Topic/Matter Intersection

Topic:"Demand Side Management" in M13007

Matter: Nova Scotia Independent Energy System Operator (IESO Nova Scotia) - Fee Recovery Mechanism Application
17 passages 7 documents

Demand Side Management across all matters →

N-1Fee Recovery Mechanism Application 3 passages
1 Figure 5: Flow of ISO Costs and Recovery Options p. pp. 19-20
1 Figure 5: Flow of ISO Costs and Recovery Options 3 Source: FTI Analysis. 4 Notes: DSM = Demand Side Management. 5 2 6 FTI ultimately recommended Option 2a: a direct custom charge to market participants. 7

AI summary Figure 5 illustrates the flow of ISO costs and recovery options, with FTI recommending Option 2a, which involves a direct custom charge to market participants. The figure is sourced from FTI Analysis and includes a note that DSM stands for Demand Side Management.

4.1.1. A Note on Option 2b p. p. 22
4.1.1. A Note on Option 2b - While Option 2b Consolidated charge to NSPI, based on the E1 DSM model and NSPI's DSM - Rider, is ranked nearly on par with the proposed Option 2a (as noted in Figure 9 and FTI's report), - the E1 model of a co...

AI summary Option 2b, which involves a consolidated DSM charge to NSPI under the Public Utilities Act, is nearly as favorable as Option 2a but lacks ISO jurisdictional support and faced opposition from stakeholders, including NSPI, during stakeholder engagement.

1 For this fee recovery mechanism application, an illustrative example of both true-up methodology p. pp. 29-32
1 For this fee recovery mechanism application, an illustrative example of both true-up methodology 2 options is provided in Appendix 3 - Fee Calculation Model. The compliance filing option 3 under-spend of $313,84114 incorporates IESO Nova...

AI summary The document outlines a fee recovery mechanism application that includes a true-up methodology and load allocation adjustment. It describes how revenue requirement true-ups and load allocation adjustments would be calculated and applied annually based on forecast and actual load served data. The process involves adjustments by the DVM and requires LSEs to submit actual load data to IESO Nova Scotia.

N-1-(i)Appendix 1 - ISO Enduring Fee Cost Recovery Jurisdictional Scan 1 passage
Types of Charges - Charges that also recover non-Core Costs are marked ( ) p. p. 20
Types of Charges - Charges that also recover non-Core Costs are marked ( ) Load Generation Intertie traders Transmission owner consumption (MWh); and a tiered, MW-based proportion of substation costs. Other Transmission Service Charges : a...

AI summary The document outlines various types of charges related to transmission services, including those that recover non-Core Costs. These include Demand Opportunity Service (DOS), Export Opportunity Service (XOS), Export Opportunity Merchant Service (XOM), Energy Market Trading Charge, and Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS), among others. Each charge is associated with specific cost recovery mechanisms and customer classes.

N-1-(ii)Appendix 2 - ISO Enduring Fee Cost Recovery Recommendation 7 passages
Steps 3 and 4 considerations for Nova Scotia p. pp. 12-14
Steps 3 and 4 considerations for Nova Scotia The primary decision for steps 3 and 4 is to determine the process behind fee setting. The Jurisdictional Scan has demonstrated two main processes that can be considered to recover these insepar...

AI summary The document outlines two main processes for recovering inseparable costs from transmission system users in Nova Scotia: incorporating recovery into the OATT or levying a Direct Charge to Market Participants. It also discusses integrated and standalone charge options, referencing the Demand Side Management model and the need for further decisions on billing determinants and relevant MPs.

1.a. New schedule in OATT p. pp. 14-15
1.a. New schedule in OATT MPs: A charge levied via the OATT would most likely charge the same MPs as the current Nova Scotia Power System Operator ("NSPSO") [21](#page-14-1) OATT, which are domestic (network 21 NSPSO is a department within...

AI summary The document discusses the introduction of a new schedule in the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), outlining potential changes in how Market Participants (MPs) are charged, including the possibility of volumetric, peak, or fixed charges. It also describes a true-up mechanism for adjusting future rates based on forecast and actual revenue differences, drawing from practices used by other ISOs and NSP's DSM rider.

2.b. Consolidated Direct Charge p. pp. 18-19
2.b. Consolidated Direct Charge MPs: A charge outside of the OATT that follows the existing framework established by EfficiencyOne [33](#page-19-1) would instead have a simpler billing structure than Option 2.a. The entire IESO revenue req...

AI summary The consolidated direct charge involves billing the entire IESO revenue requirement to NSP, who then allocates these costs to MPs. This approach simplifies billing compared to other options, but requires decisions on allocation among MPs. True-up adjustments would be based on budget variations. EfficiencyOne's costs are recovered through charges billed to NSP, and RtR suppliers will also be charged DSM fees.

Allocation adjustment design p. pp. 24-25
Allocation adjustment design The allocation adjustment will resolve any over/under-forecast of MP load share. This provides a similar allocation to a usage-based charge, but without the risk of the IESO over/under-recovering due to unexpec...

AI summary The allocation adjustment design aims to correct over or under-forecasting of MP load share. It adjusts charges based on actual energy consumption relative to forecasts, ensuring fair distribution without the risk of over or under-recovery by the IESO.

Allocation adjustment: Difference of forecast and actual MP load share p. p. 25
Allocation adjustment: Difference of forecast and actual MP load share In Year 3, Year 2 load per MP is known, hence the difference between the forecast load share in Year 2 and actual load share for each MP can be determined. Source: FTI...

AI summary The document discusses an allocation adjustment mechanism in Year 3, based on the difference between forecast and actual load share for Market Participants (MPs). It outlines how revenue instability caused by MPs exiting or entering during the year can be addressed through adjustments to monthly fixed charges or collateral requirements. The adjustments ensure that charges are reconciled among MPs, with the total sum of adjustments equaling zero.

Flexibility for future changes p. p. 32
Flexibility for future changes The flexibility for future changes criterion illustrates how the recovery mechanism is adaptable to changes such as i) an increase in transmission service competition; ii) an increasing IESO role (future ener...

AI summary The flexibility for future changes criterion highlights the adaptability of the recovery mechanism to potential changes, such as increased transmission service competition, evolving IESO roles, and shifts in the market participant landscape, including greater Renewable-to-Retail participation and special power purchase agreements.

Economic principles p. pp. 33-34
Economic principles The economic principles criterion assesses i) the extent to which the recovery mechanism applies cost causation effectively, and ii) whether it encompasses non-distortionary economic principles, such as the introduction...

AI summary The economic principles criterion evaluates the recovery mechanism's ability to apply cost causation effectively and incorporate non-distortionary principles. The assessment is positive ('green') for all options due to the relatively small IESO fee compared to other electricity system charges. NSP uses SAE models to forecast load and develop energy forecasts for the province.

N-4IESO (IG) RIR 1 to 11 1 passage
Option 1: Energy Allocator p. p. 28
Option 1: Energy Allocator Options Summ ary ¢/kWh To l B i l l ta $ $ 2 1 2 0. 4 7, 7 2 4 9 2. 0 1 7, 1. 4 % Be low he L ine t 1 0. 1 8 4 0. 0 9 0. 0 0 1 0. 1 2 2 0. 0 1 2 0. 1 8 9 La In du tr ia l rg e s To ta l ( Av ) era g e 9 0. 1 8 9...

AI summary The document presents a detailed breakdown of energy charges and billing calculations under the Domestic Service Tariff (Standard Offer) for 2026 and 2027. It includes customer charges, base fuel costs, non-fuel costs, and various adjustment mechanisms like DSM PCR and FAM BA. The data shows a slight decrease in base fuel costs and an increase in non-fuel costs.

N-9IESO (IG) RIR 1 Attachments 1 - REFILED 2 passages
- Does not consider cost causality
- Does not consider cost causality Residential Customer Charge $ 21.04 $ 21.04 Energy Charges $ 176.04 $ 176.04 $ 1.2% Energy Charges $ 176.04 $ 176.04 $ 1.2% Energy Charges $ 176.04 $ 1.2% Energy Charges $ 176.04 $ 1.2% Energy Charges $ 2...

AI summary The text presents a detailed table of various charges, including residential customer charges, energy charges, and demand charges, with percentages and monetary values. It includes references to the IESO and illustrates total bills for different customer categories, but it does not consider cost causality.

Option 5: SLF for Gen , Demand for Tx
Option 5: SLF for Gen , Demand for Tx Options Summary ¢/kWh DSM PCR ¢/kWh 0.657 0.657 0.000 0.0% 887 kWh 5.83 5.83 5.83 DSM BA ¢/kWh -0.024 -0.024 0.000 0.0% kWh - 0.21 - 0.21 - 0.21 Subtotal 0.633 0.633 0.000 0.0% 5.62 5.62 5.62 SCRR ¢/kW...

AI summary The document outlines a detailed cost breakdown for Option 5, including DSM PCR, SCRR, IESO RR, and fuel and non-fuel related costs, with percentages and kilowatt-hour values. It also includes customer charges and energy charges for the Small General Tariff (Standard Offer).

N-11-(i)CV - John D. Wilson 2 passages
REPORTS
t Practices for All-Source Electric Generation Procurement," with Mike O'Boyle, Ron Lehr, and Mark Detsky, Energy Innovation Policy & Technology LLC and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, April 2020. - "Municipal Coal in Ohio: Implication...

AI summary The text lists various reports and studies related to energy policy, procurement practices, and regulatory matters across different regions and organizations, including Nova Scotia Power, PG&E, and others.

EXPERT TESTIMONY
Alliance for Clean Energy, and Southern Environmental Law Center. Adequacy of consideration of energy efficiency in Duke Energy Carolinas and Progress Energy Carolinas' 2009 integrated resource plans. Georgia PSC Docket No. 31081, direct t...

AI summary The text outlines expert testimony and regulatory proceedings related to the adequacy of energy efficiency considerations in integrated resource plans and demand-side management plans by utility companies in Georgia and South Carolina. It discusses topics such as cost effectiveness, rate impacts, stakeholder engagement, and alternative resource options.

103397SBA (IESO Nova Scotia) IR 1 to 12 1 passage
Request IR-6:
Request IR-6: - Refer to M13007, Exhibit N-1, Application, Section 4.2 The Proposed Fee Recovery Mechanism, - which includes Figures 10 and Figure 12, illustrating the timeline for Revenue Requirement True- - Up Option 1 and Option 2, on p...

AI summary The text outlines several regulatory inquiries regarding the proposed fee recovery mechanism, load allocation adjustments, and ISO core costs. It asks about the impact of missed deadlines, verification methods, penalties for non-compliance, and the classification of interconnection study costs under core costs.

Disclaimer: These summaries were generated by AI from the filings they describe. We take care to make them accurate, but errors are possible - and they aren't advice. Only the filings themselves are the record: if you're relying on something here, confirm it against the source documents or the Nova Scotia Energy Board's own record. Full disclaimer →