" (respondent's factum, at para....
AI summary ATCO argues that the Board's distribution proposal is confiscatory, but the distinction between regulated utilities and unregulated investments is key. The text references Re Southern California Gas Co. to highlight how regulated utilities insulate investors from market risks. The Commission's decision to address disparities in profit allocation is deemed reasonable, balancing public interest and investor returns.
1. La question de l'effet confiscatoire Dans son mémoire, ATCO affirme que [TRADUCTION] « [l]es biens appartenaient au propriétaire du service public et que la répartition projetée par la Commission ne peut avoir qu'un effet confiscatoire...
AI summary ATCO Gas - South argues that a proposed rate allocation by the Commission would have a confiscatory effect. The Commission counters that regulated utilities have a set rate of return determined by regulators, not the market, citing the Re Southern California Gas Co. case (C.P.U.C. 1990). The argument highlights differences between private and regulated investments, emphasizing that regulated utilities recover costs through tariffs, not market risks.
Services de gaz désignés - 26(1) Le lieutenant-gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement, désigner les propriétaires de services de gaz assujettis au présent article et à l'article 27. - (2) Le propriétaire d'un service de gaz désigné en a...
AI summary Section 26 regulates designated gas utilities in Nova Scotia, requiring Commission approval for actions like issuing securities, capitalizing rights, or merging. Unauthorized transactions are void unless part of normal business operations. The lieutenant-governor in council designates these utilities under subsection (1).